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Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje

dc.creatorWestphal, Kenneth R.
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-09T10:07:10Z
dc.date.available2018-05-09T10:07:10Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=507
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1535
dc.description.abstractKant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.sr
dc.description.abstractKant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. ‘Transcendentalni karakter’ ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološke refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teorijusr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvosr
dc.subjectscepticismsr
dc.subjectskepticizamsr
dc.subjecttranscendental proofsr
dc.subjectmental content externalismsr
dc.subjectKantsr
dc.subjectHegelsr
dc.subjectC.I. Lewissr
dc.subjectHeideggersr
dc.subjectWittgensteinsr
dc.subjecttranscendentalni dokazsr
dc.subjecteksternalizam mentalne sadržinesr
dc.subjectKantsr
dc.subjectHegelsr
dc.subjectK.I. Luissr
dc.subjectHajdegersr
dc.subjectVitgenštajnsr
dc.titleScepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderationssr
dc.titleSkepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranjesr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBYsr
dcterms.abstractWестпхал, Кеннетх Р.; Сцептицисм & трансцендентал аргументс: Соме метходологицал рецонсидератионс; Сцептицисм & трансцендентал аргументс: Соме метходологицал рецонсидератионс; Скептицизам и трансцендентални аргументи: методолошко разматрање; Скептицизам и трансцендентални аргументи: методолошко разматрање;
dc.citation.issue1
dc.citation.volume28
dc.citation.spage113
dc.citation.epage135
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1701113W
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs//bitstream/id/3096/Kenneth R. Westphal.pdf


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