Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003.
The Philosopher and the Services.Prime minister dr Zoran Đinđić and the (unsuccesful) reform of the security sector in Serbia 2001-2003.
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Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
Članak daje pregled aktivnosti sprskog premijera dr Zorana Đinđića u periodu 2001–2003. godine u domenu bezbednosti i odbrane Repu-blike Srbije. Istaknuta je problematična struktura unutar sistema unutrašnjih poslova i državne bezbednosti nasleđena od režima Slo-bodana Miloševića do oktobra 2000. godine, kontinuitet u pojavi bezbedonosnih problema i afera, kao i rascep unutar vladajuće koali-cije Demokratske opozicije Srbije – DOS. Reforme sprovedene u ovom sektoru nisu uspele i sve se završilo atentatom na premijera 12. marta 2003. godine. Rad je napisan na osnovu novinske dokumenta-cije i objavljenih sećanja aktera političkog života i visokih rukovodila-ca Službe bezbednosti.
Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Prime Minister, demonstrated a consistent oppositional stance from his student days, nurturing a distinct skepticism towards the security ser-vices. This skepticism likely intensified following the democratic shifts post-October 5, 2000. Despite this, Djindjic seemingly underestimated the complexities of manag-ing these services within the coalition government. His initial focus was diverted away from the security sector, partly because the Army, a federal and relatively politically inert entity, did not immediately demand his attention during the initial power transi-tion. Throughout Djindjic’s tenure, a pattern of scandals and crises emerged, originat-ing from the security services or their associated political and criminal networks. These incidents occurred at regular intervals, highlighting a systemic issue. Djindjic, primarily occupied with positive reformative objectives, failed to recognize the severity of this intertwining of crime, police, and state... security in Serbia. A significant oversight was the underestimation of the Ministry of Interior’s criminalization and the State Security Department’s covert influence and capability to destabilize the new regime.In 2002, a pivotal reorganization took place, transforming the State Security Department into the Security Information Agency. Concurrently, political negotiations with Montene-gro on federal restructuring suggested an imminent expansion of the DOS and Djind-jic’s control over defense by March 2003. However, the tragic assassination of Djindjic marked an abrupt end to his term, casting a shadow on the effectiveness of the secu-rity sector’s reform. This tragic outcome underscores the deep-rooted challenges and the ultimate failure of the reform efforts within this critical sector.
Кључне речи:
Zoran Đinđić / Srbija / Resor Državne bezbednosti / reforme / State Security Department / Hague Tribunal / reformsИзвор:
Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva, 2023, 4, 2, 369-395Издавач:
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
URI
https://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/issue/view/11/11http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3674
Институција/група
IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Dimitrijević, Bojan PY - 2023 UR - https://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/issue/view/11/11 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3674 AB - Članak daje pregled aktivnosti sprskog premijera dr Zorana Đinđića u periodu 2001–2003. godine u domenu bezbednosti i odbrane Repu-blike Srbije. Istaknuta je problematična struktura unutar sistema unutrašnjih poslova i državne bezbednosti nasleđena od režima Slo-bodana Miloševića do oktobra 2000. godine, kontinuitet u pojavi bezbedonosnih problema i afera, kao i rascep unutar vladajuće koali-cije Demokratske opozicije Srbije – DOS. Reforme sprovedene u ovom sektoru nisu uspele i sve se završilo atentatom na premijera 12. marta 2003. godine. Rad je napisan na osnovu novinske dokumenta-cije i objavljenih sećanja aktera političkog života i visokih rukovodila-ca Službe bezbednosti. AB - Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Prime Minister, demonstrated a consistent oppositional stance from his student days, nurturing a distinct skepticism towards the security ser-vices. This skepticism likely intensified following the democratic shifts post-October 5, 2000. Despite this, Djindjic seemingly underestimated the complexities of manag-ing these services within the coalition government. His initial focus was diverted away from the security sector, partly because the Army, a federal and relatively politically inert entity, did not immediately demand his attention during the initial power transi-tion. Throughout Djindjic’s tenure, a pattern of scandals and crises emerged, originat-ing from the security services or their associated political and criminal networks. These incidents occurred at regular intervals, highlighting