Rousseau and Hegel: the Many Sides of Republican Freedom

Abstract

Our presentation will consist of two parts. The first part will focus on the ambivalences of Rousseau's republican freedom and critique the interpretation of Rousseau offered by Isaiah Berlin. Berlin's interpretation ignores essential aspects, including the fact that the social contract itself, as the preservation of citizens, does not simply manifest positive freedom. Similarly, the more obviously republican thought, that freedom is not being subjected to the arbitrary will of other agents, embodies a complex concept of freedom. The complexity of the Rousseauian republican concept of freedom, with its multiplex combination of positive and negative aspects, is revealed when we take into consideration the various layers of Rousseau's quadrotomy of freedom (natural freedom, civil freedom, democratic freedom, moral freedom), without resorting to reductionist interpretative strategies. Rousseau will also be analyzed as an advocate of freedom as non-domination and in the role of watching over and critiquing the government. Based on this analysis and in light of the discussion about the positive and negative aspects of Rousseau’s conception of republican freedom, the second part will examine Hegel's critique of Rousseau. It will be demonstrated that while Hegel does indeed resolve some of the paradoxes of republican freedom, which he implicitly identified through his criticism of Rousseau, he introduces new ones within his political philosophy. At the same time, it will be shown that when the negative aspect of Rousseau's conception of republican freedom is taken into account some of Hegel's criticisms directed at Rousseau’s ‘general will’ have merit and cannot be reduced to a mere misreading as is often done.