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Wolfgang Merkel

NEW CRISES: SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY¹

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the restructuring of political conflict in Western societies in the 21st century, as well as its effects on morality, science, and democracy. I argue that the traditional socio-economic dimension of conflict has been intersected by a new dimension of cultural conflict between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian camps. In this paper, I identify three new crises which are responsible for this two-dimensional conflict structure: the refugee and migrant crisis, the climate debate, and the COVID-19 pandemic. I argue that these crises are not based in "objective" facts alone, but that they are also shaped by their subjective perceptions or "crisis narratives". The paper shows that these narratives are characterized by three distinct properties: scientification, moralization, and polarization. Scientification entails the simplified perception of both science and democratic decision-making. By reducing the role of science to a singular procedure which produces non-refutable "truths", scientification has led to a change in the perception of democracy from a pluralistic and *a posteriori* decision-making to the means of implementing *a priori* scientific truth. The second characteristic of crisis narratives is moralization; that is, the stylization of one's own moral position as superior in order to disparage another moral position which introduces binarism and friend-foe relations in the political discourse of democracy. Finally, I demonstrate how these properties undermine democratic pluralism by leading it into a two-dimensional (or, in the case of the United States, one-dimensional), non-negotiable and "all or nothing" polarization.

KEYWORDS

new conflict structure,
crisis narratives,
democracy,
scientification,
moralization,
polarization

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
Introduction

Whoever talks about democracy cannot remain silent about its crises. We have known this since the days of Plato, at the latest. The gallery of great minds is an impressive one: from Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Hobbes, Tocqueville, Weber to Habermas, Offe, or Colin Crouch. All of them reflected not only on the democratic system of rule, but also its crises. As impressive as the latter three contemporaries are both scientifically and intellectually, however, their diagnoses of crisis are exaggerated – at least if one takes the term “crisis” seriously and understands it as an existential question of life or death, stability or collapse, democracy or autocracy. In the last five decades, we have not experienced any such existential crisis of democracy in Western Europe (Koselleck 2004; Merkel 2020a; Merkel 2017a; Kneip et al. 2020). The United States under President Donald Trump may be a borderline case (Levitsky; Ziblatt 2018). The populist-plebeian style of government and the undemocratic claim to power of Trump and the Republican Party supporting him have been successfully repudiated by the democratic institutions of the rule of law, the quality press, and finally by free elections. Things are different in Eastern Europe: despite membership in the European Union, Romania and Bulgaria never managed to become fully developed constitutional democracies. Far more disturbing is that the region’s former flagship democracies, namely Hungary and Poland, have regressed from consolidated to defective and illiberal democracies within a decade (Merkel 2004; Ágh 2019).

In short: there is no existential crisis of Western democracies, but there is an erosion of democracy worldwide. The latest expert surveys by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) show this very clearly. The aggregated graph line in Fig. 1 shows the average quality of “Western” democracies over time since 1950, illustrating that the quality of democracy held up until the epochal break of 1989. This marked the addition of the young democracies of Eastern Europe, whose quality was less developed than that of the Western European democracies. The small dip in the democratic evolution is quickly smoothed out again as the 32 established democracies democratized further. Greater gender equality, legal acceptance of same-sex preferences, better protection of minorities, strengthening of civil society and media diversity were the drivers of the “democratization of democracy” (Offe 2003). This trend continued until 2008, when it took a significant turn for the worse. Since then, the quality of the best democracies has been visibly declining. Twelve years are a long enough period to call this a stable trend.

This long trend line of democratic erosion is now being met with considerable force by three external crises that challenge democracy in especially persistent ways. What are these crises, what distinguishes them, and why are they particularly challenging?

Fig. 1: The development of the quality of established democracies (1950-2020).



Source: V Dem - Varieties of Democracy: Average of 26 EU countries (excluding Malta), UK, Australia, New-Zealand, Canada, USA and Japan

New Conflict Structures

Financial, labor-market and, more generally, economic crises have not gone away. It is certainly true that the “Great Recession”, the financial crisis (2008 onwards), and the ensuing Eurozone crisis (2010 onwards) were more than a decade ago. However, the construction of the European common currency, the large-scale deficit spending in response to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the considerable transformation costs in the fight against the climate crisis will contribute to the fact that economic crises will not disappear. Despite improved international governance instruments and a willingness to cooperate on the part of the major capitalist economies of the West, economic crises will continue to put pressure on democracy (Kocka 2013). Moreover, it is not only the crises of capitalism that can pose a threat to democracy, but also its very triumph: namely, when deregulated global markets continue to significantly constrain the scope for democratic politics (Merkel 2014).