a systemic issue. Djindjic, primarily occupied with positive reformative objectives, failed to recognize the severity of this intertwining of crime, police, and state security in Serbia. A significant oversight was the underestimation of the Ministry of Interior’s criminalization and the State Security Department’s covert influence and capability to destabilize the new regime.In 2002, a pivotal reorganization took place, transforming the State Security Department into the Security Information Agency. Concurrently, political negotiations with Montene-gro on federal restructuring suggested an imminent expansion of the DOS and Djind-jic’s control over defense by March 2003. However, the tragic assassination of Djindjic marked an abrupt end to his term, casting a shadow on the effectiveness of the secu-rity sector’s reform. This tragic outcome underscores the deep-rooted challenges and the ultimate failure of the reform efforts within this critical sector. PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju T2 - Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva T1 - Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003. T1 - The Philosopher and the Services.Prime minister dr Zoran Đinđić and the (unsuccesful) reform of the security sector in Serbia 2001-2003. IS - 2 VL - 4 SP - 369 EP - 395 DO - 10.5281/zenodo.10206853 ER -
@article{ author = "Dimitrijević, Bojan", year = "2023", abstract = "Članak daje pregled aktivnosti sprskog premijera dr Zorana Đinđića u periodu 2001–2003. godine u domenu bezbednosti i odbrane Repu-blike Srbije. Istaknuta je problematična struktura unutar sistema unutrašnjih poslova i državne bezbednosti nasleđena od režima Slo-bodana Miloševića do oktobra 2000. godine, kontinuitet u pojavi bezbedonosnih problema i afera, kao i rascep unutar vladajuće koali-cije Demokratske opozicije Srbije – DOS. Reforme sprovedene u ovom sektoru nisu uspele i sve se završilo atentatom na premijera 12. marta 2003. godine. Rad je napisan na osnovu novinske dokumenta-cije i objavljenih sećanja aktera političkog života i visokih rukovodila-ca Službe bezbednosti., Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Prime Minister, demonstrated a consistent oppositional stance from his student days, nurturing a distinct skepticism towards the security ser-vices. This skepticism likely intensified following the democratic shifts post-October 5, 2000. Despite this, Djindjic seemingly underestimated the complexities of manag-ing these services within the coalition government. His initial focus was diverted away from the security sector, partly because the Army, a federal and relatively politically inert entity, did not immediately demand his attention during the initial power transi-tion. Throughout Djindjic’s tenure, a pattern of scandals and crises emerged, originat-ing from the security services or their associated political and criminal networks. These incidents occurred at regular intervals, highlighting a systemic issue. Djindjic, primarily occupied with positive reformative objectives, failed to recognize the severity of this intertwining of crime, police, and state security in Serbia. A significant oversight was the underestimation of the Ministry of Interior’s criminalization and the State Security Department’s covert influence and capability to destabilize the new regime.In 2002, a pivotal reorganization took place, transforming the State Security Department into the Security Information Agency. Concurrently, political negotiations with Montene-gro on federal restructuring suggested an imminent expansion of the DOS and Djind-jic’s control over defense by March 2003. However, the tragic assassination of Djindjic marked an abrupt end to his term, casting a shadow on the effectiveness of the secu-rity sector’s reform. This tragic outcome underscores the deep-rooted challenges and the ultimate failure of the reform efforts within this critical sector.", publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju", journal = "Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva", title = "Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003., The Philosopher and the Services.Prime minister dr Zoran Đinđić and the (unsuccesful) reform of the security sector in Serbia 2001-2003.", number = "2", volume = "4", pages = "369-395", doi = "10.5281/zenodo.10206853" }
Dimitrijević, B.. (2023). Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003.. in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 4(2), 369-395. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10206853
Dimitrijević B. Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003.. in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva. 2023;4(2):369-395. doi:10.5281/zenodo.10206853 .
Dimitrijević, Bojan, "Filozof i službe. Premijer dr Zoran Đinđić i (neuspela) reforma bezbednosnog sektora u Srbiji 2001-2003." in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva, 4, no. 2 (2023):369-395, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10206853 . .