

## Chapter 5

# The Yugoslav Succession Wars and the War for Symbolic Hegemony

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This explorative study analyses how the frames of interpreting reality, together with the attendant discourses, were used in the US, British and Serbian press: (a) before Serbia's conflict with the West, that is up to 25 June 1991; (b) during the conflict, from 25 June 1991 until 5 October 2000; and (c) after 5 October 2000.

In many articles, we targeted the ultimate cases close to the ideal type of particular frames and discourses through whose application symbolic hegemony in the global or Serbian public was achieved. Compilation of the sample was facilitated by the fact that in the mid-1990s one of the authors of the study had analysed the content of more than 10,000 newspaper articles from the period 1990–1993 in the US, British, Austrian, German, Italian and Russian press (Bakić 1997, 1998, 1999). The notions of *intertextuality*, proposed by Lene Hansen (Hansen 2006, 55) following Julia Kristeva, and *interpersonality* guide the methodology of the research. *Intertextuality* concerns the frequency with which a text or idea is quoted in texts by others, and *interpersonality* the approving references to names of other authors for the purpose of reinforcing the persuasiveness of one's own assertions.

The influence of an author is also established through testimonies by powerful individuals. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, thus, expressly mentions the liberal Anthony Lewis and the conservative William Safire, columnists of the *New York Times*, as individuals who exerted strong pressure on the administrations of George Bush Sr and Bill Clinton, as well as NATO, to punish Bosnian and/or Serbian Serbs.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, newspaper articles by intellectuals who have published books with big print runs and with more than one edition in less than 10 years were also analysed. For instance, the Oxford (All Souls College) intellectual

star, the conservative polyglot Noel Malcolm, replaced Robert Kaplan as Clinton's favourite Balkan expert.<sup>2</sup> He also published texts in various newspapers, and it is therefore interesting to observe his contribution to familiarizing the Anglo-American reader with the topic of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

In the analysis, authors publishing in the world's leading print media who imposed symbolic hegemony emerged most prominently. Chosen for discourse analysis were the mouthpiece of the US political elite, the *New York Times*, and Thomas L. Friedman<sup>3</sup> and the two above-mentioned columnists. The British left-liberal paper *The Guardian*,<sup>4</sup> the reporter Ed Vulliamy and the columnist Martin Woollacott were also chosen, because the most pronounced campaign of demonizing the Serbs, be it those in Bosnia-Herzegovina or those in Serbia, occurred in the Anglo-American liberal papers, especially with the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Humanitarian-activist arguments were used to criticize the conservative governments of Major and Bush Sr and influence the liberal governments of Blair and Clinton.

In addition to editorials and columns by the above-mentioned authors, we also analysed news agency reports from the beginning of the non-armed conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia. At that time, the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was not the focus of journalistic attention and there are no editorials or commentaries, because brief agency news reduced a complex reality to clear and unequivocal frames and identities: good democrats vs evil communists; the rich West vs the poor East; the Catholic Europe vs the Orthodox (Muslim) Orient. Generally speaking, the communist pedigree of Slobodan Milošević, elected to power by the Orthodox Serbs in their common aspiration to rule over their Catholic or multi-ethnic neighbours, was the ideological shortcut for understanding the disappearance of the SFRY and the Yugoslav succession wars.

With regard to the leading Serbian daily *Politika*, the nationalist discourse of those Serbian intellectuals who sought to impose symbolic hegemony at the level of relations between the Serbs and the West was analysed. We also analysed the discourse of *Greater Serbia*, the paper of the anti-Western, far-right Serbian Radical Party.

Ideologies are long-lasting structures (F. Braudel) which facilitate orientation in a chaotic social reality. More important than their

cognitive/orientational dimension is, however, the fact that ideologies have a social meaning and importance:

Ideologies are the basic frameworks for organizing the social cognition shared by members of social groups, organizations or institutions. In this respect, ideologies are both cognitive and social. They essentially function as the interface between the cognitive representations and processes underlying discourse and action, on the one hand, and the societal position and interests of social groups, on the other hand. (Van Dijk 1995a, 18–19)

They help shape the identities of social groups by creating the rival *Other*, the perpetrator, the criminal, the bearer of dangerous tendencies, the personification of *Evil*. By contrast, *We* are always on the side of *Good*, whereby we actually justify our wish to preserve or seize power. Inasmuch, discourse analysis is a tool of ideology analysis (Van Dijk 1995a, 22; Wodak 2006b, 14).

It is little wonder then that the few politicians in the former Yugoslavia who remained loyal to the leftist ideology after the fall of the Berlin Wall provoked the wrath of the Western fight against communism. Using the discourse strategy of *triumphalization*, the winners explain the defeat of socialism as a necessary consequence of inferiority. In cognitive and social terms, leftists are portrayed as odd and disrupting remnants of the defeated *Evil*. Ideological thinking describes, interprets and evaluates the new reality using obsolete categories (Manhajm 1968). The socialist faithful in the SFRY ‘waged war’ against capitalism and the imperialist powers out of ideological inertia, sensing a conspiracy against the socialist government in their actions. Thus the *Cold War* discourse<sup>5</sup> lived in Serbia despite the fact that the SFRY had not belonged to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. It resisted the enemy’s triumphalism with the discourse strategy of *relativization*, noting for example that global socialism had not been defeated, since it still survived in Asia. The Cold War *frame* of representing reality<sup>6</sup> along the lines of *good democrats vs evil communists* contains a *Cold War* discourse of sorts that was used by conservatives and liberals. This frame, however, was not the only one used to interpret the conflicts in the SFRY. It was often grafted onto the older frame of *clash of civilizations*,<sup>7</sup> which clearly demarcates the Protestant/ Catholic, capitalist and democratic West from the Orthodox/Muslim, socialist and authoritarian East. This pattern of mapping the geopolitical reality is mostly applied by the conservatives.

The latter frame includes an *Orientalist* (Said 1979), *Balkanist* (Todorova 1997) or *Occidentalist* discourse with the attendant stereotypes regarding Easterners, Balkan people and Westerners. Orientalism above all applies to the Asian East and non-Christians, and Balkanism to the Orthodox in the Balkans. The domination of one or the other depends on whether Russia or an Islamic country, that is Islam *per se*, is considered to be the main enemy. Roughly speaking, if Russia is the enemy, the Orthodox in the Balkans are then ‘Russian agents’, and if the main enemy is a Muslim country or organization, then the Balkan Muslims are the suspicious party.