Traditional economic crises have now been joined by new crises in the second decade of the 21st century, which in turn reflect the two-dimensional conflict structure of democratic competition in the developed democracies. The traditional horizontal conflict dimension between capital and labor, left and right, state and market has long been intersected by a vertical conflict dimension featuring cultural issues. This divides our developed societies into

urban, well-educated upper-middle classes on the one hand and a lower half with less education and lower socioeconomic status on the other. The former group follows a cosmopolitan worldview and sees nation-state borders as a relic of the 20th century that must be overcome. Their normative point of reference is not the nation but the whole of humanity; the political and legal equality of multiple genders ranks above classical distributive justice; they emphasize gender-neutral language, insist on equal rights for different sexual preferences beyond “heteronormativity”, stress a liberal immigration policy, and see the fight against the climate crisis as an absolute priority for the 21st century (Reckwitz 2017; Merkel 2017b; de Wilde et al. 2019). Socio-economically, they are among the well-to-do in our societies.

At the other pole of this conflict dimension, we find the less privileged in our societies. They are formally much less educated, earn less, and are socio-economically in the bottom half, if not the bottom third, of our societies. They are in favor of the nation-state, from which they expect protection and support, including the redistribution of material resources as well as income and life chances; they tend to have authoritarian rather than libertarian attitudes; the new terminology of gender-neutral language is unimportant to them, if they are familiar with it at all. This camp is divided into two groups: one group tends toward nationalism, right-wing populism, and xenophobia. Their political home is the right-wing populist parties. The other communitarian group consists primarily of the traditional clientele of social democracy. Their normative point of reference is the Swedish “folkshemmet”, the people’s home: a relatively homogeneous “home” with a strong solidarity-based welfare state. They have become politically homeless after the culturalist turn of some social democratic parties and, after a stay in the camp of non-voters, not infrequently end up with right-wing populists across Europe.

The socio-economic and the cultural conflict dimensions shape not only the competition structure of the party system, but also the discourse landscapes of Germany as well as many other developed Western European or North Atlantic societies. “Developed” is a key adjective here because it can be shown empirically that cosmopolitan cultural discourses are particularly strong in places where economies are highly developed and conducive to postmaterialist cultural discourses emerging from a terrain of material security. This Maslov-based needs hypothesis became extraordinarily influential in comparative politics with Ronald Inglehart’s book *The Silent Revolution* and retains its validity today (Inglehart 1977). Without the cultural discourses, socio-cultural camps, and political entrepreneurs mobilizing along discursively powerful lines of cultural conflict, it is impossible to understand why the new crises in the 21st century pose such a challenge for democracy.

New Crises

Financial, labor-market and, more generally, economic crises will not disappear under capitalism. The aftershocks of the financial and Eurozone crisis have by

no means disappeared in Southern Europe. In Northern and Western Europe as well as the US, in contrast, the financial crisis was followed by a long phase of stable economic prosperity.

Traditional economic crises have now been joined by new crises in the second decade of the 21st century. What are these crises, what makes them new, and why are they, in particular, an enormous challenge for democracy? We are talking here about the refugee and migration crisis of 2015 onwards, the climate crisis that has been smoldering or even blazing for some time, and the COVID-19 crisis. What makes these crises new are three characteristics that are intertwined in a certain sequence and contribute to the division of our democratic societies. It is precisely in the case of these “new” crises that it becomes apparent that they always have an objective and a subjective dimension. The objective dimension comprises the factual circumstances surrounding the crisis in question. In the dot-com stock market crisis of 2000, it was the bursting of a bubble that sent overvalued technology stocks plummeting. In the 2008 financial crisis, it was the bursting of the real estate credit bubble, first in the US, then in Europe; in the multi-layered euro crisis, it was the rapid increase in total private and public debt, the elimination of flexible exchange rates, and speculation about Greece leaving or remaining in the common European currency. In the refugee and migration crisis of 2015, an extraordinarily rapid influx of refugees and migrants into Western Europe, particularly Austria, Germany, and Sweden, was observed. In the climate crisis, the steady increase in global warming caused primarily by human activity (especially in industrialized countries) is seen as particularly serious. In the COVID-19 pandemic, it was the rapid increase in infection rates, mortality, and overcrowding in intensive care units in the hospitals.

