POLITICS OF ENMITY – CAN NATION EVER BE EMANCIPATORY?

II

POLITIKE NEPRIJATELJSTVA – DA LI NACIJA IKADA MOŽE DA BUDE EMANCIPATORSKA?

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Rogers Brubaker

Introductory remarks

Grounds for Difference was not conceived or written as a monograph. The essays were written at different times. The two long pieces at the beginning of the book ("Difference and Inequality" and "The Return of Biology") were written last and were not previously published. Indeed they were too long to publish as journal articles. (The maximum length of journal articles, alas, keeps shrinking, even in an age of electronic publication. Articles of more than 10,000 or 12,000 words are increasingly difficult to place. I essentially found myself having to write a book in order to publish these longer essays.)

The essays collected in the book treat themes that have preoccupied me for some time, including the transnational and global dimensions of ethnicity and nationalism, addressed in the final three chapters. But they also reflect new directions in my work. In the Introduction I characterize the new directions as engaging three increasingly salient contexts for the contemporary politics of difference: the return of inequality, the return of biology, and the return of the sacred. Let me say a few words about each of these.

Obviously, equality never disappeared as a theme in social-scientific research. However, inequality has been approached in different ways in recent decades, and ways that have been tied to the increasing concern with the politics of identity and difference. As a result of this broad shift in political and intellectual sensibility, there has been less concern with structural, political-economic forms of inequality. But in recent years there has been a striking "return of inequality" – and specifically of structural and political-economic forms of inequality – in public discussion and in scholarly work. The fact that Piketty became a best-seller is just one indicator of this. This is the sense in which one can speak of a return of inequality.

Something similar can be said about the return of biology. Biological ways of making sense of sameness and difference never disappeared, of course. But discussions of race and ethnicity in the social sciences in the second half of the 20th century focused increasingly on cultural ways of understanding human difference. Yet in the aftermath of the human genome project, we see a return of the language of biology, and more specifically genetics, in social-scientific discussions of race and ethnicity. This new objectivism or naturalism about race also informs biomedical research, ancestry testing, forensic investigations, and political claims-making. I wanted to make sense of this multifaceted return of biology, not least because it seemed to pose a challenge to the constructivist theory of race and ethnicity that I and others

have been working with and developing. I wanted to find a way of responding to this challenge, without simply repeating the usual constructivist mantra that there are no biologically significant differences between socially defined racial categories. I wanted to defend a constructivist theory of race, while engaging rather than ignoring or dismissing recent developments in genetics. But the return of biology is not just a *challenge* to constructivist social science, it's also an *opportunity* for constructivist social science. The new understandings of race, ethnicity, and ancestry that are in play in medical research, ancestry testing, forensics, and political claims-making provide a rich and interesting territory to analyse. So I attempted in this chapter to write a synthetic overview of recent discussions and developments in these domains of practice.

As for the return of the sacred: here too, of course, the sacred never went away. Yet again one can speak in a qualified way of a certain "return" of religion. The sociologist of religion José Casanova's great book on *Public Religion in the Modern World*, for example, discussed the return of public, de-privatized forms of religion in recent decades, reversing a longer-term trend toward privatized, individualized, subjectivized forms of religion in the West. So I use this phrase – the return of the sacred – to signal my own interest in the ways in which the politics of difference, or you could say the politics of multiculturalism, turns increasingly on matters of religion in Europe and North America. This is indeed a new development in the last twenty five or thirty years.

So these are the "three returns" that I use as an organizing device. But I wouldn't want to insist too much on this trope: it serves primarily to mark out a set of emerging interests in my own work that led me to bring together the pieces in this book.

Grounds for Difference: Seminar with Rogers Brubaker

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
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Ljubica Spaskovska

I would like to pick up on Professor Brubaker's notion of regimes of inequality. My research is primarily historical, I work on a research project on the dissolution of state socialism in a global perspective. I've been primarily looking at the debates in the UN and especially at the UN Trade and Development Forums for developing countries, where Yugoslavia was one of the key players, such as the 'Group of 77 developing countries', and especially the shifts which took place in the IMF and World Bank and the language of development in the 1970s and 80s with the growth of the debt crisis. So I think that Professor Brubaker's implication that citizenship shapes life chances on the global stage rings particularly true in this case, and of course hierarchies and regimes of inequality can have both global and domestic repercussions, but just thinking about the North-South divide and this asymmetry which is still there, especially the prehistory of today's North-South in the 1970s and 80s when the developing countries of the South were trying to argue for a different approach to development compared to the industrialized North. Nevertheless, I'm working on a paper of the IMF and World Bank annual meeting which took place in 1979 in Belgrade, where countries such as Mexico and Yugoslavia argued that we have to tackle the debt crisis and the conditionality imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, while the director of the World Bank was arguing that actually the problem that we have on the global scale is overpopulation, not conditionality and debt.

So I think that, looking at the root of this debate about global inequalities and hierarchies, it really has its prehistory long before the 2000s and before the intellectual community decided to think about inequality. I've also been looking at human development indexes, and interestingly enough, the call from some circles to dethrone growth as an indicator of development. So growth alone is not a guarantee for human development. If we look at the historical trajectory of human development, where, for example, the socialist Yugoslavia was in the 1990, and where the countries in the region are today. Both human development and the GINI coefficient index, which is the primary indicator for income inequality, have increased of course. However, human development, mostly understood as fair opportunities, redistribution, decent standard of living – which the book very well pinpoints as important and connected to all sorts of other social differentiations such as race and religion and gender – in this region, in a post-socialist regime of inequality, these indicators of human development have decreased. Another issue I

would like to raise perhaps – the role of transnational corporations in this debate on global hierarchies. So, what was striking for us as a research team is that the UN Center for Transnational Corporations, which was set up in the 1970s to develop a code for behaviour for transnational corporations in developing countries was abolished in 1992. Some of the first countries to go to this UN center in the late 1980s, to seek advice on investment were China and Russia. So we see how in the 1980s this language of inequality and development basically shifts from countries which were pioneers of alternative globalization or development. Perhaps Professor Brubaker could comment on how he sees, in the future, citizenship and especially global citizenship developing and bridging the North-South divide.

Gëzim Krasniqi

I'm going to follow up on what Ljubica was saying about the relationship between citizenship, inequality and hierarchies that exist today in the world. I'll basically look at how citizenship feeds on and sometimes even perpetrates inequality and hierarchies both at the level of the nation-states, as the main sites of political membership in the modern world, but also more widely in the modern world. I have a final point about one of the claims that Professor Brubaker makes in his book about the relationship between difference and inequality. Citizenship today is one of the key concepts, and Professor Brubaker has written extensively on that. Citizenship is about membership in a political community, and I think this is where the contention starts. It raises a number of questions: What kind of membership? Who has a right to be a member? What kind of polity we are speaking about? Are we speaking about smaller polities, states, nations, federations, or bigger unions such as the European Union? But I think, when we see how citizenship works on the smaller scale of a nation state, it is both unequal and hierarchical. It is unequal in the sense that it provides more access and opportunities and rights to some categories than others within the polity. We have citizens, we have regular migrants, but we also have the category of refugees or irregular migrants who have a limited set of rights in a given polity.

Then, if you look at the different nation states, you will see that these problems are bigger in richer countries, but there is no necessary and clear relationship between economic well-being and the problems of unequal citizenship in a nation state. I think that citizenship is inherently unequal because the very modern concept of the state is based on the principle of exclusion and some sort of selectivity. Whenever we speak about citizenship we speak about citizens and non-citizens, about us and them, about those who are included and about others, until which point you have rights, and where your rights stop. And then you have other regimes which have other sets of rules

about who has the right to what. But I think that the problem is quite similar even at the global scale. We have a number of scholars who have spoken about that. Probably the most famous theory is Wallerstein's world-system theory about the core, periphery and semi-periphery. I think this could also be used to explain how the regimes of citizenship work in the modern world. It is not the same thing to be a British and American citizen, or a citizen of Somalia, Afghanistan, or other poor countries which are undergoing conflicts. But there is also the work by Stephan Castels, whom I have used in my papers on citizenship hierarchies, that explores the correlation between economic well-being and the prestige and rights associated with different types of citizenship stemming from different kind of politics and different states. One clear example would be the World Passport Index. If you look at the value of passports, you will see that the countries at the top are the richest and most dominant countries in the world, and the countries at the bottom are the poorest and most isolated. That makes a huge difference at the global scale.

Finally, I think that one of the points that Professor Brubaker makes in his book is that the relationship between difference and inequality is contingent, not necessary. It is empirical, not conceptual. But if citizenship is essentially about categories and about inclusion and exclusion, does this somehow imply that inequality is relational, not just empirical and conceptual, because citizenship is inherently about exclusion and inclusion? And the other question that this raises would be: if we somehow manage to de-territorialize citizenship, either through global citizenship, cosmopolitanism or stakeholder citizenship, would that avoid categorization and therefore reduce inequality and hierarchies that exist today in the modern world?

