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Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations

Abstract  Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.

Keywords: scepticism, transcendental proof, mental content externalism, Kant, Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein.

1 Introduction.

The problem of global perceptual scepticism appears simple to pose, yet devilishly difficult to resolve: As a mere point of logic, all of our experiences and beliefs can seem to us exactly as they do, and yet none be veridical (Stroud 1984, 549–50; 1989, 1994). Many analytic epistemologists have sought to rebut that logical possibility either with an especially cogent form of proof, or by citing some very basic, pervasive feature of the world (Stroud 1984, 549–50; cf. 1989, 37). Following Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense (1966), ‘transcendental arguments’ to counter global perceptual scepticism enjoyed rather a vogue. Such arguments purported to identify some necessary condition(s) for the intelligibility of the sceptic’s challenge, which is (or are) violated by posing that challenge; e.g., if human language is inherently public and social, and requires commonsense knowledge of one another and of our shared world, then ‘the sceptical challenge’ is paradoxical to the point of absurdity. However, those arguments were insufficient (Stern 2015); many focussed upon
issues of concept possession, whilst neglecting issues of any (cognitively) justified use of those concepts within any actual, genuine empirical knowledge (Westphal 2010a). Similarly, appeals only to ‘relevant alternatives’ (to any putatively justified perceptual claim), or instead to mental content externalism, appeared initially promising, except that they apparently commit a petitio principii against global perceptual scepticism. Scepticism appears to stymie epistemology, despite all the philosophical acumen marshalled against it. Is global perceptual scepticism a fundamental epistemological problem? Or does the problem rather lie in how we have conceived and addressed basic philosophical issues of empirical knowledge?

When Kant introduced transcendental analysis and proof into philosophy, he also introduced a ‘changed method of thinking’ (KdrV, Bxviii, 704). Yet Kant’s methodological innovations have been neglected, in part because his key innovation has been regarded as his hallmark ‘Transcendental Idealism’. Transcendental Idealism, however, is a substantive view, primarily about space and time themselves being (Kant contends) human forms of sensory receptivity and nothing else (KdrV, A490–1/B520, B59–60). Kant argued that his transcendental method of analysis and proof requires Transcendental Idealism; hence Post-Kantian epistemologists typically regard Kant’s cure for global perceptual scepticism as equal to or worse than the disease.

Re-examining Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by asking, What (if anything) do Kant’s premises, analyses and arguments in fact justify?, reveals that in several regards, Kant justified other, more important epistemological conclusions than he claimed, and that he did so independently of his Transcendental Idealism (Westphal 2004, 2006). Centrally important here is that Kant in fact provides two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism. These are proofs of this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary perceptual knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but upon appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. These I return to below ($5$, end); here I am
primarily concerned with the methodological reflections required to under-
stand, appreciate and assess such transcendental proofs, and why so few
analytic epistemologists – foremost amongst them: sceptics – have found
them persuasive or illuminating.

2 Philosophical Method & the Advent of Cartesianism.

Kant is correct that understanding human knowledge (and morals) requires
a ‘changed method of thinking’ (‘veränderte Methode der Denkungsart’; KdrV
Bxviii, cf. A676/B704).\(^1\) Speaking of changing one’s method of thinking may
suggest merely changing one’s standards of proof, thus raising suspicions
either of petitio principii or of simply dismissing the challenge of global per-
ceptual scepticism. Issues about philosophical method and about styles of
philosophical thinking have become more difficult to raise and address seri-
ously, as the historical perspective of contemporary philosophers continues
to contract. The notion persists that metaphysics as first philosophy amount-
ed to no more than pipe dreams, that epistemology as first philosophy was a
crucial step forward (though it landed us in global perceptual scepticism), and
that finally the advent of philosophy of language – and especially semantic
analysis – enabled us to dispel or resolve any genuine philosophical puzzles.
However convenient, this notion obscures and occludes rather more than
it illuminates. As Wilfrid Sellars realised, philosophical history is necessary
for keeping one’s philosophical methods – even meta-linguistic methods –
attuned to genuine issues.

As a prelude to reconsidering the Cartesian problem of global perceptual
scepticism, consider that ‘the’ mind-body problem is neither Ancient nor
Mediaeval (Matson 1966; King 2007). Ancient and Mediaeval philosophers
regarded the human body as percipient; our nous or mens (mind) was respon-
sible only for conceptually articulate thought and action. When Descartes
re-conceived the body as machina consisting solely in res extensa, sensory
qualities had to be relocated into the mind, or at least the into the non-corp-
oreal soul; perception – or its patently manifest aspects – moved upstairs
too. Sensory qualities – colours, tastes, auditory tones, scents – cannot them-
theselves be properties of physical particulars; they must involve ‘mental’ repre-
sentations. Global perceptual scepticism soon followed in tow – though not
without some portentous preparations. One preparation was the adoption
of an indirect, representational theory of perception. The adoption of indi-
rect theories of perception in the Seventeenth Century (C.E.) is surprising,
in view of Sextus Empiricus’ (PH 2:74) decisive criticism of their Stoic pre-
decessors: If our ‘direct’ awareness is solely of mental representations, which

\(^1\) On Kant’s changed method in moral philosophy, please see Westphal (2016a).
presumably (in favourable circumstances) are occasioned by surrounding objects or events, we cannot possibly prove that we perceive any such worldly surroundings. Once hatched, the problem of global perceptual scepticism appears to burden any advocate of a direct theory of perceptual awareness (e.g., critical realism) with petitio principii. Is this a philosophical cul de sac, or a symptom of more fundamental, methodological problems?

The symptomatic character of this apparent philosophical stand-off is revealed by two further methodological questions of historical philosophy: How, why and when did Aristotle’s model of philosophical knowledge (epistēmē, to the Mediaevals: scientia) – generally based upon Euclidean geometry, though tailored to the exactitude afforded by any domain of inquiry – become the strict deductivist model requiring infallibilist justification, familiar since Descartes, Locke and Hume? Why was Descartes, if only as the initially ignorant narrator of the Meditations, not guilty of heresy merely by suggesting in the first Meditation that perhaps the divine omnipotence might deceive him, or allow him to be deceived (AT 7:14, 15)? Both questions have a single, precise answer. The divine omnipotence can do anything which is not logically self-contradictory, including bringing about any event, even without its typical natural causes. This has two crucial implications. First, this holds also of those events we generally regard as perceiving our surroundings. Second, philosophers can do no more, and no better, than to propose merely possible explanations of phenomena (whether natural or psychological). Strictly speaking, knowledge requires ruling out any and all logically possible alternatives; only that counts as scientia. All else is a matter either of faith or of inherently fallible conjecture and belief. Exactly these views and implications were pronounced in March 1277 by the Bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier, upon authority of the Roman Pope (Piché 1999). The problem of global perceptual scepticism simply waited in the wings for Descartes to generalise an implication recognised by Chatton and Ockham, which they regarded as an occasional, entirely incidental, merely theoretical possibility: the divine omnipotence or a dastardly spirit can interfere in human perception, though the divinity does not, and here on Earth dastardly spirits are fortunately rare. The Parisian condemnation of 220 neo-Aristotelian theses in 1277 made mere conceivability a mainstay of philosophical method, argument and (dis)proof (Boulter 2011). Well-known to Mediaevalists, it has remained widely neglected even by specialists in 17th Century philosophy (Westphal 2016b, §6.2).

These notable events in philosophical history and method raise the issue of the character and status of mere logical possibilities within philosophy, especially epistemology, and in connection with global perceptual scepticism. So long as appeal to the merely conceivable logical possibility of one or another
global sceptical ‘hypothesis’ is regarded as sufficient to undermine or to de-
feat the justification of any claim to perceptual knowledge, or of any claim
to provide a sound theory of empirical knowledge, global perceptual scept-
icism will continue to appear irrefutable, insoluble and abysmal.

3 Changing our Philosophical Method of Thinking.

Kant’s ‘changed method of thinking’ concerns first and foremost how we can
pursue philosophy constructively, if appeal to merely conceivable logical pos-
sibilities is not the solution, but instead a central problem within philosoph-
ical problems. For several reasons, Kant’s methodological reconsideration of
merely conceivable, logical possibilities has again become germane to philos-
ophy. Over-specialisation, undue influence of Quine (Westphal 2015), abbre-
viation of graduate training, continuing contraction of historical perspective
and absurd demands to publish regardless of quality or cogency, have fostered
wide-spread neglect of four points, both methodological and substantive.

3.1 Conceptual Analysis: Method or Madness? Properly speaking, conceptual
analysis purports to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
proper use of the concept, phrase or principle in question, and thereby to
specify fully and adequately its meaning. This aspiration confronts a serious
dilemma, the Paradox of Analysis: How can an analysis of a concept (etc.) be
both informative, and recognised to be successful? Recognising the success
of a conceptual analysis requires recognising that it completely, adequate-
ly and correctly analyses the content or meaning of the concept in question
(the analysandum). Such recognition requires prior and independent compre-
hension of that analysandum. Such prior and independent comprehension,
however, entails that the analysis (the analysans) cannot be informative. This
Paradox holds independently of concerns about synonymy, though pessim-
mism about synonymy may have contributed to the eclipse of the Paradox of
Analysis; hotly debated through the 1980s, it is neglected by Borchert (2006).
Nevertheless, philosophers still often claim to provide an ‘analysis’ of this,
that or the other concept, term, phrase or principle – or more recently of ‘our
conceptual practice(s); as if some of our practices were somehow aconceptual.