People in the Balkans also use the above-mentioned discourses: the *Orientalist* discourse when a neighbouring nation should be portrayed as Eastern and inferior to *us* ‘Europeans’, and the *Balkanist* discourse when we compare ourselves self-disparagingly to big Western societies and cultures. This is an instance of ‘identification with the aggressor’, where the definitions of reality of the powerful are accepted as one’s own. Both discourses are used in discussions about the wars of the 1990s and their causes; reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia; and the causes of a future dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They justify the argument of ‘perennial hatred’ among South Slavs and the resulting impossibility of their living together in the same state.

The *Occidentalist* discourse of opposing the *West* is also applied in the Balkans. Although opposed to *Orientalism* and *Balkanism*, it emerged in the same framework. The *clash of civilizations* is considered to be the driving force of history. However, the superiority of the ‘rotten’ and ‘morally depraved West’, ‘mired in consumer mentality and crime’ is not acknowledged. This discourse is used by the radical right and the radical left; the former negates the values of the West, in particular of the USA, and wants to turn to Russia, China, India or Islamic countries, while the latter negates the values of capitalism and parliamentary democracy and wants to see the return of socialist values and norms.

Finally, when we look at a conflict, either directly or through the media, we tend to judge the rival’s strength and sense of justice through the frame *aggressor vs victim*. Social democrats and left-wing liberals are particularly prone to this.<sup>8</sup> Guided by the principles of humanity and human rights, they look for the weaker and more just in order to support them. A distinguishing feature of this frame is a *humanitarian-activist* discourse that

euphemistically advocates ‘humanitarian intervention’, that is war (Pawlowska 2005, 487).

If the previous three discourses are of an ideological nature, although not exclusively, the latter may be of an ideological, but also of a Utopian, nature. Its nature is ideological, especially when it is combined with the previous discourses, because this confirms that what we have is only strengthening the *a priori* arguments with the aim of winning the widest possible public support. All possible arguments are used, regardless of the logical incongruity of their eclectic use. The humanitarian discourse has a Utopian nature in the cases where a yet to-be-realized and distant world is imagined, a world based on the inviolability of each person’s rights and the resulting universal protection of human rights at the global, regional, national and local levels. Inasmuch, war is an exception, the ultimate means.

This discourse is also found in Serbia, most often as a pathetic and self-pitying perception of Serbian historical destiny in constant confrontation with the world’s greatest powers. Victimization, along with the monopolization of the victim status, is the most frequently used discourse strategy. It is used by nationalists of different ideological orientations, from Orthodoxy-inspired conservatives to left-wing critics of imperialism, thus its nationalist essence is evident. The leftists most frequently justify nationalism by using the humanitarian-anti-imperialist discourse, because nationalism has little room within the framework of a fundamentally internationalist orientation.

All the above-mentioned frames and discourses as often as not apply the *Manichean discourse strategy* of dividing the world into *Good* and *Evil*.<sup>9</sup> The enemy is Satan, homogeneous, depersonalized and dehumanized, while one’s own identity is unquestionable, devoted to defending the fundamental values of civilization. *Evil* needs to be destroyed.

Since they represent actual social interests, for which they serve as the means of ideological justification, different frames and discourses are sometimes rivals and at other times complementary. The public use of language always expresses the power of the holder of social power. Through it, symbolic hegemony is achieved, that is social domination of the relatively powerful over the powerless in the sphere of culture as a system of symbols. Through different discourse practices the established relations of power between different parts of the world, the great powers and different nations, as well as between elites and social strata, are justified and contested (Wodak and Busch 2004, 109). Politicians, editors and columnists *a priori*

shape a great deal of news, in particular on foreign policy, by fixing the view of the situation on the ground (Van Dijk 1985, 72).

## **The Frames of Representing SFRY Reality in the Anglo-American Press, 1 January 1990–25 June 1991**

Until the beginning of the war, texts on the former Yugoslavia were relatively rare. Although there was no media campaign vis-à-vis any of the sides at conflict in the SFRY, a position was taken. Reality was interpreted through the Cold War frame and discourse, which were constantly applied by AP, UPI and Reuters. A typical UPI report (15 January 1991) said: ‘Slovenia and Croatia advocate for Yugoslavia to be transformed into a confederation of independent states in order to avoid the domination of Serbia, the largest republic ruled by communists. All the three republics are refusing to recognize the federal authorities.’

The *discourse world* consists of quarrelling sides: the leaderships of the first two republics are not identified in ideological terms, while Serbia is ‘ruled by Communists’. ‘The largest republic’, ruled by communists, is represented as a danger to the public that for 50 years had associated the size and ideology of the USSR with a threat to the ‘free world’. The transformation of a socialist federation into a ‘confederation of independent states’ is a *euphemism* for the disappearance of a 70-year-old state. Through the statement that none of the three republics recognizes the federal authorities, Yugoslavia is portrayed as a hopeless state, while apparently an impression of balance is created.

The *Cold War discourse* of AP, UPI and Reuters influenced the global public since agency news is employed by many different newspapers around the world. The *discourse strategy of passing over in silence* was consistently applied for the purpose of simplifying the conflict: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were ignored. The Cold War frame, hegemonic after the end of the Cold War, justified secessionism.

## **The Frame of Representing the ‘West’ in *Politika*, 1 January 1990–25 June 1991**

During this period, the rival nations in the SFRY were written about more negatively than the *West*. As often as not, *Politika* journalists persuaded their readers that Milošević enjoyed a diplomatic advantage over Slovenia and Croatia in the EC and the USA. Nevertheless, some Western nations were also subject to negative representation. To the question ‘Historically speaking, whose legacy of ideas is the most present today in the Yugoslav territory’, historian Slavenko Terzić answered:<sup>10</sup>

1. The most present are ideas from the Austro-Hungarian legacy, behind which always stood the Vatican policy.
2. Austro-Hungary was preparing a campaign of conquest in the Balkans for decades.
3. Ever since the time of the First Serbian Uprising, when it was assessed that an independent Serbia may be the core for gathering the Serbs and all South Slav peoples.
4. This religious-political concept, since Austro-Hungary has not existed for a long time now, is clearly recognizable in recent statements by HDZ leaders about the ‘Croat historical space’, which, in addition to Bosnia-Herzegovina, should even include the territory of Old Raška (today’s Sandžak).
5. Such constructions are not only devoid of any basis, but objectively push the Muslims into a conflict with the Serbs, placing them in the position of executors of political concepts created long since in Vienna and the Vatican.

Within the frame of *clash of civilizations*, the *Occidentalist* and *Orientalist* discourses are interwoven. Religion serves the function of delimiting deep cultural differences transformed into political hostility. The historian apparently (1) only states which legacy of ideas is the most developed, linking it inextricably with the *Vatican policy* by using the temporal adverb ‘always’. He places in a negative context not only the long-extinct Austro-Hungary, but also the Vatican, an active participant in international politics. Through a *historical analogy*, local Catholics are entered into the service of foreign ‘campaigns of conquest’ by indicating that the HDZ is a Habsburg successor in the Balkans.

Finally, the aspirations of having Bosnia-Herzegovina join Croatia are criticized (4), because they turn ‘Muslims’ (Bosniaks) into an instrument of the Catholics. The metonymic use of Vienna (5) shifts the emphasis from the past to the present. A conservative ideological emphasis is placed on the Catholic conspiracy against Orthodox Serbs, while the Muslims are assigned the role of a passive means by using the accusative, which in Serbian denotes

an object. The implication is accomplished through the discourse strategy of *historical analogy* and adverbs signifying long periods of time: *always* (1), *for decades* (2), *ever since the time* (3), *long since* (5).

## 26 June 1991–5 October 2000

### *The Yugoslav Succession Wars 26 June 1991–21 November 1995*

With the start of the war in the SFRY, the British conservative N. Malcolm, a Thomas Hobbes expert and subsequently the author of two of the most influential books on the Balkans in the past two decades,<sup>11</sup> the chair of the London-based Bosnian Institute, a columnist of *The Daily Telegraph* and the co-publisher of *The Spectator*,<sup>12</sup> took an interest in Yugoslavia:

1. It is possible to be anti-Communist without being anti-federal, or anti-federal without being anti-Serb; but after the events of the last few days, the vast majority of Croats and Slovenes are implacably anti all three.
2. The idea that forcing these two countries back into a federal political system would actually increase the ‘stability’ of the area belongs to the realm of superstition not to rational politics.
3. The only way to recover anything resembling stability now is for the West to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as quickly as possible, and to encourage them to complete on generous terms the unfinished negotiations over their exit from Yugoslavia.
4. The European Community and the United States still have an enormous moral authority over the Slovenes and Croats who desperately wish to think of themselves as fully Western.
5. But if we continue to reject their claims to independence, we shall only weaken the Western-looking aspect of their nationalism, thereby helping to turn them into the very kind of resentful vendetta-obsessed isolationists that Western policy-makers should most fear.

Although it is generally recognized (1) that anti-communism, anti-federalism and an anti-Serb sentiment are separate in theory, this evidently does not apply in practice. The Cold War discourse supports the dissolution of the SFRY, as well as Slovenians and Croats against the communist Serbs.<sup>13</sup> Because of the lack of such support (2), *Western governments* are criticized through the dichotomy rational/ irrational (superstitious), which has been a deep-rooted *frame* in the *West* ever since the Enlightenment.



Malcolm (2, 3) focuses on *stability*, one of the most important conservative values, appealing to the *West* to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as soon as possible in order to maintain it. He looks at Slovenians and Croats with a dose of Balkanist irony (4) saying that ‘they desperately wish to think of themselves as fully Western’, which implies that they are not. A *bridge* is built between the Cold War and clash of civilizations frames (the ‘pro-Western aspect’ of nationalism); (5) as a result, two discourses – the Cold War and Balkanist ones – are interwoven. What stands in the foreground is breaking the ‘socialist federation’<sup>14</sup> by supporting those who ‘wish to think of themselves as fully Western’, with the aim of preserving ‘stability’. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, about which Malcolm wrote two quite lengthy books several years later, are not mentioned at all. The discourse strategy of passing over in silence simplifies the conflict.

Upon the introduction of sanctions against the SRY, the journalist and former professor of Serbo-Croatian at Nancy University, Komnen Bećirović, wrote:<sup>15</sup>

1. With the events in Bosnia, the Yugoslav tragedy is spreading, as well as the anti-Serb sentiment, which, following the fierce position of the US government against Serbia, has swept the entire Western world, and is now extending to the Islamic world as well.
2. One of the oldest and most famous nations of Europe – the Serb nation, whose history is identified with the struggle for freedom and human dignity – is being blamed, insulted, banished and pilloried by the international community, along with calls for its destruction!
3. And as the culmination of absurdity, a people who in the two great conflicts of the century have suffered a heavy death toll of three million in the defence of civilization against Germanic slavery and Nazi barbarism!
4. At the same time, the most faithful Yugoslav allies of that evil are being praised, encouraged and rewarded (...)
5. Unfortunately, the strong Germanic sense of revenge and the hereditary Croat, Muslim and Albanian hatred towards Serbs seem to have become the standards of Western policy in Yugoslavia.

A discourse world is created: the Serbs are opposed to the US-led West and the Islamic world. People slide into national megalomania (2), typical of numerically small nations. The discourse strategy of justifying the Serbs (2) delegitimizes the West, because what can someone be like who is, *metaphorically* speaking, ‘pillorying’ the nation-embodiment of universal

human ideals. The response to the stereotype of Serbs as barbarians is the exaggeration (3) in terms of *victimization*. Anti-German stereotypes, which are strong in the Serbian public, delegitimize the *Other* as the personification of oppressors and ‘Nazi barbarism’. The discourse strategy of a Manichean division of the world (4) *justifies us* and *demonizes them*. National identities are (5) essentialized and immutable. Fatalism shows through, because the author is aware that the *West* cannot be defeated. Nevertheless, it is declared an enemy and, through a historical analogy, portrayed as a successor to the *Germanic Evil*.

On 14 April 1992, the State Department issued, through the USIS agency, official guidelines to the ‘international community’ on the interpretation of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>16</sup> As early as the following day, an editorial appeared in the *New York Times* (*NYT*) under the *metaphorical headline* ‘Stop the Butcher of the Balkans’. The nickname that Slobodan Milošević was never to be rid of is extremely important from the point of view of *intertextuality*.<sup>17</sup>

1. Slobodan Milošević, strongman of Serbia and wrecker of Yugoslavia, may not be as ruthless and reckless as Saddam Hussein.
2. But his aggression against the newly independent republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has become just as blatant – and just as urgently requires a stern response.
3. Unless the international community acts against him now, thousands may die.
4. Even conscientious outsiders have grown confused and weary by the ceaseless, complex civil warfare.
5. But there’s nothing confusing or complex about how much of it arises from the Serbian nationalism whipped up by Mr. Milošević, Europe’s last Communist tyrant.
6. He resorted to force in a vain attempt to keep Slovenia and Croatia from breaking away.
7. Now he has wheeled and lashed out mercilessly at Muslim-majority towns in Bosnia.
8. Bosnia’s people – 44 percent Muslims, 31 percent Serbs and 17 percent Croats – live side by side.
9. Now, by the tens of thousands, they are fleeing the artillery barrages side by side.
10. In contrast to Mr. Milošević’s divisiveness, Bosnia’s freely elected leaders formed an ethnic coalition to try to hold Yugoslavia together.

