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ETHICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF KIERKEGAARD'S PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM

ABSTRACT

Starting with the point of freedom being one of unavoidable ideas of existential philosophy, as well as philosophy in general, we shall consider ethical and ontological aspects of contemplation of freedom in Kierkegaard's philosophy. We deem that existential philosophy, "contemplated" in all its variations, represents the very horizon or manner of philosophical comprehension of freedom phenomena, where freedom is integrally observed, thus allowing us to talk about unique bliss of ontological and ethical dimension, both of those appearing to be equally important. Therefore, freedom dominates the Kierkegaard's determination of individual, co-determines all its leap stages but also continually makes possible the sense of human existence.

KEYWORDS

ethical, freedom, moral, ontological, individual, existential philosophy, perception of freedom

Specificity of Kierkegaard's Contemplation of Freedom

Syntagma stating that *self-imposed limitations represent realisation of my freedom* (Svendsen 2014: 242), discloses the frame or advice for perceiving freedom nowadays. Subjectively accessing just small number of thinkers, consciously and deliberately, Svendsen considered freedom in its three *manifestations*, ontological, political and ethical, thus desiring to *approximate* his own consideration to readers with no philosophical education (background). In our opinion, this *opens* Svendsen towards the horizon of existential comprehension of freedom, woven on individual self-structuring in the atmosphere of never-ending process of defining the term freedom.

Kierkegaard's philosophy, summed up as *a score of various life forms* (Zimmer 2011: 151), poetically speaking, represents *the most vivid* horizon of contemplation of freedom. Generally observed, in the context of existential thinking, one could say that the freedom appears simultaneously with truth, and that as those faithful topics that permeate philosophy from its beginning. At the same time, they can be talked about as terms treated by the philosophical thinking the most, and consequently the most emptied of meaning that could be denoted as existentially conditional, i.e. life denoted area of understanding. The reason for it is certainly the fact that those terms are dealt by the philosophy

as its foundations and without them one cannot speak about serious thinking, i.e. one cannot talk about man's reality.

The thought situation is somewhat more favourable when it comes to *truth* (Filipovic 1989: 155–157), but not in a sense that philosophy ended up with truth, on the contrary. Spectrum of philosophical paradigms devoted to truth ranges from antique, i.e. classic theory of adequacy or correspondence to theory of record and coherence, and if wishing to think historically, then the very pluralism of truth, as a characteristic of post-modern thinking, points out to an unfinished matter as life is, poetically speaking: i.e. to each curious spirit, the consideration of truth is revealed as a necessity of overrunning the actual situation. Without explaining in details, we could say that, in this context, the consideration of truth is revealed in more favourable situation, due to the denotation that existential thought places truth alongside with freedom which is nothing else then man's ownness, the Kierkegaard's individuality which is actually ontological oppositeness between individual and crowd. We make remarks about truth so the freedom does not come down to subjective and voluntarist line because, as ontologically and ethically as we may observe the freedom validity area, along with the truth it has to be truthful to the extent that can be understandable for another man, even if the extent is possibility of accepting the other man's freedom. Since it seems that Kierkegaard's conceptual determination for an individual, not the subject, is based on this thinking bliss, we shall say something about that too. Firstly, Kierkegaard is misaligned with ruling philosophical "ideology" in every way, primarily with that of Hegel, so his individuality hides what an abstract subject cannot possess: he is not allowed, for the general, higher cause. Secondly, individual stands in the midst of a crowd, opposite and despite of it, draining freedom as a condition and possibility of self in that very relation. Because the aim in existentialism is individual human situation just because it is presented in the form of climate appropriate for becoming an individual and, for a thinking man and his existence, that individuality is presented as an objective thing within subjectivity, solid soil and inseparable feature from the essence of a being itself. Therefore, freedom is limited boundlessness of a being. And it seems to have been like that forever, with certain boundaries caused by the diversity of time, experience and space. It could even be argued that perception of freedom is irrelevant, in metaphorical and ontological key, if the task is only conceptual description. Because with *elders* (Filipovic 1989: 304–306), or two of the greatest, we find familiar twinning of the term of freedom which forks in two, visible in each subsequent contemplation of freedom. According to Plato, freedom is defined within an idea of justice realised by an ideal state, therefore such ideal determination of freedom is reflected in a thought that everyone does what is his belonging capability; hence the freedom is presented as an internal determination within the man's infatuation with an ideal. Aristotle perceives freedom in a more systemic way, in dialectic three-steps, differentiating ontological determination of freedom according to which a man lives for his own sake and is determined by self-purpose, and ethical, leaned against

ontological where the choice of good and realistic things for a man matters. The frame of political determination is also determined in his contemplation of freedom, considered through actualisation of ontological and moral freedom as a social system in which an individual achieves the greatest fulfilment and it also seems that Hegel's receptive determination of state is not far from this syntagma. Therefore, if the freedom, at one level, is an ontological term that "describes" the very essence of a man, then, on the other level, ontic or factual level freedom¹ (Reese 1996: 242–244) may be represented through at least four ways that cover the variation in one of implementation areas what is also shown in several tens of various theories within these four ways. This "goes" simply because a man is the only being in the nature who is not complete in his inner, deepest determination, or at least significantly, a being determined by the necessity of the outer, laws of nature, but realises himself in the openness and the harmony with the outer world. Besides all other conclusions, this reveals what could be identified as a common feature which is nothing but conceptual elusiveness of freedom.

Ethical Dimension of Freedom

Starting from the previous section, to us it seems advisable that, instead of an attempt to determine the freedom by a definition, what is mainly pointless, to set our presentation of freedom thinking through the *Kierkegaard's Copernican turn* (Aumann 2008: 169), visible due to diffuse use of pseudonym. Let us remind that the purpose of pseudonym is, inter alia, determined as a way of overcoming the inability to communicate the subjectivistically located truth to another². Since this is where the hint is for solving the truth subjectivity riddle that could be comprehended by another individual, the situation is partly explained in the following attitude: "*Kierkegaard understood the world as the sphere of the creative activity of God. He took very seriously the fundamental biblical theme that God creates the universe through speech. Everything that exists does so because God is speaking it into existence. The human soul is that unique place in all of nature where the voice of God can be heard and responded to consciously*" (Bellinger, internet).³ Therefore, the turn here refers to the problem of understanding the truth, meaning the *equivalence* between a man and freedom, as a subjective source of truth inside the relation which is necessarily directed towards the absolute but only a part of that relation; therefore, the truth is inside an individual, in the *spirit* transcended by God, but

1 Terms *freedom* and *liberty* are separated in meaning lately so the first one refers to the situation of choice, whereas latter covers political-social area with no limitations and which is as such acknowledged to the members of society.

2 For more details see Preface of Kierkegaard's *The Sickness Unto Death*, Serbian edition (Kjerkegor, Seren (1980), *Bolest na smrt*, Beograd, Mladost). I think that Zurovac's stance is mainly directed to this basic ontological news in relation to traditional philosophy.

3 Bellinger's essay „Kierkegaard: Copernicus of the Spirit”.

inside-me who understands myself as another towards the general crowd which is subsequently *the origin* of truth as a result of Individual's self-appointment. Hence, Kierkegaard finds the outcome of truth in self-appointment as an Individual thus pointing at the truth determination turn as a problem of conveying that truth to another (besides that gnoseological location of truth within the subject) but also as a problem of comprehending the source of freedom. Generally speaking, this is hereby implied as a core determination with a hint of dominance, ideas of freedom as identified with a man-individual, by no means through leaning on the sophistic source of the well-known measure of all things, out of which everything would subsequently end in an unreachable ideal of a man-standard, but as a determination that the man himself is freedom. Besides the fact that Kierkegaard nohow belongs to the circle of *western relativism*, one should bear in mind that he, in his idiomatic way, nominates matters of thinking significantly different with the request that the sense of the world must be measured by freedom and individual's self-awareness, that of a specific individual, thus diagnosing the crisis of a contemporary man and his world expressed in the syntagma of turning the existing way of thinking "upside down". This is yielded by the thesis that the basis for the aforementioned relativism lies in the statement *that there are two opposite statements in every matter*. So the freedom thinking is ultimately diffusely determined, what is more clearly visible in ethical than ontological treatment of freedom. Kierkegaard's consideration of freedom phenomena is placed within the complete opus as one *implied* thinking concept of freedom of an individual. Hereby is emphasized that the freedom was subject to philosophical thinking since its beginnings, but not so passionately and with such a cry for sense as it was done in existentialism. It can be said that is *locus* of freedom placed in individual. Therefore, naming freedom perception implied, means to us freedom of thinking as a constituent of an individual in all its states; or as a determination that separates the individual, in the existence, from any other being; or as an existence itself within the deepest determination of an individual. If knowing that Kierkegaard *resented* to Hegel *freedom as recognition of necessity*, what is nothing more than reconciliation of an individual with the fact the he is not the end purpose but abstract historical process, we hereby meet the very moment where the freshness of his perception of freedom arises. I.e., the intersection point refers to the ontological unity of the person that is not a true person if not a free person, so it is not an individual but an abstract subject in the World spirit network. There, where the necessity rules, no freedom resides; necessities we recognise in the nature or logic are not opposed to the freedom of personality because they simply do not reside in the same place. In an anagogic way, Kierkegaard contemplates the truth of a being by responding to the classic abstract idealism, later scientific, constantly systemic, with the request *...it should immediately be borne in mind that the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about the individual's relation to Christianity* (Kierkegaard 1992: 15). If it wasn't like this, the delusions of the system would remain, i.e. the Christianity developed alongside and got established as a system that

