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Searle’s Conception of Institutional Reality

dc.creatorMladenović, Ivan
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-01T10:15:55Z
dc.date.available2017-11-01T10:15:55Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/454
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to present Searle’s conception of institutional reality as an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy and social theory. Its importance notwithstending, the two objections will be raised concerning the central notion of collective intentionality. Searle thinks of this notion as crucial for explaining human cooperation and social reality. The first objection is that Searle missed to take into accout the rationality assumption in his explanation of cooperation and human interaction. The second objection is related to the previos one. Additionally, Serle missed to investigate the role of autonomous moral agent in the procedure of constructing social reality. Given this shortcoming, there is no possibility for addressing the question of justice within Serle’s theory of institutional reality.eng
dc.format3 20 (2009) 185-198
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagesr
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvomul
dc.subjectinstitution
dc.subjectsocial reality
dc.subjectcollective intentionality
dc.subjectkonstitutivna pravila
dc.subjectracionalnost
dc.titleSerlovo shvatanje institucionalne realnostisrp
dc.titleSearle’s Conception of Institutional Realityeng
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-ND
dcterms.abstractМладеновић, Иван; Серлово схватање институционалне реалности;
dc.citation.spage185
dc.citation.epage198
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID0903185M
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/handle/123456789/454/10_Mladenovic_2009-3.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y


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