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The Object as a Series of *Its* Acts

Keywords

Abstract
Our intention is to construct the conditions for a new position that more closely explains the reality of the object (its location, concreteness, possibility of being seen, extension, instantaneousness, etc.), but also the object's movement, the "situation" in which it is or becomes a potential agent that "works," influences us and incites us to *movement* towards us, indeed gives us a *turn* towards an ideal object and its realization. Using a variety of texts that thematize the object, a few passages from Hegel, we attempt to reveal connections between key architectural (and not only architectural) concepts, form a given epistemological order, and differentiate amongst basic acts and operations that could be ascribed to the object.

Objekt kot serija *svojih* dejanj

Ključne besede

Povzetek
Naš namen je ustvariti pogoje za novo zastavitev, ki natančneje pojasnjuje realnost objekta (njegovo umestitev, konkretnost, možnost biti viden, ekstenzijo, hipnost itd.),

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pa tudi gibanje predmeta, »situacijo«, v kateri je ali postane potencialni dejavnik, ki »deluje«, vpliva na nas in nas spodbuja h *gibanju* proti nam, nam dejansko daje *obrat* k idealnemu predmetu in njegovi realizaciji. S pomočjo različnih besedil, ki tematizirajo objekt, in nekaj odlomkov iz Hegla poskušamo razkriti povezave med ključnimi arhitekturnimi (in ne samo arhitekturnimi) pojmi, oblikovati določen epistemološki red ter razlikovati med osnovnimi dejanji in operacijami, ki bi jih lahko pripisali objektu.

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Although Hegel's metaphysics of objectivity is neither complementary nor analogous to his metaphysics of subjectivity, we are going to experiment with one or two of his famous claims from the *Philosophy of Right*, assuming a few different protocols that decisively determine an entirely uncertain *status* of the object. Our intention is to construct the conditions for a new position that more closely explains the reality of the object (its location, concreteness, and possibility of being seen, its extension, instantaneousness, etc.), but also the object's movement, the "situation" in which it is or becomes a potential agent that "works," influences us, and incites us to *movement* towards us, indeed gives us a *turn* towards an ideal object and its realization. This position, in which it is possible to orient oneself towards the object and ensure conditions for the *object* to be oriented, assumes a kind of repetition of forcing and foregrounding the object in Brentano and Central European philosophy. The differentiation between the object and *Gegenstand*[1]—very difficult to express in English and some other languages tied to Latin—seems to provide the decisive step that reveals the importance of various acts and verb forms at the root of the noun "object." To

[1]   Kasimir Twardowski differentiates the object towards which one attempting to represent it is directed from an immanent object, which is the content of that representation. *Gegenstand* (or in Serbo-Croatian *predmet*; in that language one word for subject is *podmet*, both are strictly analogous to the Latin) would be that which is held against and towards which attention or representation is directed; while the object would be an image or a pseudo-image or symbol of "this *Gegenstand*, which is here 'real.'" Jean-François Courtine, "Presentation," introduction to *Théorie de l'objet et Présentation personelle*, by Alexius Meinong (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 18–24. Paradoxically, in contrast with much more precise options used by authors of early debates on the topic, such as Ekhart (*Widerwurf*) or Böhme (*Gegenwurf*), *Gegenstand* is not synonymous with *object*. Rather, *Gegenstand* is already fixed, standing in place, attending or waiting to be represented; furthermore, *Gegenstand* does not cease to be present and permanent.

understand the situation in which the object is recognized as object, we would like to privilege a basic act or gesture, which is difficult to determine because it is sudden and quick—the act of throwing. The action does not necessarily concern the hand nor what is in the hand, nor even what is being struck, missed, its landing, or the end of the trajectory. The sudden gesture or operation, above all creative and precise, leaving different traces in time and space, must decide on the construction of a scene with myriad actors. It is for this reason that the throwing is necessarily an architectural operation, not merely an athletic or war operation or technological means. When Lacan situates anything that might concern architecture and all its related concepts, they include above all the gaze or perspective whence seen (seeing something, seeing one's own gaze, etc.), the space in which an internal process initiated from the outside and vice versa are exchanged—this magic taking place between the interior-exterior is always a matter of projection!—and emptiness or void (*vide*). The architectural is necessarily about emptiness and occurs always around the emptiness ("*autour d'un vide*," "*entoure un vide*," etc.). Penetrating into the emptiness and the ability of the architect to construct and create an object (not even necessarily an architectural object)[2] can certainly change the notions of the object we have acquired from ontology and social ontology.

