CONTENTS

The Third Way: The Experiment of Workers' Self-Management in Socialist Yugoslavia

Zoran Erić

Post–World War II Yugoslavia

The year 1948 was in many ways decisive for the future social system of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,[1] which had just arisen out of World War II. In that year, a decisive dispute between Tito and Stalin resulted in a break with all ties to the USSR and its dictate as proclaimed in the Cominform Resolution.[2] Following Stalin's accusations that Yugoslavia was "too similar to the old regime," the entire Yugoslav political structure was set up to prove Stalin wrong and to assert this fact to the Soviets. The Yugoslav social system, therefore, had to be different from Soviet state socialism, which led to an ideological experiment with a non-state type of socialism. It was simultaneously both anti-Soviet and Soviet-centric because it was created as a "mirror image" to the USSR model. It couldn't exist without the USSR as the necessary Other in relation to whom the new Yugoslav identity was built. The development of such a system after the historical break had support in the authentic anti-fascist liberation movement, which provided the concept for the strongest cohesive force within the multiethnic country, namely fraternity and unity among all nations in the fight against German occupation.

The reforms of the Yugoslav socialist country, which began right after the end of World War II, took another course as a result of the split with Stalin and were aimed at establishing a third

1. The anti-fascist movement of partisans proclaimed in 1943 the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, and the country was renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia after World War II, in 1946, by the newly established communist government. The country was renamed again in 1963 to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

2. Due to accusations in the Resolution, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), a Soviet-dominated organization of communist parties formed in 1947, which was the successor to the Comintern (Communist International).

possible solution, a third way in between the Eastern and Western blocs. One of the crucial projects of the new country was to build its administrative centre, and the choice was a marshland across the river Sava and the old city of Belgrade, where New Belgrade, as the capital of socialist Yugoslavia, was about to be built—a process that started exactly in 1948. The concept of the capital was elaborated in urban planning, with a dominant administrative axis in which the buildings for the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Presidency of Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia were first marked. Even though architectural competitions for these two buildings were opened as early as 1946 and the building process of the latter began in 1948, the immediate crisis—the clash with the USSR and the isolation imposed by the Eastern bloc, as well as the West's passive and cautious approach in anticipation of a resolution to the conflict—prolonged the realization of all major architectural and urban projects. The situation slowly started to change after Stalin's death in 1953, and there was a loosening of pressure on Yugoslavia, which enabled Western countries to send military and economic support. In the years of crisis, and torn between two power blocs during the Cold War period, Tito, together with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, managed to establish an enlightened foreign policy through the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955. The movement was an attempt to avoid participation in the Cold War and consisted of countries that didn't want to conform to the rule of two major political blocs by trying to find a third possible platform on which to cooperate and act globally. After the Belgrade Declaration of reconciliation with the USSR in 1955, and after loans started to flow from the International Monetary Fund, Yugoslavia was able to further develop its chosen "third way," both in the urban planning of New Belgrade and in the Non-Aligned Movement: these two developments coincided in 1961 when the first summit of the movement was held in the newly opened (specifically for this occasion) building of the Presidency of the Government (renamed the Federal Executive Council and commonly called Palace of Federation).

The building itself, which had final modifications before the opening, showed the potential of architecture to reflect its socio-political context and the need to "visualize" the idea of the "third way," which opposed both the paradigm of Western modernism, seen in the International Style, and Eastern Socialist Realism.[3] The cultural sphere had also played a vital role in the construction of visual representations, illustrating the sociopolitical orientation of socialist Yugoslavia. The "doctrinary" period of Socialist Realism, which lasted several years, erased all links with former "bourgeois aesthetics." Paradoxically, it was "canonized" on the V Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1948, just after the split with Stalin, but already from the beginning of the 1950s its normative role in the production of socialist imagery in service to its pro-claimed principles of liberty, equality, brotherhood, and unity, etc. were questioned by the artists themselves. Theoretical support came later from the group of <u>Praxis</u> philosophers who offered an answer to the question how to produce within a theoretical and practical paradigm that would remain Marxist but that would be critical of the "vulgar materialism" of "reflection theory," which advocated for Socialist Realism in art practice. The outcome was the possibility for a new paradigm of "socialist aestheticism" (i.e., non-representa-tional art), as elaborated by the Serbian writer Sveta Lukić.

