Marija Velinov

Foucault/Derrida Fifty Years Later consists of texts dealing with the debate between Foucault and Derrida described in different ways – as the relation between the transcendental and the empirical, immanence and transcendence, or deconstruction versus genealogy. It offers different options for understanding the problems arising from the debate.

The debate began by Derrida’s critique of Foucault’s attempt to write a history of madness itself, madness before it becomes subject to/ of reason. It would, as Naas suggests, require carrying out an archaeology of the silence, that is, writing a history without speaking of madness. (Naas, p. 53) Derrida argues that the revolution against reason could be made only within it and that an archaeology against reason could not be written. Although, as Huffer reveals, that statement could not be found in Foucault’s work. (Huffer, p. 25) Further, the question was the status of madness in the texts used by Foucault and in his own writing. Briefly put, it is concerned with Foucault interpretation of the supposed exclusion of madness in Descartes’ first meditation. In the second half of “Cogito and the History of Madness”, Derrida questions Foucault’s interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations, and offer his own instead.

The debate was never available for the public, there was no specific date, there were no images or transcripts. It unfolded in (at least three) texts: Foucault’s History of Madness, Derrida’s “Cogito and the History of Madness” (first as a lecture which Foucault attended), and Foucault’s text “My Body, This Paper, This Fire” (an explicit response to Derrida). We may add Derrida’s “To Do Justice to Freud”, which can be described as a belated addition to the old debate, but we should also bear in mind that there were difficulties in determining the relevant texts and their sequence. For instance, a decade passed between Derrida’s challenge in 1963 and Foucault’s response in 1972; we should also have in mind modifications, editions and translations of the publications. By simplifying this exchange we limit it and exclude many other texts which we consider today part of the debate, including posthumous publications of their seminars which show us that the debate continued afterwards.
Some essays in the volume show the connection between Derrida’s late seminars and the debate, since they are interpreted as a continuation of the dialogue, while others reveal the mutations of Foucault’s work as its aftermath. Given the new material, the debate between Foucault and Derrida is now, about fifty years later, becoming a new subject of study for scholars of today.

The book contains twelve articles by different authors, divided into five parts: Openings; Surviving the Philosophical Problem: History Crosses Transcendental Analysis; After-Effects; Life Death, Power: New Death Penalties; Foucault’s and Derrida’s Last Seminars. Although the essays can be read out of order. They access key texts and central problems of the debate, while suggesting different ways of understanding their impact on future research. Some contributors take sides in the debate, while others offer examples of how to combine their suggestions.

Macherey acknowledges that both Derrida and Foucault uncover reason as defied against, and protected from, madness, but he situates the gap between them, and shows how Derrida turns Foucault’s argument against him. Huffer rediscover the impact of *The History of Madness*, which she argues still remains to be read. Her argument relies on the fact that the original French passages critiqued by Derrida are missing from the English translation, for which Foucault himself was responsible (he excised all the key passages and pages criticized by Derrida), making the book paradoxically famous and unknown at the same time. Samir Haddad shows how Foucault’s accusation that Derrida’s method is a “petty pedagogy”, a philosophy that teaches that “there is nothing outside the text” can lead to insights about the relation between philosophy and teaching. Contrary to this, as Colin Koopman argues, Foucault believed that “philosophy can confront its limits only by going outside of itself, for instance into the work of history.” (Koopman, p. 73) Robert Trumbull includes “To Do Justice to Freud” in the debate, by showing how Derrida’s earlier “Cognito” argument is adjusted and reaffirmed in the article. The central problem of the volume, differently approached in the texts, are Foucault’s and Derrida’s transcendental methods. For example, some essays give detailed descriptions of the ways they revise the classical mode of transcendental analysis. Khurana argues that there is more in common in their revisions of the transcendental than is generally perceived, while Amy Allen insist on the divergence between the two methods. She deals with Habermas’ and Derrida’s interpretation of Foucault and concludes that they are unable to tolerate Foucault’s distinction between reason and forms of rationality, which helps him describe contingency as a possibility of transformation and freedom. Colin Koopman and Huffer make cases for the practice of genealogy, as Koopman argues that one must choose between genealogy and deconstruction, and also that the exchange between the two thinkers is in fact about the status, nature, future, and history of philosophy. Michael Naas and Geoffrey Bennington express concerns about Foucault’s methodology, and both show that methodological questions are at the same time political. Revel show us the effect of Derrida’s critique in Foucault’s work, while Custer does the opposite by thematizing Foucault’s influence on Derrida work. Trumbull and Penelope Deutscher both suggest new methodologies arising from the combination of Derrida’s and Foucault’s analyses. In this respect, Trumbull speaks of the possibility of *deconstructive genealogy*. The contributors all together show commitment to understand the specificities of both authors in order to analyse how and why they produce tensions and incompatibilities.