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dc.creatorCvejić, Igor
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-10T08:00:38Z
dc.date.available2019-07-10T08:00:38Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2003
dc.description.abstractOsnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma.sr
dc.description.abstractThe main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.sr
dc.language.isosrsr
dc.publisherBeograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvosr
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Integrated and Interdisciplinary Research (IIR or III)/43007/RS//sr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.sourceTheoriasr
dc.subjectKantsr
dc.subjectosećajsr
dc.subjectuzvišenosr
dc.subjectpoštovanjesr
dc.subjectintencionalnostsr
dc.titleNasilna intencionalnost uzvišenogasr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NCsr
dcterms.abstractЦвејић, Игор; Насилна интенционалност узвишенога; Насилна интенционалност узвишенога;
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.volume62
dc.citation.spage53
dc.citation.epage68
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs//bitstream/id/4691/0351-22741902053C.pdf


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