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Autonomija gramatike i semantički internalizam

dc.creatorDobler, Tamara
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-01T10:17:48Z
dc.date.available2017-11-01T10:17:48Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1321
dc.description.abstractIn his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.eng
dc.format25 1 (2014) 144-163
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvomul
dc.subjectgramatika
dc.subjectsemantic internalism and externalism
dc.subjectmeaning as use
dc.subjectreference
dc.subjectVitgenštajn, Ludvig
dc.titleThe Autonomy of Grammar and Semantic Internalismeng
dc.titleAutonomija gramatike i semantički internalizamsrp
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-ND
dcterms.abstractДоблер, Тамара; Aутономија граматике и семантички интернализам;
dc.citation.spage144
dc.citation.epage163
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1401144D
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/4771/1319.pdf


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