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SECURITY AND FREEDOM: A COMPLEX ALLIANCE[1]

ABSTRACT
The concepts of security and freedom have long had an antagonistic relationship in the political sphere. Since Plato wrote his *Republic*, authors such as Machiavelli, Hobbes and subsequent contractarians have understood that some limitations on individual freedom were necessary for the sake of collective security. This paradigm has since been inherited by different thinkers and is key in most political theory proposals. Following this path, Todorov has analyzed the current geostrategic situation as a result of the milestone of the Iraq War of 2003, in order to shed light on strategies that should be pursued to achieve international security of the contemporary new world order. However, his approach follows the conceptual framework of previous authors, which therefore prevents him from integrating the freedom required by contemporary Western democracies with international security. In this article, we intend to provide an alternative perspective, addressing the problem from a multidimensional conceptualization of security and freedom.

1. The Security and Liberty Paradox

Traditionally, the concepts of *security* and *freedom* have had an antagonistic relationship in the political sphere. Since Plato wrote his *Republic*, authors such as Machiavelli, Hobbes and subsequent contractarians have understood that some limitations on individual freedom were necessary to guarantee a kind of collective security.

This conceptual paradigm, based on the belief that freedom and security in the political sphere comprise a binomial and are often at odds with one another, has been inherited by different thinkers, and is key in most political

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theory proposals. Following this line of thought, Todorov (2003), in *The New World Disorder: Reflections of a European*, examined the current geostrategic situation as a result of the milestone of the Iraq War of 2003, proposing an analysis able to shed light on strategies that could be pursued in attaining the international security of the contemporary new world order. However, his approach follows the conceptual framework of previous authors and, thus, in our opinion, is unable to integrate the freedom required by contemporary Western democracies with the concept of international security he advances. In this article, we propose an alternative perspective, addressing this problem from a multidimensional conceptualization of security and freedom, and argue that the articulation of both is not only possible but necessary to guarantee a peaceful world order.

It is true that the war in Iraq may seem like an event long in the past, especially in light of the emergence of new conflicts such as the war between Russia and Ukraine, which call into question the foundations of a certain concept of European security. That said, Todorov's analysis of this 2003 conflict reveals certain premises still in force today which, in our opinion, are necessary for developing new political strategies able to shape a world order that allows for the survival of humanity while preserving quality of life. In this sense, Todorov's conceptual scheme is not obsolete, but rather increasingly relevant, not only because it continues to be used in theoretical interpretations of current conflicts, but also because it constitutes a productive theoretical foundation for understanding contemporary security and, therefore, a way of conceiving war.

For this reason, in this article, we will carry out an analysis of three basic interpretative premises – also maintained by Todorov – of the narratives underlying the discourses used to justify initiating war. Working from these premises, we will then proceed to elaborate an alternative theoretical proposal of freedom and security that can overcome the difficult conciliation of both concepts.

1.1. Material Goals as the Engine of War

It is a widely held thesis in the field of polemology that wars are always ultimately started for economic reasons (Kennedy 2010). This idea, which is rooted in a materialist conception of history, holds that economic relations and the modes of production determining the social framework are the causes of war. This conceptual scheme implies an understanding that the cause of war is always based in an economic interest of the warring factions or at least of that which initiates the aggression. Thus, from the theoretical framework of historical materialism, all social change, violent or not, is ultimately attributed to the economy and the tensions that it generates in the distribution of wealth (Bukharin 2013). From this perspective, the relationships between human beings and societies obey, at their core, material motivations. Therefore, although superficially a conflict may appear framed in ideological, religious, identity, or other contexts, a seasoned historian or sociologist following the explanatory thread of history and searching for economic imbalances between

the warring factions should be able to reduce any past, present and future conflicts to their material causes.

