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dc.creatorVosgerau, Gottfried
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-12T09:53:24Z
dc.date.available2019-06-12T09:53:24Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=727
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1965
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I provide an argument for the assumption that contents supervene on vehicles, which is based on the explanatory role of representations in the cognitive sciences. I then show that the supervenience thesis together with the explanatory role imply that the individuation criteria for contents and vehicles are tightly bound together, such that content internalism (externalism) is in effect equivalent to vehicle internalism (externalism). In the remainder of the paper, I argue that some of the different positions in the debate stem from different research questions, namely the question about the acquisition conditions and the question about the entertaining conditions for mental representation. Finally, I argue that the thesis of externalism is much more interesting if understood as a claim about how mental representation works in our world as opposed to how they work in all metaphysically possible worlds. In particular, I argue that this “nomological” understanding of the thesis is able to explain how and why the experimental methods used in contemporary cognitive sciences are able to provide insight into behavior generation.en
dc.description.abstractU ovom radu predstavljam argument u prilog pretpostavci da sadržaji supervenišu na po-srednicima koji je zasnovan na eksplanatornoj ulozi predstava u kognitivnim naukama. Po-tom pokazujem da teza o superventnosti, zajedno sa eksplanatornom ulogom, implicira da su kriterijumi za individuaciju sadržaja i posrednika blisko povezani na takav način da je in-ternalizam (eksternalizam) o sadržaju zapravo ekvivalentan internalizmu (eksternalizmu) o posrednicima. U ostatku rada, pokazujem da neki od različitih pristupa u debati proističu iz različitih istraživačkih pitanja, tačnije, pokazujem da neki od pristupa proističu iz pitanja koje se tiče uslova sticanja mentalnih predstava a drugi iz pitanja koje se tiče uslova za razmišlja-nje o mentalnim predstavama. Najzad, pokazujem da je teza o eksternalizmu daleko zani-mljivija ako je razumemo kao tezu o tome na koji način mentalno predstavljanje funkcioniše u našem svetu a ne kao tezu o tome na koji način mentalno predstavljanje funkcioniše u svim metafizički mogućim svetovima. Tačnije, pokazujem da „nomološko“ razumevanje teze može da objasni kako i zašto eksperimentalne metode koje se koriste u savremenim kognitivnim naukama mogu da pruže uvid u obrazovanje ponašanja.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherBeograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teorijusr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Societysr
dc.subjectexternalismsr
dc.subjectsemantic externalismsr
dc.subjectvehicle extrenalismsr
dc.subjectsuperveniencesr
dc.subjectempirical methodssr
dc.titleVehicles, Contents and Supervenienceen
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dcterms.abstractВосгерау, Готтфриед; Вехицлес, Цонтентс анд Супервениенце; Вехицлес, Цонтентс анд Супервениенце;
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.volume29
dc.citation.spage473
dc.citation.epage488
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2298/FID1804473V
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/4563/bitstream_4563.pdf


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