The Dualism of practical reason and the autonomy Sidgwick’s pessimism and Kant’s pptimism

Abstract

The question this paper is concerned with is: what if Immanuel Kant found a solution to the problem of the dualism of practical reason before Henry Sidgwick even came to formulate it? A comparison of Sidgwick’s and Kant’s approach to the problem of the dualism of practical reason is presented only in general terms, but the author concludes that this is sufficient for grasping the advantage of Kant’s solution to the problem.

U ovom tekstu postavlja se pitanje šta ako je Imanuel Kant rešio problem dualizma praktičkog uma pre nego što je Henri Sidžvik uopšte stigao da ga formuliše? Komparacija između sidžvikovskog i kantovskog pristupa problemu dualizma praktičkog uma ovde se pruža tek u opštim crtama, ali autor zaključuje da je i to dovoljno kako bi se uvidela prednost Kantovog rešenja tog problema.