This is only a partial list of the causes and circumstances of the crises. None of the three new crises can be explained by “objective” facts alone; in all of them, there is a subjective dimension of considerable importance. This relates to the construction of a crisis narrative as it is repeatedly developed in societal discourses by government, opposition, new political crisis entrepreneurs, media, demagogues, or social movements. There may be legitimate or illegitimate reasons for this. What holds true is the following: a crisis is only a crisis when the majority of people believe that it is a crisis. Crisis narratives contribute to this belief just as much as the “objective” facts they try to explain or distort. It is, above all, these crisis narratives that feed on the three new properties of scientification, moralization, and polarization, then nourish and weave them into a crisis context of public significance.

Scientification

Not all three crises are equally affected by scientification (Bogner 2021). The scientification thesis applies least of all to the refugee crisis. Even if policy-making elites have less expertise here than in social, labor-market, or domestic policy, the demand for scientific research on refugee movements and migration

is limited. However, more NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and think tanks operate here as policy advisors than traditional associations and lobby groups in economic and social policy. The situation is different in the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The complexity of the causes and spread of greenhouse gases or viruses catch political decision-makers cognitively unprepared, almost by necessity. The political demand for expertise in the (natural) sciences is accordingly high. Without scientific advice, rational and efficient crisis solutions cannot be found. The term “evidence-based policy making” already found its way into policy research from the health sciences (with “evidence-based medicine”) in the 1980s. With the climate crisis and the pandemic, it is also increasingly appearing in German political and media usage.

As necessary as scientific evidence-based policy advice is, it is not without problems and side effects. Governments may select scientists who best suit their concept, to the extent that they can already have such a concept pre-scientifically. Political-strategic selection is particularly problematic in complex crises characterized by ignorance and uncertainty. It is precisely there that politics requires a particularly broad and pluralistic access to scientists and scientific disciplines. If this access is strategically narrowed down for political reasons, the scientification of politics leads to the politicization of science. “Evidence-based policy making” is then in danger of being turned into “policy-based evidence making”.

Not only does this mean the exclusion of certain alternative scientific positions, but parts of science can come dangerously close to the sphere of political activism. “Scientists for Future”, in a sense the knowledge suppliers for the social movement “Fridays for Future” (FFF), cannot have an easy time following the epistemic imperative of open-ended research behind their scientific-political engagement. The movement activists of FFF, for their part, respond as naïvely as logically: “Science has told us”. In other words, the political plans have long been at the ready and it is compromise-based politics that stands in the way of the necessary one-to-one translation of scientific research into policy. Two problematic simplifications become visible here: on the one hand, “science” is spoken of in the singular, as if it were not precisely the competing pluralism of the sciences with their permanent attempts at refutation that guarantees scientific progress in the search for truth (Popper 1963); on the other hand, democratic policymaking is misunderstood as a machinery for implementing “truthful”, “indubitable” knowledge. It is as if there were always only *one* political problem in migration,² climate policy, or pandemic policy, rather than multiple consequences affecting civil liberties, the labor market, economic growth, inequality distribution, or generational and gender issues. One of the too little-noticed side effects of the scientification of politics is the naïve simplification of what science and politics are and what they can, should, and

2 I am consciously using the overarching term “migration” here in the awareness that there are very different motivations and causes of human movements that, in turn, lead to different legal categories for immigrants and refugees.

must be in a democracy. The singularization of both knowledge and political processing does not do justice to either.

This raises another problem that will preoccupy democracy now and especially in the future. This is a question that, beyond social movements, concerns the governing and the governed alike: can science (in the plural) (pre-) determine the common good? Not least in Germany, an old longing that never quite disappeared is experiencing a renaissance: namely, to bypass or even overcome the arduous path of party pluralism (referred to as *Parteihader* in the Weimar era) and the laborious process of finding compromises. This is by no means to be done by an autocrat, but perhaps by an impeccable sphere such as that of science, committed only to truth. Why, then, should one deviate from the supposed truth just because different interests, less truthful politicians, or even ignoramuses influence the political decisions and thus water down the best solution conforming to science? What we would then need are collective philosopher-kings who are ethically and cognitively on top of the problems of the day and can solve them faster, more effectively, and more justly than the lengthy decision-making processes on the levels of pluralistic interest negotiation are ever capable of doing.

