Social Epistemology between Revisionism and Expansionism
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The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic”... philosophy.
Keywords:analytic and continental philosophy / social epistemology / knowledge / revisionism / expansionism
Source:European Journal of Analiytic Philosophy, 2014, 10, 2, 31-48
- Rijeka : University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy