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This voluminous book is a collection of papers by authors from various philosophical backgrounds that includes an extensive and multifaceted research on the problem of subjectivity, viewed in the light of Nietzsche's philosophy. Subjectivity, as a philosophical problem *par excellence*, with its centuries-long tradition, still figures as one of the most viable problems of philosophy. Even though it is debatable if this problem plays the central role in Nietzsche's philosophy, it still is one of its most important and most intriguing aspects, taken into account Nietzsche's ties, but also a radical break, with the philosophical tradition, as well as the progeny of Nietzsche's thought among 20th and 21st century philosophers. The book is divided into three sections, first of which is concerned with Nietzsche's various influences from philosophical, scientific and literary tradition. The second section deals with the question whether Nietzsche is still a modern or a post-modern philosopher, with respect to his views on the concept of subject. Finally, the third part focuses on current debates that are being discussed among Nietzsche scholars.

Section I *Tradition and Context* represents a comprehensive discussion on influences on Nietzsche's view on the self, 'I' and the subject, with great depth and detail in tracing the sources that shaped Nietzsche's reception of philosophical tradition. In this regard, the first three articles deal with the inevitable influence on Nietzsche by rationalist philosophy, i.e. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz – philosophers who shaped the modern view of the subject. De(con)struction of the Cartesian concept of subject (though Descartes never used this term) as *res cogitans* plays a very important role in Nietzsche's philosophy and his views on the *self*. Thus, the first article, titled *Writing from a First-Person Perspective: Nietzsche's Use of the Cartesian Model*, provides a comparative analysis of the conceptions of self, elaborated by these two philosophers, their common utilization of the first person perspective and their views on immediate self-knowledge. It draws upon Descartes' *Discourse on the Method* as a helpful model in interpreting Nietzsche in his use of this perspective (p. 59), especially having in mind Nietzsche's citation of the passage from this work in the first edition of *Human, All Too Human*, where he emphasizes the importance of philosophical solitude. Nevertheless, what Descartes fails to provide us with, in Nietzsche's view, is his own *becoming* as a philosopher, his individual genesis which is rooted deeply below the level of *cogito* – in affects and drives. Therefore, an

important role in Nietzsche's understanding of these deep fabrics of the self can be found in Spinoza and Leibniz. What drew him to Spinoza, the second article (*Power, Affect, Knowledge: Nietzsche on Spinoza*) argues, was the idea of subjectivity as agonistic conflict of affects, our intellect being just one among many of them. This concept of affect is viewed in broader perspective of Spinoza's ontology of *striving (conatus)*, where affects are the expression of this immanent dynamics of being (p. 72), and his joyous world affirmation, in light of Nietzsche's maxim *amor fati*. Along these lines, the paper on Leibniz (*Leibnizian Ideas in Nietzsche's Philosophy: On Force, Monads, Perspectivism, and the Subject*) shows a great affinity of Nietzsche to the Leibnizian idea of substance pluralism, i.e. monads as dynamic substances with intensive, immanent force that shapes their *perspectives*, the idea which would shape his own mature concepts of force and will to power. The ambivalence and complexity of Nietzsche's reception of rationalist tradition is thus shown in his admiration for its notions of essential dynamism of the world as well as subject, though staying deeply suspicious of the powers of the intellect and their notions of God.

Further investigation of the self in articles *Kant and Nietzsche on Self-Knowledge* and *Nietzsche and Schopenhauer on the 'Self' and the 'Subject'* turns to perhaps even more crucial thinkers for Nietzsche's development and it focuses primarily on the idea of self-transparency of the subject as a moral agent. Despite a number of striking differences between Nietzsche and Kant, this article provides a nuanced account of these two philosophers' views on moral agency. A juxtaposition of their trust in our cognitive faculties in their attempt to shed some light on our intentions outlines Nietzsche's radical skepticism: even though Kant is aware of the possibility of error, Nietzsche goes even further to say that apperception is always self-deception. Introspection and apperception are intrinsically flawed (p. 122), and this is what Nietzsche sees as residue of Kantianism in Schopenhauer, his great educator who still had faith in immediate self-awareness of the body. Thus, the article on Nietzsche and Schopenhauer shows their tight connection, especially in their mutual intention to revoke the idea of rational agency and subject as *res cogitans*. The authors remind us of how Nietzsche is actually indebted to his educator, a fact that is sometimes easily overlooked, especially having in mind that Nietzsche's attack on the subject does not mean a rejection of *selfhood* per

se, since both hold that the self is *will* – which is expressed in one's *act*. On the other hand, we can see their discord on this very notion of the will, body, character and freedom.

Besides purely philosophical influences, articles *Psychology without a Soul*, *Philosophy without an I* and *Helmholtz, Lange, and Unconscious Symbols of the Self* situate Nietzsche's thought in the broader context of 19th century German psychology and psychophysics, namely, authors like Helmholtz, Lange, Fechner and Mach – some of whom Nietzsche was well acquainted with. These analyses illuminate Nietzsche's views in comparison with their conceptions of the self, where we can see their shared enthusiasm to do away with idealism and spiritualism through the materialist idea of unstable unity of the subject. Also, the articles elaborate a possible influence on Nietzsche's conceptual designations such as the sub-conscious, drives, power-quantity, force, etc. from their scientific discourse, as well as the epistemological consequences such as constructivism, anti-realism and symbolism which pervaded Nietzsche's later philosophy.

The impressive breadth of influences is further corroborated within articles 8, 9 and 10 (*Nietzsche and "the French Psychologists": Stendhal, Taine, Ribot, Bourget; Social Ties and the Emergence of the Individual: Nietzsche and the English Perspective* and *"Know Yourself" and "Become What You Are": The Development of Character in Nietzsche and Emerson*), first of which deals with Nietzsche's reception of "the French psychologists", "free spirits" and the *perfect decadents* – Stendhal, Taine, Ribot and Bourget. It uncovers us *Nietzsche the psychologist* ("going against the German taste"), as someone who greatly admired their cruel self-dissection, extreme analytical passion in uncovering the fragile self, lacking of dominant commanding instinct (p. 222), all of which are the multiform expressions of *décadence*, and we can see how Nietzsche learned about it from these "French psychologists". On the other hand, Nietzsche is far less enthusiastic about another type of psychologists, namely the English ones. Hence, the next article discusses his polemics with the English Darwinists, evolutionists and utilitarians, whose works he got acquainted with through his friend Paul Rée. The author elaborates some of the main reasons for Nietzsche's animosity towards the "English psychology" and its derivations – mostly Herbert Spencer and his adaptive model of the relation between individual and the environment, since this model Nietzsche associates with mere reactivity, passivity and conformism (p.

249). Moreover, their conceptions of gregarious, as well as egoistic individual, is something that Nietzschean psychology strongly opposes, as it aims to do away with traditional “atomistic” notion of the ego. The final article of Section I aims to show how Nietzsche has drawn inspiration from the American transcendentalist movement, namely, from Ralph Waldo Emerson. This article introduces us to Emerson’s concept of self and self-creation, as well as his notion of character, adopted from Goethe. It examines the maxim of *becoming what one is* in its similarities and differences among the two authors, as well as knowing oneself through *act*, which goes hand in hand with their mutual mistrust towards introspection. Traces of Emerson are pointed out in Nietzsche’s admiration for wanderers and *intellectual nomadism* (p. 267) and his ethics of embracing life’s difficulties, taking pleasure in transience in order to enrich one’s perspectives and plasticity of the soul. However, the author argues that this Goethean notion of plastic soul among the two authors sometimes transforms into imperialist ego, in its desire to expand and overcome the individual perspective.

After an extensive account on the context of Nietzsche’s views on subjectivity in Section I, Section II associates his thought with the modern crisis of the subject. Hence, in the article *Nietzsche on De-centered Subjectivity or, the Existential Crisis of the Modern Subject* we are presented with an argument that his criticism of the subject is actually a part of radicalization of modernity’s own self-critique and an attempt to underscore how the experience of nihilism has transformed the project of modernity into a much harder task. For it, we would need a strong unity of the pluralistic subjectivity and undetermined instincts of modern man, as a way “beyond me and you”, a way to the *Übermensch*. This lostness of modern man and plurality of the subject is further investigated through striking similarities between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in the article titled *The Plurality of the Subject in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: Confronting Nihilism with Masks, Faith and Amor Fati*, in their aims to present us subjectivity in its disintegration, through honesty, irony and wit (p. 319). Subject is always *becoming*, in constant self-transformation, so the author shows us how both thinkers consciously reflect this through their elusive texts, pseudonyms and masks – making us unsettled, showing us the unstable footing we are standing on. Still, who is this self and what are the ways of self-discovery are the questions which are further pursued in the

comparative study on Nietzsche and Heidegger – *Nietzsche vs. Heidegger on the Self: Which I Am I?* We can see some striking similarities in their views on the self and alternative ways of *self-reference* of *affective*, decentered self, as well as their concern about individuality and authenticity. Nevertheless, the author underscores their profound disagreement: Nietzsche’s account on the origin of conscious selfhood is “naturalistic” and historical, whereas Heidegger comes from the tradition of transcendental phenomenology. While Nietzsche seeks for the possibility of self-reflection in drives, values and will to power, Heidegger turns to transcendental structure of *Dasein*, recouring to a supra-historical structure, the author argues, favoring Nietzsche’s more historical approach.

A very important aspect in Nietzsche’s criticism of modern subjectivity is his notion of the *drive*. In that light, a comparison with Freud’s systematic account on this notion is offered in the article *Nietzsche and Freud: The ‘I’ and its Drives*, as well as their mutual ambition to destroy atavisms of spirituality and rationalist prejudices in understanding the self, since they provide incoherent views on self-determination and freedom. However, their fundamental aims turn out to be quite different – Nietzsche has no ambition to systematically elaborate his theory of drives, nor he thinks that is possible: his account is anti-realist, whereas Freud seeks for scientific objectivity, the author claims (p. 385). Also, we see how Freud’s idea of non-intentionality of drives is closer to Schopenhauer’s blind will, as well as a certain amount of pessimism, whereas Nietzsche considers drives to be crucial for self-creation and overcoming pessimism. Subject, for Nietzsche, is a fiction and in a sense it’s contrasted to his notion of the self. Consequently, self-creation can be read as desubjectification and this double process of self-affirmation and self-abolition is presented through a Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche in the article titled *Nietzsche, Deleuze: Desubjectification and Will to Power*. Its focus is on the *pathos* of will to power, both as psychological and as world-principle. In this sense, this reading aims to uncover Nietzsche’s own process of desubjectification through his writing, his attempt to “open the body of the thinker to the world” (p. 397). What this approach uncovers is a radical sense of consistency of Nietzsche’s thought: in order to understand the world as will to power, one must understand oneself as will to power. In his aim to undertake the transvaluation of all values, Nietzsche himself as a subject, as a body,

must be locus of this process – thus, the world as will to power is not merely a hypothetical claim, but the highest form of affirmation. Another aspect of destruction of the subject is examined in the next article – *Questions of the Subject in Nietzsche and Foucault: A Reading of Dawn*, reading Foucault’s appropriation of Nietzsche’s genealogy as antihumanist means – to show the becoming of the subject. This article focuses on Foucault’s later phase, his “ethical turn”: investigation on how a subject forms itself. It focuses mostly on Foucault’s reading of *Dawn* and argues that in this work Nietzsche attempted to outline an idea of self-experimentation, making oneself different than what history has made us. Hence, Nietzsche’s view of self is seen as a resistance against normalization tendencies of his time; instead, one ought to cultivate one’s drives like a gardener as the ultimate practice of freedom. Thus, both philosophers are viewed in light of the old philosophical aim promoted by Epictetus: philosophy as *cura sui*.