The Yugoslav version of socialism
Yugoslavia developed a socialist regime that could be seen as an eclectic model that united a theoretical background in some aspects of Marxism but that also "borrowed" some of the socioeconomic premises of capitalism. First formed with the concept of a "frater-nity and unity" among South Slavic nations, Yugoslavia was not, however, conceived of as a national state, nor was there any specific goal of forming a new nation that could be seen as a revival of the old regime. The new concept was for a society that was national in appearances, but socialist in essence. Unlike a liberal-democratic understanding of the state as the central institution of democracy,

3. Ljiljana Blagojević, "Strategije modernizma u planiranju i projektovanju urbane strukture i arhitekture Novog Beograda: Period konceptualne faze od 1922. do 1962. godine," Ph.D. diss., Belgrade University, Faculty of Architecture, 2004, 125-26.

the socialist regime insisted on the Marxist idea of a dying out of the state. The idea of socialism was to turn the state into society, to weaken its power to the level where state functions are taken over by associations of free producers. From the point of view of socialist ideologists, true democracy was not political, as liberalism would like to claim, but economic. Liberal democracy was, therefore, seen as inferior to socialist, economic democracy.

For Yugoslav communists, the concept of self-management,[4] as promoted already in 1950, meant the same as the concept of democracy for Western European liberal countries. True democracy could be seen only in the concept that human beings themselves control the products and conditions of their work. For a society where workers are the most important subjects, true democracy could be, thus, reached only when the workers decided on the products of their labour through self-management.[5] Successful reforms and economic prosperity led Edvard Kardelj, the mastermind of the reforms, to claim, "self-management had not only demonstrated the economic effectiveness" but also allowed Yugoslavia to "solve democratically most of the contradictions and conflicts that cropped up in society."[6] Kardelj, as the main ideologist of the concept, conceived of an ideocratic society and tried to push "social reality" towards an ideological concept. He thus followed Marx's recommendation that it is not enough to interpret the world in a new way, but to make possible world changes in a way in which reality will come closer to your interpretation.[7]

4. The phases of the development of self-management in Yugoslavia were the following: 1945-52, the period of a centrally planned economy, similar to the Soviet model of state socialism; 1952-65, the introduction of self-management, where the process of decision-making was gradually decentralized; 1965-74, the period of self-managed market socialism, when market mechanisms were utilized in as many areas as possible, focusing on the activities of socially owned enterprises operating in the market; 1974-88, the system of "free associated labour" or "contractual socialism." See Saul Estrin and Tea Petrin (1991), "Patterns of Entry, Exit and Merger in Yugoslavia", in P.A. Geroski and J. Schwalbach, eds., *Entry and Market Contestability: An International Comparison* (Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell), 204-20.

5. Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad Cetvrte Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 2003), 146.

6. Ibid., 121.

7. See Marx's analysis in the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." See http://www.marxists.org for the full text of the theses.

For workers' self-management socialism, society had much greater importance than the state, which was supposed to die. However, this "death" had to be a very long process, and in the first years of workers' self-management the role of the state and the Communist Party was of the utmost importance. The network of basic pillars that led the social development of self-management socialism was very complex and, therefore, the political system had to regulate the relations between these pillars in order to foster their synchronous actions and prevent any one from becoming monopolistic. These social pillars were seen in the sociopolitical interest of the producers, in working collectives as carriers of production, in communes, in socialist associations, and in the state.[8] The state, therefore, had the task of creating a path between the broad initiatives of immediate producers and the working people, thus transforming itself from an instrument of rule over the people to an organizational instrument of self-managed workers with the aim of governing their affairs. Likewise, the Communist Party, whose avant-garde role was crucial at the first phase of socialist development, had to lose its ruling position and hand it over to the free producers and their associations.[9] All kinds of social associations such as working councils, civil society unions, etc. flourished in the new society and created a broad network in the self-management system of Yugoslavia.

