Counterfactuals and Unphysical Ceteris Paribus : an Explanatory Fallacy
Protivčinjenični iskazi i nefizički ceteris paribus : jedna eksplanatorna greška
Abstract
I reconsider a type of counterfactual argument often used in historical
sciences on a recent widely discussed example of the so-called “rare
Earth” hypothesis in planetary sciences and astrobiology. The argument is
based on the alleged “rarity” of some crucial ingredient for the planetary
habitability, which is, in Earth’s case, provided by contingent evolutionary
development. For instance, the claim that a contingent fact of history which
has created planet Jupiter enables shielding of Earth from most dangerous
impact catastrophes, thus increasing Earth’s habitability, leads often to the
conclusion that such state-of-affairs must be rare in the Galaxy. I argue that
this reasoning is deeply flawed, for several closely related reasons. In addition,
the relevance of the philosophical problem of transworld identity for
this kind of historical reasoning in science is put forward. This highlights
many explanatory problems one faces when using historical counterfactuals
in study... of complex, nonlinear dynamical systems – and bolsters the relevance
of philosophy for evaluation of scientific explanatory claims.
Keywords:
counterfactuals / astrobiology / philosophy of science / philosophy of history / transworld identitySource:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2013, 143-160Projects:
- Visible and Invisible Matter in Nearby Galaxies: Theory and Observations (RS-176021)
- Theory and practice of science in society: multidisciplinary, educational and intergenerational perspectives (RS-179048)