11. They broadcast news free of the bilious nationalism that poisons the airwaves of neighboring Serbia.
12. They moved to break free of a Serbian-run Yugoslavia only after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence.
13. The US and the European Community have yet to send a strong enough message to Mr. Milošević: Get out.

The discourse strategy of personalization ('strongman' of Serbia and 'wrecker of Yugoslavia') and the rhetorical device of comparison with Hussein, after the previous year's US attack on Iraq, heralded Serbia's fate. The discourse world (2) is completely established by listing all actors: the bad guys are carrying out the action, the good guys are enduring it. The discourse strategy of compulsion is used to persuade people that the bad guy must be met with a 'serious and resolute response' in order to protect the victim of 'blatant aggression'. *Humanitarian considerations* are used (3) to justify the *interventionism* of the euphemistically dubbed 'international community', that is (13) the USA and the EU. The editorial acknowledges briefly (4) that this is 'confusing', 'ceaseless civil warfare'. It then (5, 6, 7) relativizes this in a Cold War fashion through the discourse strategy of personalization, identifying the 'Communist tyrant' who *metaphorically* 'whips up Serbian nationalism' as the sole culprit for the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Defining the war as an aggression by Milošević's Serbia is also accomplished (8–12) through the untrue statement that the three ethnic groups that 'side by side' represent 'Bosnia's people' are now 'fleeing the artillery barrages side by side', which in spatial terms paints the picture of a container, a limited space from which people are forced to flee regardless of their ethnic background. The most grotesque, and clashing with elementary logic, are the statements that the coalition of Radovan Karadžić, Alija Izetbegović and Stjepan Kljuić tried to save Yugoslavia, and that it fought nationalism 'that poisons the airwaves of neighboring Serbia'. How should one then explain that Bosniaks were not expelled from Serbia, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina all three ethnic groups, and Bosniaks in particular, were ethnically cleansed?

Bosnian Serbs as one man boycotted the referendum for 'breaking free', which is a euphemism for Bosnia-Herzegovina's secession, from 'Serbian-run Yugoslavia'. Therefore, it is an untrue statement that *the three* Bosnian

ethnic communities decided to leave Yugoslavia only after Slovenia and Croatia seceded. Imperatively, although ambiguously, the USA and the EU are instructed to threaten Milošević with using force in order to have him leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, or perhaps power. The Cold War and aggressor-victim frames combine the corresponding discourses and the *discourse strategies of passing over in silence, lying, personalization and compulsion*.

Six weeks after the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former speechwriter for Richard Nixon, William Safire, approvingly quoted A. Lewis, creating *interpersonality* as a discourse network of important persons who publicly speak about the same topic in a similar way with the aim of influencing the authorities and the public, that is of attaining symbolic hegemony. The Serbs needed to be collectively punished.<sup>18</sup> A conservative endorsed a liberal in the upcoming elections precisely because of his position on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia:

1. The Serbs have earned a reputation for ferocity.
2. They are now represented by – and not oppressed by – their own dictator, Slobodan Milošević.
3. Sorry, but the law of the jungle has been repealed.
4. No longer should any people get away with barbarism in the name of vengeance.

Thus, as early as in May 1992, (1) the *Other* was depersonalized and dehumanized with the help of the rhetorical device of irony. Somewhat out of tune with the usual style of writing in the newspapers of the American elite, (2) the leader and the people were identified. The Serbian ‘dictator’ has democratic legitimacy. Depersonalization and dehumanization (3) are also achieved through the metaphorical accusation of ‘the law of the jungle’.

A conservative does not need to hide, for the sake of political correctness, behind the guise of distinguishing between ‘bad leaders’ and ‘the misled people’. The Serbs are ‘Balkanized’. The talk is of ‘Serbia’s bloody invasion of the neighbours’, in the face of which ‘George Bush has hidden under the table’. The emotional language was supposed to influence the public, and the cowardice metaphor to disqualify Bush Sr from presidential office. The frame of representing reality is the *imperial* one (punishing the ‘barbarians’), and the discourse *interventionist*, but without

the humanitarian ideological veil that liberals are so fond of. The face of the one remaining global power should be saved.

Among numerous journalists and columnists who portrayed the Serbs as the *Others*, a special place is occupied by the double Pulitzer Prize winner, lecturer at Columbia and Harvard, liberal columnist of the *NYT* and strong opponent of the war in Vietnam, Anthony Lewis. At the beginning of an article dedicated to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina,<sup>19</sup> he provided a description of events with the information on who, where and when ethnically cleansed whom, which established the ‘discourse world’ (Chilton 2004, 54).

The frame of the Second World War is used, as well as the *Holocaust* discourse, the discourse strategy of historical analogy and of compulsion to ‘do something’. The roles are unequivocal: the Serbs are the new Nazis; the Bosniaks the new Jews; and even a new Neville Chamberlain has emerged:

1. President Bush has been a veritable Neville Chamberlain in refusing to face the challenge in Yugoslavia.
2. He has dithered, deferred to a Europe that was looking to him for leadership, refused to call for the international military action that everyone knows is the only way to stop the Serbian aggression.
3. President Bush compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler.
4. I am against such analogies, because they cheapen the Holocaust.
5. But if that one is to be used, it better fits the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević, the inventor of ‘ethnic cleansing’.

In an election year, (1) George Bush Sr was being accused of cowardice and called ‘a man of the past’, while Clinton, who, as it is *euphemistically* put, ‘called for action in Yugoslavia’ was being praised. The rhetorical device of pointing to general knowledge (2) (‘everybody knows’) indicates ‘the social normalization of personal models’ (Van Dijk 1995b) and is often used when one has no sufficiently convincing arguments. The columnist rhetorically imposed his view of the Serbs and the situation in the Balkans and the world based on his power and culturally anchored frames (*the Second World War, the aggressor vs the victim*) as socially relevant. One cannot find a better justification for a war against a country than the historical analogy with Hitler (3). However, the view is expressed (4) against historical analogies

that cheapen the *Holocaust*. But if they are used at all, says Lewis (5), then they better fit Milošević than Hussein, because the former is the ‘inventor of “ethnic cleansing”’. That Milošević invented neither the term nor the practice is not the most important point.<sup>20</sup> More important is the relativization of the view on cheapening the *Holocaust*, because Milošević was not compared with Hitler only like that, but the entire text is dedicated to it.

*The Second World War frame* is present in the victorious countries. It often includes the *Holocaust* and *humanitarian-activist* discourses.<sup>21</sup> What we have here is actually a sub-pattern of the cognitively ethically more basic frame of the *aggressor* vs the *victim*. These discourses were applied in relation to the siege of Sarajevo and several controversial massacres (Vase Miskin street, attacks on Markale vegetable market) as well as the genocidal massacre by General Mladić’s forces in Srebrenica in the first half of July 1995.