Todorov, however, offers a relevant argument pointing to the specific case of the Iraq war which challenges the main premise that all conflict can be reduced to economic causes. This example is pertinent for deepening our understanding of the problem we are addressing: the articulation of a model able to coherently integrate security and freedom. When analyzing the reasons for the 2003 war, Todorov denies that it was initiated for solely economic purposes (Todorov 2003: 12–20). Regardless of the correctness of his interpretation, we would like to underline his refusal to reduce all causes of conflict to economic relations, which supposes a highly restricted materialist colonization of spiritual life. The historical materialist interpretation by which all politics can be reduced to economics, while conceptually seductive, denies, in practice, empirical observations that contradict it. In fact, we often find examples of disastrous economic management precisely because of submission to ideological dogma. The spiritual has weight in practical life because the spiritual guides praxis: the economy is the result of practical activity, not a cause of it.

In fact, Horkheimer himself points out the same thing in his article "History and Psychology" (1932), in which – without denying the existence of this relationship – he rejects an economistic approach to psychology, which seeks to simply attribute psychological behavior to the economic basis of society without studying in detail how economics condition the psyche. In his remarkable study "Authority and Family" (1936) Horkheimer goes further, arguing that if the cultural processes of a society are ultimately determined by the laws that govern its economic apparatus, the behavior of its members cannot be explained by virtue of economic phenomena alone, but rather all cultural factors have formed the character of the members of said society. Finally, in his fundamental article "Traditional and Critical Theory" from 1937, Horkheimer contrasted these two types of theory and indicated that changes in social relations do not leave critical theory untouched, but rather influence it even in its structure. He illustrated this emphasizing that, even in his own time, there had been a massive change in social relations that necessarily had to affect all of culture: a transition from a time when owners controlled companies to another in which – without changing the legal concept of property – business owners became defenseless against the management and manpower of corporations. With this, the concept of the dependence of the cultural on the economic is transformed:

> Now, with the annihilation of the typical individual, this dependency must be understood in a somewhat vulgar materialistic way. Explanations of social phenomena become simpler and more complicated. Simpler, because the economic determines human beings in a more immediate and conscious way, and because the relative strength of opposition and the substantiality of the cultural spheres disappear. And more complicated, because the unbridled economic dynamics, in the midst of which the majority of individuals have become, produces new figures and fatalities at a rapid pace. ("Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie", in Kritische Theorie, 1968; T. II: 185)

It is undeniable that in the Frankfurt School's interpretation of Marx's theses, there is a certain intent to develop a more comprehensive interpretation of history than that very reductionist concept of historical materialism which would ultimately become a simplification of Marx' work resulting from the International and the political exploitation of Marxism.

1.2. A Terrible Enemy as a Threat to International Security

Every war needs a legitimizing discourse in order to begin. The construction of narratives in order to convince public opinion is essential in securing the material support and human resources necessary for war (Esch 2010). The reason *par excellence*, strong enough to motivate armed mobilization, is that which argues that the enemy is a threat to the survival of the nation. Moving the population to rise up in arms requires constructing a ruthless, monstruous enemy in the collective imagination. An empirical example of this thesis can be found in the Iraq war: the primary justification for the declaration of war being that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction – that is, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons – that it could make available to terrorist groups.

Todorov, however (Todorov 2003) dismantles these arguments, as well as the argument that the US-led Western bloc intended to seize oil reserves. He even sees it as improbable that at the base of the motivations for the Iraq war there was an ideological interest in imposing a Christian paradigm. In reviewing the literature written since, arguments and counter-arguments such as those offered by Todorov can be found not only in specialized academic literature, but also in essays and news articles.

In fact, it was demonstrated that in order to justify the invasion of Iraq, senior officials of the Bush administration pressured the intelligence apparatus to ignore the data that contradicted the existence of weapons of mass destruction, while embracing those who fueled the suspicion despite their biases and lack of rigor (Pfiffner 2018). Thus, it became clear that a justification for war was manufactured, deceiving the American people as well as the rest of the world (Woodward 2004, 2006, 2008).

The elaboration of these narratives showcases two levels of action that must be distinguished in order to understand the argument of the devastating enemy. The first regards finding legitimizing principles of an ethical nature to justify initiating war. These arguments may well range from intervention to avoid the suffering or persecution of a threatened group, to, as in the case of the Iraq war, the guarantee of international security. In this sense, the importance of building an enemy so terrible that it poses a threat to one's own survival generates the fear in the population necessary to convince them that a preventive war is essential. But configuring a strong enemy also has another equally important function: the strengthening of national identity. This idea, profusely developed by Carl Schmitt (2015), understands that the essence of the political is found precisely in the friend-enemy dialectic. Taking this concept to the international sphere, the construction of a cruel and formidable enemy

entails the configuration of a well-defined bloc by strengthening cohesion between powers sharing a common interest in destroying the enemy that threatens security. The creation of polarized blocs occurs through the configuration of narratives that attribute characteristics to the antagonist, with the polarization becoming more pronounced the more extreme the traits. Therefore, in any war, the use of propaganda as a method for spreading an image of the enemy as cruel and formidable not only responds to an interest in generating fear in the population, but also in configuring a sufficiently firm national identity, able to be sufficiently ruthless in its decisions. Fear alone can be a paralyzing emotion, however, when combined with conviction and self-confidence, it is often able to mobilize a population unwaveringly for a cause.

The second level of action necessary for the construction of an *ad hoc* narrative unsupported by empirical evidence is to satisfy the underlying interest that moves the party initiating a war. The true reason for a war and the need to find a legitimizing foundation for it are two very different things.

In this sense, once again, the reasons for the deliberate construction of narratives can also be attributed to economic interests. Curiously, however, in the case of the Iraq war, these stray far from the common geostrategic analysis models that seek explanations for international conflict in the asymmetry of the distribution of wealth between nations, particularly natural resources. In fact, in the years that followed the invasion, it became clear that the objective was never Iraqi oil, but rather a justification for the United States to enter into a high-intensity war that would exponentially increase its budget for military spending, generating billions of dollars for certain industrial groups in the defense sector (Terry 2006; Dunne 2014).

This thesis apparently clashes with Todorov's, but also brings to light another argument contained within the author's thought. Understanding the subtlety of the argument requires making a preliminary assessment of human and social micro-analysis in the study of conflict, which goes beyond the perspective of the supposed interests of the nations involved in conflict as if these were completely homogeneous blocs. Seen in this light, it does not seem plausible that the American people would have willingly agreed to start a war in which more than 100,000 civilians and as many as 40,000 US soldiers died for the sole purpose of increasing the business of the defense industry lobby. Conjuring public support required creating a legitimizing narrative that would convince public opinion.

1.3. Internal Security Dependent on External Security

In commenting on the importance of basing the initiation of war on legitimizing principles of an ethical nature – a constant throughout the history of Humanity – we have pointed out two factors that seek to justify these legitimizing principles: 1) relief of suffering and 2) the guarantee of security and, therefore, one's own survival.

These elements, of a moral nature, that intervene in the configuration of the narratives themselves as incontestable legitimizing principles for the West's

initiation of war, and influence public opinion, have some common features which we can also trace in Todorov's theses on war. Specifically, the thinker finds that, in arguments seeking to justify war, there are two central issues which can be found in the justification speech of then President Bush as well as in the legitimizing discourse of countless other conflicts. Following the first level of narrative function noted above, the justification for the United States declaring war was twofold (Todorov 2003: 27):

a) On the one hand, spreading freedom and freeing people from the yoke of oppression.

b) On the other, guaranteeing the security of the United States itself.

Taken together, both premises together reveal the difficult dialectical relationship of the antagonistic link between security and freedom in the field of international relations and international politics. The thesis underlying the articulation of this categorical pair that emerges from these legitimizing arguments is that guaranteeing the internal security of a country requires imposing a civilizational paradigm on the enemy similar to one's own. This, however, has the surprising implication that both dimensions in the field of foreign policy are in an inversely proportional dialectical relationship.

This idea assumes a total redefinition of the concept of internal security, as, in order to guarantee the security of a sovereign State, internal security would have to be conceived not as that concept which guarantees that, within the system, member agents behave in accordance with laws, therefore reducing crime, but rather the concept of internal security able to guarantee the stability, strength and survival of a system and way of life against possible external attacks, which can also justify the exercise of actions of influence in other sovereign countries.

In turn, exporting freedom to a country would consist in the imposition of a system that would guarantee the freedom of expression of members of that sovereign community. However, what emerges is that this promotion of political freedom in a country without a democratic tradition can be counterproductive in achieving the security of the country promoting these freedoms. It is precisely at this extreme that Bush's arguments become paradoxical: the greater the freedom in a sovereign State – that is, diversity, a plurality of forms of expression and ideals – the fewer the security guarantees for other countries, which may be attacked for their different forms of understanding.

Although Todorov recognizes that, in principle, security and freedom need not be incompatible, in practice they are very difficult to reconcile. The thinker attributes this to the difference in the means used to achieve both objectives. While the guarantee of security usually requires the use of force, the expansion of freedom is normally achieved through the establishment of a liberal democracy. Here, Todorov is directly alluding to political liberalism (Todorov 2003: 30 f.), which is precisely where the indicated contradiction is observed: political liberalism is premised on pluralism and the peaceful coexistence (*consensus*)

of different comprehensive doctrines of good that presuppose a principle of extended tolerance. However – the author claims – when this system is imposed, there is already an internal contradiction between "tolerance and respect for diversity", leading to the dogma of "liberal imperialism" that Kagan points out. Robert Kagan, in his essay "Power and Weakness: Europe and the United States in the New World Order" (2002) observes that to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe that it should serve to spread the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order.

From this consideration, a satisfactory solution can hardly be found – hence the author's logical conclusion of the impossibility of a peaceful and free world order. Rather, the most that the Planet could aspire to is a kind of "world disorder", given his consideration that the objectives of freedom and security do not go hand in hand. Moreover, the assumption that the national interest is that which should prevail, and that internal security must be defended, underpins the argument that the establishment of liberal regimes in other places can only be justified if it benefits internal security.

The contractualist Todorov defends these theses, unequivocally affirming the need to guide all political development of society through a single objective that is none other than maximizing security. Todorov's pessimism implies that for the author, maintaining relative peace in certain regions of the world necessarily requires its imposition by totalitarian regimes, thus also limiting the freedom and possibility of development of the societies upon which it is imposed. It is a choice of the lesser evil, following Hobbes' thesis in his *Leviathan* (2012).

Although throughout this text we intend to dispute Todorov's arguments, we must also recognize that global reality unfortunately tends to ratify his pessimistic ideas about human nature. Thus, moving from the Iraq war to other catastrophic confrontations occurring in the two decades since, we can find examples such as the so called *Arab Spring*. These social uprisings were largely encouraged by Europe and the US, as the elites of these countries understood that they could contribute to the spread of Western ideals of freedom (Dadush, Dunne 2011). It is well established that these social movements were mainly autochthonous, and as such were rather independent from direct political actions of the Western states. Moreover, it must be clearly stated that encouragement should be clearly differentiated from causation, though encouragement is at the base of influence and influence leads, at least partially, to causation.

Their result, however, has been chaos, the loss of human life, and the genesis of still unresolved crises (Santini, Hassan 2012). Among the many nations on the southern shore of the Mediterranean that can be cited as an example (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, etc.) the uprisings of Syria and Libya should be highlighted.

In Syria, the attempts to overthrow the Al-Assad regime have produced a hellish civil war, especially brutal due to the indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on civilians and the horror wrought by the use of chemical weapons (Droz-Vincent 2014). The Syrian civil war has become an increasingly regional problem as a result of the flow of emigration and refugees it has generated,

which has considerably destabilized not only neighboring countries such as Turkey and Lebanon but even the European Union itself, which has been forced to urgently develop policies and procedures to deal with a human problem of never-before-seen proportions in the Mediterranean (Fargues, Fandrich 2012). In addition to all this human suffering, the power vacuum created by the attempts to destabilize the Syrian regime was not filled with ideals of political liberalism, but rather the Islamic State, which came to control important territories of the country by imposing social terror through the application of radical Islamic law (Kaválek 2015).