neglects the truth so sought after by Kierkegaard. In his most general metaphor, the place of truth is thereby shown, hence the individual in its search for the truth as an inner relation, whereas the existential thinking uses terms basic for idealism, but with one key difference. Therefore, we quote Kierkegaard:

The term being in those definitions must, then, be understood much more abstractly as the abstract rendition or the abstract prototype of what being in concreto is as empirical being. If it is understood in this way, nothing stands in the way of abstractly defining truth as something finished, because, viewed abstractly, the agreement between thinking and being is always finished, inasmuch as the beginning of the process of becoming lies precisely in the concretion that abstraction abstractly disregards. (Kierkegaard 1992: 190)

It is totally understandable that word *disregard* comprises nothing but conceptual generalisation of life, elimination of determining and unpredictable moments that disturb dialectic regularity of the System, all thought to be, by Kierkegaard, opposition of freedom because it is necessity for an individual and thus freedom opposite.

As it is clearly indicated in each of his records, Kierkegaard places the area of freedom inside the personality, amongst personal choices and commitments, where Hegel's *dialectic mediation* bears no power since it rules *fantastic beings* (Kierkegaard 1992: 191)⁴, therefore his dialectics of inside has no denial nature in its development; so if wanting to speak "more freely" we shall say that, as for Kierkegaard, assumption, sometimes assumptions, or the preceding one, retain in existence by following the regularity *remembering the future observed in the past* since his perception of freedom retains existential character of a being meaning that every existence is personal for a man. So, as an example or a situation that creates the atmosphere of understanding for the reader, he uses what is the oldest in European man's memory, a Bible with its tales; on the other hand, he explains himself by means of Socrates. He links freedom to the original *liberation* of Adam from the natural all-union, unawareness of the own being that reaches the humanity being through such a dramatic fate as the original, forefathers' sin; because that is when a man attains possibility of freedom as, up to that moment, asleepness of spirit through detachment from fore-unity, fore-awareness. That Kierkegaard's perception of freedom is on the other side of every historical movement's necessity, where objectivity of the very thought has no utter sense; the internal sphere created by endeavour to realise complete and identity being. That gives the hint of kind of freedom. Being presented as *same-by-itself*, between freedom and personality, through the realised moment, but also as insufficiency of the becoming, we come to freedom as a need for constant *becoming*, realisation of infinity in finite. Hence, generally speaking, it is possible to say that Kierkegaard's freedom is *implied*, since it is present along with the truth, i.e. its omnipresence

4 Here is more explicit *criticism* of the purpose of Hegel's books from we took certain part, paraphrased.

is initially shown as *human being's dream*, as a selection which is a condition for every future choice an individual makes. Therefore, in order to show liveliness of the choice, it is being thoroughly, *pseudonymously and logically* (Kierkegaard 1987: 431) thought within the category of *choice* (he himself would say it was his only category) showing that, when an individual makes a choice, it is the absolute choice because the choice is not this and that materialistically, but absolute *own self in an eternal validity*, i.e., *the choice* can be understood *as a solution for possibilities that ultimately have the same argumentation value* (MacIntyre 1998: 140). Thereby we come to the ontological unity of my own self and freedom. Reasonableness, or something by which this unity means retention from both in the third, i.e. freedom in its emphasis as eternity of possibilities, is Kierkegaard's most abstract matter in thinking of freedom. At the same time it is the most specific thought of freedom at the moment of realisation. I.e. freedom as the realisation in the *same-by-itself* of myself and the absolute; I am when I choose myself, because *I choose in the absolute sense, and I choose absolute just with what I chose, I do not choose this or that and absolute is my own self in an eternal validity* (Kierkegaard 1987: 432). Further on, Kierkegaard speaks about one significant difference between the aesthetic and ethical individual, *main difference that everything revolves about*, difference that explains it all and that is simplicity handed out to the reader, with anticipated caution, over anonymous pseudonym. That significant bauble is that *ethical individual is transparent to itself and does not live "randomly", as it is the case with aesthetic individual* (Kierkegaard 1987: 578). Placing all this in a debate called *Equilibrium Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Composition of Personality*, Kierkegaard actually subordinates all individual's abilities to that unique objective, complete personality who is inside itself same as the freedom.

Ontological Dimension of Freedom

It would be hard to shed light on freedom in an ethical sense, just conditionally or temporarily differentiated from ontological, without describing the previous condition, or better to say state, but of the kind recognised as *setting*. In fact, freedom, as hidden man's essence just briefly grazed as ultimate ideal in every day's perception, remains condition aspired to by a man in a peculiarly confusing way, ambiguously, actually as irony has the thought relate to pure thoughtfulness. So, freedom fits a man, surely as a value of an abstract ideal that cannot be reached, or hardly reached, by means of revolution; and then it stands wrong, although it serves as a proof of effort, general aspiration or omnipresence and, thereby, haziness of freedom. Hence it is harder to find conventionality in Kierkegaard's perception of freedom, but as a confirmation of omnipresence, one can find similar banality of preceding state, opening for freedom efflux. There is a special setting in place for his perception of freedom, special inner relation expressed in certain existential character of a sinner. That condition, setting, is anxiety shown in his psychological work, called "The Concept of Anxiety". The whole debate is based on the postulate

that points out to the basics, that Kierkegaard's man *is the synthesis of infinity and finite, transient and eternal, freedom and necessity, in short: synthesis* (Najdanović 2009: 69). That synthesis appears to be a problem for existential determination, which is not surprising because anxiety is considered a state, present in both of man's united poles as an *insinuated* state which is announced as potential before as well as after opening the possibility, so it can be treated as a warning, signalling feature of a man's inside. Therefore, anxiety points towards the possibility of freedom, towards its appearance. *Possibility*, now as a category with reference to category of choice, is of another kind, therefore, after psychology makes an initial step in elaboration of anxiety, we enter dogmatism, although we are only interested here in the part that concern freedom; and awareness of oneself, self-awareness. For him, to be educated in possibility means to be prepared for communication which is relation with self as an absolute; to be ready to open self towards the absolute is turning towards the eternity, which is nothing but freedom of individual from delusions of the World, realisation of oneself as Existence. Equality of faith and thought is self-explanatory, but as a *passion*. *One who is formed by possibility, is formed by its eternity* (Kierkegaard 1980: 138). With Kierkegaard, one should be aware of the specific environment due to dialectic line, the unity attained by interfluence and interlacing of anxiety, possibility and eternity, which, as a dialectic triad which is not that because *the previous* is not denied, points to the *victim* direction. As it will turn out, Kierkegaard's relation towards the concept of the victim is self-denying, even in the sense that his thinking denies, puts the thinking, reasonable part of the personality in the second place. Therefore, one who is formed by anxiety, is formed by possibility and only he is formed by his eternity. Hereby we notice possessive-reflexive adjective *one's own* as a passing point towards understanding what has been said, because eternity is primarily understood as a general category, feature of Absolute or God so it is necessary to pay attention and attempt to see what personal, *one's own* eternity is in the matter. Since the first characteristic of possibility is that *everything is equally possible in possibility* (Kierkegaard 1980: 139). They are between nothing and reality. Being of possibility is that it can always be but only if it can be borne by the internal potential of personality. This is not outside of reflection on freedom, on the contrary. One may say that, instead of constantly aspiring to *repack the world* that would create chaos, a man should direct himself to the truth travelling through personal self-realisation because personality becomes that unique absolute, and hence the free personality is its own goal. So, the personal self-realisation is the base point from where we can change the world, whereas free personality is only true reality and there somewhere is the constant or basic truth that Kierkegaard conveys to us.

If perceived historically, with Kierkegaard, realisation of freedom rests on life, experienced moments, biographic reminiscences he uses to shed light on most of his concepts. It is also the case with freedom in the context of his beloved Regina, who is so much more significantly important for Kierkegaard than their engagement can be spoken about as a biographical reminiscence from

two people's lives, even in cases when it leaves a deep trace in souls. Regina is actually as important as the paradigm of father, as seeking the true Christianity; to be more specific, significance is shown in experiencing the possibility to renounce something valuable for the most precious value. It is so in perception of freedom, because freedom reveals itself in renunciation, i.e., victimisation that leads towards the absolute. The thought of such renunciation without experiencing is manifested as pointless in many Kierkegaard's sentences. Hereby we shall only point out to some, more vividly and lively communicated. So, *My relation to her* is one small paragraph we find in *Diary* (Kierkegaard 2013: 188–189). Even before that paragraph he endlessly *contemplates and unwinds* each moment, each encounter, gesture, different acts within same situation; comprehensiveness. However, in this paragraph he speaks of *major guilt for pursuing her and dragging her along*. Any ordinary man would say about himself that regret occurred, however, through five cycles Kierkegaard here elaborates particular significant *relational* moments of cognition and emotions, emotional self-development and immediacy of interior through suffer with no hint of an end. Dialectically, he speaks of “her” in seven episodes; two of which are augmented, one as an *ultimatum*, second one as a *crucial step*. Ontologically, relation is shedding light on inner being, reaching unmediated reflection. Existentially, it is about sacrificing ethical for religious. There is indirect speech used on another place (Kierkegaard 2013: 118). Johannes writes to Cordelia, and as he does that, he is already *aestheticizing*. Thereby the *female existence is existence for another*, and it reflects in *maiden* which is such *only in relation to a man*. This is ontological matter by all means, i.e., by determining existence, whereas empirically, thus ethically, there is confusion because *seldom one finds a woman who would be something else*. Simply, breaking an engagement for Kierkegaard is a sacrifice same as the one, standard-like, that Abraham, once upon a time, left to a man, but a man to whom Kierkegaard allocates a mission thus making him newly-revealed type; not some new, still non-existent man, super-man, but the very existing one, concrete, with a sacrifice mission, the one who builds own self through despair and anxiety thus making it possible to exist in one new, self-awareness-full meaning.

And every time when it comes to contemplation of freedom, there is a discussion on choice, either-or, which in philosophical perception of time, does not see oppositeness as a problem because philosophy treats time as past time, history, which is future for freedom, still non-existent but determining as a possibility not to be if missing a choice. *My either-or firstly means a choice that is chosen by, what is chosen comes second*, i.e. choosing between two suggestions is less significant in relation to *choosing volition* (Kierkegaard 1987: 431). The thing is that two spheres have been usually equated, speculative thinking and freedom, hence many difficulties arise in presenting freedom as reality, i.e. part of existence. A specific man is “not interested” in Hegel's sphere of necessity, which is reasonable because it is part of world's mind, where oppositeness does not create problem, i.e. where mediation has its place; Kierkegaard's directs us towards the inner sphere of personality where either-or has determining

meaning, where historical necessity has no influence on the freedom of an individual because *freedom is eternal and arises from nothing* (Kierkegaard 1980: 94). With Kierkegaard *necessity* is reflected through *sin*, and the aim is on unrealised essence of a being as the greatest sin, since it blocks other constitutive characteristics of an individual, from freedom to truth. Further on, in his book "The Concept of Anxiety" he contemplates sin, another non-philosophic category, very systematically, thus unusual for his opus, bringing immediate presentation of freedom as a subject of contemplation for psychology as "competent" discipline with its own, certain legalities related to the psychological sphere. Surely, as it is clearly noted in *Introduction*, psychology is here in Kierkegaard's conceptual scope and understanding the subject, so, inter alia, for this reason, this book is marked as *filled with philosophy* (at least by Heidegger) and it is usually marked as the most difficult book (Bertman 1990: 117). *In an anxiety everyone is returning to own relation to Absolute*, so the anxiety could not be observed conventionally psychologically, but for Kierkegaard *it is as Mind or Logos are for Hegel* (Kierkegaard 1980: 37). Psychological finds limit and inability in a specific *setting* where *anxiety is vertigo of freedom that appears because the spirit wishes to continue synthesis, and freedom, infatuated with its own possibility, catches that moment of infinity and clings onto it* (Kierkegaard 1980:59). Sartre points out that Kierkegaard in this work presents the essential difference between various types of anxiety, such as: anxiety as a fear of unknown patness of my being, anxiety of future, as a field full of un-lightened past and anxiety as bare, plain fear which is not a true anxiety because it refers to immediate and objective danger. Accepting determining Kierkegaard's attitudes in contemplation of anxiety, Sartre calls the first one *anxiety from oneself*, whereas fear, but not ordinary ever-day fear, is different because it determines the feeling of a *being in the world* (Sartre 1966: 29).