Here are the bullet point protocols for any possible theory of the object:

a) Subject, object, project, eject, reject, conject, etc.—all concern the verb or action of *iacio* (to throw) and necessarily imply both a temporal and spatial construction in which such an act or collection of acts takes place. The tacit agent or demiurge that launches something[3] (e.g., casts its gaze, or even merely goes through the motion of throwing) or expels something, actually places or displaces their act of throwing into space and time, marking it

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[2] We are referring to the important book by Petra Čeferin in which she carefully distinguishes amongst the object, the "resistant objectal moment," the theory of two objects, and the architectural object important for any future philosophy of architecture. Petra Čeferin, *The Resistant Object of Architecture: A Lacanian Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2021), 75–76. Furthermore, we have in mind the various texts by Rado Riha on architecture and the object.

[3] This "something" is the first and perhaps closest alternative to the word "object." See Tim Crane, *Objects of Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3; Charles Travis, "Etre quelque chose," *Philosophiques* 45, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 229, https://doi.org/10.7202/1048623ar; Roland Barthes, "Sémantique de l'objet," in *Œuvres completes*, ed. Éric Marty (Paris: Seuil, 1994–2002), 2:65–73; Courtine, "Presentation," 24–25.

and determining it with various prefixes that today often confound and cannot be clearly differentiated. The prefixes *sub*, *ob*, *pro*, *con*, *tra*, and *inter* are supposed to show that the act of throwing organizes or engages various elements in time and space.

b) A set of names or labels for these operations of different gestures could have, first of all, its epistemological justification and a specific order, and also might have a given succinct conceptual harmony. Namely, the theater of positive things, representations, and content, would, in its origin, have to have two basic models of movement towards something else (indicated as "other," as outside or beyond), which in the Middle Ages would have been designated with a distinction between a formal and an objective concept (*conceptus formalis et obiectivus*).[4] Simultaneously with the throwing as movement *out*, there is the gesture of catching or gathering (*conceptio*); only these two movements together can better locate all the elements of this theater.

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[4] Heidegger provides a brief reconstruction of this medieval distinction: "The concept of *ens*, as Scholasticism says, *conceptus entis*, must be taken in a twofold way, as *conceptus formalis entis* and as *conceptus objectivus entis*. In regard to the *conceptus formalis* the following is to be noted. Forma, *morphé*, is that which makes something into something actual. Forma, formalis, formale do not mean formal in the sense of formalistic, empty, having no real content; rather, *conceptus formalis* is the actual concept [*der wirkliche Begriff*], conception [*das Begreifen*] in the sense of the *actus concipiendi* or *conceptio*. When Hegel treats the concept in his *Logic* he takes the term 'Begriff,' 'concept,' contrary to the customary usage of his time, in the Scholastic sense as *conceptus formalis*. In Hegel, concept (*Begriff*) means the conceiving and the conceived in one (*das Begreifen und das Begriffene in einem*), because for him thinking and being are identical, that is to say, belong together. *Conceptus formalis entis* is the conceiving of a being; or, more generally and cautiously, it is the apprehending of a being [. . .]. But what does *conceptus objectivus entis* mean? The *conceptus objectivus entis* must be distinguished from the *conceptus formalis entis*, the understanding of being, the conceiving [*Begreifen*] of being. The *objectivum* is that which, in apprehending [*Erfassen*] and in grasping [*Greifen*], is thrown over against [*entgegengeworfen*], lies over against [*entgegenliegt*] as the graspable [*Greifbare*], more exactly, as the grasped [*be-griffene*] *objectum*, that which is conceived as such in the conceiving, the conceptual contents or, as is also said, the meaning." Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 83–84; bracketed original German terms are sourced from Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phenomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 117; see Marco Forlivesi, "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suarez, Pasqualigo, Mastri," *Les Études philosophiques* 60, no. 1 (January–March 2002): 3–30, https://doi.org/10.3917/leph.021.0003.

c) The history of the use of objects or thinking about the object[5] is the history of inversions, analogic disorders, and manipulations with insufficiently articulated relations between subject and object ("*Cette relation est polymère*").[6] The connection between thing and object, between a positive item that can be touched or destroyed and a fictional or ideal, imaginary object is unclear;[7] and often the characteristics of what we today call the object used to belong to the subject.[8] If, in addition to the concept, we add the protocols of "project" or "projection" to the eternal antagonism between the subject and object, it becomes perhaps possible to reconstruct or explain the subject/object shift with an entirely new and entirely real momentum when the object ceases to be the object (it ceases to be counter to the subject, when it slips away, when it is no longer the object, when it stops being an obstacle and object in the sense of the limit or terminus of an agent's action) and moves into a field that can be designated with the notion of project.

d) Forcing various analogies and counter-analogies in the context of objects is always above all a consequence of the entirely unclear status of the body ("body" being actually the first object or thing suffering the action of the subject, whether mine or of another, changing and growing, which desires or is desired, etc.) in relation to the subject and one producing acts. The body is a totality of various details, just as the object is always a set or collection of a plurality of objects. The object is thus always plural and always missing something, something else.[9] All known definitions of the object—that which

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[5]　"*Obiectum*" is the neuter of the present participle of *obicere*, to place in front, to present. Some texts about the object are unsurpassed in their wealth and diversity. Lawrence Dewan, "'Obiectum': Notes on the Invention of a Word," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 48 (1981): 37–96; Jacques Lacan, "La relation d'objet et les structures freudiennes," *Bulletin de psychologie* 516, no. 6 (2011): 503–18, https://doi.org/10.3917/bupsy.516.0503.

[6]　Alain de Libera, *Archeologie du sujet III: L'act de penser 1; La double révolution* (Paris: Vrin, 2014), 491.

[7]　See Gilbert Ryle, Richard Bevan Braithwaite, and George Edward Moore, "Symposium: Imaginary Objects," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *Supplementary Volumes* 12 (1933): 18–70.

[8]　Alain de Libera's analysis of Heidegger's seminars in Zurich shows well this inversion from the medieval subject into object. Libera, *Archeologie du sujet* III, 491–96.

[9]　"How a being (*être*)—*une totalité*—can feel a lack of something that, by definition, it does not have (*il n'a pas*)." Lacan, "La relation d'objet," 504. In his 1967 PhD thesis, Jean Baudrillard evokes (incompletely, not entirely) the famous scene from Godard's 1968 film

can be represented or personified or divided or incorporated, or that an object is an object if it can be anything else—allow for uncertainty as to its existence and its latent absence (*heimatlose Objekt*).[10]

e) The figure of the architecture or architecture, as our own additional protocol in the reconstruction of the status of the object, ought to indicate a constant "desire of the architectural" (since Gregotti as far back as 1972 equates desire with design or *progetto*) and to ignore and crush any resistance and fixedness of the object (which is its fixedness across or on the path, *gegen/encontre/against*; the desire of the architect produces the object, "*un objet fascinant*,"[11] immediately modifying, distancing, and destroying it; and vice versa). The desire of the architect (the person who daily alters their *object* training at the gym; Shakespeare's Lord Bardolph in *Henry IV,* part 2, who secretly prepares the project of usurping the king and constructing a new kingdom; the designer of a new automobile, etc.) always creates the object anew, destabilizing in the process its primary characteristic: permanence.[12]

Le Mépris (*Contempt*). Jean Baudrillard, *Le système des objets* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 142. The English translation of the dialogue between Camille and Paul is as follows: "See my feet in the mirror? Think they're pretty? Very. You like my ankles? And my knees, too? I really like your knees. And my thighs? Your thighs, too. See my behind in the mirror? Do you think I have a cute ass? Really. Shall I get on my knees? No need to. And my breasts. You like them? Yes, tremendously. Gently, Paul. Not so hard. Sorry. Which do you like better, my breasts, or my nipples? I don't know. I like them the same. You like my shoulders? I don't think they're round enough. And my arms? And my face? Your face, too. All of it? My mouth, my eyes, my nose, my ears? Yes, everything. Then you love me totally. I love you totally, tenderly, tragically. Me too, Paul." The issue is of course not only the necessity of the existence of the other that completes the totality with their profession of love ("I love" here means only +, addition, connecting body parts)—as early as 1588, Robert Green says in *Perimedes* that "women are more glorious objects" (quoted in the entry "object, n." of the Oxford English Dictionary)—it is exclusively a question of crisis, counting and computing, intonation and collecting "cast glances," of "une revolution totale de l'objet." André Breton, "Crise de l'objet," in *Le Surrealisme et la Peinture* (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), 687.