Meanwhile, in a Libya wracked by the chaos of the Arab Spring, NATO carried out a punitive operation seeking to eliminate the brutal repression of the Gaddafi dictatorship. Gaddafi and his regime fell, but to this day, social and political chaos continues to prevail in Libya, and the country could be considered another failed state (Varivelli 2014; Colombo, Varivelli 2020). In addition to this, another (perhaps worse) consequence materialized when numerous armed groups operating in the country and protected by Gaddafi were forced to move south, destabilizing the entire Sahel area, particularly Mali, generating another problem with untold consequences for the security of Europe (Larémont 2013). Having in mind the proven involvement of bot the Gaddafi and Al-Assad regimes in different terrorist actions across Europe, as well as in military operations in neighboring countries, it is not easy to evaluate the contribution that the interventions in Syria and Libya have provided to the final security outcome, as this effort involves balancing the human costs of these interventions against those that would be projected should the interventions had not have taken place. Nevertheless, keeping our analysis to what actually occurred, is undeniable that the destabilization of these regions created a massive flow of migrants across the Mediterranean. As a consequence of this thread, both NATO and European Union have been forced to launch several military and civilian efforts, such as the support and enhancement of the air defense capabilities of Turkey, the expansion of the EU border control agency (FRONTEX), or the different operations in Sahel such as EUTM-MALI, BARKHANE, SERVAL and G-5 SAHEL, among others.

The alternative to the chaotic and risky implementation of Western democratic values in these countries were those states in which such a social experiment was not allowed. A paradigmatic example is Morocco, an authoritarian and brutal country in terms of its political repression of dissent (Cavatorta 2016), but one which Europe and the US refer to as a crucial partner for maintaining security in the region (Boukhars 2019). This constitutes another clear example of a choice of the lesser evil in pursuit of a minimum guarantee of stability and security.

It does not appear then that Todorov's argument lacks empirical foundation beyond the Iraq War, in light of the recent history of global conflict. However, there are also paradigms with a solid conceptual base that discuss the antagonistic relationship between the categories of freedom and security. From these positions, both concepts would in fact have a directly proportional link,

the advancement of individual liberties in a society constituting the main tool for promoting its security. Next, we will delineate these notions that constitute the intellectual armament with which we intend to refute Todorov's theses.

2. The Articulation of Freedom-Security for a World Order. From Todorov to Sen

2.1 Security as a Development of Freedom

In our view, it is possible to reconcile the concepts of security and freedom in the international sphere if we use a different theoretical perspective that allows for a peaceful world order. This idea would presuppose, on the one hand, the promotion of interculturality in the sphere of international relations and, on the other, a multidimensional approach to the objectives of security.

In relation to the creation of intercultural strategies, Todorov himself considers the European identity and the European model as frameworks to be to aspired to. One of Europe's key objectives is the development of a model of external influence – thus, a truly European external action directed at regional neighbors, especially Africa and the Middle East, should contemplate long-term strategies that are based on a deep understanding of those societies and cultures (Galtung 1996). Only cooperation policies that promote the conditions of possibility respectful of diversity allow the development of dignified life for those human beings that make up those cultures, thus providing regional stabilization so vital for security both inside and outside the European Union. In order to be truly successful, this interaction should be bidirectional – in fact, all comprehension triggers a hermeneutic process that modifies the comprehending agent in some way.

In turn, this notion of security linked to the possible development of the population overcomes the opposition of the security-freedom binomial by proposing a mechanism in which freedom itself leads to social peace, stability and eventually security. The central element of this approach is that these mechanisms of influence cannot ultimately be considered short-term strategies, as they imply cultural changes which may require generations to materialize effectively. The failures witnessed over the past decade, such as the ISAF operation in Afghanistan or the Arab Spring, would in reality be the consequences of short-term strategies and a lack of determined commitment to tackle these enormous challenges (Zinni, M Augier, Barrett 2022). In Afghanistan, in addition to the 110,000 soldiers who made up the coalition, an equivalent number of doctors, professors, agricultural engineers and a host of professionals would have been necessary to truly change the sociological and economic substratum of the country. In addition to these human and material resources, Western countries should have made an explicit commitment to maintaining a force that would ensure security indefinitely until the situation in the country made it no longer necessary. In the absence of such a force, the

Taliban only had to sit back and wait for the reappearance of the power vacuum they were so eager to fill.

