COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND AUTISM: AGAINST THE EXCLUSION OF THE “SOCIAL MISFITS”

ABSTRACT
The paper aims to shed light on Searle’s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of “we-intentionality”. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle’s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

Introduction
In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle (1995) proclaims collective intentionality – thoughts and intentions of a group - as a defining feature of social reality; an ability all human beings share. Collective intentionality is commonly defined as a joint intentional behavior of a group directed towards some collective goal. People diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders lack the ability and motivation to engage in collective intentional behaviors and actions. Thus, I prompt the question of whether the collective intentionality is, according to Searle, a defining feature of human beings, and, consequently, does it withdraws the exclusion of autistic individuals from the society. In what follows, I shall argue that Searle would not embrace the exclusion of autistic individuals from the society, as well as the restrictiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Rather, I shall claim, collective intentionality can be interpreted as a biological disposition that has not been evolved in all human beings, even though all share the disposition in question. Once the first threat to Searle’s view is cleared, I raise my concern on exclusion of autistic individuals from collective intentional actions, due to their social impairments. I propose the extension of Searle’s notion of collective intentionality by recognizing behaviors that individuals with autism are capable of performing, and
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which can be acknowledged as both collective and intentional. The structure of the paper is following. The first chapter draws upon the terminology of John Searle; the second chapter problematizes the biological primitiveness of the collective intentionality, while the third provides conceptual framework for Autism Spectrum Disorders. Given that individuals with autism do not follow typical developmental pathway of social engagement, the fourth chapter proposes the broadening of Searle’s concept of collective intentionality.

Searle’s Account of Collective Intentionality

Given that collective intentionality is a building block of all social phenomena, in this section, I shall investigate what are the defining features of collective intentionality and what makes it qualified to be a necessary precondition for social reality.

Searle’s notion of collective intentionality is based on twofold intuition: first, a collective intentional behavior is not equal to the summation of an individual behavior, and second, the existence of mutually shared beliefs (even about intentions of other group members) is not sufficient to ensure cooperation. The first part of intuition – the irreducibility of collective intentionality to individual intentionality – is found in cases where I am doing something as a part of a group doing something. The example Searle extensively uses throughout the book is a football game: collective intentionality can be seen in offensive lineman’s blocking of the defensive end. This action is only a part of team’s execution of a pass play, even though it is only an offensive lineman that is performing the action. However, if the action lineman performed was not a part of the team’s goal (execution of a pass play), then it would merely be an individual act. Same actions can thus, on one occasion, be an individual act and, on another, a collective act. To make this distinction clear, Searle offers the following examples:

Imagine that a group of people sitting on the grass in various places in a park. Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally located shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence “I am running to the shelter”. But for each person, we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case there is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park converge on a common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common point. We can imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in the two cases; the people running to the shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers. Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly internally different. (Searle 1995: 402–403).

In the example of a group performing an outdoor ballet choreography, the intention of each group member (the individual “I intend”) derives from the collective intention of the group (“we intend”). Moreover, Searle argues that we-intentionality is irreducible to I-intentionality, claiming that “we simply have to recognize that there are some intentions whose form is: “We intend that we perform act A, and such an intention can exist in the mind of each individual agent who is acting as
part of the collective” (Searle 1990: 96). In this manner, collective intentions cannot be analyzable in terms of a set of individual intentions. The same follows for the attempt of analyzing collective intentions by considering a set of mutual belief about the group actions. This is the second part of Searle’s intuition about collective intentionality, according to which beliefs that members of a group share do not ensure the intention to cooperate. Without this intention, collective intentionality does not exist within a group. Searle continues by stating that “all the intentionality needed for collective behavior can be possessed by individual agents even though the intentionality in question makes reference to the collective” (Searle 1990: 407).

The idea is that what makes an action or a behavior collective and intentional is a specific type of mental state – *we-intentionality* – which differs from the mental state one has during individual intentional behavior. Having this mental state, one intends to cooperate with another in terms of sharing a collective goal. We-intentionality is shared by all humans and is rooted in biology.¹ The biological foundation of collective intentionality is expressed through the feature of primitiveness. It is argued that collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentional behavior, i.e. that it is logically primitive in means that it cannot be logically analyzed in term of other concepts. The logical primitiveness will not be of interest in this paper². Rather, it is the feature of the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality that is put into a spotlight as it underlies that human beings, in general, possess the capacity for collective intentionality. The latter is problematic due to the fact that some individuals (such are individuals with autistic spectrum disorders) do not possess the level of collective intentionality.

**The Biological Primitiveness of Collective Intentionality**

Collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something else. (Searle 1995: 24)

Notice that Searle’s assertion about the biological element of the collective intentionality is quickly followed by a claim about the impossibility to analyze collective intentionality through individual behavior or mutual beliefs of the group. The same maneuver Searle repeats once again when claiming that “the capacity for collective behavior is biologically innate, and the forms of collective intentionality cannot be eliminated or reduced to something else” (Searle 1995: 37). I hold that this is the reason why the discussion about the primitiveness of the collective intentionality is often focused only on the Searle’s non-summativist account, while the biological notion is put aside. So what does it mean that collective intentionality in Searleian sense is biologically innate³ and primitive? As Searle remarks, the capacity to engage in collective intentional behavior is a trait that has evolved through natural selection and evolutionary adaptation and is now immanent in

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¹ “...what sort of being are we that we have the capacity to form such [we-] intentions? Ultimately the answer to that has to be biological.” (Searle 1995: 413).
² For debate on logical primitiveness, see Mejers 2003; Pacherie 2007; and Salice 2015.
³ The term “innate” is used to mean “shared by all members of the species”. (see Mameli and Bateson 2006: 173)
human nature⁴. However, he continues, it is the underlying capacity of collective intentionality that is crucial for collective behavior, i.e., “something like a pre-intentional state of “the other” as an actual or potential agent like oneself” (Searle 1990: 413). Therefore, it seems that behind the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality stands a notion of “the sense of the other” as a part of the community I am engaging into. One acquired this “sense” through ontogenetic development⁵, and it is because of it that humans have a natural tendency to look upon others as candidates for collective intentional activity. According to this conception, we must suppose that

the others are agents like yourself, that they have a similar awareness of you as an agent like themselves, and that this awareness coalesce into a sense of us as possible or actual collective agents. (Searle 1990: 414)

Searle insists that collective intentionality presupposes a “sense of the other as candidates for cooperative agency” (Searle 1990: 414). This presupposition of the other as a co-agent is biologically innate, and in this sense, the question arises: Is the capacity for collective intentionality a feature that applies to all human beings in general? Or better yet, does the capacity to engage in collective intentional behavior define our species, in a way that one needs to have it in order to be counted as a human being? While most people possess the ability to engage in collective intentional behaviors, there are some individuals who lack both the capacity and the motivation to encounter with others in intentional activity. Empirical findings suggest that children and adults with autistic spectrum disorders⁶ (ASD) perform very poorly in joint attention and cooperative activities (Colombi et al. 2009: 143–163). The reason is, studies showed, to be found in their inborn inability to share mental states with others in the process of group intentional agency.

It is almost self-evident that Searle would not claim that autistic persons are not human beings. Thus, a different interpretation of the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality imposes. I propose that Searle’s intention is to assert that all human beings have a biological predisposition for engaging in collective intentional activities and behaviors by accepting others as co-agents. The idea is that all humans have an increased chance of developing a pattern of behavior (in this case collective intentional behavior) based on the genes we inherited. While most people have developed a disposition toward collective intentionality, there are cases where the activation of the disposition does not occur. If we accept capacity for collective intentionality as a biological disposition all humans share, then the first threat to Searle’s theory is discarded.

The second threat for Searle’s theory follows from the assertion that collective intentionality is the defining feature of society in general. Given that individuals

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⁴ “The selectional advantage of cooperative behavior is, I trust, obvious. Inclusive fitness is increased by cooperating with conspecifics.” (Searle 1995: 38).

⁵ “What sort of beings are we that we have the capacity to form such intentions? Ultimately, the answer to that has to be biological.” (Searle 2002: 103)

⁶ Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are a group of related developmental disorders that are characterized by impairments in social interaction, language development communication, as well as stereotyped motor behaviors. ASDs include Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder and Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise specified (PDD-NOS).
with ASD do not possess the capacity to understand and perform the intentions embedded into collective actions, there is a potential threat to Searle’s theory of embracing Husserlian exclusion of anomalous subjects from the society. Husserl asserts that the world is a constitutive accomplishment of rational, adult, mature and sane – normal – human beings. Children, the insane, the mentally impaired, the old, those with severe disabilities, and other “abnormal” subjects are excluded by Husserl from the collective of co-constitutors. Is the lack of the capacity for engaging in collective intentional behavior a criterion for exclusion from society? I gather that Searle would not accept the exclusion of the autistic children and adults from the society. Namely, in relation to general population, there is only a small number of individuals whose disposition towards CI has not been evolved, so Searle could accept that society can function even if not all members share the capacity for collective intentionality or even engage into collective intentional actions. However, we need to strive to include such individuals into society by recognizing the behaviors and actions that they can engage into.

The next section will consider the background of autistic individuals engaging in collective intentional behaviors, and examine what are the features that avert them to enter fully into society and make them a part of the group of “the social misfits”.

**Autism and Its Defining Features**

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is defined as a subcategory of neurodevelopmental disorders, characterized by impairments in social communication and restriction in interests and behaviors (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 5th edition 2013: 299.00; F84.0). The term “spectrum” indicates variations and heterogeneity of the autistic conditions that range from people with severe developmental delays to high functioning savants. However, all people with ASD share the triad of impairments: (1) impairments in language and communication, (2) impairments in social interaction and (3) repetitive or restricted interests and behaviors. The most distinguished aspect of ASD is difficulty within the reciprocal, social interactions. From an early age, autistic children have impairments in using and understanding eye-contact, gestures, face-expressions, and cooperation. Social interaction in autism spectrum disorder is exhibited through impairments in non-verbal behaviors, failure to develop peer relationship and lack of sharing interests and goal with others. With respect to the latter, one of the most enduring psychological theory tends to expand the triad of impairments by adding key deficit all autistic individuals share – the impaired “theory of mind” (ToM), or a condition of “mind-blindness”. This account can explain why children with autism have difficulties with simple behaviors such as joint attention, pretend-play and telling lies.

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7 “[…], excluded are the children, and also mentally ill and sick in general, insofar as they live in the anomality […]. Only the mature as normal human persons and in the unity-nexus of their communicative lives are subjects for the world which is their world […] Also, the old […] are counted as anomalies here, as well as the sick.” (Husserl: 178, cf. 618)

8 Joint attention or indicating behaviors “involve the use of procedures (e.g. showing a toy) to co-ordinate attention between interactive social partners with respect to objects or events in order to share an awareness of objects or events” (Mundy et al. 1986: 657).
Theory of mind (ToM) is a cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to self and others (Goldman 2012). Namely, by “theory of mind we mean being able to infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action” (Baron-Cohen 2001: 174). The most famous empirical discovery about the development of the ToM is the discovery by Wimmer and Perner (Wimmer and Perner 1983) of a cognitive shift in children between three and four years. The research showed that children at the age of three fail false-belief task, whereas, at the age of four, children tend to succeed on the test. Difficulty in understanding other people’s beliefs, intentions and emotions is a core cognitive feature of autism spectrum disorders. Some studies have shown that autistic children, regardless of the IQ, are “mind blind”, meaning that they are “blind” when it comes to understanding other people’s intentions. Studies have shown that most autistic children fail false belief tasks (Happe and Frith 1996: 1377–1400), do understand the distinction between appearance and Reality, and do not understand complex causes of behavior such as beliefs (Charman et al. 1997: 781 – 789). The ToM is closely related to Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as it is counted as a capacity that allows us to understand and predict another agent’s behaviors and thoughts.

However, not all research argues that mindblindness is the key mechanism underlying the social interaction impairments seen in ASD. The degree of understanding of intentional behavior in autistic children is thus uncertain, as experimental results do not match: one research stream claims that “autistic individuals are relatively unable to understand”, (Gallese, Eagle, and Migone 2007: 152), the intentions behind one’s action, while the other stream shows that the majority of children with autism understand that others have intentions and behave toward achieving them. These studies conclude that what autistic children lack are not the skills to understand the intentional behavior of others, but the motivation and capacities for sharing psychological states with others. The latter is one of the diagnostic criteria for ASD, given that the capacities for intention-reading and the motivation to share psychological states with adults or peers interact during the first year of life. Thus, it is claimed that autistic children understand other people’s intentions, but lack the skills and motivation for sharing mental states, as well as the interest in other person’s psychological states. For example, a study performed by Carpenter et al. (2002) showed that autistic children imitated adult’s unconventional actions.
(such as turning the light with the head), but also that they understand the intentions of the unconventional actions (they looked at the light with anticipation). Thus, it can be concluded that what autistic children do not understand is not the intentions themselves, but is the decision-making process behind the intentional activity. This implies that autistic children and adults have some basics of a theory of mind (i.e. they are not completely “blind”), but have difficulties in using it appropriately within social engagements.\footnote{While there is a vast amount of research on mind-blindness in autistic children, less attention has been devoted to the question of compensation of the theory of mind deficit. Baron-Cohen recognized this issue and in his study he concluded that there are methods which may be powerful tools for bypassing the theory of mind deficit. For more, see Swettenham, Baron-Cohen 1996: 73–88.} Social interactions with others are not completely absent in autism, but they are deviant, as autistic children are unable to develop socially in order to make social relationships (see Torres 2013: 7–32.). With regard to cooperation, children diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorders have very weak cooperative abilities and do not engage in cooperative activities with their peers or with adults. The motivations and skills for participating in collective intentional behavior are woven into the earliest stages of human ontogeny. However, I shall show in the following chapter that even though autistic children do not follow the typical human developmental pathway of social engagement, they are able to participate in cooperatively grounded behavior if adequately trained. In the following three chapters I will suggest an extension of Searle’s account of CI.

The Extension of the Collective Intentionality Behaviors

The first level of the CI I suggest is “doing-as-the-model-does” level. Imitation plays an important role in social learning and development and is considered to be one of the fundamental means of acquiring new knowledge on how to engage in social and emotional exchanges with others. In typical infants, imitation emerges in early developmental phase and plays a crucial role in the development of the cognitive, as well as social and communication behaviors, such as language, pretend play, and joint attention (Rogers and Pennington 1991: 137–162). It is through this reciprocal imitation process that infants show a social interest in the other agent (Nadel and Guerini 1999: 209–234), i.e. the caregiver, develop a sense of shared experience (Malatesta and Izard 1984: 161–206), and engage in communication (Trevarthen, Kokkinaki and Fiamenghi 1999: 127–183). Reciprocal imitation can also be of great help in learning conventional actions (Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1987: 276–282), and in peer interactions. Thus, imitation plays a crucial role in the development of more sophisticated social skills and group intentional behaviors. With 10 months, infants begin to imitate caregivers’ action with toys, making the play between them more object-oriented (Uzgiris 1999: 186–206). Through this strategy, the child learns conventional actions with toys, and later on, conventional actions with other objects, which leads to “proto-referential” imitation – a process in which imitation begins to be used as a mechanism for learning about how objects work. This type of imitation learning is proven to develop a theory of mind capacities in autistic individuals (Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993: 335–366). While for
most infants imitation comes naturally, for children with ASD, imitation requires direct teaching. Sigman and Ungerer (1984) were among firsts to conducted research on the relationship between imitation and autistic traits. They found that children with ASD have deficits in vocal and gestural imitation. When it comes to deficits in exhibiting imitative behavior, we need to stress the difference between two types of imitation: meaningful, goal-oriented and goal-less imitation. The goal-directed theory of imitation (GOADI) suggests that one can imitate only when she creates a cognitive hierarchy of goals for the action during observation, and then repeats an imitative action based on those goals. Contrary, in goal-less imitation, repetition of the movement style itself is the goal. The study conducted by Hamilton et al. (2007) found that participants with ASD exhibit some difficulties goal-directed imitation, but can imitate correctly to some extent. On contrary, the ability to imitate goal-less or meaningless actions is completely impaired. The reason for their poor imitation skills lies mostly in their low interest in behaviors around them. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they are unable to learn to imitate. Ingersoll (2008) proposes an imitation method designed to teach the social use of imitation in young children with autism – the reciprocal imitation training (RIT). This approach is designed to increase social responsiveness and intrinsic motivation by practicing the contingent imitation between one adult and one child. The adult imitates the child’s action and vocalizations at the same time as the child, with a goal to increase coordinated joint attention and to prepare the child to imitate the model. During this imitation process the adult, by using very simplified language, describes the action he and the child are performing. Once the child becomes aware of adult’s imitation (i.e. the reciprocity), the child is taught to imitate the perceived adult’s behavior. If the child does not spontaneously imitate, the model uses physical guidance to encourage the child to imitate. The imitation starts with familiar actions; once the child begins to imitate the familiar actions, the novel actions are introduced. The goal of this type of imitation is for imitation to become spontaneous. Therefore, the demonstrator does not use “Do this” principle, but verbal markers and descriptions of the modeled action (for example, the description “Vroom” or “The boy is driving” when modeling the play with car toy). This kind of highly structured learning environment helps children with ASD to maintain the imitation in different situations, to imitate spontaneously and, finally, to generalize the behaviors learned by imitation. In the earlier study, Ingersoll and Schreibman (2006) found that teaching imitation skills to young children with autism increases coordinated joint attention, and suggest a relationship between imitative performances and other social skills. It is important to notice that the imitation is not the process in which the observer blindly mimics the action of the other, but “that the observer attempts to reproduce the intentional actions of the other, including the goal toward which they are aimed” (Tomasello et al. 2007: 33). Ultimately, the imitation is, therefore, a type of social learning and it requires an understanding of others and oneself as intentional agents. This is why I suggest that the first level of collective intentionality should be “doing-as-the-model-does” level – the goal-directed imitation.

Recall Searle’s example of the outdoor ballet choreography where the intention of each group member derives from the collective intention of the group. Let us
suppose that one member of the dance group is autistic. She cannot read the intentions of the other dance members, nor can she fully grasp what is shared intentional cooperative activity. However, through imitation learning and declarative simple verbal instructions, she will be able to spontaneously repeat the dance choreography on a common point. The key element of this imitation learning process is the explanation of intentions embedded into imitated actions and, more importantly, the explanation that these intentions are shared. If we recall that the main problem concerning shared intentionality in individuals with autism was the lack of their “reading intentions” skill (the lack of theory of mind), then the solution to this problem would be the explicit explanation of intentions of others as the intentions all group members share. Also, recall that individuals with autism are efficient when it comes to performing a goal-directed imitative action. Thus, the autistic dancer may not be able to fully grasp that the choreography is a result of we-intentionality, she will act towards achieving a common goal by imitating both the goal and intention of the model. The second example of engaging autistic individuals in the collective intentionality through the process of imitation is object imitation. By engaging in the imitation process while observing the demonstrator using an object, autistic individuals learn object function (proto-referential imitation learning), or as Searle puts it, the knowledge that “this object can be used to do X in context C”. In this manner, individuals with autism learn observer-relative features\(^{12}\) of the object in the imitation. For example, when the demonstrator is using a five-dollar bill to pay coffee in a coffee-shop, the observer learns that the five-dollar paper bill (the object) can be used to pay coffee (the purpose) in the coffee shop (the context), and that the five-dollar bill has a status function that differs it from blank paper or kid’s fake dollar bills.