Tamara Petrović Trifunović

I would like to focus on another issue, more in the field of my research. It is connected to the first part of the book, the part on inequality. First of all, I would like to say that I highly appreciate the focus you put on the symbolic dimensions of inequality and how categories of difference produce and reproduce inequalities. Because I believe that it is of great importance to study "processes that contribute to the production and reproduction of inequality through the routine and taken-for-granted actions of both dominant and subordinate actors". This is in fact the quote of Michèle Lamont in a paper from 2014. In the same paper, the author says that the cultural processes are "a crucial missing link between cognitive processes and macro-level inequality", which is a field that I'm really interested in. With that in mind, my first question would be: would you say that the very theme of the next year's annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, which is connected

to the understanding of the nexus of culture, inequalities and group boundaries, in some ways represents a culmination of already existing strong currents in contemporary US sociology, or should it be seen as a breaking point for cultural sociology and sociology in general in the US?

The second question is connected to this one: at the beginning of this chapter you mention taste, as one of the dimensions on a horizontal plane, where people distinguish themselves from others according to the logic of difference. How would you, in this way, analyse the dimension of taste, or cultural consumption, cultural affiliations, level of cultural capital, and their role in the production and reproduction of inequality in the contemporary US society? Would you take the cultural competence – this is just a term I use for this short discussion – into account according to the three general processes that you distinguish in the book, especially the first two which are the allocation of persons to reward-bearing positions and the social production of unequally equipped categories of persons? Do you think that "cultural competence" still plays a significant role in the production and reproduction of inequality, and in the reproduction of "forced immobility" (not in the same way as citizenship, of course), or has it lost its power, especially in the United States? Or maybe you think it has never played a significant role, because there are some specificities and contingencies in the US society. So, in short, how do, in your opinion, cultural differences contribute to both symbolic and socio-economic inequalities? Cultural – in the narrower sense.

Rogers Brubaker:
Response to Ljubica Spaskovska, Gëzim Krasniqi and Tamara Petrović Trifunović

Thank you for this initial set of very interesting comments. Since Ljubica and Gëzim both focused on citizenship and inequality, let me speak to the issues that they raised first, and specifically to Gëzim's questions about whether citizenship is inherently hierarchical, both at the level of the nation state, and more broadly. He very clearly set out some key notions about citizenship, which of course is inherently categorical, has an inside and outside, a boundary; it is internally inclusive and externally exclusive. What I was trying to do by addressing citizenship as one nexus where difference and inequality intersect was to suggest that when we think about the exclusionary workings of citizenship, which everyone is aware of, we tend to think about those who are, as it were, *visibly* excluded. We tend to think in particular those who are within the territory of the state, but excluded from the privileges of citizenship. In the US now, we have approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants, and when one thinks about citizenship, exclusion, and inequality in the American context, these are the people one thinks about first. There

has been very interesting sociological research done on undocumented migrants. This is not a single category: it is highly differentiated, and there are many respects in which undocumented persons do have some rights, even what might be called citizenship rights in some local contexts. But of course they lack very critical fundamental rights, and there is good ethnographic work showing how many undocumented people avoid all forms of contact with state agencies, particularly in parts of the US where local officials have not only the power, but indeed the obligation to tap into state-wide databases and to report the presence of undocumented migrants. Since an encounter with a local official might lead to deportation, many people live in the shadows, avoiding institutions like hospitals and so on.

This is all very clear. What is less clear, and less often discussed, is the *invisible* exclusionary working of citizenship. This is what I wanted to highlight in my brief discussion of citizenship. That is, I wanted to talk not about the 10 million people that are excluded from US citizenship and its protections while living in the territory of the US, but rather about the *billions* of people who are excluded from the citizenship of powerful, prosperous, relatively peaceful countries, because they can't even become an undocumented immigrant. Of course, we didn't need the refugee crisis of 2015 to tell us that nation states are not hermetically sealed, that no states can perfectly seal their borders. Nonetheless, even the nearly one million people who arrived in Germany last year comprise a very small fraction of the number of people who would *like* to have access to German territory, even for the uncertain status of being an asylum-seeker. This brings into sharp relief the powerful and still largely taken-for-granted exclusionary workings of citizenship on a global scale. It is this that I wanted to highlight. Despite the decline of legal categorical exclusion based on race, sex, religion and so on, legal categorical exclusion based on citizenship continues to be built into the architecture of the global state system. And it is so fundamental that it is hard to imagine a world without it. Of course large numbers of people cross state borders. But a far greater number would like to do so, yet are prevented from doing so because of their citizenship.