[10] This is A. Meinong's phrase from a 1906 text. See Roderick M. Chisholm, "Homeless Objects," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 27, no. 104–5 (1973): 207–23.

[11] "Comment inventer un objet fascinant, un objet qui tient l'homme en respect [an object that keeps a respectful distance from man]*?*" Georges Didi-Huberman, *L'Homme qui marchait dans la couleur* (Paris: Minuit, 2001), 20.

[12] Permanence is the basic characteristic of the object as such. See Jim Gabaret, *La permanence de l'objet: Une analyse de l'identité spatio-temporelle et intersubjective des objets* (PhD diss., Centre de philosophie contemporaine de la Sorbonne, 2018).

> The architect produces an event or change (two synonymous words), by always manipulating four crucial moments of their action: concept, project, conject, and object.[13]

Still, what does the object do and how does it create this desire for the new and for change? Does the object act? And if so, how?

In paragraph 124 of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel explains subjective satisfaction of the individual, defining the subject in the process as a series or totality of their various acts. Here is the passage:

> The subject *is* the series of his acts. If these are a series of worthless productions, the subjectivity of the will is also worthless; if the acts are substantial and sound, so likewise is the inner will of the individual.[14]

To Hegel, the important word is the italicized "is" (*ist*). The existence of the subject is constituted by a series of acts, which can be of one kind or another. Such acts determine the substance of the individual; or, the collection of these acts constructs the subject as such. Hegel collects and thinks that these acts can reflectively act on their author, that they cannot only be ascribed to the author, but even when completed, they remain bound to the author. If the subject can be defined as someone or something that performs the action of a sentence, or as someone under (*sub*) everything that is (as the subject holds everything, sets it up, giving

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[13]   Four moments or concepts corresponding to the architect's desire to be blind and focus on the invisible (the production of concepts), to design—with others!—what is not there (projective mind meeting the conject, institutional mind), producing an entirely new object (expressive mind). It would appear that this could provide a new definition for "the creative thinking practice of architecture." Čeferin, *Resistant Object of Architecture*, 73. See Petar Bojanić, "The Acts of Project(ion) / Project Acts or Projacts," *Rivista di Estetica* 71 (2019): 92–100, https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.5521; Snežana Vesnić and Miloš Ćipranić, "The Concept: A Map for Generations," *Rivista di Estetica* 71 (2019): 101–16, https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.5529.

[14]   G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2005), 107, § 124. "Was das Subjekt *ist*, ist die Reihe seiner Handlungen. Sind diese eine Reihe wertloser Produktionen, so ist die Subjektivität des Wollens ebenso eine wertlose; ist dagegen die Reihe seiner Taten substantieller Natur, so ist es auch der innere Wille des Individuums." G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 233.

it stability), in this case, Hegel insists that it is a collection of successive gestures across a period of time that represents the subject. Less important here is the rhetoric of the use of time and temporal perspective; rather, more important is the idea that the acts together are actually objects that might be collected, gathered, counted, held together in a single subject. Looking further at the text that explains paragraph 124 of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel's subject is entirely like the character of Camille from Godard's *Le Mépris*. Her lack, the search for the portion of the body and the object that is not there, her counting and searching for the new, the as yet unnamed and unloved, her search for the object as a thirst for satisfaction (*Befriedigung*) or the right to satiation or satisfaction,[15] can only be realized through recognition of the community or by others. In this case, Paul, Godard's hero, who incessantly repeats and confirms (through his speech, through his gaze) that the subject is ultimately constituted in the totality of their acts. The claim that the object is always plural or part of a multiplicity of elements (a totality comprising several objects) indicates a grandiose complication of the relation subject-object. The acting of the object, in this case, is the constitution thereof into a totality, into a whole, which is supposed to be the crucial characteristic of the subject. There can be no subject without a plurality of objects[16] (which is a pleonasm) or without organizing an object into a totality. Still, it is insufficient, as something seems to not work in this construction. What is it? Why does Paul, suddenly, at the end say "I love you totally, tenderly, tragically" (Je t'aime totalment, tendrement, tragiquement)? What is the catch? What is it that makes it tragic or uncontrolled? Is it a lack of Paul's acts that leave him unconstituted as a subject? Does Paul in his acts towards Camille not produce subjects? Are his tenderness and love towards Camille as a totality of objects insufficient to establish harmony in this theater of an exchange of acts that do not transform into so-called "social objects"? It would seem that here again Hegel has an answer. In the annex to paragraph 119 of the *Philosophy of Right*, where he deals with intention and well-being, Hegel writes:

