Is there a Need for Political Liberalism to have an Account of Pre-Overlapping Consensus Reasoning?
Da li je političkom liberalizmu potreban neki model rasuđivanja pre preklapajućeg konsenzusa?
|dc.description.abstract||In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a liberal well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way These institutions should be justified by particular conception of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the first stage of its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to liberal conception of justice – freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong’s conception of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies should be justified (whenever possible) on basis of these values alone. Thus, reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic beliefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its ideal of well-ordered society.||eng|
|dc.format||25 1 (2014) 57-74|
|dc.publisher||Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju|
|dc.source||Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society||mul|
|dc.subject||moral duty of civility|
|dc.title||Is there a Need for Political Liberalism to have an Account of Pre-Overlapping Consensus Reasoning?||eng|
|dc.title||Da li je političkom liberalizmu potreban neki model rasuđivanja pre preklapajućeg konsenzusa?||sr|
|dcterms.abstract||Зелић, Небојша; Да ли је политичком либерализму потребан неки модел расуђивања пре преклапајућег консензуса?;|