Citizenships have radically different values. One indicator is indeed the price that people would pay for a "good" citizenship. Here's where we may have a small disagreement – is the inequality between different citizenships intrinsic or somehow contingent? I see it as contingent, in the sense that one could imagine a world of bounded and exclusive citizenships that did *not* have radically different values. If there weren't major differences in life chances between countries, then the inequalities associated with bounded citizenship wouldn't be so consequential. That is, you would still have exclusive, bounded, closed citizenships, but they would not be arranged in a steep

hierarchy. As a matter of fact, of course, the world we live in is not like this; citizenships *do* differ massively in value. Ayelet Shachar's book *The Birthright Lottery,* for example, describes citizenship as a valuable form of property that one inherits at birth in a morally arbitrary manner. And one can pass on this inherited property to one's descendants.

On the symbolic dimensions of inequality: Tamara, you quoted briefly from the work of Michèle Lamont. I see myself as engaged in a similar enterprise, and I presented an early version of this paper to Michèle's cultural sociology workshop. Both of us – and numerous others – are trying to connect, or reconnect, structural sources of inequality with the cultural dimensions of difference. Trying to reconnect these implies that scholarship had lost sight of this connection. This I think was the case, but increasingly people like Michèle and my former colleague Andreas Wimmer are giving renewed attention to the issue. One indicator of this is indeed the theme of next year's ASA meetings.

To your question about taste: I mentioned taste only in passing in this chapter. I have elsewhere engaged the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who of course comes immediately to mind if one thinks of taste in connection with cultural competences or cultural capital. And I have found Bourdieu's work to be immensely fruitful. However, I don't think one can simply take over what Bourdieu did in the French context and apply it in the American context. Bourdieu was writing about a landscape where the various forms of cultural capital were strongly hierarchized, a world in which high cultural forms had much greater prestige and value than pop-cultural forms. That is not the case in the US. There we see a pluralisation of taste worlds, even a de-hierarchisation. Paul DiMaggio has done important and interesting historical work on this. He shows how certain high cultural institutions were established around the beginning of the 20th century in many American cities. But by the end of the 20th century, the cultural consensus that sustained the connection between upper-class status and mastery of certain high cultural forms had vanished, and there is today no agreement about ranking of different forms of cultural competence. The world of taste is not as strongly hierarchized as a reading of Bourdieu would suggest.

Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc

I really enjoyed this book, because I was a little bit outside of the topic of identity and diversity for a few years, it was more a topic of my MA studies. In a way, it was a nice way to catch up with the field. I had the feeling, while reading, like there was an academic play-date: lots of new ideas and toys have been thrown up in the air, and then you tidied it up and organized it for us, or for somebody new entering the field, in order to get a general perspective

on the different ways and approaches how one can tackle these key issues related to diversity. For me personally this was more a book about the social organization of identity, because that is the perspective I was most interested in. Therefore, I was most drawn to the chapter on religion and nationalism. Going through an overview of different approaches how one can tackle these very complex and multilayered topics, was a nice way to check myself – so this is what I did when I was writing my thesis. I was actually reminded of something you said during the thesis seminar in 2008, and it was a very passing remark, but something that really stayed with me. We were discussing about religiosity as a concept that somehow describes the variety, the continuum between lower and higher levels of religious attachment, feeling or identity. And you said "Yes, we need that kind of word for ethnic identity, something like *'ethnocity'*. And I remember writing it down – 'ethnocity'", I was thinking about it because this kind of identification can be very salient for someone's identity, for the organization of the society, or it can be very marginal and less important for individuals or for the organization of society.

