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15 Citizens' assemblies at supranational level: Addressing the EU and global democratic deficit

Abstract: The problems related to the democratic deficit, lack of democratic legitimacy, and widening gap between citizens and decision-makers seem even more striking in the case of decision-making at supranational level. One response to this crisis of democracy at the supranational level has been the creation of citizens' assemblies (CAs) promoted and implemented by the various actors: European Union, NGOs, international organizations, and social movements. Still, although all those actors advocated for the use of CAs at supranational level there are significant differences regarding the capacity of those actors as well as the CAs they promote to address the democratic deficit. Starting from this assumption, in the following pages I will analytically differentiate between CAs implemented by the European Union (EU), a system provided by the political authority and those CAs implemented by supranational actors that lack formally legitimate political authority.

Keywords: global democratic deficit, EU democratic deficit, supranational citizens' assemblies, supranational deliberation, supranational deliberative mini-publics, European citizens' panels

15.1 Introduction

> We recommend that the European Union holds Citizen's Assemblies. We strongly recommend that they are developed through a legally binding and compulsory law or regulation. The citizens' assemblies should be held every 12–18 months. Participation of the citizens should not be mandatory but incentivised, while organised on the basis of limited mandates.
>
> (Report from the European Citizens' Panel 2, Session 3–17,
> Conference on the Future of Europe, 2021)

As stated in the introduction of this *Handbook*, there is a widespread crisis of democracy, which has been the matter of intense political and academic debate for over 20 years. The problems related to the democratic deficit, lack of democratic legitimacy, and widening gap between citizens and decision-makers seem even more striking in the case of decision-making at supranational level or, to put it in a slightly different perspective, in the case of political decisions that produce effects beyond the local or national borders.

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One response to this crisis of democracy at the supranational level has been the creation of citizens' assemblies (CAs), participatory institutions which seek to bring together an inclusive group of ordinary people to deliberate formally on a political issue and to exert an influence on public decision-making (see the Introduction to this *Handbook* for a definition of CAs). The use of CAs at supranational level was proposed and promoted by various actors: European Union (EU), NGOs, international organizations, and social movements.

Still, although all those actors carried out CAs and advocated for their use at supranational level, there are significant differences regarding the capacity of those actors as well as the CAs they promote to address the democratic deficit. Starting from this assumption, in the following pages I will analytically differentiate between CAs implemented by the European Union (EU), a system provided by the political authority and those CAs implemented by supranational actors that lack formally legitimate political authority.

The relevance of the idea that CAs could serve as institutions that could help in addressing the democratic deficit could be inferred just by looking at the long list of CAs implemented at the supranational level so far. On the one hand, the EU continuously, since 2005, promoted various types of CAs. The first EU initiatives that took the form of CAs were two Citizens Conferences organized within the 6th Framework Programs (FP) financed by the European Commission. One focused on "the city of tomorrow"[1] while the other one, the "Meeting of Minds: European Citizens' Deliberation on Brain Science",[2] dealt with the impact of new developments in neuroscience.

Those experiments, not formalized institutional processes, created the precedent for other similar projects promoted under the 7th FP, the Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (2005) and Debate Europe programme (2008).[3] Under Plan D the First European Citizens Consultation was organized in 2006–2007. It involved 1,789 lay citizens from 27 EU countries. In addition, with the EU institutions' support, two wide European Deliberative Polls involving the random samples of more than 300 European citizens were organized in 2007 and 2009 respectively. The most recent example of the EU institutions' initiative to "reinvigorate democracy" is The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE),[4] promoted by the Presidents of the European Parliament, European Commission, and Council and launched in 2021 in Strasbourg. It comprises four thematic CAs each gathering 200 randomly-selected Europeans reflecting the EU's diversity.

On the other hand, the list of the CAs implemented "globally" seems to be shorter and more diverse. Unfortunately, it is not possible to trace all CAs implemented at the "global" level since, unlike in the case of the EU, there was no unique political entity

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1 See http://www.raise-eu.org/.

2 Meeting of minds – European citizens' deliberation on brain sciences: final report of the external evaluation (2006), DOI:10.18419/opus-5483.

3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0158:FIN:en:PDF.