> Manifestly more or fewer circumstances may be included in an act. In the case of arson, e.g., the fire may not take effect, or it may spread farther than the agent intended. Yet in neither case is the result due to good or bad fortune, since man

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15. "The right of the subject's particular being to find himself satisfied [. . .]" (Das Recht der Besoderheit der Subjekts, sich befriedigt zu finden). Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 107, § 124; Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 233.
16. "'*Le sujet naît de l'objet* [The subject arises from the object].'—Michel Serres." Bill Brown, "Thing Theory," *Critical Inquiry* 28, no. 1 (Autumn 2001): 1.

> in acting must deal with externality. An old proverb rightly enough says, "A stone flung from the hand is the devil's." In acting I must expose myself to misfortune; that also has a right to me, and is the manifestation of my own will.[17]

When the subject or a person is doing something, "they must deal with externality," which leads them to a tragic situation. Still, far more important here is that the space of action is necessarily to be found on the outside and that the external is the site of uncontrollable things. "A stone flung from the hand is the devil's" (Der Stein, der aus der Hand geworfen wird, ist des Teufels). Unequivocally, Hegel predicts that what is external and the scene initiated by the act of "throwing" (the object) and which confirms the existence of what is external ("action," "external," "throwing," and "stone" are all registers not under human or the subject's control or responsibility) confirm the possibility of something we could call "the acts of the object." We do not know where the stone will ultimately end up, or better still, where it ends and in what way the action as such of throwing unfolds. Paradoxically, we know even less than we think we know, since we do not know how any action of the subject ends. What does this mean? That all action endangers the basic principle of reality, which is causality. In a word, we cannot "gather," "collect," or "glean" all the consequences of our actions (gestures). The significance of "throwing" (the stone and Devil are merely cosmetic additions to Hegel's constructions) implies immediately a new analogy or counter-analogy of "catching" or "gathering," which is what Godard's Camille does, in her attempt to hold herself firm, entirely thanks to her partner.

Hegel's proverb thus becomes an introduction to two operations or two movements that directly concern the object (or at least would appear to): the first is the act of throwing itself, which implies various domains, the best known among which are the subject, object, project, conject, etc.[18] The second, reflex-

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Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 104–5, § 119. "Es ist allerdings der Fall, daß bei einer Handlung mehr oder weniger Umstände zuschlagen können: es kann bei einer Brandstiftung das Feuer nicht auskommen oder auf der anderen Seite dasselbe weiter greifen, als der Täter es wollte. Trotzdem ist hier keine Unterscheidung von Glück und Unglück zu machen, denn der Mensch muß sich handelnd mit der Äußerlichkeit abgeben. Ein altes Sprichwort sagt mit Recht: der Stein, der aus der Hand geworfen wird, ist des Teufels. Indem ich handele, setze ich mich selbst dem Unglück aus; dieses hat also ein Recht an mich und ist ein Dasein meines eigenen Wollens." Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 225.

[18]   Across various books in the last decade, Peter Sloterdijk varies and thematizes the figures of throwing and thrower, first appearing in *Nicht gerettet: Versuche nach Heidegger* (Frankfurt

ive action, is entirely conceptual, where something from the outside "comes in" or where something is accepted and captured from externality itself, thus becoming the representation or concept. Be that as it may, thrown objects or the Devil's objects arrive constantly, because what is thrown necessarily returns and is caught. Here is how Thomas Aquinas, in an entirely different register, regardless of the Devil being a symptom and present in every miss, explains the act of the object or the conceptualization of the thrown object:

> For what is conceived in the intellect (*intellectu concipitur*), since it is a likeness of the thing understood, representing the thing's form, seems to be an offspring of the thing. Therefore, when the intellect understands something other than itself, the understood thing is like a father of the word conceived in the intellect, and the intellect more resembles a mother, whose property is that conception takes place in her. But when the intellect understands itself, the word conceived is related to the one understanding as an offspring is to a father.[19]

The father or the object or what comes from the outside is really the subject that actively, and in this case very precisely, hitting the mark, arrives at *its proper place.*

The two sets of operations or series of acts initiated by Hegel's proverb are simultaneous and permanent, meaning that this theater of connections and relations usually leads to various distribution of roles, terms, and meanings. Thus, the history of the world could probably rather neatly fit into four verbs: approach, move away, hit, and miss. If we consider "missing" the rule, as after all Hegel (and not only Hegel) constantly does, the simultaneous nature and continuous contact (and friction) between the external and the internal, throwing

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am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001) as a stone that is thrown. Here is Sloterdijk's breakdown of roles: "The throw that hits the mark is the first synthesis of subject (stone), copula (action), and object (animal or enemy)." Peter Sloterdijk, *Not Saved: Essays after Heidegger*, trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 116.

