Collective Intentionality and Autism: Against the Exclusion of the “Social Misfits”

Abstract

The paper aims to shed light on Searle’s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of “we-intentionality”. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle’s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

Članak teži da osvetli Serlov pojam kolektivne intencionalnosti (KI) kao primitivan fenomen koga dele sva ljudska bića. Ovo poslednje može biti problematično, pošto postoje pojedinci koji nisu sposobni da razumeju kolektivnu intencionalnosti u potpunosti sarađuju unutar okvira „mi-intencionalnosti“. Ovo je slučaj sa pojedincima koji boluju od autizma, pošto je nedostatak motivacije i veština za deljenje psiholoških stanja sa drugima jedan od kriterijuma dijagnoze Spektra autističkih poremećaja (ASD). Ovaj članak tvrdi da isključivanje pojedinaca sa autizmom nije pretnja za Serlovo shvatanje kolektivne intencionalnosti, jer se ona može tumačiti kao prosta biološka dispozicija koju sva ljudska bića dele. U nastavku, članak predlaže proširenje Serlovog shvatanja KI tako da uključuje ponašanja pojedinaca koji imaju dispoziciju za KI, ali koja se nije razvila kroz ontogenezu: naime, pojedinaca sa autizmom.