The goal of imitation is for the autistic individual to continue to conduct the imitated behaviors in absence of direct instructions and model. Once an autistic individual achieves this level, he would memorize the instructions of the model and turn them into rules. It is commonly known that individuals with autism prefer highly stable environments, as well as rule-guided activities, thus this shift from performing simple actions to turning them into rules does not come as a surprise. Likewise, autistics perform relatively well when guided by external prompts, and face almost no difficulties in familiar social situations. This can be traced in the ability of high-functioning children with autism to interpret and anticipate social intentions of schoolmates and teachers on the basis of identifying school routines and rules (Ochs et al. 2004: 147–183). In accordance with this, the second level of collective intentionality I propose is the rule-governed collective intentional agency.

Baron-Cohen’s empathizing-systemizing theory (Baron-Cohen 2004) proposes that alongside having a deficit in ToM, individuals with ASD have a surplus of hyper-systemizing. The function of systemizing is to find the governing laws of the system in order to learn how to act in particular events. The hypersystemizing theory explains the repetitive or restricted interests and behaviors seen in ASD,

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\(^{12}\) Searle makes distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative features of the world. Intrinsic features are features that exist independently of conscious observers and their representations of the world. Observer-relative features, on the other hand, exist only relative to the intentionality of conscious observers.
directed towards systems with well known governed rules. Rule-governed behavior is acquired as a result of stated rules. The rule, the antecedent, specifies a behavior and a consequence. However, one can follow the rule without having to experience the consequences, i.e. without having to directly contact contingencies. For example, one follows the rule “If you drink bleach, you will die” without ever having to engage in drinking bleach. Tarbox et al. (2011) conducted the study on establishing rule-governed behavior in individuals with autism. They taught their participants to respond to simple rules (e.g. If this is a cookie, then jump), through multiple-exemplar training (MET). The MET technique is based on using multiple examples when teaching and is proven to be efficient when teaching children with ASD. The participants of the study were trained on a number of rules, followed by generalization probes conducted to determine whether participants could respond to novel rules. Although some participants required extensive training, all participants eventually demonstrated an accurate response to a variety of untrained rules.

Searle, explaining what collective intentionality is, provides two examples that can be transliterated to the suggestion of rule-governed behavior as a second level of the CI. The first is Searle’s example of a football game and the offensive lineman’s blocking of the defensive end as a part of the collective action. The offensive lineman in the pass play of the football team can easily be person diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Her action of blocking the defensive end can still be performed as a part of the team’s goal of executing a pass play. However, in order to engage in a shared activity, rather than an intentional one, she needs declarative instructions on her part of the activity and to embrace those instructions as rule. Once she embraces the rule in form of If you block the defensive end, your team will execute a pass play, she can accept that she and her teammates are performing an action of a pass play together, i.e. she accepts teammates as his co-agents and shares the same goal with them. In order to provide the opportunity to individuals with ASD to achieve the latter, it is important to provide them with simple straightforward instructions, and use some visuals to help break down the information (e.g. football tactical board). Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to provide instructions on how to execute the play, but also instructions and guidance that the act they are performing has one goal that they all share.

Individual with ASD who follows the rule “If you block the defensive end, your team will execute a pass play” can: 1) act as a part of the group in a controlled settings and stable environment; 2) learn that all participants of the group including oneself have same intentions; 3) learn that his act is a part of a group act.

However, individuals with ASD cannot fully understand collective intentional behavior they engage in. Likewise, they cannot engage in collective intentional behavior without prior training and learning the rules of the action. I claim that full understanding of, and engaging in, collective intentional behaviors without prior training is the third and the highest level of the CI. Searle himself understands the structure of human institutions as a structure of constitutive rules, and claims that people are typically not conscious of these rules, but follow them unconsciously. To explain how we relate to rule structures without knowing the rules and following them consciously, Searle appeals to the notion of the Background – the set of non-intentional or pre-intentional capacitates that enable the functioning of intentional states. The Background capacities have a task to cope with social phenomena:
Instead of saying, the person behaves the way he does because he is following the rules of the institution, we should say just, First (the causal level), the person behaves the way he does, because he has a structure that disposes him to behave that way; and second (the functional level), he has come to be disposed to behave that way, because that’s the way that conforms to the rules of the institution. In other words, he doesn’t need to know the rules of the institution and to follow them in order to conform to the rules; rather, he is just disposed to behave in a certain way, but he has acquired those unconscious dispositions and capacities in a way that is sensitive to the rule structure of the institution. To tie this down to a concrete case, we should not say that the experienced baseball player runs to first base because he wants to follow the rules of baseball, but we should say that because the rules require that he run to first base, he acquires a set of Background habits, skills, dispositions that are such that when he hits the ball, he runs to first base. (Searle 1995: 144)