4 https://futureu.europa.eu/pages/about.

that promoted them but a wide variety of actors such as NGOs, international organizations, and social movements and those processes are neither systematically documented nor archived in some publicly available databases[5] which means that also a process of institutional learning from those experiences is impeded. As it is often the case also in the CAs implemented at the local and national level, we don't have a trace of the process of discussion or formulation of the policies that took in consideration the recommendations that the CAs produced, so the eventual political influence that the outputs of those processes could have produced is also put in question. Besides, the CAs at the "global" level were most often part of a broader initiative that had different specific goals for each phase of the process and were not directly integrated in the formal processes of decision-making. For instance, this is the case of the 13th Association for Women in Development (AWID) International Forum that was held in Brazil in 2016 that brought together 1,700 activists and women from marginalized groups from over 140 countries. The CAs that were organized, as one of the elements of the forum, had a flexible format regarding characteristics of participants, topics, possibility to choose specific CAs to participate in, and so on. This was also the case in the United Nations Youth Climate Summit that gathered youth activists and ordinary young people from all over the world to discuss the world's climate change emergency. The summit used different forms of CAs such as participatory budgeting, town hall meetings, and deliberative workshops, but also some formats that are not similar to CAs. One of the most mentioned examples of the CAs at the supranational level is the World Wide Views, the large-scale initiative of citizens' deliberation on the climate issues promoted by the Danish Board of Technology Foundation, an independent counselling institution connected to the Danish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education. So far, three WWVs were held: on Global Warming in 2009, on Biodiversity in 2012, and on Climate and Energy in 2015.

A quick glance at the proclaimed reasons for the promotion of CAs at supranational level confirms that the common political goal of those CAs, both at the EU and global level, was to offer solutions to the problem of democratic deficit in supranational policymaking. The idea that CAs could tackle the problem of democratic deficit is based on the assumption of deliberative democracy according to which the political decisions could be legitimate only if they are reached through a process of inclusive deliberative discussion that allow arguments of "all" those affected by some political issue, to be heard (Manin 1987; Bohman 1996).

In order to understand the relevance that CAs could have in terms of reducing the democratic deficit at supranational level of decision-making, but also the challenges regarding their implementation and benefits they can bring to the actors and political processes, I argue that we need to distinguish analytically between CAs promoted at

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5 For example, the OECD report published in 2020 mapped 289 cases of CAs, and identified only three per cent of those as being supranational. However, we know with certainty for at least nine cases of CAs organized only at EU level.

EU level and those at global level. In fact, in the following pages we will see that two distinct paths of development of the CAs could be traced; one applies to the introduction of CAs within the European Union (EU), a system provided by the political authority and political constituency in the making (Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2014), while the other is related to their introduction within the global system of governance that lacks formally legitimate political authority, political constituency, and that is often described as non democratic (Zweifel 2006). The key implications of different features of the EU and global system of policymaking on CAs will be taken into account in the next two sections, where major political and scientific arguments for the introduction of CAs at supranational level will be outlined. Following the systemic approach to deliberation (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012) I consider that the legitimacy of political decisions is generated through the interdependence and exchange between a variety of institutional and non-institutional (deliberative) actors that are part of that system. Therefore, in this contribution I will rely on political and scientific discussion about the possibility of the CAs to represent one part of the solution to democratic deficit at the supranational level. I will discuss two specific proposals of institutions that are conceived as solutions for the democratic deficit at the supranational level: Popularly Elected Global Assembly (Falk and Strauss 2001) and Deliberative Global Citizens' Assembly (Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz 2011). Before all, I will try to show that, in order to understand the possibilities of CAs to address the democratic deficit at the global level, it is necessary to distinguish between EU and global policymaking systems.

15.2 Political arguments for the institutionalization of citizens' assemblies at the supranational level

The proliferation of the idea that the European Union must find the way to involve citizens in political life can be traced back to the debate on its democratic deficit that started in the early 1990s, when the Danish referendum rejected the Maastricht Treaty, although intense experimentation with the CAs actually stems from the "period of reflection" that followed the 2005 rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty (Friedrich 2011). On the whole, these facts were taken as clear symptoms of an increasingly tense relationship between the EU and its citizens: the era of "permissive consensus" seemed definitely over and the conviction was that the EU was suffering a legitimacy crisis due to a deficit in its democratic credentials (García-Guitián 2022). This resulted in a process of democratic engineering that consisted of three phases inspired by three different principles related to representative, participatory, and deliberative conceptions of democracy. Each phase also had different targets: elected representatives in the European Parliament (EP), representatives from civil society organizations, lay citizens, and the general public. In the third phase of participatory engineering, the EU opened a space to direct citizens' participation (Abels 2009; Hüller 2010.; Di Mauro