The ideological basis for a society of workers' self-management was soon translated into all spheres of social life. The property regime was a good example, namely, after the nationalization of all big private companies and industry in the post-war period, with the introduction of self-management, state property was declared "social property" belonging to the society as a whole. The shift in social practice was reflected as well in the change in name of the Communist Party to the League of Communists at the VI Congress in 1952. Consequently, the building designed for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, yet to be opened in 1965, was renamed

8. Nebojša Popov, *Partija (SKJ), politička vlast i samoupravljanje* (Belgrade: Radnički univerzitet Curo Salaj, 1966), 46-47.

9. Ibid.

The Building of Social Political Organizations, following the new tendency in social development.

Self-management in social practice

The main nucleus of this new society of workers' self-management was seen in the creation of basic units in factories and industry—e.g., the "basic organization of associated labour" (BOAL)—that provided workers with the prerogative to decide for themselves on the production process.[10] The lower levels of society provided the place where real, direct democracy took place, where all workers participated in the decision-making process. While the working councils were independent in decisions on production and other social issues such as the distribution of income, vacations, rights to state-owned apartments for workers in need, etc., on other issues they depended, on one side, on experts regarding scientific issues, and, on the other, they operated under the auspices of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia regarding all cadre questions. The Communist elites had exclusive prerogative in cadre administration, and, therefore, while the real self-management of workers occurred on the lower level, on the upper level, among elites in the League of Communists, there was not much democracy.

The Constitution of 1974 introduced the concept of self-management in all spheres of society. The population was divided into the "working class," "working people," and "citizens." In accordance with Marxist theory, "working class" was the term used to mark the locus of power in a socialist regime. Working people were all employees in state-owned companies and institutions. All other members of society were seen just as citizens. To be able to actively take part in the self-management system, the "citizens" had to join sociopolitical associations that functioned at different levels—from the county to the city and to the federation—but citizens actually could act only on the level of their local territorial units, while the other "sociopolitical" organizations were reserved for working people only. State laws and regulations controlled all of these associations and organizations, and their activities were monitored and

10. Jović, *Jugoslavija,* 209.

approved by the Socialist Union of Working People (SUWP), the biggest one of them all.[11]

In the political system, self-management functioned in the following way. The new concept was based on the principle of "delegates" and "delegations." The system began at the lowest level in factories and all associations and social groups on local levels, like BOAL, where the delegates were selected to form delegations. This principle continued up to the Parliament, but the delegates there were responsible to the delegations that selected them and had to strictly follow their instructions. The population had the possibility to choose delegates only at the lowest level, still having just one mostly unknown candidate. The whole system of delegates and delegations was regarded as the major shift from a bourgeois parliamentary democracy to a more immediate workers' democracy.[12]

The system of self-management became universal in society and covered all areas in the public sector and all professions that used public (state) property for its activities. It was implemented in such spheres of society as state administration, schools, and cultural institutions such as museums and theatres, where all institutions were governed by workers' councils in which all employees had a vote.

Problems in the implementation of self-management
In ideocratic societies, such as the Yugoslav socialist society was, we have to analyze the level of discrepancy between the conceptual ideological premises of how the society was intended to function and the actual modus operandi that occurred in social reality. The implementation of the workers' self-management system had many obstacles and problems, but also inherent antagonisms. The problem in a system of delegates was that it was still a representational model of self-management, and the desired immediate and direct self-management by an association of free producers (as it was elaborated by Kardelj) was underdeveloped and never to be achieved.

11. Vojin Dimitrijević, "Sukobi oko
 Ustava iz 1974," in Nebojša Popov, ed., *Srpska srana rata*, vol. 2 (Belgrade: Samiz-dat B92, 2002), 15.

12. Ibid., 14.

The conceptualization of a model of workers' self-management reached four different sets of problems in its social implementation: the bureaucratization of self-management practice; the position of workers' organization and broader social associations; internal distribution, or the process of formation of workers' individual income and its repercussions on social relations; and deviation from principles on the leading role of the League of Communists.[13]

Instead of the de-bureaucratization of society, the numerous working councils, associations, and other social units produced even bigger and more complex administration and bureaucratic apparatuses. The major criticism of Marxism towards liberal democracy, that it represents abstract citizens when levelling society to a political democracy, now came back to the Yugoslav Communists; their system eliminated the idea of the abstract citizen and expected the workers to represent the interests of abstract "working people."

The first critical voices that attacked the bureaucratization of the self-management system came already in the 1960s from a group of leftist, Hegelian-Marxist philosophers whose platform was the magazine Praxis,[14] published from 1964 to 1974. They found the main problem and cause of the unsuccessful development of a proper self-management socialist system to be the prevalence of "statist bureaucratic" groups in Yugoslav society. They advocated for a more effective and less bureaucraticized system of self-management.[15]

Other problems in the implementation of such an elaborate and complex political and social system could be seen in the relatively undeveloped country in which it was conceived, where the working class was, historically, underdeveloped and the population was mainly rural. It was difficult to create a modern, ideologically conscious working class in such a society, where most of the workers were still strongly tied to the village and land.

13. Popov, *Partija (SKJ)*, 63.

14. Its international editorial board included Alfred J. Ayer, Erich Fromm, Lucien Goldmann, György Lukács, Zygmunt Baumann, Ernst Bloch, Agnes Heller, Jürgen Habermas, Henri Lefebvre, Herbert Marcuse, etc.

15. See Renata Salecl's text "The Crisis of Identity and the Struggle for New Hegemony in the Former Yugoslavia," in Ernesto Laclau, ed., *The Making of Political Identities* (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 205-32.

On the federal level, a structural problem existed in the strong contrast between the richer and the poorer republics. There was always a big discrepancy in the pace of development and economic standard between the northwestern part of the country (Slovenia and Croatia being the most developed republics) and the southeastern parts (Macedonia and Kosovo suffering from very slow development and economic growth, partly due to overpopulation). Distributive justice among the republics was always a major issue for Tito and the Communist elite, and the federal budget had a complex strategy built within it for overcoming such problems. The fair redistribution of the federal budget and the percent that the developed republics had to contribute to the underdeveloped ones never ultimately succeeded in fostering an adequate pace of economic growth among all republics.

In the thesis of Kardelj from 1970 that identified the necessity of the "plurality of self-management interests" as crucial for a society of self-managed workers, Renata Salecl found the key ideological problem that provided the groundwork for the eventual disintegration of the self-management system. For Salecl, this phrase, among many others in the vocabulary of self-management, actually had greater relevance than just an empty formulation and could have been used to undermine the unbreakable monolith of the League of Yugoslav Communists. The League had to be united, and there were no possible dissonant voices from within its elite that would speak publicly. If they did, the method of discreditation used against "astray thinkers" was all too familiar to all socialist regimes. Therefore, a plurality of opinions, ideas, and interests was never welcome in the public sphere. With the introduction of this concept from the very ideologist of the society (Kardelj), the unity of the League of Yugoslav Communists was challenged in the public sphere. Salecl analyzes further that this, as she calls it, surplus syntagm "became the point at which the system began to fracture, that is to say, the point where elements, which had until then formed an ideological structure, now achieved independence and began to function as 'floating signifiers' awaiting new articulation."[16]

16. Ibid., 208.

This tendency opened up the public sphere for hegemonic struggles and the rise of ethno-nationalism that would soon end up in a series of ethnic clashes and the dissolution of the country of Yugoslavia.

The decline of self-management
After the death of Tito in 1980, there were many symptoms that suggested the collapse of the social system of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia was inevitable. In the following period of the 1980s, the Yugoslav economy was facing a serious crisis manifested by hyperinflation, foreign debts, trade deficits, unemployment, etc. For this reason the Yugoslav government adopted a policy of building the private sector and fostering the inflow of foreign capital, thus, openly introducing a new model of the free market economy into the existing system. The full demise of workers' self-management could be seen in 1988, as the social model changed and the mixed market economy (based on diversified property forms) replaced "social property" and self-management.

The economic reforms of Prime Minister Ante Marković were, at that time, the ultimate efforts at preserving a Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by founding it on new ground with the creation of a civil society, which focused on four fundamental principles: a free market economy; the opening up of the country to the world; an establishment of a legal state and the development of civil rights; and the democratization of political life with introduction of a pluralistic, parliamentary democracy. This program faced big resistance by the Communist oligarchy in the republics because it compromised all previous pillars of the socialist system. On the other hand, this last chance for choosing a civil instead of a purely ethnic society was lost due to a prevailing "national awareness," which led to the ethnification of the republics in SFR Yugoslavia, which couldn't find common interest in a peaceful manner. It was obvious that the state apparatuses couldn't mediate between a common state identity and narrow national identities which were competitive and in collision.[17] As a consequence, the country

17. Vesna Pešić, "Rat za nacionalne države," in Nebojša Popov, ed., *Srpska srana rata*, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 2002), 42.

disintegrated and ethnic clashes soon followed.

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the newly formed nation(al)-states took their own courses in social transformations that comprised a full shift towards the free market economy and the privatization of formerly "social property." From the perspective of their new social system(s), there was a common tendency toward a resurgence of religious identities on the one hand, and the rise of neoliberal or predatory capitalism on the other.

Social transformations after the demise of self-management

Privatization in Serbia had begun with Ante Marković's Law on Enterprises in 1988 and proceeded with the Serbian Law of 1991 and was mostly completed by 1994.[18] It happened that this year was a turning point in the retreat and abolishment of privatization, which had to be revaluated because of hyperinflation, this then led to direct state control of enterprises by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and his oligarchy. This was no surprise, bearing in mind the mechanisms behind hyperinflation,[19] and the motives of Milošević and the political elite who actually induced it and abused monetary and political power for their personal economic gain and control over the means of production and key enterprises.[20]

18. The very slow progress in privatization in Serbia and Montenegro during the 1990s was caused by the United Nations' sanctions, the lack of foreign capital, the sharp decline in economic activity, poor experience and constraints to implement and control privatization, and the low level of information and nontransparent procedures. See Veselin Vukotić, *Privatization in Montenegro: Global Development Network for Southeast Europe* (Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2001).

19. The most severe economic crisis came after the UN Security Council's resolution 757, which declared economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on May 30, 1992. The formal reason for this measure by the UN was the engagement of Serbian military and paramilitary forces in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as cases of ethnic cleansing. In April 1993, the complete blockade of all financial transactions with the FRY was established by UN declaration 820. In this sociopolitical environment, hyperinflation started to grow rapidly, and in January 1994 it reached its peak with a daily rise in prices on the level of 62% or 2% per hour!

20. When he assumed the leading position in the Communist Party in Serbia in the mid 1980s, Slobodan Milošević came to the idea of economic mobilization to help the development of the Republic. The major project in this respect was the Loan for the Serbian Industrial Renaissance, which was announced in June 1989. The loan was supposed to show the cohesive strength of all Serbs throughout the world, and all state-run institutions and media had the task of supporting this project. This step was just one in a row of the "robbery of people," as Mladan Dinkić described it. See M. Dinkić, *Ekonomija destrukcije* (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996).

Hyperinflation and the <u>economy of destruction</u> induced social stratification in an extreme manner. It meant the impoverishment of the majority of the population on the one side and the creation of a political-financial elite on the other. The new elite consisted of the highest political leaders, a small number of directors of state-run companies and banks, as well as the owners of certain "private" but essentially "para-state" companies. They all based their material and formal status on different kinds of monopolies: a monopoly over the release and distribution of money; a monopoly on the importation and trade of certain merchandise; the media monopoly; and a preference in financial transactions with the state, etc. Their interest was, therefore, never oriented to the overall development of the state economy, but the maintenance of their personal monopoly and wealth.[21] One of the aspects that made possible such a concentration of power and wealth within this limited group of people is the fact that Serbia was, and still remains, the only post-socialist country where a denationalization law was never adopted.

After the collapse of Milošević's regime in 2000, the new government took a more direct course towards neoliberal capitalism and more "transparent" auction or tender sales of previously socially owned enterprises, all supported by a new law on privatization from 2001. However, it happened that a large number of enterprises ended up in the hands of individuals/companies that had accumulated capital during the 1990s and were highly implicated in many cases of corruption and fraud in alliance with Milošević and his regime. On the other hand, all major industrial facilities that were not destroyed in the NATO bombing of 1999 were sold within a few years to big international companies and the process was followed by economic mediation of the so-called transitional banks, mostly from the South East Europe (SEE) region, which are now flourishing in Serbia and buying financially exhausted local banks.[22]

The social transformation had the strongest effect on the former pillar of socialist society—the workers. Labour conditions in

21. Ibid., 234-35.

22. For example, British American Tobacco and Philip Morris bought the tobacco industry, US Steel bought the steel industry, and finally the Russian companies Lukoil and Gasprom bought the oil and gas industries.

the devastated factories and industries were at the lowest possible level; i.e., the workers were not getting any salaries for years, and the new proprietors mostly took the approach of cruel capitalist exploitation, which resulted in a series of strikes at different factories and enterprises, as well as public protests by unions. If we just have a look at the statistics in the period from 2001 to 2004, we see that the number of workers in the public sector decreased by 200,000, yet the increase in the private sector was only 100,000, meaning that 100,000 workers lost their jobs.[23]

The new social shift towards neoliberal or predatory capitalism is best exemplified spatially in the urban realm. In Serbia, this is manifested most clearly in New Belgrade, which was figured to be both the administrative and cultural capital of socialist Yugoslavia, and which is now the site of the most rapid urban transformation. The social change is exemplified symbolically with the privatization of the building of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party, which was once the locus of power for the driving force in socialist society. The building was bombed by NATO in 1999, sold in 2002, and transformed into a business centre and symbol for the rapidly spreading new ideology in New Belgrade. With the recent development of the Ušće shopping mall which, at 130,000 square meters, is the biggest in the Balkans, and the future twin tower of the business centre (the tallest in the Balkans), this site is becoming a new "city" or centre of financial power. If Yugoslavia was, unlike other socialist countries, developing a specific model of socialism after its collapse, the invasion of neoliberal capitalism is just too similar to all post-socialist countries and it affects it in the same way it affects the urban realm of all the major capital cities. The spatial effect of this rapid social transformation can be seen in new types of segregations taking shape both through "self-isolation" of the financial elite in New Belgrade's recently formed housing blocks, which resemble gated communities, and also the marginalization of different social, ethnic, and racial groups in certain blocks, such as the Chinese community or shanty towns in the case of the Roma

23. Mile Jovanović, Bojan Stepanović, and Srđan Staničić, "Privatizacija u Srbiji," http://www.ekof.bg.ac.yu/nastava/ekonomika_industrije/studentske_prezentacije/PRIVA-TIZACIJA%20U%20SRBIJI.ppt.

population. The sharp socio-spatial stratification is creating new types of social relations and re-creating the class antagonisms of capitalism, as well as the conditions for struggle and conflict.

The legacy of self-management: New perspectives?

In a recent theoretical analysis of the possible alternative social and economic systems to the actually existing phase of capitalism, the model of workers' self-management in socialist Yugoslavia is worth revisiting. Other important models for analysis are the cases of self-management in Latin American countries such as Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina, where, in different contexts, workers have shown the potential for self-organization and the capacity to reclaim and repair factories and enterprises. The case of Yugoslav workers' self-management was the longest and, in its early stage, the most successful due to the strong, homogenizing forces of anti-fascist and then anti-Stalinist movements, but also because it was implemented through a top-down method by the ruling communist party in order to encompass all spheres of society. Such a social model could be, therefore, analyzed at the limits of its historical context with all the valuable lessons one could learn from it, both in its successful phase and its demise. However, this model is difficult to "translate" into an understanding of the bottom-up and grassroots processes of self-management and self-organization emerging in different social systems in capitalism today. For instance, the actual debates of the workers' self-management movement in Argentina focused on several key issues, including whether the enterprise should be run by an occupying cooperative or self-managed by workers; whether alliances should be made with political parties and their leaders; and whether the perspective of self-management in enterprises should be local, regional, sectoral, or national in scope.[24]

24. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, "Worker self-management in historical perspective, 1950-2006," http://libcom.org/library/worker-self-management-in-historical-perspective.

