Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking
Чланак у часопису (Објављена верзија)
Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
There are two widely-held intuitions about morality. One is the claim that all
persons have equal moral worth; the other is that sometimes we are morally allowed or
even required to give preference to those individuals whom we love. How can we justify
our reasons of love in the face of moral egalitarianism? As of recently, there are three
mutually competing accounts of why it could be said that we have reasons of love: (i)
the projects view, (ii) the relationship view, and (iii) the individuals view. In this paper,
I first examine these three views and find fault with each of them as they stand. I then
proceed to propose a complex, yet a more compelling, account of reasons of love that
builds on the individuals view
Кључне речи:
reasons of love / moral equality / moral thinking / partiality / impartialityИзвор:
Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak, 2019, 32Издавач:
- Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
Колекције
Институција/група
IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Konjović, Marko PY - 2019 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2309 AB - There are two widely-held intuitions about morality. One is the claim that all persons have equal moral worth; the other is that sometimes we are morally allowed or even required to give preference to those individuals whom we love. How can we justify our reasons of love in the face of moral egalitarianism? As of recently, there are three mutually competing accounts of why it could be said that we have reasons of love: (i) the projects view, (ii) the relationship view, and (iii) the individuals view. In this paper, I first examine these three views and find fault with each of them as they stand. I then proceed to propose a complex, yet a more compelling, account of reasons of love that builds on the individuals view PB - Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade T2 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak T1 - Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking VL - 32 DO - 10.5937/BPA1932115K ER -
@article{ author = "Konjović, Marko", year = "2019", abstract = "There are two widely-held intuitions about morality. One is the claim that all persons have equal moral worth; the other is that sometimes we are morally allowed or even required to give preference to those individuals whom we love. How can we justify our reasons of love in the face of moral egalitarianism? As of recently, there are three mutually competing accounts of why it could be said that we have reasons of love: (i) the projects view, (ii) the relationship view, and (iii) the individuals view. In this paper, I first examine these three views and find fault with each of them as they stand. I then proceed to propose a complex, yet a more compelling, account of reasons of love that builds on the individuals view", publisher = "Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade", journal = "Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak", title = "Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking", volume = "32", doi = "10.5937/BPA1932115K" }
Konjović, M.. (2019). Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade., 32. https://doi.org/10.5937/BPA1932115K
Konjović M. Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak. 2019;32. doi:10.5937/BPA1932115K .
Konjović, Marko, "Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking" in Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak, 32 (2019), https://doi.org/10.5937/BPA1932115K . .