TY  - JOUR
AU  - Westphal, Kenneth R.
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=507
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1535
AB  - Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism;
both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting
through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we
think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless
in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world
and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on
general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various
fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the
world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns
identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of
human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive
justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such
analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive
strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein
and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections
required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and
why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.
AB  - Kant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. ‘Transcendentalni karakter’ ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološke refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations
T1  - Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje
IS  - 1
VL  - 28
SP  - 113
EP  - 135
DO  - 10.2298/FID1701113W
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Westphal, Kenneth R.",
year = "2017",
abstract = "Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism;
both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting
through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we
think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless
in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world
and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on
general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various
fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the
world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns
identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of
human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive
justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such
analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive
strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein
and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections
required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and
why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating., Kant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. ‘Transcendentalni karakter’ ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološke refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations, Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje",
number = "1",
volume = "28",
pages = "113-135",
doi = "10.2298/FID1701113W"
}

Westphal, K. R.. (2017). Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 28(1), 113-135.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1701113W

Westphal KR. Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;28(1):113-135.
doi:10.2298/FID1701113W .

Westphal, Kenneth R., "Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 28, no. 1 (2017):113-135,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1701113W . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Westphal, Kenneth R.
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1384
AB  - ‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation ‘human rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit (1997) has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant’s Critical methodology and explicating the social character of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right to justification (Forst 2007) – both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational
justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning.
AB  - ‘Hegel’ i ‘ljudska prava’ retko su povezivani i oznaka ‘ljudska prava’ retko se javlja u njegovim delima. Zaista, Hegel je kritikovan zbog izostavljanja ujedno građanskih i političkih prava. Moja pretpostavka jeste da su čitaoci tražili moderni Dekalog i da su zanemarili kako Hegel pravda svoje stavove, i stoga samo koje stavove opravdava. Filip Petit (1997) je preusmerio pažnju na republikansku slobodu. Hegel i ja se slažemo sa Petitom da je republikanska sloboda krajnje važna vrednost, ali apelovati na njenu vrednost, ili opravdavati je apelom na reflektivni ekvilibrijum, nedovoljni su i u teoriji i u praksi. Rekonstruišući Kantovu kritičku metodologiju i objašnjavajući društveni karakter racionalog opravdanja u ne-formalnim domenima, Hegel pokazuje da je republikansko pravo na ne-dominaciju konstitutivno za podjedanko republikansko pravo na opravdanje (Frost 2007) – gde su oba nužni uslovi za dovoljno racionalno opravdanje u svim ne-formalnim domenima, uključujući zahteve za prava ili imputacije dužnosti ili obaveza. To je neposredna moralna, politička i pravna implikacija Hegelove analize uzajamnog priznanja, i njegova temeljna, konstitutivna uloga u racionalnom opravdanju. Specifične posledice fundamentalnog republikanskog prava na ne-dominaciju moraju biti određene sagledavajući koji oblici nedozvoljene dominacije su mogući ili verovatni unutar bilo kog specifičnog društva, u pogledu njegovih društvenih, političkih i ekonomskih struktura i funkcionisanja
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right to Non-Domination
T1  - Hegelovo opravdanje ljudskog prava na ne-dominaciju
IS  - 28
IS  - 3
SP  - 579
EP  - 612
DO  - 10.2298/FID1703579W
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Westphal, Kenneth R.",
year = "2017",
abstract = "‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation ‘human rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit (1997) has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant’s Critical methodology and explicating the social character of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right to justification (Forst 2007) – both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational
justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning., ‘Hegel’ i ‘ljudska prava’ retko su povezivani i oznaka ‘ljudska prava’ retko se javlja u njegovim delima. Zaista, Hegel je kritikovan zbog izostavljanja ujedno građanskih i političkih prava. Moja pretpostavka jeste da su čitaoci tražili moderni Dekalog i da su zanemarili kako Hegel pravda svoje stavove, i stoga samo koje stavove opravdava. Filip Petit (1997) je preusmerio pažnju na republikansku slobodu. Hegel i ja se slažemo sa Petitom da je republikanska sloboda krajnje važna vrednost, ali apelovati na njenu vrednost, ili opravdavati je apelom na reflektivni ekvilibrijum, nedovoljni su i u teoriji i u praksi. Rekonstruišući Kantovu kritičku metodologiju i objašnjavajući društveni karakter racionalog opravdanja u ne-formalnim domenima, Hegel pokazuje da je republikansko pravo na ne-dominaciju konstitutivno za podjedanko republikansko pravo na opravdanje (Frost 2007) – gde su oba nužni uslovi za dovoljno racionalno opravdanje u svim ne-formalnim domenima, uključujući zahteve za prava ili imputacije dužnosti ili obaveza. To je neposredna moralna, politička i pravna implikacija Hegelove analize uzajamnog priznanja, i njegova temeljna, konstitutivna uloga u racionalnom opravdanju. Specifične posledice fundamentalnog republikanskog prava na ne-dominaciju moraju biti određene sagledavajući koji oblici nedozvoljene dominacije su mogući ili verovatni unutar bilo kog specifičnog društva, u pogledu njegovih društvenih, političkih i ekonomskih struktura i funkcionisanja",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right to Non-Domination, Hegelovo opravdanje ljudskog prava na ne-dominaciju",
number = "28, 3",
pages = "579-612",
doi = "10.2298/FID1703579W"
}

Westphal, K. R.. (2017). Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right to Non-Domination. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society(28), 579-612.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1703579W

Westphal KR. Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right to Non-Domination. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;(28):579-612.
doi:10.2298/FID1703579W .

Westphal, Kenneth R., "Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right to Non-Domination" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, no. 28 (2017):579-612,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1703579W . .