It is possible to speak in similar terms of the conflict in Iraq, the object of Todorov's analysis and the basis for his thesis on what he calls "world disorder". In both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, all of the tactical and operational objectives had been achieved after just a few weeks of operation; the military forces did their job quickly and effectively (Schadlow 2017). The strategic and political objectives however, if there were any, turned out to be poorly defined (Brooks 2022).

Similar conclusions can also be drawn from the failure of the Arab Spring, making it clear that social or cultural influence is not achieved merely through a communication strategy based on opinion leaders, social networks, or social media. True influence is obtained by establishing the conditions of possibility for the development of a dignified life that, together with the clear message about the urgency of social change, give people the opportunity to produce changes in their lives and their environment, that is, to achieve the necessary conditions to live with dignity and in peace.

These considerations, based on verifiable empirical evidence, are linked to the thesis of the capabilities approach, developed by authors such as Amartya Sen (1993, 1999, 2011) and Martha Nussbaum (1993, 2000, 2011). In this regard, since 1990 the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) uses a new notion of human development, inaugurated by the revolution that the theory of the capabilities approach brought about (Sen 1999), which no longer focuses exclusively on quantitative criteria such as economic growth or GDP. This new paradigm of human development theories has expanded its information bases and the perspective from which it analyzes human reality and the conditions of the quality of life according to the objectives and ultimate goals of a moral nature (Nussbaum 2011). This has crystallized in the conceptualization of public human development policies that are aimed at improving human living conditions from a multidimensional perspective (access to health, education, decent housing, political freedoms, social rights, economic security or access to an unpolluted environment, etc.).

Although *capabilities approach* is the global theoretical framework that operates in the field of human development, and is followed by the United Nations Development Program (UNPD), surprisingly, it is hardly taken into account in geopolitical analyses of armed conflicts and international security.

For this reason, our hypothesis argues that a first level of conceptualization of a certain idea of multidimensional security is closely linked to the aforementioned notion of human development. This new concept, which UNDP currently uses for its reports and human development indicators (HDI and HPI), is closely connected to the qualitative factors of what, in Amartya Sen's terms, makes up a dignified life and, therefore, is strongly linked to the existence of structural and material living conditions that enable the effective realization of people's life projects.

Likewise, the idea of multidimensional security bound to the contemporary notion of human development would be integrated by different dimensions

and factors of a political, social, psychological, economic or environmental nature. The development or poverty of a country would be measured according to heterogeneous indices such as children mortality, literacy, access to a health system or political freedom and, following this line of global action, crisis management models and their methodologies must be developed following this notion of multidimensional security.

2.2 The New Use of the Armed Forces in a Peaceful World Order

Alongside these ideas, a novel use of the armed forces should also be considered part of a much broader and more ambitious strategy of foreign action for influence over regions of interest to Europe. This resolutely active strategy of a Europe that, for decades, has opted for passivity in international relations, must overcome some paradigms anchored in the European social memory derived from its colonialist past. That said, Europe is in a position to assume the role of power or agent of influence as an exporter of a political, sociological and anthropological model that has been shown to enable the highest levels of freedom, security and economic and social development. Todorov's relativist positions, such as his famous work on the conquest of America, delves into these concepts which can be framed in ethical or moral relativism (Todorov 1999).

On the other hand, we are currently witnessing a political shift in Europe and the US, characterized by a populace that seems to be increasingly seduced by isolationist political approaches such as those defended in political speeches by Donald Trump in the US, Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom, or Santiago Abascal in Spain (Gaffikin 2023; Pratt 2023). The central message of these speeches is that nations should close themselves off to the outside world and build walls and barriers that isolate people from a supposed external threat, mainly in the form of immigration. This message is forcefully permeating Western societies, precisely at a historical moment in which it is perhaps most necessary to understand that, in a global world, it is impossible to isolate oneself from the outside.