The Serbian press conveyed reports and statements by international players with misgivings, and the official mouthpiece of the SRS pursued a xenophobic campaign. A text (June 1994) headlined ‘Sorosland’ stated:

In addition to the communists, who are again raising not only their heads but their strutting bosom as well, the Soros fund is yet another internationalist dragon threatening this people and its state. In addition to the Shiptar state in Kosovo and Metohija, we are set to get one more parallel state on our own territory – Sorosland.

Because of Milošević’s blockade of the Republika Srpska, the Radicals attacked the SPS as ‘Communists’ and, homogenizing the enemies with internationalism as the only shared feature, lumped them together with the ‘Soros fund’. Extreme nationalism metaphorically spoke of ‘dragons’, fairytale monsters threatening the Serbs. The use of the first person plural ‘we are’ and the possessive pronoun ‘our own’ stresses the ethnic perception of soil regardless of the people who live on it.

### *Intermezzo: 1996–1997*

During 1996 and 1997, there was no war in the Balkans. There was a lull in the relations between Serbia and the West. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, was a topic. Ed Vulliamy,<sup>22</sup> a *Guardian* journalist, wrote<sup>23</sup> ‘Omarska was a concentration camp in northwestern Bosnia, run by Serbs and dedicated to the humiliation and murder of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

It seemed unbelievable that a network of such camps – with their echo of the Third Reich – could have existed in the heart of Europe, hidden from view for three months while thousands were slaughtered and those who remained were kept skeletal, bloodied by torture and living in abject, desolate terror.’

Through the Second World War frame, historical analogy and the use of emotionally loaded words, the tragedy that befell Bosniaks and Croats is described and evaluated. The metaphor ‘in the heart of Europe’ points to the vulnerability and importance of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as to the moral unbearableness of the recent event. However, the writer does not mention that similar camps dedicated to the ‘humiliation and murder’ of Serbs existed, for example the Bosniak-held Čelebić or the Croat-held Dretelj. Nazis are recognized in the homogenized and depersonalized Serbs.

What is requested of them is a confrontation with the past similar to that of Germany after the Second World War. Should one expect of a left-wing liberal to demand a confrontation with the past of the most powerful nations with an imperial past and ambitions? Instead, regret is expressed over the fact that the Serbs remain undefeated,<sup>24</sup> because that prevents a confrontation with the past.

1. We had the same argument here, over and over again: can such a whirlwind of violence be dictated by an elite that dupes an otherwise kindly, boozy folk?
2. Here at the village of Omarska, in the shadow of an accursed mine, everyone knew and nobody objected.
3. There are soldiers and pretty girls sipping coffee at the Wiski Bar, where the main street meets the railway siding that runs into the mine.
4. For four months, as they freebooted around the scrappy streets, these people were yards away from the screaming and the mutilation.
5. They would have watched the ‘ethnic cleansing’ convoys pass, out on the road to nowhere.
6. I was part of such a convoy of 1,600 wretched Bosnian Muslim deportees myself; we were herded over the mountains at gunpoint, through a terrifying gauntlet of hatred and spitting, or else cold nonchalance, from the Serbs who beheld us from the roadside.
7. The people in Omarska’s Wiski Bar, listening to Madonna on the jukebox, would have watched the trucks enter camp Omarska full of people, only to come out empty.
8. But now, in the frozen village, we are told: ‘There was no camp here – ever.’

A drunken Balkan man (1) is a favourite image in the West. *Generalization* (1, 2) is used, a powerful *rhetorical device aimed at homogenizing the enemy* as the embodiment of *Evil*. An indication of time (4) is given in ‘for four months’, while ‘they freebooted’ in the streets, ordinary Serbs were ‘yards away’ from ‘the screaming and the mutilation’. They would have watched (5) the ‘ethnic cleansing’ convoys pass, metaphorically speaking, ‘out on the road to nowhere’. The metaphors and the emotional language reinforce the impression of heartlessness of those ‘who knew, but did not object’. The personal testimony (6) reinforces the persuasiveness of the story; the identification with the people in trouble is expressed through the pronoun *we*. The mention of a ‘whisky bar’ (3, 7) contrasts the suffering of the people in the nearby camp with the moral numbness caused by the hatred of those who are having fun in the vicinity. The roles are divided along the lines of ethnic stereotypes. By quoting the local Serbs (8), an analogy is drawn with the ‘negationism’ and ‘revisionism’ of the *Holocaust*. Denial shows the lack of strength for confronting the past.

In 1996 and 1997, the opposition, and even some supporters of the Serbian government, sought to cast the West in a somewhat pleasanter light. Only the Radicals consistently insisted on an anti-Western position:<sup>25</sup> ‘Belgrade has turned into a dirty, smoky SALOON. Belgrade is choking in vice and kitsch “made in the USA”.’ Belgrade is metaphorically seen as a ‘Wild West’ saloon. Milošević is an American agent who is breaking Serbdom like Gorbachev Russia, and ‘vice’ and ‘kitsch’ are typical of all things American. The adjectives ‘dirty’ and ‘smoky’ tell how the West affects Serbia: it soils and chokes it. The contrast is emphasized: ‘cheap American kitsch’ is choking the ‘rich Serbian culture’. The text is an example of the Occidental discourse in the clash of civilizations frame.

### ***Kosovo: The Final Act of the Yugoslav Tragedy***

Starting from 1991, individuals of different ideological orientations (Johann Georg Reissmueller, Anthony Lewis, William Safire, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ronald Reagan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Margaret Thatcher, French *New Philosophers*, etc.) recommended the bombing of Serbia. On 24 March 1999, their wishes were answered. An article by the *NYT* columnist Thomas L. Friedman,<sup>26</sup> a Pulitzer Prize winner, discussed possible options:



1. But those are our options: Beat the Serbs until they learn to love the Kosovars.
2. Invade Kosovo and own it forever.
3. Cut and run and bear the stain forever.
4. Or bomb and talk and hope to build a messy diplomatic solution from the ashes of Kosovo.
5. Oh, there's a fifth option: Put your hands together and pray that the Clinton team knows something that you don't.

The fact that Serbs too are Kosovars (1) is often overlooked; the Albanization of the term 'Kosovar' ethnically cleanses first the language and then the reality. The discourse strategy of *animalization* makes possible the most cruel showdown with the disobedient. As if they were animals being taught through classic conditioning, the Serbs should (the word which was left out in the original, but is implied) be beaten *until they learn how to love* the Albanians. If this is irony, it is inappropriate. It is also recommended (2) to create a colony in the twenty-first century. The temporal adverb 'forever' implies that the most powerful role of the USA is guaranteed for good. In a different context, the adverb (3) is linked to a metaphor which expresses moral prohibition. It is interesting that the first option did not entail any 'stain of shame'. An empire can show heartlessness, but not faintheartedness. The adjectives *dirty* and *messy* (4) serve the function of the metaphor for 'a diplomatic solution', which places in the foreground the moral dubiousness and the practical complexity of such solutions. Tacitly, bombing is morally purer and practically simple. Nevertheless, it is less humane and it metaphorically turns Kosovo into 'ashes'. The implicit criticism of the Clinton administration (5) is of a jovial character, and the article exhibits the *imperial frame* and *interventionist discourse* of justifying the bombing of Serbia.

