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Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu

dc.contributor.editorJovanov, Rastko
dc.creatorNešić, Janko
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-01T10:15:05Z
dc.date.available2017-11-01T10:15:05Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/85
dc.description.abstractIn order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.eng
dc.format24 4 (2013) 218-241
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvomul
dc.subjectdispositions
dc.subjectpowers
dc.subjectcausal explanation
dc.subjectdualism
dc.subjectabsences
dc.titleDispositional Explanations in Dualismeng
dc.titleDispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmusrp
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-ND
dcterms.abstractНешић, Јанко; Диспозициона објашњења у дуализму;
dc.citation.spage218
dc.citation.epage241
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1304218N
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs//bitstream/id/1303/Dispositional Explanations in Dualism.pdf


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