Definition of freedom is affirmed, definition which is not that in the strict sense of perception, as a *possibility of the possible, but also the power of being able to do so, because if the freedom is really motion of reflection in itself, then these two possibilities of freedom are actually only one and the same possibility-like itself and the mirror image of reflection* (Todorović 2001: 105). We distance from this statement, i.e. to define freedom here would mean to remain at conceptual which does not open the very possibility of doing, leap that turns eternal possibilities into possible, current and becoming. Simply because an individual man, Kierkegaard's contemporary, with his incorporation into the existing forms of human existence, meaning social and individual occurrences, he is *opposed to* free personality, existent being that chooses itself. Kierkegaard aims at individuality that is courageous to accept itself truly, seemingly in a way that rejects temptation, "Adam-like" example that opens qualitatively new possibility from *Nothing* through elimination of natural. That certainly implies revolution as true elimination of the existing order, which is natural in its *fore-sample* and rational in all latter cases. There is no way it could be achieved by disintegration of the current order by some social, politically induced revolutions, this is primarily about the personal and rare courage to start

and enlighten processes inside an individual that would lead to the essential reconstruction of a being, cease of unhuman living. That is primarily conditioned by questions of the truth of a being and simultaneously its freedom. Kierkegaard's question of truth is primarily a question of existential truth which means it is not about historically cognitive knowledge, but about ways of existence, *confessions*, through which an individual does not necessarily debate any factual, historical consistencies but significantly differently conveys *the way of his search for the sense of own life and the way of illuminating those facts through this search* (Životić 1973: 44). So it is clear that Kierkegaard's truths are *illuminating* and not explanatory what doesn't mean that he doesn't controvert or contemplate objectivity and materialism as frame of existence for a free man, but, as we have indicated, he emphasizes specific, always personal dimension, effort to be made in the direction of discussed despair and omnipresent anxiety through which an individual gains its absolute of using freedom, which is proportional to potential, incognitive and immanent to an individual man. The special emphasis is on bilateral relation between us and the truth, created in the simultaneous attention that objective truth, if detached from my existence, could not be spoken about because it simply cannot be in such way, and on the other hand, my inner, spiritual life must be connected to outer, objective world so it isn't insanity, just like even greater insanity is the objective one, not linked with the spirit.

Kierkegaard wrote many pages in order to "disclose" traditional philosophical abstraction of a man; it primarily refers to Hegel's magnificent work named System, hence System with capital S, cause Kierkegaard takes it personally, everything other in traditional philosophy is less *clumsy* or more human related to inexcusable deed to create pan-logical scientific system out of antique love for wisdom. The truth in the System is process-historical, mediated, triad dialectic and presented as senior and essential, so the attention of Kierkegaard is directed to pointing out to excessive objectivity and unbiased concern; because what is this philosophy that eliminates a man, not caring about his entire being. Therefore, Kierkegaard seeks grounds in well-known places, at least for Christians (as an exponent and denial of a trapped man), for which he, maybe, too often used to use biblical syntagmas and motives as a well-known surrounding for his reader. If he was to use the same language to communicate to everybody, he would not be understood not even to the least extent, and understanding *him* is opinion of the reader about *own self* so the philosophy in his thinking should be a tool for our own being or it itself is nothing, i.e. it is then totally useless and hence his great effort would be meaningless. So, there where the necessity rules instead of freedom, where the truth is objective, necessary and mediated instead of unmediated, subjective-life aware, then individual *is not being* and there is no existence without it. That explains Kierkegaard's passionate opposition to Hegel's contradiction in which the final being has a role of a "tool" in realising the objective purpose of the truth and calling it all philosophy of freedom. Questioning himself and us about freedom as a condition of truth, and vice versa, Kierkegaard firstly asks if a man may