In this respect, it is useful to turn to the ideas of French sociologist and urbanist Henri Lefebvre[25] and the questions he posed when he reflected on the idea of "new citizenship."[26] Lefebvre's thinking regarding new citizenship relied on three propositions: the right to difference, a redefinition of citizenship, and self-management. Essentially, he was asking for new rights of the citizen. This included the right to information, free expression, culture, identity within difference (equality), self-management, the city, and services, among others yet to be defined. The right to self-management Lefebvre proclaimed among other new rights for the citizen would involve rights to the democratic control of the economy, and, therefore, of companies, including national or nationalized ones, i.e., those which up to now had been under some degree of state control. Lefebvre defined self-management (autogestion) as: knowledge of and control (at the limit) by a group—a company, a locality, an area or a region—over the conditions governing its existence and its survival through change, through self-management.[27]

It is exactly in the intertwined circuits between social relations and their spatial embeddedness that we can see the potential for new types of self-organization taking shape. Likewise, the possibility for different social groups that arose in new social systems in Serbia and in other former Yugoslav republics to influence their own reality and fight for both social and spatial justice exists in these intertwined circuits.

25. Henri Lefebvre was arguing that exactly because of self-management Yugoslavia was one of the rare countries to be able to concretely deal with the problem of the "New Urban."

26. Lefebvre was working on the new relations among the individual, society, and the state and thinking about how to redefine citizenship under "mondialization," the immigration and migration patterns that are shaping urban and social landscapes and new forms of belonging.

27. Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas, and Eleonore Kofman, eds., *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings* (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 218-19.

Neil Smith, an urban geographer who has been central
to the critique of gentrification, is a distinguished pro-
fessor and former Director of the Center for Place, Culture
and Politics at the Graduate Center, City University of New
York. His books include *The Endgame of Globalization* (2005),
*American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to
Globalization* (2003), *The New Urban Frontier* (1996), and
*Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of
Space* (1984).

Klaus Ronneberger is an independent urban researcher in
Frankfurt, Germany. Informed by decades of experience in
urban social movements, he has edited and authored numerous
articles and books on urban theory, regional restructuring,
local politics, and law and order, including *Die Sadt als
Beute* (1999).

Ljiljana Blagojević is an architect, historian, and theo-
rist at the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade,
Serbia. Her research focuses on relations among space,
politics, and ideology in the architecture and urbanism of
the twentieth century. She lectures, teaches, and publishes
widely in Serbia as well as internationally.

Zoran Erić is an art historian, curator, and lecturer. He
holds a Ph.D. from the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. Currently
he is working as Curator of the Centre for Visual Culture
at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Belgrade. His research
fields include the meeting points of urban geography, spa-
tio-cultural discourse, and theory of radical democracy.

EDITORS

Urban Subjects (Sabine Bitter, Jeff Derksen, and Helmut
Weber) is a cultural collective formed in 2004. Urban Sub-
jects focuses on research and developing artistic projects
on urban issues. Urban Subjects curated *NOT SHEEP: New Urban
Enclosures and Commons*, Artspeak Gallery, Vancouver, in
2006, and organizes discursive programs with the Vancouver
Flying University.

Jeff Derksen lives in Vancouver, Canada, and works in the
English Department at Simon Fraser University. His books
include *After Euphoria: art/space/neoliberalism* (2009),
Annihilated Time: Poetry and Other Politics (2009), *Trans-
national Muscle Cars* (2003), *Dwell* (1993), and *Down Time*
(1990). He has published widely on poetics, art, urbanism,
and cultural politics.

Sabine Bitter and Helmut Weber have worked since 1993 on
projects addressing cities, architecture, and the politics
of representation and of space. Sabine Bitter is based in
Vancouver and works at Simon Fraser University. Helmut
Weber is based in Vienna. Their exhibitions include *Right,
to the City*, Upper State Gallery, Linz; *We Declare: Spaces
of Housing*, Gallery Gachet, Vancouver; *Live Like This!*
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