Show simple item record

Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam

dc.creatorVranić, Bojan
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-17T11:05:39Z
dc.date.available2018-10-17T11:05:39Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=459
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1888
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to re- flexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in mor- al and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum’s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and polit- ical disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents’ emotional judgments.en
dc.description.abstractCilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teorijusr
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179076/RS//
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Societysr
dc.subjectdemokratijasr
dc.subjectdemocracysr
dc.subjectemotivismsr
dc.subjectemotional judgmentssr
dc.subjectmoral disagreementsr
dc.subjectemotivizamsr
dc.subjectemocionalni sudovisr
dc.subjectmoralni sporovisr
dc.titleDemocratic values, emotions and emotivismen
dc.titleDemokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizamsr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dcterms.abstractВранић, Бојан; Демократске вредности, емоције и емотивизам; Демократске вредности, емоције и емотивизам; Демоцратиц валуес, емотионс анд емотивисм; Демоцратиц валуес, емотионс анд емотивисм;
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.volume27
dc.citation.spage723
dc.citation.epage738
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1604723V
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/4237/bitstream_4237.pdf
dc.identifier.wos000408374000002


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record