Therefore, when I was looking at this very nice mapping of different approaches to study of religion and nationalism I was wondering how this analysis of different approaches relates to the issue of gradation in religious or national identity, in the sense of higher/lower level of religiosity, or higher/lower level of saliency of the ethnic identity for the organization of society. I am not thinking only at the individual level of personal identity but also at the social level, because this is one quality of the book – that it somehow connects the bottom-up and top-down approaches, that is, researching these issues from the perspective of society or individual. When talking about different levels of salience or gradation in intensity of feeling ethnic or religious identity, I was wondering how your book communicates with intersectionality as an approach of study which looks at different axes of identity – race, class, gender, ethnicity and so on, and how they interact and create systems of diversifications and systems of discrimination. Because your book is also organized along these different axes – you look at different dimensions of citizenship, gender, religion, nationalism, and you go deep into each one of them, but we all know that none of these lines of diversification work individually or on their own in society. They are always working in combination, they are always historically contingent. And as much as I have personally deep support and respect for intersectionality as an approach and I like to advocate it around, it was immensely hard for me to apply it in practice. When you're conducting a research or writing a research project, you have this very abstract idea how you should do it, but it is very hard to put it into practice, because it becomes an equation with too many variables. And I was thinking – what do you think generally about intersectionality as an approach and how do you think the book relates to that concept?

Viktor Koska

I was thinking about how to make an introduction about what I am going to ask professor Brubaker today, because he gave me probably key theoretical approach in analysing the extensively rich data on ethnicity and migration integration issues and different categories of citizens. How did I find about the work of Rogers Brubaker? It was late 2006 when I was doing my masters at Oxford University, where, as a young scholar at that time, I decided to explore what has never been explored in Croatia before, the experience of the Serb minority returnees in the small town of Glina. What I was expecting was to see very clearly shaped entities of former refugees who are now returnees and who are obviously Serb ethnic minority. By that time I was also approaching what Professor Brubaker terms as the groupist approach. My difficulty was that, after conducting 30 interviews, I was approaching a groupist identity only at those times when I was imposing that on my respondents, or when I was asking the question in which they were reflecting not their personal experiences, but the experiences that they picked up somewhere else. This was happening after four or five hours of discussing what it meant to be an ethnic Serb in an environment which was expected to be extremely hostile, considering the ethnic cleansing. So I was in despair because I thought that I was going to fail my thesis, I don't have a theoretical approach through which I can explain what was going on.

A friend of mine suggested to me your books about ethnicity without groups and *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, and that book literally saved my academic career. So thank you very much for that. I would disagree with Jovana that this book cannot offer a venue how to explore ethnographic research. I actually think that this is the book that allows researchers to explain a very complex reality within ethnicity, how it works, and to clearly see the areas within groupist approaches that have been institutionalized. In that case, I will just jump over to your newer book and the approaches that you developed in the fifth and sixth chapter, particularly on diaspora and membership migration in the member states, especially because today we have the referendum in Republic of Srpska. This book is so important because it actually allows us to explain in analytical language what is going on beyond the political discourse of everyday ethnicity which is always shaped in a groupist term.

In that case, I would like just to reflect briefly on the fact that, just as you said, diaspora is not an entity in the world, it is a stance toward the world. I would like to combine this with the analysis of a very particular Croatian case about how the external politics of inclusion have been shaped over the five or six years, and how they are sometimes aiming to include very complex ideas of ethnicity, but then exclude them on the other side. For example, if you take diaspora as the imagined groups of people who are having

their ancestry and descendants on a particular territory. In Croatia we have more than 400.000 people who were forced to leave the country – Serbs – in the 1990s, who are now settled in Serbia. On internal politics of belonging, Croatia has enacted a set of policies by which it is denying the right to these people to keep their residency in Croatia, even if they are citizens. On the other hand, the new strategy for Croats abroad has completely excluded this category of possible diaspora. On the other hand we are also seeing that there are different categories of tackling diaspora in the Croatian strategy. There are very clear goals about what we want to have, and which is basically measured in the nation state and ethnic Croatians in reality. For example, Croatia is obviously not setting the same strategy for Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it wants to keep its sovereignty over that section of the population in Bosnia. It is also pushing off possible return of non-wanted ethnic Croats who might come back. Those are Croats from Vojvodina, from less developed areas, and it comes very clear – the Croats who are actually welcome to come back are those who are not Croats at all. They are discovering their ethnicity where it does not exist. It is a similar situation with the Croatian national soccer team. The coach is going to Latin America and looking for talents and he is convincing them that they are Croats because of their ancestors. There is one model that I like to explain to my students which makes clear this differentiation and this challenging issue about how we are imagining even ethnic diaspora. For example, there is no question about that one particular individual who transgresses this idea of ethnic identity and turns to citizenship – this is Nikola Tesla, who is of Serb ethnicity, but he is considered to be Croat by the diaspora. But according to Croatian citizenship laws, the descendants of Nikola Tesla would not be eligible for Croatian citizenship. On the other hand, the descendants of Ante Pavelić, the notorious war criminal, would have the right to Croatian citizenship even if they didn't speak the language, and had no knowledge about Croatia at all.

Jovo Bakić

Since the end of the 1990s, when I read *Nationalism Reframed*, Rogers Brubaker has been one of my sociological guides through the study of nationalism and ethnicity. And it is a real pleasure to discuss some issues with such a scholar. As my students know very well, I introduced Brubaker's triangle in order to explain relations between Croatia, as a nationalizing state, Serbs in Croatia as national minority, and external national homeland – Serbia. Brubaker's triangle is an invaluable instrument, if one would try to explain historical circumstances and relations between both Serbia and Croatia, and Serbs and Croats.

Regarding "the return of biology" – I just don't want to talk about it because I do not have time to talk about it. I think that discussing the theme

of return of biology, especially from someone who is, like Rogers Brubaker, a constructivist, is something that we have needed. "Return of the sacred" – yes, it is; but late Anthony Smith dealt with this incomparably, and I would not repeat his arguments. Regarding "the return of inequality" – yes, I agree with almost all professor Brubaker wrote. However, I have an objection. I think that when you discussed the issue of inequality, and you dealt with Tilly's durable inequalities, you criticized him following your colleague and one another intellectual guide of mine – Michael Mann. You quoted Michael Mann, when he criticized Robert Tilly, that Tilly missed the class. And Tilly missed to explain inequality in terms of social class although he is a kind of neo-Marxist. We both agree with it.

At the same time, you do the same. You just missed the class. And I think that class is also an external category together with citizenship, ethnicity or religion. That is why I just want to ask you that – why did you do it? Why don't you involve the concept of the class? And you even mentioned it in your introductory word here, that capitalism is an important issue, that Thomas Piketty wrote about it insightfully, and I agree – but still, why don't you connect the issue of class with citizenship, with race, with ethnicity? And in many ways, they are more often than not overlapping. You have discussed legal boundaries, and legal propositions that race meant something different in the system of apartheid in South Africa. Today it is not legally codified. One could discuss the race issue in the USA as well. However, I want to stress especially lack of the class analysis in *Grounds for Difference*. I think that one has to take into consideration the class as a ground for difference. Workers were only half-citizens of a state, because many of them have no voting rights until the beginning of the 20th century. They have achieved thoroughly recognized citizenship rights only gradually and under pressure from organized workers' movement. However, neither this legal equality means proper social equality for workers, nor legal equality means social equality for Afro-Americans. There are several boundaries that obstruct the progression of workers, and not to mention the precariat (a very interesting category that appeared relatively recently). That is why I think that one should connect contemporary capitalism and the class in order to improve your otherwise excellent analysis.

Rogers Brubaker:
Response to Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, Viktor Koska and Jovo Bakić

Again, a terrifically interesting set of comments. Let me be very quick and selective. I appreciate very much Jovana's two questions. The first was about gradational rather than categorical differences. While differences of religion – i.e. of religious affiliation or membership – are generally understood

in *categorical* terms, differences of religiosity are understood in *gradational* terms: one can be more or less religious. Jovana reminded me that I have the habit of remarking that we have no corresponding category for ethnicity. That is, we have ethnicity (like religion) as a categorical notion, but we do not have a term for "ethnosity" as a matter of degree that would correspond to religiosity. Yet such a notion would be useful, since in the study of ethnicity we would like to know – at least I would like to know – not only *what* someone's ethnic affiliation or identity is, but *how* ethnic they are. Deeply ethnic? Or only occasionally and symbolically ethnic? Degrees of identification with any category not only vary among people; they also fluctuate overt time and context. This is what I meant in writing in earlier work about "groupness" as a variable, or in suggesting an "eventful" perspective on nationness as something that happens with particular force at particular times and places.

About intersectionality, I struggle as you do with this notion. It is true that no category of difference works in the real world on its own. One is never just a woman; never just a Muslim; never just a member of a particular social class. All social determinations always act concomitantly and simultaneously. But that poses a huge and indeed intractable analytic problem. Unless you want to artificially restrict your attention to say two dimensions, you immediately confront exponentially increasing complexity. The combinatorics become impossibly complex. So, as you say, you get an equation with too many variables. This is something I struggle with also in my most recent book (*Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities*). How can one talk about the logic of race as a system of classification on the one hand, and the logic of sex and gender as a system of classification on the other, since race and gender never work independently? Indeed they don't. Yet at the same time they are two distinct systems of classification with quite distinct logics, and I think it is useful to consider the systems in relation to one another. Intersectionality is important, but social analysis does not have to be *always* and *only* intersectional.