put his head on the block for the truth? The question arises as the preceding one, but simultaneously as a hypothesis he uses to involve us in a discussion on the relation between a man and truth, as a necessary situation testing process thus testing an individual. In his usual style, Kierkegaard here, using concepts that are not really concepts from the philosophical point of view, actually puts the reader in a position to be involved in a discussion what makes his initial questioning resemble Socratic method, also known as maieutics. Although, one should bear in mind an opposite option, such as Životić's final remarks, illustrational for the logic they use. Hereby we mean a kind of return to Hegel that seems to be an unusual verdict to the existential thinking. *"Kierkegaard wanted free individual without free community. Hence an individual can only remain in the world of necessity without real possibility to express own personal strengths, without possibility to get realised as a free being."* (Životić 1973: 48). Therefore, in the sense of disagreeing with the previous assessment, the starting point of Kierkegaard's philosophy could be an assumption that freedom is not attainable philosophically since every argumentation would then be "caught in the network" of logical necessity thus reaching direct contradiction with freedom, exclusively attainable through spiritual endeavour through such state of mind in which anxiety pervades the whole being, explained in Kierkegaard's psychology as own subject and which opens up possibility for freedom. Still, philosophical is partly interwoven with Kierkegaard's psychological, at least as an auxiliary tool but also as logically necessary reason. Therefore, Kierkegaard devotes his work, philosophical in teaching, poetical in language and form, to anxiety, because an individual does not exist without freedom which *is not* such without anxiety as a precondition in which seeker exercises for the final self-cognition.

Conclusion

What could be ending words at this article when we know that Kierkegaard, by denying philosophical path, actually denies the conceptual exclusiveness as an "addle" way to illuminate something belonging to each man? Kierkegaard's thought teaches us- necessity of freedom is possible without philosophical, whereas vice versa does not make sense. In that atmosphere, we deem that making conclusions about freedom can be done in the horizon of basic orientation of existential thinking as primarity of existence over essence, where freedom appears such us deepest truth of Individual. Therefore, primary for a man is whatever is lively, existential, pervasive, of flesh and blood, breath embraced, recognised through freedom, comprehended as freedom. Freedom as a feeling, atmosphere and suffering of existence or freedom as a paradox of a being that lives limited existence as becoming with inner projection of limitless and unfinished as always in-motion, im-perfect finalisation of the own purpose. Hence inability to separate and differentiate ethical and ontological in Kierkegaard's philosophy.

Resume: Ethical and ontological dimension of contemplation of freedom in Kierkegaard's philosophy direct towards the unique horizon of self-appointment of an individual. Just like the existential philosophy generally represents the specific form of philosophical perception of freedom in which the freedom is comprehensively considered, also with Kierkegaard these two dimensions cannot be observed separately. Ethical dimension of freedom is presented not only in the ethical manner of existence, but as a capability of generalisation and relation to the world. Ontological dimension is not only in the question what is the essence of an individual but also in what needs to be done to become an individual. Hence it was necessary to present key aspects of Kierkegaard's perception of freedom through systemic thinking and Christianity, on one hand, and inside his contemplation of an individual, on the other. Both dimensions imply constant questioning of conditions set before a man with the purpose of making him an individual, and within the paradox of existence as limited boundlessness.

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Etičke i ontološke dimenzije Kjerkegorovog poimanja slobode

Apstrakt

Polazeći od stava da je sloboda jedna od nezaobilaznih ideja egzistencijalne filozofije, ali i filozofije uopšte, razmatraćemo etičke i ontološke aspekte promišljanja slobode u Kjerkegorovoj filozofiji. Smatramo da egzistencijalna filozofija, promišljena u svim njenim varijantama, predstavlja onaj horizont ili način filozofskog poimanja fenomena slobode, u kome se sloboda misli integralno, pa se onda može govoriti o jedinstvenom patosu ontološke i etičke dimenzije, gde se one pokazuju podjednako važnim. Sloboda tako dominira Kjerkegorovim određenjem pojedinca, sa-određuje sve skokovite etape ali i neprestano čini mogućim smisao čovekovog bivstvovanja.

Ključne reči: etičko, sloboda, moral, ontološko, pojedinac, egzistencijalna filozofija, poimanje slobode