I accentuate my argument here to illuminate the democratic pitfalls of this scientific understanding of politics. When, for example, in climate policy, it is said that the goal and the path to the goal have long since been formulated by science and that politics must only finally implement them, this is based on a misunderstanding of what democracy is. As the theorist Adam Przeworski put it, democracy is “a system of ruled open-endedness, or organized uncertainty” (Przeworski 1991: 13). The institutions and procedures are fixed *a priori*, and the results of decisions are therefore necessarily contingent within the framework of the constitution and its laws. This, incidentally, is one of the cardinal differences with authoritarian decision-making regimes. For climate activists, zero-COVID advocates, and science-armed technocrats, on the other hand, it seems clear: the outcome is *a priori* fixed, the procedures only have to be adapted to it. This is the core of technocratically narrowed-down “evidence-based policy”. This is at odds with Ernst Fraenkel’s core postulate of pluralistic democracies: In a pluralistic democracy, the common good is achieved only *a posteriori*, as the result of a “delicate process of divergent ideas and interests among groups and parties” (Fraenkel 1991: 200). In this process, the state must ensure the “equality of arms” between the various social groups (parties, associations, organizations, groups), as well as the consideration of the interests of minorities. Scientific findings, too, must pass through the sluices of democratic decision-making procedures if they are to become legitimate, authoritatively binding resolutions and induce compliance from free and sometimes obstinate citizens.

Moralization

The second characteristic element of the “new” crises is the moralization of politics and scientific positions. Moralization is distinct from morality. Morality,

as codified in the human rights and freedoms of democratic constitutions, enshrined in the postulates of equality and justice in the norms of the rule of law, or understood as tolerance and respect in civilized civil societies,³ cannot be conceived without a morality that must constantly be subject to justification. Without morality there is no democracy. Moralization, however, is a different matter. Moralization is a self-righteous stylization of one's own moral position in order to disparage another moral position. It is a variety of egocentrism, a "moral ostentation" that claims for oneself a position of moral superiority (Neuhäuser, Seidel 2020: 10). Such ostentation cannot be had without moralizing and inappropriately reducing the complexity of political issues.

Two examples illustrate this. If, in the climate crisis, for example, someone criticizes the wisdom of the recent Constitutional Court ruling, which calls for a more precise step-by-step plan for achieving the Paris climate goals, by maintaining that this constitutes an excessive encroachment on parliamentary authority, he or she is usually not confronted with constitutional counter-arguments, but rather (not infrequently) defamed as a climate denier who accepts that, as a result of his or her petty democratic-theoretical concerns, the climate catastrophe will come closer, countries will be flooded, and people will have to die as a result of drought in certain regions. An argument on the issue of judicial self-restraint and parliamentary prerogatives thus becomes simplified and displaced onto the level of another issue in order to ascribe *ad personam* an immoral or even inhumane attitude to the opponent. This form of self-righteous moralization is not infrequently conducted with the aim of excluding supposedly immoral persons from the discourse of moral participants. If such an argument is conducted *coram publico*, it acquires a particularly intolerant effect.

Another example can be drawn from the controversial debates on measures against COVID-19. Here, the difficult balancing act between Article 2(2) and the freedoms enshrined in Articles 4, 8, 11, and 12 of the Basic Law in particular was repeatedly discussed, and rightly so. In moralizing discourses, the first sentence of Article 2(2), "Everyone has the right to life and physical integrity," was not only declared to be the overriding fundamental right, but all those insisted on balancing it against the other freedoms in the COVID-19 debate were suspected of devaluing the lives of their fellow human beings. Thus, not only was the counter-position dismissed as immoral, but the speaker also elevated himself onto the moral high ground. While, with the exception of the AfD, the official discourses in parliament were still conducted in a sufficiently civilized manner, on the Internet they not infrequently turned into hate and agitation via the moralization of positions.

