Приказ основних података о документу
What is Wrong with Anti-Paternalism?
Šta je pogrešno u antipaternalizmu?
dc.creator | Sládeček, Michal | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-04-10T11:45:23Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-04-10T11:45:23Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-5738 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3807 | |
dc.description.abstract | The article scrutinizes anti-paternalistic arguments concerning the best judgements, the autonomy and the moral status of persons. The first two have been criticized by Quong as inadequate, and the article attempts to point out the shortcomings of this critique. The best judgement argument can be reformulated, having in mind particular situations in which person’s own judgement should be considered as decisive. The autonomy argument cannot be disregarded as too permissive regarding paternalism as it allows paternalistic interventions, which are weak and confined only to a strictly limited scope. Also, when considered as the condition for the validity of choice, autonomy cannot be treated as an ultimate value. Finally, the moral status argument proposed by Quong is plausible to some extent, when claiming that it is presumptively wrong to treat persons as not having equal moral powers. However, this argument does not cover the legitimate institutional policies in specific cases when it can be reasonably presumed that people will omit to act in favour of their well-being. Also, this argument would prohibit any interventions in order to increase availability of goods, even if the moral status of the persons is not affected. | sr |
dc.description.abstract | U članku se ispituju anipaternalistički argumenti koji se odnose na najbolji sud, autonomiju i moralni status osobe. Prva dva argumenta je Kvong (Quong) kritikovao kao neadekvatne i ovaj članak nastoji da ukaže na nedostatke ove Kvongove kritike. Argument najboljeg suda može se preformulisati tako što se uzima u obzir posebna situacija u kojoj bi vlastiti sud osobe trebalo da se smatra za odlučujući. Razlog za odbacivanje argumenta autonomije ne može da bude to što isuviše dozvoljava paternalizam, pošto paternalizam koji ovaj argument dopušta jeste blag i ograničen na striktno određeno područje. Takođe, ukoliko se razmatra kao uslov valjanosti izbora, autonomija se ne tretira kao najviša vrednost. Konačno, argument moralnog statusa koji uvodi Kvong jeste primeren do određene granice kada se njime tvrdi da je prema osnovnoj pretpostavci pogrešno da se osobe tretiraju kao da ne poseduju moralne moći. Ipak, ovaj argument ne obuhvata legitimne institucionalne politike u specifičnim slučajevima u kojima se može opravdano pretpostaviti da će osobe propustiti da delaju u korist svoje dobrobiti. Takođe, ovaj argument zabranjuje svaku intervenciju koja bi povećala dostupnost dobara, čak i kada ova intervencija ne utiče na moralni status osoba. | sr |
dc.language.iso | en | sr |
dc.publisher | Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju | sr |
dc.relation | "info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/inst-2020/200025/RS//" | sr |
dc.rights | openAccess | sr |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society | sr |
dc.subject | autonomy | sr |
dc.subject | availability of goods | sr |
dc.subject | paternalism | sr |
dc.subject | anti-paternalism | sr |
dc.subject | Quong | sr |
dc.title | What is Wrong with Anti-Paternalism? | sr |
dc.title | Šta je pogrešno u antipaternalizmu? | sr |
dc.type | article | sr |
dc.rights.license | BY | sr |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.volume | 35 | |
dc.citation.spage | 149 | |
dc.citation.epage | 164 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/FID2401149S | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | sr |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/13844/bitstream_13844.pdf |