and Fiket 2017). Political arguments for the involvement of lay citizens in EU political life were basically the same as for civil society's involvement, and both aimed to create a shared public arena of communication and participation in Europe and were suggested as "solutions" for the democratic deficit of the EU. However, the type of initiatives promoted in the third phase, as well as the language employed in political documents, indicated a clear shift towards the deliberative model of democracy and the involvement of ordinary citizens (and not only organized interests) into the political life of the EU through various forms of CAs.

The Plan D and its follow-ups were a direct European Commission (EC) reaction to the Heads of State and Government call for a "period of reflection", which was meant "to enable a broad debate to take place in each of our countries, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties".[6] The Plan D delineated ambitious objectives identifying goals such as "set[ting] out a long-term plan to reinvigorate European democracy and help[ing] the emergence of a European public sphere, where citizens (…) actively participate in the decision-making process and gain ownership of the European project".[7]

The EU institutions have remained on this path since then and the most recent EU initiative, The Conference on the Future of Europe (2021), while aiming to "giv(ing)e citizens a greater role in shaping EU policies"[8] also improved a method of integrating recommendations from the CAs (European Citizens' Panels) in political decisions. At the final Conference Plenary, in fact, all actors that participate in decision-making will gather in discussion: the citizens that participated in CAs, EP, the Council, and the European Commission, as well as representatives from all national Parliaments.

On the other hand, although a wide variety of actors promoted CAs at the global level, they all aimed to solve problems with democratic deficit of global governance in some specific thematic areas. To give one example: the main proclaimed goal of the WWV project was to respond to the need for global solutions to global problems such as environmental cross-border challenges. As stated in the Policy Report[9] from the first WWVs: "As markets, technologies and environmental issues become increasingly global in scale, so does policymaking. In this new reality, the distance between citizens and policymakers increases, thereby diminishing the citizens' sense of ownership in decision-making. This creates a need for new initiatives to bridge the widening democratic gap."

The reasons for the promotion of CAs at global level were always tied to democratic deficit in decision-making regarding specific issues. The need to democratize the overall system of global governance or to promote global citizenship was not the main focus of those initiatives. Besides, the initiatives to promote CAs at global level

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6 http://www.coreuropa.eu/migrated_data/com2005_0494en01.pdf.

7 http://www.coreuropa.eu/migrated_data/communication_planD_en.pdf.

8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1065.

9 http://globalwarming.wwviews.org/files/AUDIO/WWViews%20Policy%20Report%20FINAL%20-%20Web%20version.pdf.

never made an explicit reference to the movements for an alternative democratic globalization that were on the rise in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Yet, it seems that the political pressures to democratize the international system of governance came exactly from those movements that were reclaiming the right of global citizenry to participate in global decision-making.[10] Those movements in fact pose the questions of both global polity and democratic accountability of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank (WB) regarding their possibility to influence policies that have direct influence on citizens' lives.

Like in the case of the EU reforms that were implemented in order to make the EU system of governance more democratic, the first phase of reforms in the global system followed the logic of representative democracy and aimed at making international organizations more representative and accountable (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Weiss and Wilkinson 2018). For example, in 2010 the Campaign for the UN Parliamentary Assembly was launched and supported by a broad range of individuals and institutions from more than 150 countries. The UN Parliamentary Assembly was imagined as an independent watchdog in the UN system and consultative body that would develop into a world parliament over time (UNPA Campaign 2010).

However, there is a shared consensus in the international relations literature that despite calls for more democratic governance at global level and tentative reforms of single organizations, the global system has not been significantly democratized (Zweifel 2006; Belém Lopes and Casarões 2019).

