Dispositional Explanations in Dualism
Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu
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In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.
Кључне речи:dispositions / powers / causal explanation / dualism / absences
Извор:Filozofija i društvo, 2013, 218-241