Further on, in the article *Gapping the Subject: Nietzsche and Derrida*, Nietzsche is associated with another “postmodern” thinker with an aim to show how for both of them subject is inscribed in language, their skepticism of self-knowledge, through possible Nietzschean influence on the concept of *différance*, as well as the difference of the “naturalist” Nietzsche from “postmodernist” Derrida. This connection of introspection with language also plays an important role in Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the next article (*Questioning Introspection: Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on ‘The Peculiar Grammar of the Word “I”*) discusses their common affinity for language, since both are very much interested in that peculiar grammar of the word “I” and its unavoidable linguistic mediation. Despite the enormous differences in terms of ambitions of their philosophical projects, we can see their common thread of deconstructing the Cartesian subject. This concept of the subject had a centuries-long history, which is presented in the article *Subjects as Temporal Clues to Orientation: Nietzsche and Luhmann on Subjectivity*, as an introduction to how Nietzsche’s criticism made an epistemological break that influenced sociology as well, namely, the one of Niklas Luhmann. Here we can see how this break paved way to Luhmann’s concepts of observation, system, autopoiesis, orientation, as well as subject construction.

Problem of subjectivity is the indispensable part of the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, thus the article *Three Senses*

of Selfless Consciousness. Nietzsche and Dennett on Mind, Language and Body investigates their curious relation. The author presents a reading of Nietzsche through the lenses of cognitive science, how Nietzsche’s anti-Cartesianism predicted Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model and how they converge in relating the unity of consciousness with language, and therefore the public (p. 514), as well as the possible meanings of the *sub-personal* and *selfless consciousness* in both thinkers.

The final section of the book addresses some more contemporary discussions on the topic of Nietzsche and subjectivity. The first article (*Nietzsche on the Embodiment of Mind and Self*) is an approach to Nietzschean notion of the *body* and how this notion functions in his thoughts on *embodiment*, and it investigates its possible meanings – namely, *effective* and *phenomenal* embodiment, as different ways of the mind-body relation. In this relation, Nietzsche stresses the importance of the body and gives it a certain methodological advantage, so the next article, titled *Self-Knowledge, Genealogy, Evolution*, aims to elaborate his three types of methodologies in self-knowledge: *physiology*, *psychology* and *genealogy* – as *indirect* means of achieving self-knowledge, which is always an interpretation. The author argues that these indirect means play a vital role, though not in a strictly theoretical sense, but rather *practical* one: self-knowledge is a prerequisite of self-creation. This creation includes our inner *evaluations*, it is tightly connected with our morality. Inner evaluations are a matter of our affective structure, so we can see the further elaboration of this in articles *Moralities Are a Sign-Languages of the Affects* and *Nietzsche on Consciousness, Unity, and the Self*. This meta-ethical reading gives us a detailed account on affect anatomy, their inclinations, aversions and their natural and cultural conditioning. Our affects are our self – this is how self for Nietzsche confronts the idea of the conscious “I”, which means that our self-creation at its root is not a conscious process, but a matter of drive integration and cultivation. Two different means of drive integration are confronted: either unity of all drives under one master-drive or “egalitarian” view where all drives are harmonized in an individual. Be that as it may, Nietzsche certainly shows that the individual is pre-formed, it is a *dividuum*, which is utilized in the article *Nietzsche’s Socio-Physiology of the Self* as a criticism of the liberal concept of the individual, namely, Rawlsian view that the individual is pre-existent to society and

that it is separate from values and aims it chooses freely and independently. That our acts are much more complex is a view presented in the last article, *The Expressivist Nietzsche*. It closely examines passages that include metaphysics of action, arguing that Nietzsche never wanted to dismiss the doer-deed logic, but rather to deepen our understanding of agency, being skeptical of this clear notion of the “doer” (p. 658). This notion implies immediate self-knowledge of motivation and intentions, which Nietzsche deems impossible, so as an alternative view, expressivism shows that the doer, the *self*, cannot be separated from the deed, but is rather expressed in it and can be known indirectly through it. In that sense, his diagnosis of

nihilism is viewed as crisis of self-expression as self-creation, as a fundamental lack of *act*.

In conclusion, this extensive and multifaceted study shows us how the problem of subjectivity is still very viable not only in many different philosophical trends, but also humanities in general. One of its most valuable aspects is that this book opens a wide range of contemporary issues that modern humanities have to address, one of which is certainly the problem of *act* and the subject who *acts* within a society in crisis. Nietzsche is thus, rightfully so, presented not only as a destructive thinker, but also in his highest efforts to provide some new perspectives on subject integration.