The Advantages of Neomoorean Antiskeptical Strategy

Abstract

This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies – namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick’s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose’s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses’ contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called “abominable conjunction”. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose’s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick’s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black’s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.

Cilj ovog rada je da pruži podršku neomurovskom rešenju skeptičkog paradoksa. Branićemo tezu da ovakva epistemološka pozicija zadržava prednosti i izbegava nedostatke rivalskih antiskeptičkih pozicija, pre svega epistemičkog kontekstualizma. Radi ilustracije problema koji skeptik postavlja pred nas, pozivamo se na Nozikov poznati primer „mozga u posudi“ koji omogućava formulisanje valjanih argumenata koji se sastoje od međusobno nekonzistentnih, ali nezavisno plauzibilnih premisa. Prvi i drugi deo rada biće posvećeni Nozikovoj, i Dirouzo-voj teoriji znanja baziranim na principu osetljivosti. Pozivajući se na Dirouzov epistemički kontekstualizam, pokazaćemo da neuspeh Nozikove kondicionalne analize znanja u pružanju zadovoljavajućeg odgovora na skeptički paradoks nije posledica njene zasnovanosti na prin-cipu osetljivosti, već odbacivanja principa deduktivne zatvorenosti i usvajanja takozvane „nepodnošljive konjunkcije“. Treći deo biće posvećen ukazivanju na slabosti po pretpostavci najuspešnijeg, kontekstualističkog odgovora na paradoks. Pokazaćemo da iako Dirouz pre-vazilazi prepreke Nozikove teorije na kojoj je jednim delom sama njegova teorija izgrađena, kontekstualista pravi svojevrsne ustupke radikalnom skeptiku. Na kraju uvodimo Blekovo neomurovsko stanovište bazirano na principu osetljivosti, kao ono koje ne pravi ustupke, niti kontraintuitivne predloge.