Martin Woollacott, a liberal columnist writing for the *Guardian*, one week after the start of the NATO bombing wrote:<sup>27</sup>

1. What happened at Rambouillet was that Europe and America laid out their terms for continuing the partnership, which were that Milošević should hand Kosovo over to Western protectors, in return for which he would be helped to stay in power in Serbia proper.
2. That, we now know, was a bargain he was not prepared to make, no doubt sensing that his rivals in the opposition would use it to unseat him.

3. So he tempted them into what amounts to a national government and put everybody on the same road to perdition.

Essentially, this is an accurate interpretation (1) of the Rambouillet ‘alibi diplomacy’.<sup>28</sup> Milošević refused the indecent proposal. What is passed over in silence is that some opposition members did not join the government in order to be able to conclude that everybody is on ‘the same road to perdition’. In other words, there is no politician in Serbia with whom one could talk. What is there to do with a society cultivating a ‘narrow and morally blind Serbian view of the world’? The Serbs are homogenized, depersonalized, dehumanized and demonized.

Woollacott made topical the leitmotif of the geostrategic concern: Serbia as Russia’s agent in the Balkans.<sup>29</sup> The headlines stressed the importance of a NATO victory ‘for us’. The personal pronoun in the first person plural refers to the *West*, that is NATO and the political-military *establishment* of the USA and the EU. NATO sought a new role after the Cold War, and it was believed that the role of the world policeman was fitting: ‘Nato’s technical problems in the Balkans are the consequence of too slow a shift from territorial defence to intervention capability, for what we want from Nato has changed in the last 10 years. People want this military instrument to be used to put things right in societies where normal political life has broken down.’ The pronoun in the first person plural ‘we’ and euphemisms (‘a shift from territorial defence to intervention capability’) persuade the public that it wants NATO to transform itself from a defensive to an offensive organization. Who decides what normal political life is, and when and where it has broken down? The answer ‘people want’ points to the ‘social normalization of personal models’. UK liberals were no strangers to the imperial frame in the past either.

In Serbia, the activities of William Walker, head of the OSCE monitoring mission in Kosovo, the Rambouillet conference and the bombing led to anti-Western hysteria, illustrated by a press release issued by the Serbian Writers’ Association:<sup>30</sup>

1. Before Europe got terminally ill, its greatest bards, in the name of humanism, defended the Serbian people, the Serbian holy objects that are older than the first mention of Shiptars in history and the Serbian culture, which preserved the dignity of the roots of European civilization.

2. Still, contemporary barbarians want to create on the soil of Christian Europe, in addition to Albania and Turkey, two more militant anti-Christian states, Bosnia and Kosovo.

3. Although numerous world agencies (slipping from the control of bancocracy) showed that in the village of Račak (15 January 1999) the Yugoslav army and Serbian police did not perpetrate a massacre – which the American executor and man without qualities William Walker tried to fabricate – the Contact Group puts an ultimatum to the Hague tribunal to launch an investigation into this issue in a sovereign state (Serbia and Yugoslavia).

4. The Contact Group (like a Gauleiter guard) issues an ultimatum demanding that members of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Ministry of Interior be suspended.

The occasion for the press release is an ultimatum that the Contact Group (28 January) issued to the SRY after the controversial event in Račak (15 January 1999). Humanism, Christianity, Europeanhood and Serbhood (1) are interwoven and equalized. Metaphorically, Europe is terminally ill because it is helping Muslims who are *a priori* ‘anti-Christian’ and ‘non-European’. The Orientalist discourse completely overlooks the possibility and reality of the secular character of some Muslim states, and the Serbian culture in an Orientalist/narcissistic fashion is considered to be the guardian of the ‘dignity of the roots of European civilization’. The passive Europe is pitied rather than reproached.

The main enemies (2) are ‘contemporary barbarians’, the Americans, who are stereotypically uncultured and uneducated. Paradoxically, the secularized Western Europe is judged more favourably than the devout USA, although the discourse is saturated with Christian conservatism. Robert Musil’s metaphor (3) stereotypically suggests the insensitivity and immorality of W. Walker and the Americans. Bearers of the anti-fascist coalition (4) are identified with the Nazis. The clash of civilizations frame is linked to the Second World War frame, with the discourse strategy of victimizing *us* and demonizing the *other*.

## **Beyond 5 October 2000**

The frames of representing reality applied in the 1990s are still being reproduced today, although the Serbs and Serbia are not portrayed as enemies. Hague tribunal trials, crises (for example the assassination of premier Đinđić, Milošević’s death, the status of Kosovo) and international court rulings that do not correspond to 1990s frames all lead to this

reproduction. Thus, on the occasion of the 27 February 2007 ruling by the Hague-based International Court of Justice, Marlise Simons wrote in the *NYT* an article headlined ‘Court Declares Bosnia Killings were Genocide’:

1. The International Court of Justice on Monday for the first time called the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 an act of genocide, but determined that Serbia itself was not guilty of the enormous crime.
2. It freed Serbia of the stigma of being a genocidal nation and absolved it from having to pay war reparations, as demanded by Bosnia.
3. But the judges ruled that demonstrating a pattern of conduct or of atrocities was ‘too broad’ to qualify for the definition of genocide.
4. In essence, they did not answer the question often asked in The Hague: when does ethnic cleansing become genocide?

