How “Political” is Quong’s Political Liberalism?
Koliko je „politički“ Kvongov politički liberalizam?
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In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more distinctively “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlapping consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the “liberal objection”.
Keywords:comprehensive doctrines / political liberalism / Rawls / preklapajući konsenzus / javni um
Source:Filozofija i društvo, 2014, 47-56
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju