Yugoslavia and De Gaulle’s Revision of the Cold War
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This paper will analyze France’s attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries’ diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure–the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle’s attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact’saggression toward C...zechoslovakia, Moscow’s complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US’s unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle’s attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible.
Кључне речи:
Yugoslavia / France / foreign policy / détente / Charles de Gaulle / Josip Broz TitoИзвор:
Istraživanja, Јournal of Historical Researches, 2022, 33, 153-173Издавач:
- Novi Sad : Filozofski fakultet
Финансирање / пројекти:
- Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије, институционално финансирање - 200025 (Универзитет у Београду, Институт за филозофију и друштвену теорију) (RS-MESTD-inst-2020-200025)
Колекције
Институција/група
IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Žarković, Petar AU - Bešlin, Milivoj PY - 2022 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2952 AB - This paper will analyze France’s attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries’ diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure–the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle’s attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact’saggression toward Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US’s unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle’s attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible. PB - Novi Sad : Filozofski fakultet T2 - Istraživanja, Јournal of Historical Researches T1 - Yugoslavia and De Gaulle’s Revision of the Cold War VL - 33 SP - 153 EP - 173 DO - 10.19090/i.2022.33.153-173 ER -
@article{ author = "Žarković, Petar and Bešlin, Milivoj", year = "2022", abstract = "This paper will analyze France’s attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries’ diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure–the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle’s attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact’saggression toward Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US’s unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle’s attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible.", publisher = "Novi Sad : Filozofski fakultet", journal = "Istraživanja, Јournal of Historical Researches", title = "Yugoslavia and De Gaulle’s Revision of the Cold War", volume = "33", pages = "153-173", doi = "10.19090/i.2022.33.153-173" }
Žarković, P.,& Bešlin, M.. (2022). Yugoslavia and De Gaulle’s Revision of the Cold War. in Istraživanja, Јournal of Historical Researches Novi Sad : Filozofski fakultet., 33, 153-173. https://doi.org/10.19090/i.2022.33.153-173
Žarković P, Bešlin M. Yugoslavia and De Gaulle’s Revision of the Cold War. in Istraživanja, Јournal of Historical Researches. 2022;33:153-173. doi:10.19090/i.2022.33.153-173 .
Žarković, Petar, Bešlin, Milivoj, "Yugoslavia and De Gaulle’s Revision of the Cold War" in Istraživanja, Јournal of Historical Researches, 33 (2022):153-173, https://doi.org/10.19090/i.2022.33.153-173 . .