The headline is a half-truth, at best. Not all ‘Bosnia killings’, but only the Srebrenica massacre, was declared an act of genocide, but it is necessary to align the court ruling with the aggressor-victim frame; hence the headline, because many people do not have time to read entire articles. The discourse strategy of victimization of Bosniaks, at the cost of misleading the readers, is still at work, despite the fact that under the headline (1) a full explanation is given which includes the statement that Serbia is not guilty of ‘the enormous crime’. Obviously, (2) Serbia was considered genocidal. The adjective ‘genocidal’ demonizes a nation or a state, seriously calling into question any demand by its members because they are *a priori illegitimate*. The victimization secures the monopoly over the status of victim for the Bosniaks. If there were also often victims among Serbs and Croats, then they should not be ethnicized.<sup>31</sup> The article systematically applies the *discourse strategy of passing over in silence*. Hence, the argumentation of ‘Bosnia advocates’ is presented extensively, while it is not mentioned that Bosnian Serbs did not endorse the lawsuit. Also, no quotes by Serbian lawyers are cited. The prosecution expert witness, historian András Riedlmayer, is quoted as listing destroyed mosques, Catholic churches and monasteries, and ‘vacated municipalities’. However, no words of the defence witnesses are quoted. The selection of quoted sources and the syntagm ‘demonstrating a pattern of conduct or of atrocities’ (3) suggest to the reader that, if not genocide, then something similar took place in the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally (4), the main conclusion of the article is voiced, because the sentence

starts by emphasizing the ‘essential’. The judges, referred to by the pronoun ‘they’, which diminishes their authority, ‘did not answer the question’ about the difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The text on the ruling, which starts with a headline that misleads the public, ends in dissatisfaction with the judges and the ruling, which disavows the headline. The *hermeneutical circle* closes: the *NYT* is unhappy because the ruling clashes with the picture of reality which it had created over 15 years and which it continues to promote irrespective of the court ruling; this explains the half-true headline. The *aggressor-victim frame* and the *humanitarian-activist discourse* are still at work.

In Serbia, the status of Kosovo makes problematic afresh the attitude towards the West, because the USA and the EU are considered responsible for ‘taking away holy Serbian soil’, ‘the heart of Serbia’, ‘the Serbian Jerusalem’ and ‘15 per cent of the territory’. *Politika*’s military commentator and columnist Miroslav Lazanski linked the NATO bombing and the status of Kosovo:<sup>32</sup>

1. Vidoje Tomić was a guard on the Belgrade-Bar railway on the stretch passing through Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. through the Republika Srpska.
2. When he was younger, he loved listening to stories about his famous cousin, US Navy Sergeant-Major Petar Tomić, who died a heroic death on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor, saving his friends on the warship ‘USS Utah’ under a hail of Japanese bombs and torpedoes.
3. Many years have passed since and Vidoje Tomić grew up believing that his cousin’s heroic death in 1941 contributed to the indestructible US-Serbian alliance.
4. Did not Serbs rescue US pilots in the Second World War?
5. And that thing with Korea, too, we almost offered to go there under the UN flag to help the Americans.
6. And then, all of a sudden, the Americans bombed the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7. He did not want to talk any more about his cousin from the warship ‘USS Utah’, a holder of the highest US war medal.
8. And then came the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999.
9. All of a sudden, NATO helicopters soared above the railway, three combat Apaches and two Black Hawks with a commando squad.
10. He aimed his Bock hunting rifle at NATO commandos.

11. They killed him on the spot.
12. In the name of peace?
13. No, probably in the name of their friendship towards the Serbs, as one would put it in the modern European vocabulary today when ‘the imposition on Serbia of supervised independence for Kosovo’ is talked about.
14. As if they, actually, saw all of us as Uncle Vidoje.

Within the *aggressor vs victim frame* and through the archetype of David’s struggle against Goliath, the self-pitying nature of Serb nationalism is expressed. The Serbs are a victim of the powerful and ungrateful USA and EU. Uncle Vidoje is a *stereotypical metaphor* of the Serb people: elderly, poor, honourable, loyal, courageous, selfless, honest and not understood by the ungrateful world.

A rhetorical question is used (4) for the known fact that the Chetniks rescued US pilots in the Second World War as a rhetorical device, and the next thing mentioned as an argument in favour of the ‘US-Serbian alliance’ (5) is *something that did not take place*. The author says ‘we almost offered’ to go to Korea. The word ‘almost’ indicates that we did not ‘offer’ it. The ‘we’ refers to the Serbs, and at the time Serbia did not exist on the international scene; there was only the socialist Yugoslavia. This is an instance of megalomania, because ‘our help’ to Americans in Korea is discussed in a serious, and not ironic, tone.

The idyllic narrative comes to an abrupt (6) stop, because ‘all of a sudden’ the Americans bombed the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The context of the bombing is not discussed – the crime committed in Srebrenica on behalf of the Serbs, the US interests – because this hinders the victimization of the Serbs. The Americans are assigned an active role: they ‘bomb’; the Serbs suffer passively. It is made known metaphorically (7) how great the disappointment of the Serbs is at their ingratitude. The language is, understandably, more direct (8) than the language of NATO officials and many Western journalists who euphemistically called the bombing ‘action’, ‘intervention’ or ‘campaign’. The metaphor emphasizes the difference in the balance of forces between the Serbs, ‘the old Uncle Vidoje’ (aged 70) and the West, ‘NATO’s most elite commandos’. The rhetorical question ‘was Uncle Vidoje killed “in the name of peace”’ expresses irony, and the ironization of political correctness (13) shows Euro-scepticism.

## Conclusion

The aim of this survey was to identify and analyse the dominant frames of representing reality and the attendant discourses. By no means do we claim that we have shown all the existing frames representing the relations between the West and Serbia; the limited space did not allow this. For instance, the *left-wing anti-imperialist frame* of N. Chomsky and E. Herman, and the very interesting polemical exchange between the left-wing liberals from *The Guardian*, led by E. Vulliamy, and the leftists gathered around the journal *Living Marxism* and the magazine *Z-net* have, thus, remained out of reach. Several dominant frames and discourses in the USA and Great Britain vis-à-vis the Serbs have been identified. Although in reality they are often combined, for the purposes of the research they were analysed separately. The Cold War frame and discourse dominated in the liberal and social democratic press up to the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the conservative press combined this pattern and discourse with the clash of civilizations frame and the Balkanist discourse. With the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the frame aggressor-victim and the humanitarian-activist discourse prevailed in the liberal and social democratic press, with the sub-variant of the Second World War frame and the *Holocaust* discourse, sometimes interwoven with the Cold War frame. Finally, the imperial frame and the interventionist discourse were also applied during and especially towards the end of the 1990s.

In Serbia, the clash of civilizations frame and the Occidentalist discourse were dominant, combined with the Orientalist discourse when it came to the attitude towards the Muslims, and especially the aggressor-victim frame, accompanied by a self-pitying nationalist discourse.

1 Simms, B. (2003), *Najsramniji trenutak: Britanija i uništavanje Bosne* (translation into Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, previously known as Serbo-Croatian) (Sarajevo and Belgrade: Buybook and Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji), pp. 46, 83: 'The media were hammering us (...) And although you know politicians say they don't care what Chip Hogan in the *Washington Post* says or Will Safire in the *New York Times* or Anthony Lewis or any of the others, over a period of time it was hammer, hammer, hammer.'