"Excess moralization" (Strohschneider 2020) and the discrimination of dissenters not infrequently associated with it also become clear when it comes to

3 "Civilized civil society" is not a pleonasm, but a demarcation from "dark" undersides of civil society as represented by the likes of PEGIDA, Reichsbürger or militant conspiracy "theorists" in the German context.

labeling those citizens who, for whatever rational or (predominantly) irrational reasons, protest against the COVID-19 policy of the German federal government and the state governments. A name was quickly found for them: “Corona deniers”. Even before that, all those who refused to believe in anthropogenic global warming against all scientific evidence became “climate deniers”. But no discourse can be conducted with liars and deniers. As a result, these individuals are first conceptually and then actually excluded. Let there be no doubt: the author of this article has nothing at all in common with the positions of so-called “climate deniers” and “Corona deniers”. However, he considers moral discrimination to be democratically problematic and politically unwise, as it pushes people of very different convictions to the margins of democratic society. Democracy, on the contrary, requires debate, the “freedom of the dissenter” (Luxemburg) and the “unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas), i.e. inclusion and not exclusion.

A problematic binary is introduced into political discourse through the moralizing disparagement of opposing positions and the postulation of the superiority of one’s own. The binary code becomes: truth vs. lies, morality vs. immorality. In such a binary meta-scientific discourse, pluralistic, dissenting scientific positions in the public sphere become something that has to be fought against. This form of communicative practice initiates a moralistic transformation of discourse that crisis narratives then cast in the form of a friend-foe relation (Schmitt 1991: 20). It is not only the right-wing admirers of Carl Schmitt who understand this as the essence of the political; no, it is also supposedly left-liberal currents⁴ that view the exclusion of immoral opinions and their exponents as their democratic moral duty. The attempt of both sides to integrate complex societies with their own particular morals is pre-modern and leads to polarization in modern societies – the third characteristic of “new” crises.

Polarization

Democracy can be understood as a political order in which differences in interest, worldview, and moral conceptions of a pluralistic society can be peacefully negotiated and processed. If this succeeds with the majority approval of the population and without violent or anti-system dissidence on the part of political, social, religious, or ethnic minorities, democracy maintains its stability since the legitimacy of the democratic order, both empirical (in the form of approval from the population) and normative (Kneip, Merkel 2020), proves itself over and over again.

If this pluralism, while conflictual, is carried out in mutual acceptance and according to *a priori* fixed rules of decision-making, this can constitute a particular strength of democratic institutions and their embeddedness in a lively civil society. The transition from lively pluralism to polarization takes place

4 The common designation “left-liberal” is misleading in this context; exclusionary discourses may be many things, but being liberal is not one of them.

especially when the multitude of social divides merge and bundle into a single dimension. When this happens, cross-cutting cleavages lose their moderating effect and a single cleavage dominates the political contest. This can lead to society splitting into two camps. In the populist narrative, it becomes “us” vs. “them”, the “corrupt elites” vs. the “pure people” (Müller 2017; Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017).

In free Western societies, an increasingly far-reaching dimension of cultural conflict has been emerging over the past decade that runs between the camps of cosmopolitans and nation-state communitarians. The latter can appear in both traditional social-democratic and nationalist guises (Merkel 2017b; de Wilde et al. 2019). In Germany and Western Europe, the two dominant lines of conflict, socio-economic and cultural, have not completely merged into a one-dimensional one. However, the socio-economic conflict dimension between the well-off and the less well-off does not intersect the vertical cultural conflict dimension between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism orthogonally, since the camp of the better-off tends toward cosmopolitanism and that of the less privileged toward nation-state communitarianism. The two lines of conflict tend toward each other, but have not (yet) fused into a single dimension. That is why polarization in most Western European societies is not as advanced as in the United States, where social conflict has been politically fused into a single dimension by the polarized two-party contest between the Republicans and the Democrats. However, the one-dimensionality that Somer and McCoy describe is by no means a necessary condition for the polarization of a society (Somer, McCoy 2019; Somer, McCoy, Luke 2021). If the cultural conflict dimension dominates in a society, sharp polarization can emerge even in a two-dimensional conflict structure.

In polarization research, a distinction is made between democratizing polarization and pernicious polarization, i.e. polarization that threatens democracy (Pausch 2020). Why is cultural conflict (currently) particularly harmful? Socio-economic conflicts are generally easier to deal with than cultural conflicts. There, it is not a question of all or nothing, but of more or less. Compromises are possible, if not obvious. This does not mean that distributive conflicts are settled once and for all. The recurring compromises between the conflicting parties nourish mutual trust as well as acceptance toward the opponent and stabilize the rules of conflict resolution. The policies of the welfare state and collective bargaining agreements after 1919 and 1949, respectively, demonstrate the pacifying effect of this “democratic class struggle” (Korpi 1983) in Germany. Cultural conflicts are usually structured differently. They are about the whole, about true or untrue, lie or truth, recognition or non-recognition, identity vs. identity. Here, what is negotiated are “fundamental and, from the point of view of those concerned, non-negotiable, because morally absolute, values” (Lütjen 2021: 11). Purism allows for neither relative positions nor compromise (Pausch 2021: 3). The drivers of social purism are to be found primarily on the side of the populists, but also among the self-righteous moralizers of political conflicts.

Conclusion: Scientification, Moralization, Polarization, and Democracy

The migration, climate, and COVID-19 crises are characterized by scientization, moralization, and polarization to different degrees, but all of them to a much greater extent than economic crises. Discourse camps have long since formed in most Western democracies, reinforced with scientific and moralizing arguments by interest groups, NGOs, movements, political parties, and political entrepreneurs. The not infrequently hand-woven moralistic positions tear down the bridges of understanding between the camps. Opponents become enemies. Science, following this logic, cannot be negotiated any more than morality. “Science has told us”. Minority or dissenting opinions are effectively immoralized by majorities or activists. We are currently experiencing a re-coding of political conflicts that poses new challenges to democracy in Germany, Europe, and North America.

Beyond scientization, moralization, and polarization, the three crises have revealed other problematic trends for democracy. This became particularly clear in the COVID-19 crisis (Merkel 2020b). A shift from participatory input to decision-making output took place, whereby the executive dominated the legislature and science dominated democratic representation. Re-democratizing democracy after the pandemic is a challenge. But challenges are not yet crises. They only become so when politics and society fail to find answers appropriate to democracy. Faster, more centralized, more executive – as popular a choice this might be, it is the wrong one. Democracy needs time, pluralism, and dissent. If it is deprived of these, it loses quality and resilience (Schäfer, Merkel 2020). This will not stop the worldwide erosion of democracy, but accelerate it.

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Wolfgang Merkel

Nove krize: nauka, moral i demokratija u 21. veku

Apstrakt

Ovaj članak istražuje restrukturiranje političkog konflikta u zapadnim društvima u 21. veku, kao i efekte koje je ono imalo na moralnost, nauku i demokratiju. Pokazujem da je tradicionalno socio-ekonomska dimenzija konflikta postala ispresecana novom dimenzijom kulturnog konflikta između kosmopolitskog i komunitarnog kampa. U radu identifikujem tri nove krize koje su odgovorne za ovu dvodimenzionalnu strukturu konflikta: izbeglička i migrantska kriza, debata o klimatskim promenama i COVID-19 pandemija. U tekstu pokazujem da ove krize nisu zasnovane samo na „činjenicama“, već takođe i na subjektivnim percepcijama krize ili „naracijama krize“. Ove naracije poseduju tri različite osobine: scijentizacija, moralizacija i polarizacija. Scijentizacija podrazumeva simplifikovanu percepciju nauke i demokratskog procesa odlučivanja. Ona redukuje ulogu nauke na singularnu proceduru koja proizvodi neupitnu „istinu“ i time menja sliku demokratije od pluralističkog i *a posteriori* procesa donošenja odluka u sredstvo primenjivanja *a priori* naučne istine. Druga osobina naracija krize je moralizacija, odnosno stilizacija sopstvene moralne pozicije kao superiorne u odnosu na drugu, čime se unosi binarizam i prijatelj-neprijatelj odnos u politički diskurs demokratije. Najzad, demonstriram kako ove osobine podrivaju demokratski pluralizam time što ga vode u dvodimenzionalnu (ili u slučaju Sredinjenih Država, jednodimenzionalnu), bezkompromisnu i „sve ili ništa“ polarizaciju.

Ključne reči: nova konfliktna struktura, naracije krize, demokratija, scijentizacija, moralizacija, polarizacija