These isolationist theses connect with Todorov's vision of the globe as an amalgamation of atomized and separate sovereignties pursuing their own interests. This idea, based on a Marxist interpretation of international relations attributing geopolitical phenomena to relations of domination and dependency between states (which we have previously criticized for its materialistic determinism), is also objectionable for its analytical reductionism. This reductionism, from a classical perspective of international relations based on the unitary concept of the nation-state, simplifies the actors involved in the conflict, leaving inherently human phenomena that are at the base of security threats out of said analysis, and thus leaving both the question and its answer incomplete.

In our view, however, the current geopolitical reality has, due to various factors – among them technology – changed in such a way that interactions, connections and links that transcend borders and sovereignties have evolved

significantly, with direct consequences for the concept of security, which can no longer be understood only as "inside" a sovereign country.

Regardless of the number of cross-border interactions, there are other elements that challenge this conception. The proliferation of International Organizations, for example, requires rethinking the concept of international security from a broader perspective than simple national security. The UN as the great international political body, or other confederations of supranational importance, particularly the EU, reflect a certain political will that transcends national sovereignties. Although these confederations once existed only in the mind of a visionary Kant (1939) as a postulate of Reason for a lasting but unattainable peace, today they are a material reality, regardless of their more or less imperfect character. In addition, powerful international organizations dedicated to specific issues, but of global transversal importance, such as OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, OECD, World Bank, and so on, have arisen and receive direct support from these confederations – both material resources as well as human capital or a legitimizing foundation. These organizations entail not only the projection of the foreign policy of member countries, but also necessarily represent their political will.

Having said this, Todorov's thesis about the primacy of a country's internal security, which implies the support for and establishment of liberal regimes only if they are favorable to Western States, must be analyzed in detail, because the atomism of sovereignties is not an accurate reflection of the current international geopolitical scenario. The concept of "benefit" for a given country can hardly be separated from its interconnections. The withdrawal of a country from an organization or treaty can effectively result in harm for the other participating countries, but also in grave repercussions for the withdrawing country (regardless of its power in the international sphere). Measures ranging from the imposition of economic sanctions, diplomatic exclusion or the boycott of the products of civil society itself, to give a few examples, are excellent tools for applying international political pressure.

The other point that we would like to highlight is related to the observable difference between the means of achieving security and those aimed at achieving freedom.

The contemporary understanding of armed conflict is very different from the concept of traditional war. The idea of war as the conflict between two or several contenders to invade and impose a system or take over the territory or natural resources of other countries has given way to various new forms of armed conflict, thus inaugurating a whole new lexicon of concepts such as hybrid warfare, guerrilla warfare or complex emergency (Väyrynen 2023).

What emerges from these new forms of armed conflict is that war is a human phenomenon, which in turn leads us to consider any natural conflict that is "humanitarian" by definition. The famous distinctions by type of operation (Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking) are based on operational criteria to establish action procedures and, above all, define the appropriate capacities for the specific problem with respect to which action is being taken (Zaman,

Biswas 2022). Ultimately, though, any conflict must be analyzed from a strategic point of view, and action must be taken considering its humanitarian nature, that is, humanistic or social. A related but different issue is the capabilities (military or otherwise) used for managing the conflict. Armies are one of many instruments of political action – but they are neither the only, nor even the primary instrument, even in war.

In the new doctrinal conceptions of modern military operations, the concept of the spectrum of conflict or the so-called *gray area* gains strength. This implies the existence of a continuum between full collaboration and open confrontation, in which tension escalates, manifesting itself in strategies and tactics that, using all the instruments of power including, but not limited to, the military, increase the state of confrontation (NATO 2021).