2 Weisman, S.R., 'Coming to Terms With Kosovo's "Old" Hatreds', *NYT*, 12 June 1999.

3 An influential supporter of all the recent US wars.

4 The columnist Francis Wheen: 'The most common accusation is that by advocating military action against Serbia, I have joined "the Guardian's armchair generals"'. Wheen, F., 'Peeps from a Pipsqueak', *The Guardian*, 14 April 1999.

5 Discourse is a form of social practice expressed through speech and writing. It is socially conditioned and at the same time it conditions the social reality. What is important is the social context (institutional, situational, social-structural) of communication (Wodak and Busch 2004, 108).

6 The frame of representing reality is given in advance to generations, social classes and nations. It is a long-lasting structure shaped by the experience of various social groups through generations which inevitably affects social practice and signifies 'an area of experience in a particular culture' (Chilton 2006, 51). In the context of communication, *framing* selects some aspects of reality and neglects some others; emphasizing the former as especially important, it defines the problem and offers a causal interpretation, moral evaluation and a practical treatment (Entman 1993, 52). *Frame* refers to the unexpressed thought, the 'mental mapping of reality', whereas *discourse* is more directly linked to expressing thoughts. Of course, the difference between an abstract discourse and its textual concretization is important in analytical terms.

7 Bakić (1997, 1998, 1999)."

8 Bakić (1997, 1998, 1999).

9 Max Weber considered them secularized theological notions in politics.

10 'Zatočnici nestale monarhije' (Interview with Dr Slavenko Terzić), *Politika*, 30 September 1990.

11 Malcolm, N., 'Bosnia: A Short History' NYP, 1994, NY; 'Kosovo: A Short History' NYP, 1998, NY.

12 Malcolm, N., 'Yugoslavia at Breakpoint', *The National Review*, 29 July 1991.

13 How important the label 'communist' was is illustrated by Anthony Lewis's column ('Where is the Outrage?', *NYT*, 4 November 1991): 'The tragedy that has overtaken Yugoslavia is the direct result of the ambitions of the Serbian Communist leader, Slobodan Milošević. (...) The Milošević grab for power aroused in other republics opposition that was both ethnic and democratic – anti-Communist – in character'. The Cold War discourse included the discourse strategy of *personalization*. Anti-communism was considered without reservation to be the guarantee of a democratic orientation.

14 The blame was placed squarely on the communist Milošević and Serbian nationalism: 'It is this lopsided survival of the Communist political tradition with its artificial stimulation of Serbian nationalism for its own internal purposes, that has set the present series of nationalist conflicts in motion.' Nationalism is, thus, good if it is pro-Western (5) and bad if used by communists.

15 Bećirović, K., 'Zapad i Srbi', *Politika*, 31 May 1992.

16 The international community should consider the Serbian and 'Yugoslav' military leadership responsible for the aggression and destabilization directed against Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Tanjug Press crveni bilten*, April 1992.



17 *Butcher of the Balkans* is a frequently repeated metaphor. For instance, in the *NYT* editorial of 8 July 1992, 'Croatia, the Butcher's Apprentice', or in the article by Tim Judah 'Banker Hurd to fund "Butcher of Belgrade"', which avoids the politically incorrect use of 'the Balkans'. This was a metonymical 'Balkanization of the Serbs'. Serbian neighbours are dislocated from the Balkans, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is 'an example of the multicultural, tolerant and cosmopolitan West', while Milošević and Serbia are the embodiment of the dark and violent Balkans (Hansen 2006, 113–14). Ed Vulliamy, Rory Carol and Peter Beaumont, 'How I Trapped the Butcher of the Balkans', *Observer*, 1 July 2001. Ian Traynor, 'No Smoking Gun for "Balkan Butcher"', *Guardian*, 28 February 2004. On 12 March 2006, CNN reported: "'Butcher of the Balkans" found dead'.

18 Safire, W., 'Punish the Serbs', *NYT*, 21 May 1992. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former adviser to R. Reagan, is also quoted approvingly. Moreover, the Pulitzer Prize winner asked the presidential candidates what they would do in order to stop the 'Serbian aggression'. He was happy only with Bill Clinton's answer, although he himself advocated harsher measures.

19 Lewis, A., 'Yesterday's Man', *NYT*, 3 August 1992. On 2 August, Roy Gutman published a Pulitzer Prize-winning story on concentration camps in the *Newsday* tabloid, and *ITN* aired distressing footage from Trnopolje. Hence, August 1992 was the month with the most pronounced anti-Serb writing in the US and Western European press. On 4 August, for instance, the *NYT* published an editorial 'Milošević is not Hitler, but In formal rhetorical terms, the negation in the first part of the sentence, followed by the conjunction 'but', serves to confirm that this is at the very least something very similar to what is being negated. The discourse strategy of *historical analogy* and the rhetorical devices of *simile* and *metonymy* confirm this: 'Mr. Milošević is only a minor-league Hitler. The London Conference must not become a minor-league Munich'.

20 On the distinction between genocide and ethnic cleansing and the history of the phenomena, see Michael Mann (2004).

21 Hansen uses the term *genocide discourse* (Hansen 2006, 111–14).

22 Vulliamy, E. (1994), *Season in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War* (New York and London: Simon & Schuster).

23 Vulliamy, E., 'Middle Managers of Genocide', *The Nation*, 10 June 1996.

24 'Undefeated, the Serbs choose to "hide reality from themselves"'.

25 'Srpski Gorbačov', *Velika Srbija*, January 1996.

26 Friedman, T.L., 'Bomb and Call in George Mitchell', *NYT*, 2 April 1999.

27 Woollacott, M., 'How the Man we Could-do-business-with is Becoming the Man we must Destroy', *The Guardian*, 3 April 1999.

28 An unacceptable proposal is offered, and the refusal is then used as an alibi for bombing. A term used by Zivorad Kovačević, former SFRY ambassador in Washington.

29 Woollacott, M., 'Russia may be Bluffing. Nato must Win, as the Importance of Victory to us is Great', *The Guardian*, 10 April 1999.

30 Udruženje književnika Srbije, 'Rasistički, pravoslavofobični i antisrpski akt', *Politika*, 3 February 1999.

31 The total death toll in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 100,000, including both fighters and civilians, of whom 65.8 per cent were Bosniaks, 25.6 per cent Serbs and 8.01 per cent Croats. Bosniaks, however, made up as much as 83.33 per cent of all civilian victims. *Ljudski gubici u Bosni i Hercegovini 1991–1995*, Istraživačko-dokumentacioni centar Sarajevo; [http://www.idc.org.ba/prezentacija/rezultati\\_istrazivanja.htm](http://www.idc.org.ba/prezentacija/rezultati_istrazivanja.htm) (10 August 2007).

32 Lazanski, M., 'Čiča Vidoje i NATO', *Politika*, 31 March 2007.