Therefore, according to Searle, the relevant behavior is not controlled by rules, but the psychological mechanism which underlies background capacities. We often act without applying rules consciously or unconsciously; we just know how to act. When we go to a coffee shop and buy a coffee with five dollar bill, our behavior is not controlled by constitutive rules of the money, but the knowledge and ability to use money as a medium for exchange. In the case of autistic individuals, this does not follow. Unlike most people, autistics need to know the rules of the institution in order to conform to them, and they need to learn them on the explicit and straightforward level. Autistics do not evolve a set of dispositions sensitive to the rule structures; they can learn the rules, but because of the lack of this disposition (i.e. background capacity) they cannot grasp them completely. For a person with autism, five-dollar-bill, or a football game is a set of learned rules that control their behavior in a specific context (e.g. in a coffee shop or at a stadium). Thus, even though individuals with autism can learn to participate in intentional collective behaviors by using the reciprocal imitation training and multiple exemplary training, they cannot fully understand collective intentionality. (Tomasello et al. 1993) concluded that while most people have evolved skills and motivation for collaborating with one another in activities involving shared goals, children with autism do not follow the typical human developmental pathway of social engagement with other persons. Even though Tomassello does not use this term, I believe that the evolved skills and motivation for collaboration autistic children have not gained through developmental pathway is Searle’s notion of the background capacities.

Conclusion

The capacity to engage in collective intentional behaviors has evolved through evolutionary adaptation and became innate to all humans. It is linked to the pre-intentional state of the other as a potential agent, which is a part of the Background capacities. Autistic people, alongside of having deficit in recognizing mental states of other agents (i.e. “mindblindness”), lack the Background capacities and the capacity to engage spontaneously in collective intentional behaviors. This is why I proposed the extension of Searle’s notion of collective intentionality so it could also refer to collective behaviors autistic persons are capable to perform. More specifically, I call for levelling collective intentionality from mere imitation of collective
intentional behavior, over learning how to engage in collective intentional behavior though rule-governed behaviors, to full understanding of collective intentionality that includes the Background capacities.

References:


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Kolektivna intencionalnost i autizam: protiv isključenja „društveno neprilagođenih“

Apstrakt
Članak teži da osvetli Serlov pojam kolektivne intencionalnosti (KI) kao primitivan fenomen koga dele sva ljudska bića. Ovo poslednje može biti problematično, pošto postoje pojedinci koji nisu sposobni da razumeju kolektivnu intencionalnost u potpunosti sarađuju unutar okvira „mi-intencionalnosti“. Ovo je slučaj sa pojedincima koji boluju od autizma, pošto je nedostatak motivacije i veština za deljenje psiholoških stanja sa drugima jedan od kriterijuma dijagnoze Spektra autističkih poremećaja (ASD). Ovaj članak tvrdi da isključivanje pojedinaca sa autizmom nije pretnja za Serlovo shvatanje kolektivne intencionalnosti, jer se ona može tumačiti kao prosta biološka dispozicija koju sva ljudska bića dele. U nastavku, članak predlaže proširenje Serlovske shvatanje KI tako da uključuje ponašanja pojedinaca koji imaju dispoziciju za KI, ali koja se nije razvila kroz ontogenezu: naime, pojedinaca sa autizmom.

Ključne reči: Serl, kolektivna intencionalnost, autizam, imitacija, kooperacija, pravilima vodenog ponašanja