In such an undemocratic system, the sporadic and unsystematic promotion of CAs, that aim to respond to specific challenges that global problems pose, has serious limitations regarding their possibility to address democratic deficit in global policymaking. In the political promotion of CAs by the EU, their potential to build common European identity and European polity (Di Mauro and Fiket 2017) as well as the interrelation of CAs and EU institutions, were, and remained, considered highly relevant for addressing democratic deficit. Instead, the political promotion of global CAs is focused mainly on solving problems in particular policy areas without serious reflection on neither the relationship between institutions and organizations with CAs nor their potential to build common identity and polity.

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10 Those movements organized a series of protests: those at the gathering of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999, at the gatherings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington and in Prague in 2000, at the gathering of G8 countries in Genoa in 2001, and at the meetings of the World Economic Forum.

15.3 Scientific arguments for the institutionalization of citizens' assemblies at the supranational level

In the political effort to promote CAs, the EU institutions, NGOs, international organizations, and social movements were supported by theorists of democracy who developed a critique of representative democracy, stressing its inner limits and inability to fulfil democratic functions at the supranational level. According to this view, traditional instruments of representative democracy and international governance should be combined with tools of participatory and deliberative models of democracy, based on a broad involvement of citizens in decision-making (Bohman 1999, 2004; Crespy 2013; Smith and Brassett 2008; Fishkin, Luskin and Siu 2014). However, despite a relatively strong consensus about the democratic deficit at supranational level and shared understanding that the nature of the supranational issues requires supranational policy, the literature on deliberative democracy that approached problems of supranational democratic deficit did not advance straightforwardly towards the proposal of CAs as solutions to the problems of global democracy.

Like in the case of political discussion regarding the institutional reforms of the EU or international organizations, the solutions to democratic deficit were initially inspired by the principles of representative democracy. This view suggests that existing elected representative bodies, such as EP, should be empowered or that supranational representative bodies ought to be formed in order to deal with the democratic deficit at supranational level(s) (Stie 2021). Furthermore, the theoretical approaches arguing that the principles of deliberative democracy should be integrated at the supranational level often remained at the level of theoretical discussions and no clear path towards the promotion of institutions of CAs could be traced from that literature (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Eriksen 2006; Cochran 2002; Dryzek 2006; Smith and Brassett 2008).

Very rarely academic discussion evolving around the principles of representative versus participatory and deliberative democracy focused on specific proposals of institutions that should be implemented at a supranational level of decision-making in order to deal with the democratic deficit.

Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss in their article 'Toward Global Parliament' (2001) approached the question of the democratic deficit in global governance from the perspective of international relations. They proposed the solution in a form of Popularly Elected Global Assembly (PEGA), underlying the need for an international system of decision-making to have elected national representatives to decide for global citizenry within the global assembly.

PEGA basically follows the model of the EU Parliament: it is composed of political representatives of all countries of the world, elected by citizens in elections held at the national level. The authors did not develop in detail the PEGA model but were more focused on arguments that support the necessity of its institutionalization. They

were reflecting on political claims of left-wing, anti-globalism movements (movements for democratic globalization) that were insisting on the lack of democratic legitimacy of international organizations to shape citizens' daily lives. Recognizing that globalization is dispersing political authority throughout the international order, they focused on designing the model of global institution that would have legitimate political authority within the framework of electoral democracy.

Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz (2011) accepted the basic justifications for a global democratic institution advanced by Falk and Strauss (2001). Starting from the critique of their PEGA model, they moved beyond electoral democracy logic and elaborated a deliberative model of a global democratic institution – Deliberative Global Citizens' Assembly (DGCA).[11]

The DGCA is structured as a deliberative mini-public or, as we define it in this *Handbook*, citizens' assembly, a citizens' forum in which a sample of citizens, (randomly) selected from the population affected by some public issue, deliberates and makes a decision on that specific issue (Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Ryan and Smith 2014; see the Introduction to this *Handbook*).