In this context, the need to first understand and then intervene in social and human phenomena, well become apparent before the threshold of the conflict. This understanding and execution of mechanisms of social influence has a preventive nature and can be carried out with military or other means. In any case, it is based on the systematic study of social dynamics long before violence appears. In line with the above, the doctrinal developments of Western militaries tend to consider military force as an actor of influence. Thus, for example, the first NATO doctrinal principle for any type of operation is the so-called "Behavior-centric approach", meaning that any operation, whatever its type, must be conceived as an effort to induce behavioral changes in certain human groups (NATO 2022).

In our opinion, all these arguments justify that any crisis must be addressed with humanist and sociological criteria, that is, people must be placed at the center of the approach to the problem. Paradoxically, this notion has become firmly established within the military, even though it remains controversial for the political establishment, civil society and certain intellectual currents.

3. Conclusion

The management of the majority of conflicts ravaging a large part of the world (not only the migratory drama in the Mediterranean, but also the mass exodus of Venezuelan refugees or the violation of human rights in Nicaragua, to give a few examples) presents a need to manage types of crises different from those referenced by Todorov – the use of force and bombardments. These other conflicts are quite different, and require multidimensional crisis management in which both force – that is, the military resources of different governments – as well as other specialized organizations intervene. Faced with this situation, which is clearly and viscerally reflected in massive migratory flows and other complex conflicts, one cannot conceive of security as something internal to a nation, but rather as an international and even multidimensional issue.

It is true that Todorov refers to the specific case of the Iraq war and the US intervention in the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime as a preventive war – an attack war but for legitimate defense –, today, however, the humanitarian crises and the question of security are something else.

Political institutions are ultimately comprised of people, and we believe that to presume that all those who make up these institutions are moved by purely strategic and economic interests is simply fallacious. These subjects have multiple motivations, among them ethical and moral values, and political will responds to this amalgamation of motivations and values. This argument holds even in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, turning it into a human phenomenon and not simply an economic one (Eltchaninoff 2018). If we assume this idea, then the public policies that are executed, and even the objectives of military interventions must respond to this political will which is also guided by moral values.

Todorov's theses consider conflict as between regimes, and therefore, the claim of supremacy of one over the other would find its justification in a certain sort of moral superiority. This, however, ignores the humanitarian crises to which one cannot remain indifferent, neither from a moral nor strategic perspective.

For this reason, we maintain that the management of a peaceful world inevitably requires the realization of security and freedom, both understood as multidimensional. This idea conceives freedom as the factual possibility of a dignified life, which can only be achieved in a setting of peace. It also, however, highlights freedom as an internal requirement for a secure world order, since only in a system in which people can develop their life projects in dignified conditions can a certain stability be achieved. This articulation of security and freedom as a necessary binomial requires that security be understood as multidimensional.

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Lidija de Tjenda Palop i Hakobo Huerta Vega

Bezbednost i sloboda: složen savez

Sažetak

Pojmovi bezbednosti i slobode odavno stoje u antagonističkom odnosu u političkoj sferi. Otkako je Platon osmislio *Državu*, autori poput Makijavelija, Hobsa i kasnijih kontraktarijanaca razumeli su da su neka ograničenja individualne slobode nužna zarad kolektivne bezbednosti. Ovu su paradigmu usvojili različiti mislioci i ključna je za većinu političko-teorijskih stanovišta. Na tom tragu, Todorov analizira aktuelnu geostratešku situaciju kao rezultat prekretnice koju je predstavljao rat u Iraku 2003. godine, da bi osvetlio strategije koje su neophodne za međunarodnu bezbednost u savremenom novom svetskom poretku. Međutim, njegov pristup sledi pojmovni okvir ranijih autora, što mu onemogućava da integriše međunarodnu bezbednost i slobodu kakvu podrazumevaju savremene zapadne demokratije. U ovom članku nameravamo da ponudimo alternativnu perspektivu, pristupajući ovom problemu kroz multidimenzionalnu konceptualizaciju bezbednosi i slobode.

Ključne reči: bezbednost, sloboda, razvoj, rat, Irak, uticaj, geopolitika.