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Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje

dc.creatorBaccarini, Elvio
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-01T10:17:48Z
dc.date.available2017-11-01T10:17:48Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1315
dc.description.abstractJonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared reasons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that Quong puts forward in opposition to the convergence view is represented by the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the requirement of sincerity.eng
dc.format25 1 (2014) 75-95
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvomul
dc.subjectconsensus
dc.subjectconvergence
dc.subjectGaus
dc.subjectQuong
dc.subjectjavni um
dc.titlePublic Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence Vieweng
dc.titleJavni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenjesrp
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-ND
dcterms.abstractБаццарини, Елвио; Јавни ум. Консензуално и конвергентно виђење;
dc.citation.spage75
dc.citation.epage95
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1401075B
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs//bitstream/id/4767/1313.pdf


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