The first critique of the PEGA advanced by Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz (2011) is that certain states would be reluctant to concede some part of their own sovereignty and an elected global body such as PEGA could represent a direct challenge to their national institutions. The US and China are taken as examples of the states that already showed preferences to maintain a world order in which there are no more global institutions to bind them. Although both countries have been unwilling to cede formal authority to international elected bodies, this could change with the introduction of innovative institutions such as DGCA. Namely, the hypothesis is that the lack of understanding of the very nature of the deliberative institution such as DGCA, composed of ordinary citizens that through deliberation formulate recommendations, policy proposals, or make decisions, would not look like a threat to the US Congress. The fact that no elections would need to be organized may solve the reluctance of the Chinese and other authoritarian governments that are not organizing competitive democratic elections as legitimate ways to select the representatives. Besides, both China and the US already showed willingness to accept CAs organized at the local level (Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz 2011). Yet, the question of political influence of the DGCA and its eventual contribution to the reduction of democratic deficit remains open if global political actors remain unwilling to cede their formal authority, as underlined by the Dryzek,

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11 It should be mentioned here that, like in the case of the EU, inclusion of civil society in the global system of governance was also proposed as a response to the problems of democratic deficit. However, no specific model of institution or supranational body of global civil society was formulated so far and those proposals remained at the level of theoretical conceptualizations of a global civil society and its democratic function in the global system (Bartelson 2006). At the same time, the Millennium NGO forum, based on inclusion on various civil society organizations, was implemented by the UN but its function was to provide inputs of NGOs for the UN Millennium Summit and not to address democratic deficit.

Bächtiger and Milewicz (2011). The DGCA could therefore be implemented more as symbolic and not as really empowered institutions that would be able to tackle the democratic deficit of the global decision-making process.

Second, the elections for PEGA would suffer from the same problems as the elections for EP. The democratic nature of elections to the EP is put into question given the lack of European focus of the electoral contest (Follesdal and Hix 2006). Framed by national parties, the EP electoral contest is producing electoral choices based exclusively on the performance of national governments or political programmes framed in terms of national issues (Eijk and Franklin 1996). As Hix noted, "it is not enough to have representative institutions and free and fair elections if these elections are uncontested or do not change political outcomes" (Hix 2008: 76). Additionally, the turnout of the EP elections is very low (Marquart, Goldberg and de Vreese 2020). The ideators of DGCA underline that the empirical research on CAs indicates that there are reasons to believe that the DGCA would suffer less from the above-mentioned problems: citizens who were invited to take part in the CAs showed a high degree of commitment to participate, learn about the issue, discuss with others, and adopt different perspectives before making an opinion or proposals. In that regard, Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz (2011) argue that global citizens could perceive their participation as consequential, especially because they usually do not have a possibility to directly partake in political processes. However, there is also a counter argument based on the research on CAs and indicating that the lack of political will to consider the outputs of deliberation when formulating decisions could also demotivate citizens to deliberate (Jacquet 2017).

An additional argument that the ideators advance in favour of DGCA is related to the procedures of elections for the Assembly. In the case of PEGA the specificities of electoral systems and at the same time the size of the country must be taken into account when designing the model for elections, and the optimal solution might not be easy to find; in contrast, the DGCA would rely on solid sampling procedures.

Besides, the fact that the citizens who participate are not linked to specific national constituencies would also allow the discussion to evolve around common (global) goods problems instead of around constituency interest according to the ideators. Previous research already showed that citizens are able to act in the name of the common good, even at supranational level (Gerber et al. 2014; Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2014; Di Mauro and Fiket 2017). This seems to be one of two major advantages of DGCA, the other being a long-term perspective that the supranational assembly must take when discussing a global issue. The relevance of these two criteria becomes clear if we think about the climate change issue as a global issue that a hypothetical assembly must discuss (see Knops and Vrydagh's chapter in this *Handbook*). Namely, the relatively short duration of the mandate that elected representatives have is not compatible with the long-term perspective that is needed for climate change policies. Political parties and political representatives, insofar as they aim to be reelected, will likely hesitate to propose unpopular measures that will be costly in the short term. In distinction, ordinary citizens once elected for the DGCA will not suffer from a pressure of reelections and therefore will be more willing to adopt measures, often very relevant for climate

change, that will bring benefits only after a period that is longer than political mandates.

The ideators of DGCA, however, do not place DGCA at some specific point within the process of decision-making, instead they argue that its role could be defined ad hoc and contextualized in reference to the specific issue and specific global context. But exactly this undefined position in relation to power holders within the undemocratic global system we showed, could represent the weakness of global CAs specially regarding their main goal, that is, to tackle global democratic deficit.