Viktor, thank you for your kind words, it is always wonderful to know that one's writing has a certain resonance, that it helps think through problems. This is the best any author could hope for – to know that some concepts can be put to work! One doesn't fashion concepts just to fashion concepts; conceptual analysis is useful only if it improves the tools we have for thinking through substantive problems. So I appreciated very much your comments on the complexities – and I would say the absurdities, the ironies – of the internal and external politics of membership and citizenship in the Croatian case. I have one small illustrative discussion that resonates with your comment tucked away at the end of the chapter on "Migration, Membership, and the Nation-State." Here I drew on a much longer empirical piece that I wrote

with Jaeeun Kim on the politics of transborder membership and belonging in Germany and Korea. We considered ways in which certain *potential* external kin had been considered and defined at various times as *actual* transborder kin by Germany, and how the same thing happened in both North and South Korea, in different ways, with respect to potential transborder kin in China, in Japan, and in the former Soviet Union. We emphasized that one can't assume that transborder external kin are just "out there." Rather, they must be constructed, identified, defined, and delimited. Some who are excluded who might well have been included, others are included who might well have been excluded. There is a whole labour of construction of the population that is then given certain rights and privileges, such as the opportunity to acquire citizenship. So I loved your comments on the ironies of the Croatian case.

Jovo, thank you very much for your comments. Let me just address the question of why I don't discuss class in a sustained way in the chapter on "Difference and Inequality." This has to do with the way I set up the question that I address in this chapter. I pose a deceptively simple, but in fact quite complex question of how categories of difference, which are not in themselves *intrinsically* linked to inequality, are nonetheless *contingently* implicated in the production and reproduction of inequality. I do not treat class as a category of difference because it is intrinsically, by its very nature, *already* a category of inequality. So class doesn't belong alongside citizenship, alongside ethnicity, race, sex or gender, or religion, since all of these other categories of difference are *contingently* linked to inequality. You can imagine a world of difference without inequality, or a world in which patterns of inequality would be entirely independent of categorical differences of, say, ethnicity, religion, or gender. You can't even *imagine* this about class because it is intrinsically a form of inequality. That is why I do not address class in this chapter.

Marko Kovačević

Actually, it is really great to see that many colleagues here had previous experience with reading Professor Brubaker's book, and some of them have been reading him for one or several decades. I have to say that I have learnt about Professor Brubaker's work by chance two months ago. I come from area different area of study, International Relations and International Security Studies, and I find this book a good expression of meta-theory that can encapsulate certain perspectives, certain notions and concepts that are used in International Relations and International Security. My research deals with topics such as state building, Europeanization, and identities of post-Yugoslav states. I read this book as a way to give more meaning to certain concepts that are employed in the works of some Security Studies' theorists, most notably those who belong to the so-called *Copenhagen School*.

I found the line in your book that refers to the language being the medium of politics and communication. This can be related to the *Copenhagen School* and some of the concepts it uses and develops, such as identity, discourses, and the theory of securitization as a speech act. That understanding of the current developments in social theory more generally – where language is the medium through which security is constructed as a speech act sparks interests across the spectrum of social sciences today. Thus, the formative role of language in security practices is what we mean by security and is actually underscored by securitization theory. So, in my view, this understanding of identity language and the ways of difference has key implications for the contemporary International Studies. Here I would like to make another international security-related remark regarding the idea of modernity, and how it can be applied to the discussions of the ways states interact and develop in terms of state-building efforts in the 20th and the 21st century.

The latter is important for certain discussions about how the security dynamics reflect on regional levels. In this way, it is important to note that there are, in the works of Barry Buzan and his colleagues from the early 1990s, the conceptualizations of the pre-modern, modern and postmodern states. If we employ that kind of conceptualization of this triad of states – for example, from certain pre-modern states in the previous centuries, across the modern states that were present in the 20th century, to the postmodern states (i.e. the European Union member states, Japan, or the US) – does this understanding of modernity as a 'single modernity' have any implications for our thinking about states? Does this conceptualization of modernity as being one, except for its theoretical implications and fruitfulness for further thinking, have any implication for thinking about equality and what does that mean in terms of International Security Studies?

