Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003.

Abstract

Članak daje pregled aktivnosti sprskog premijera dr Zorana Đinđića u periodu 2001–2003. godine u domenu bezbednosti i odbrane Repu-blike Srbije. Istaknuta je problematična struktura unutar sistema unutrašnjih poslova i državne bezbednosti nasleđena od režima Slo-bodana Miloševića do oktobra 2000. godine, kontinuitet u pojavi bezbedonosnih problema i afera, kao i rascep unutar vladajuće koali-cije Demokratske opozicije Srbije – DOS. Reforme sprovedene u ovom sektoru nisu uspele i sve se završilo atentatom na premijera 12. marta 2003. godine. Rad je napisan na osnovu novinske dokumenta-cije i objavljenih sećanja aktera političkog života i visokih rukovodila-ca Službe bezbednosti.

Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Prime Minister, demonstrated a consistent oppositional stance from his student days, nurturing a distinct skepticism towards the security ser-vices. This skepticism likely intensified following the democratic shifts post-October 5, 2000. Despite this, Djindjic seemingly underestimated the complexities of manag-ing these services within the coalition government. His initial focus was diverted away from the security sector, partly because the Army, a federal and relatively politically inert entity, did not immediately demand his attention during the initial power transi-tion. Throughout Djindjic’s tenure, a pattern of scandals and crises emerged, originat-ing from the security services or their associated political and criminal networks. These incidents occurred at regular intervals, highlighting a systemic issue. Djindjic, primarily occupied with positive reformative objectives, failed to recognize the severity of this intertwining of crime, police, and state security in Serbia. A significant oversight was the underestimation of the Ministry of Interior’s criminalization and the State Security Department’s covert influence and capability to destabilize the new regime.In 2002, a pivotal reorganization took place, transforming the State Security Department into the Security Information Agency. Concurrently, political negotiations with Montene-gro on federal restructuring suggested an imminent expansion of the DOS and Djind-jic’s control over defense by March 2003. However, the tragic assassination of Djindjic marked an abrupt end to his term, casting a shadow on the effectiveness of the secu-rity sector’s reform. This tragic outcome underscores the deep-rooted challenges and the ultimate failure of the reform efforts within this critical sector.