On the empirical side, our understanding of the challenges and benefits of the supranational CAs is mainly based on those CAs implemented at the EU level. We know that: deliberation is feasible in a transnational and pluri-lingual setting (Olsen and Trenz 2014); the EU unfinished polity can be recognized and taken as a reference point by citizens included in deliberation and finally – deliberation could transform the public sphere and help build citizens' feelings of belonging to the same community (Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2014; Di Mauro and Fiket 2017). Still, we should be careful when assuming that those benefits of deliberation could be realized through implementation of the global CAs.

15.4 Concluding discussion: Supranational citizens' assemblies as possible remedies for democratic deficit

In the last fifteen years there has been a political interest to adopt the CAs as a solution for democratic deficit at the supranational level. This political interest goes hand in hand with a broader theoretical movement for the introduction of deliberative democracy into global policymaking. However, in the previous pages we have seen that there are relevant differences between the supranational level in the case of the EU, on one hand, and the global political context, on the other, and that those differences must be taken into consideration when discussing the role that CAs could have in addressing the democratic deficit.

First of all, there is a political effort at EU level to democratize the whole system of policymaking, and the introduction of the CAs within this system could be seen as a part of this attempt. On the other hand, in a global setting that has characteristics different from the local, national but also the EU settings, the process of democratization actually never started, although there were some initiatives that aimed to promote it. CAs at global level could indeed be imagined as drivers of development of global deliberative systems and overall democratization of global governance (Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz 2011) but the systemic approach to deliberation (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012) warns us that the legitimacy of political processes must be seen as determined by the relationship of reciprocity and a mutual dependence between political and social actors that are part of the system.

Even if, as it is the case of already implemented global CAs or as the one proposed by the creators of DGCA, the CAs remain only advisory, they must still be empowered enough to create a real challenge to existing sources of power in global governance in order to address democratic deficit at the global level. Without democratic transformation of the institutional design of a global system that would allow the transparency and accountability of global decision-making procedures and processes, the CAs can be, at best, used to improve the democratic legitimacy of specific political decisions like, for example, those related to climate change. Nonetheless, the possibility of the recommendations produced by the CAs, implemented as ad hoc bodies, to exercise any political influence is hard to imagine in an undemocratic system of global governance. We can also envision CAs planting "the seeds for communicative transformation in global politics" (Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz 2011: 40), but expanding deliberative democratic processes beyond the single CA would be a major challenge in an undemocratic system. The example of the autocratic regime of China and its deliberative experimentation promoted at the local level teaches us that we should be careful when assuming that single deliberative initiatives could initiate the processes of democratization of the entire system in the near future. It is more likely that the deliberative assemblies could provide the stability for the authoritarian regime (He and Warren 2017; see also He's chapter in this *Handbook*). At the same time, even if we formally provide the global CAs with more political power than advisory one, it would make the need to democratize the global system of governance more urgent. It is hard to imagine that the power holders of the global system that are reluctant to the democratization of the global decision-making would gave up on their power to decide, even on specific issues, and give it to the ordinary citizens included in the CAs.

Another difference between the EU and global context that must be thought through when reflecting on the possibilities of the CAs to address the democratic deficit is the characteristics of the constituency and the polity. The potential of CAs to generate democratic legitimacy rests on propensity of the citizens included in the CA to recognize themselves as members of the polity and furthermore to identify as a constituency that could generate legitimate political authority (Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2014). While in the case of the EU there are certainly some challenges that the polity and the constituency features create, the recognition of political authority and the identification of the constituency in global context are hard to imagine. Even if we, in deliberative fashion, consider polity and constituency as possible outcomes of the process of deliberation (Cooke 2000; Eriksen 2006), it also seems that some preconditions must be fulfilled for outcomes to be successful. In the case where CAs led to the confirmation of the hypotheses of the polity- and constituency-generating power of deliberation, the participants of the CAs were at the same time empowered as potential voters in the EP elections (Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2014). This, once again leads us to consider the necessity to democratize the overall system of global decision-making, the actors and bodies that participate in the process, and their interactions. The introductions of CAs as remedies to democratic deficit at supranational level must be discussed with reference to the po-

litical context. This is not to say that the CAs should not be promoted as discussion forums aiming at socialization of the global "polity" with deliberative logic, but only that we need to be clear when discussing their possible reach, while hoping that they could still trigger the emergence of a global deliberative system and overall democratization of global politics.

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