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Dispositional Explanations in Dualism
Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu
dc.contributor.editor | Jovanov, Rastko | |
dc.creator | Nešić, Janko | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-11-01T10:15:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-11-01T10:15:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier | 0353-5738 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/85 | |
dc.description.abstract | In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes. | eng |
dc.format | 24 4 (2013) 218-241 | |
dc.format | application/pdf | |
dc.language | en | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society | mul |
dc.subject | dispositions | |
dc.subject | powers | |
dc.subject | causal explanation | |
dc.subject | dualism | |
dc.subject | absences | |
dc.title | Dispositional Explanations in Dualism | eng |
dc.title | Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu | sr |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC-ND | |
dcterms.abstract | Нешић, Јанко; Диспозициона објашњења у дуализму; | |
dc.citation.spage | 218 | |
dc.citation.epage | 241 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/FID1304218N | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/1303/bitstream_1303.pdf |