In this regard, there are some works by the authors who theorize within the 'postmodern' tradition in International Relations, such as Arlene Tickner, and who call for thinking about 'non-Western' IR theory and practices. My question would be whether having this one conception of single modernity, does that conception (you mention in the book that there are two components of the conception of modernity, one is the core and the other is flexible) – can we, for example, expect certain implications for the developments in Asian and other regionalisms in the world? For example there is ASEAN, which is a regional organization of the South-East Asian countries, and there are arguments about the differences and conceptions of the ASEAN regionalism compared to the European Union. This might further imply that the conception of modernity can be understood differently in those countries, reflecting the quality of their institutions. My second question is about state identity, since you also cover the notion of identities, and the differences in

identities on the level of individuals and the level of societies. In this sense, what would be your opinion on the notion of state identities – is it a viable concept today if we go for notions of pluralism? What is the usefulness of the concept of state identity today, in your view?

Ivan Đorđević

I will start with one reflection on singular versus multiple modernities. It reminds me of similar discussions in anthropology between postmodernity and coming back to some kind of positivist approach in ethnography and anthropology these days. As I understood, and you will tell me if I am wrong, your notion of single modernity here is a criticism of the concept of multiple modernities understood as something which is the consequence of the cultural turn in cultural studies or anthropology. I understood this as a culturalisation of politics, where culture became some kind of a core topic for human and social studies. But on the other hand, giving voice to indigenous people also focused politics on culture and blurred somehow the other kinds of inequality. From my point of view, coming back to the concept of single modernity gives an opportunity to reconsider these concepts that criticized the mid-century concept of modernity. But, on the other hand, if we take the notion that multiple modernities concept somehow contested the ideological nature of the mid-century concept of modernity, it also, from my point of view, became part of the culturalised and deeply ideologised polity which could be connected with the concept of the end of history. Or a concept that basically promoted new values, values of liberal democracy and market economy as a main goal of whole societies around the world.

I would also like to mention – you mentioned actually – the adaptability of nationalism and the nation state as something which is in the real core of nationalism and the nation state. I was thinking about something which is relevant within the EU during this period. From one point of view, the EU is now something I would call the double-edged politics of belonging. The EU now considers itself as an entity that protects itself, protecting its own values like human rights, like plenty of different results of identity politics during the last decades. Now it is making a kind of a fortress of Europe, protecting itself like a typical nation state. It builds itself as something which is territorialized, and it has its own identity, from the point of view of EU members. On the other hand, within the EU, we now have a debate which we can call 'more nation states against more Europe'. The concept of 'more Europe' is now abandoned, and the concept of the nation state is relevant again. Like in Hungary or in other countries of the so-called Visegrad group. My question is: is this adaptability of a concept of a nation state that we can see within the EU right now – it adapts itself, and is obviously very adaptable

as a concept? But on the other hand, other parts of this liberal discourse, like this teleological liberal discourse which is connected to the economy, is not abandoned at all. If we define the EU as a nation state broadly seen, or we define it as a different nation state which is now trying to make a different kind of community, there is no debate about the concept of progress. There is no mentioning of this kind of inequality, considering inequalities mainly in an economic discourse. So, my question is: if this liberal model is abandoned, is it possible to think about different economic models within the new emerging nation states?

Rogers Brubaker:
Response to Marko Kovačević and Ivan Đorđević

Regarding the question of single modernity versus multiple modernities, I should note that I address this issue in a very short chapter on "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Modernity." This was not framed as a broad-based intervention into debates about modernization theory. It addressed a limited and specific question: if we are talking about nationalism and politicized identity, do we need the concept of multiple modernities to make sense of the multiple forms assumed by nationalist politics, politicized ethnicity, indigeneity, and so on? Or is it helpful to think about the development, emergence, and worldwide diffusion of a set of models and templates for claims-making as part of a single global process, a process that assumes many different forms in different times and places, and yet is nevertheless a single process? I favor the latter view. The notion of diffusion may be seen by some as too closely linked to mid-20th century modernization theory, but I think diffusion can be understood in a more sophisticated way. What diffuses is not simply mechanically taken over from one context and used in another. Diffusion proceeds rather through a variety of creative syntheses through which what diffuses is melded with a variety of local, indigenous idioms and adapted to local circumstances. This produces a great variety of forms, but that variety can be interpreted as a set of variations on a certain core "package," a certain set of basic templates and models. This is what leads me to speak of single modernity rather than multiple modernities.