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dc.creatorRoselli, Andrea
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-12T10:37:24Z
dc.date.available2019-06-12T10:37:24Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=701
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1967
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I defend situated approaches of cognition, and the idea that mind, body and external world are inseparable. In the first section, I present some anti–Cartesian approaches of cognition and discuss the intuition they share that there is a constitutive interaction between mind, body and external environment. In the second section, I present the fallacy of the Cartesian theater of the mind and explain its theoretical premises. In the third section, I present a spatial argument against it, and argue that some case studies could give support to the idea of the mind stretching over the boundaries of the skull. In the fourth section, I present a temporal argument, and argue that even in this case the idea of an interaction between our cognitive life and the external world has at least a very strong intuitive palatability.en
dc.description.abstractU ovom radu branim situirane pristupe kogniciji i ideju da su duh, telo i spoljašnji svet nerazdvojivi. U prvom odeljku predstavljam nekoliko anti-kartezijanskih pristupa razumevanju kognicije i ispitujem deljenu intuiciju da postoji konstitutivna interakcija između duha, tela i spoljašnje sredine. U drugom odeljku predstavljam logičku grešku kartezijanskog teatra i objašnjavam njene teorijske pretpostavke. U trećem odeljku predstavljam prostorni argument protiv kartezijanskog teatra i pokazujem da neke studije slučajeva mogu da daju potporu ideji da se duh proteže izvan granica lobanje. U četvrtom odeljku predstavljam vremenski argument i pokazujem da čak i u ovom slučaju ideja o interakciji između našeg kognitivnog života i spoljašnjeg sveta ima barem veoma snažnu intuitivnu prihvatljivost.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teorijusr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Societysr
dc.subjectextended cognitionsr
dc.subjectanti–Cartesianismsr
dc.subjectmindsr
dc.titleThe Mind beyond the Head: Two Arguments in Favour of Embedded Cognitionen
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dcterms.abstractРоселли, Aндреа;
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.volume29
dc.citation.spage505
dc.citation.epage516
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2298/FID1804505R
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/4565/bitstream_4565.pdf


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