[19] Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium of Theology*, trans. Richard. J. Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 36. "Quando igitur intellectus intelligit aliud a se, res intellecta est sicut pater verbi in intellectu concepti; ipse autem intellectus magis gerit similitudinem matris, cuius est ut in ea fiat conceptio. Quando vero intellectus intelligit se ipsum, verbum conceptum comparatur ad intelligentem sicut proles ad patrem." Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae*, Corpus Thomisticum, bk. 1, chap. 39, https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ott101.html.

and catching, requires us to introduce the alternative as well, that is, the option or idea of the ideal, analogously, the idea of the concept. Hegel's Devil implies the existence of some "ideal object" (an ideal throw, a perfect stone that arrives where it is intended, taking only its charted course, perfectly embodying the concept of stone as such when it lands), which never comes to pass, but nevertheless continues to exist and fascinate. Its ideality is protected by the project or the projective mind. This is the moment when any idea of the object is really erased in the project (the project lasts longer, it does not assume any kind of opposition or reflexivity, nor does it shy away from the Devil). In any mention of any object she finds and names, Camille *a priori* sets the concept of each and evokes the ideal object. There can be no totality of all or the whole unless each object is not individually ideal.

What then is the ideal object? Is it in Camille's mind or does it appear in encountering every individual object? Is it moved by the object as such? Is it an objective act?

The "ideal object," or for example the "ideality of the architectural object" (Peter Eisenman's text "Misreading Eisenman" contains the phrase "the object as ideal essence")[20] is actually a paraphrase of the title of Jacques Derrida's 1957 unwritten doctoral thesis, "The Ideality of the Literary Object" (L'idealité de l'objet litteraire). Derrida's sentence from "Introduction to Husserl's *Origin of Geometry*," "the ideal object is the absolute model of the object in general" (l'objet idéal est le modèle absolu de l'objet en general),[21] implies that this ideal is actually regulative and opposed to objects not purely intentional or objects that are intentional *cum fundamento in re* (a distinction we borrow from Roman In-

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[20] Peter Eisenman, "Misreading Eisenman," in *Eisenman Inside Out: Selected Writings, 1963–1988* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 211.

[21] Jacques Derrida, introduction to *L'origine de la géométrie*, by Edmund Husserl (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962), 57.

garden),[22] or opposed to ordinary physical objects (which, for example, Peter Eisenman also calls "things in themselves").[23]

The head (Camille's and other) does not contain objects (this would be nonsense), nor even the ideal or ideas (for this would be trivial—everyone has ideas, heads are brimming with ideas, meaning that such an explanation is insufficient). Rather, it contains the "ideal of the object as such." The idea of something that has physical presence is precisely the conceptual or the concept. In his famous text on conceptual architecture, Peter Eisenman finds that "the idea within the thing itself" is synonymous with the "conceptual structure" of the thing itself, and finally that "physical reality itself does have a conceptual aspect."

What is the novelty here? Projecting (to project is to throw something forth, in front of oneself) is not projecting/designing an object (one does not throw forward an object). The object is, rather, discovered, revealed, selected, exposed, presented before (*vis-à-vis*; *Gegenstand*) by way of the concept. In that sense, the project is a projection of the concept that is always the concept of the object (the "ideal of the object as such"). The task of philosophy and architecture is to reveal the concepts of physical things and to realize objects in time (process and design are two protocols that only appear at this point).

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[22] "The architectural work can be not merely thought or imagined but also realized to a certain degree, that it can be an intentional object, but *cum fundamento in re*." Roman Ingarden, "The Architectural Work," in *Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film*, trans. Raymond Meyer and John T. Goldthwait (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 271.

[23] Eisenman, "Misreading Eisenman," 215. Levinas's book on intuition in Husserl contains the phrase "*une structure ideal de l'objet*" and it displays rather well the nature of the ideal. Emmanuel Levinas, *Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologique de Husserl* (Paris: Vrin, 1930), 117.

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