Solving the Paradox(es) of Analysis, like solving the Meno Paradox of Learn-
ing (Meno 80d), requires appeal to partial understanding, yet in a way (or
ways) compatible with partial understanding being genuine albeit incomplete
understanding, and compatible with some tenable account of our competent
use of criteria of adequacy. The best solutions to the Paradox of Analy-
ysis replace (if implicitly) conceptual analysis with conceptual explication

2 E.g.: Black (1944), White (1948), Linksy (1949), Chisholm & Potter (1981), Fumerton
Conceptual explication does not aspire to completeness. Instead, conceptual explication aspires to selective (partial, incomplete) specification of the content or meaning of an important concept, term, phrase or principle (the explicandum), sufficient for the purposes of one or another indicated investigation, whilst also aspiring to improve upon the explicandum within its original context of use. This link to the original context of use affords important criteria of adequacy for any explication (explicatum). This context of use will not be simply a manner of speaking, but a manner of speaking developed, adapted and adopted to facilitate some activity, within some specified natural or social context.

It is striking and significant that both Kant (KdrV, A727–30/B755–8) and Carnap (1950a, 1–18) distinguished terminologically and methodologically between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication, using just these terms, for very much the same reasons and to the same effect, namely: modest, cautious corrigibility as well as tenability of their resulting explications. Though Carnap would have been loath to admit it, Kant welcomed the implication that conceptual explication involves a significant measure of semantic externalism, insofar as successful explication must be context-bound. This is significant, both methodologically and substantively: The adequate explication of any explicandum, and the appropriate use of its explicatum, is a function of possible contexts of its actual use, not of merely imaginary contexts of its (allegedly) possible use! This suffices to restrict the relevance of philosophical appeals to merely imagined logical possibilities, though exactly how and how much it restricts such appeals must be specified within the context(s) relevant to any actual explication.

3.2 Conceptual Explication & Philosophical History. Translating philosophical questions, puzzles or problems out of the material mode of speech (about, e.g.: things, events or persons) into the formal mode of speech about terms, sentences and syntactic or semantic rules, was supposed to provide ways to either resolve or dissolve those original questions, etc., in part because the formal meta-language was supposed to have a perspicuous, manageable simple structure, with no obscure corners in which devilish problems might lurk. Though often helpful, recourse to formal modes of speech proved not to be quite the expected philosophical expedient, either because the formal meta-linguistic resources were too restrictive, or if sufficiently generous, allowed too much slack for philosophical preconceptions and predilections to contaminate the procedures and their products (such as Quine’s ‘preference’ for ontological ‘desert landscapes’).

Conceptual analysis requires an untenable semantic atomism (or views quite close to it); conceptual explication rightly accommodates moderate (‘molecular’) semantic holism. The untenability of semantic atomism is the Achilles
heel of Carnap’s empiricist semantics, because the meaning of even the simplest observational predicate is not only a function of whatever sensory quality or circumstance it properly designates, but also of the syntactic form(s) of the observation reports in which it can occur; these forms are set by the formation rules of the linguistic framework to which they belong (Westphal 1989, 60–3). These points about philosophical explication were explicated by Wick (1951), regrettably without due notice.

Wilfrid Sellars was particularly explicit and conscientious about what his, unfortunately now passing, generation of Northern European analytic colleagues took for granted: effective recourse to any formally regimented metalinguage requires carefully examining the specifics of the philosophical history of the relevant issues, so as to comprehend, assess and benefit from (as it were) the ordinary language of philosophers, past and present, so as to avoid or to minimise potentially misleading terms or formulations, and to note proper precautions wherever they cannot be avoided without cumbersome complexity. These philosophers further recognised that ‘relevance’ must be construed broadly, not narrowly, because resolving any one (set of) philosophical issues inevitably has implications for the proper formulation, assessment and resolution of others. In short, resolving philosophical perplexities requires systematic philosophy, and philosophy can only be sufficiently systematic by also being deeply historically and textually informed philosophy (cf. Scharff 2014).

3.3 Domains of Inquiry: Formal & Substantive. Much philosophical ingenuity has been expended developing formalised languages for syntax, semantics, modality, proof theory and logical deduction. The use of these formal resources, however, has not often been sufficiently self-critical. A very important recent finding (Wolff 2009) is that, strictly speaking, the one formal domain – i.e., the one domain within which sentences are demonstrable solely due to their form – is a carefully reconstructed Aristotelian square of logical oppositions (without conversion). All other domains involve existence postulates, including semantic postulates. The adequacy and relevance of these semantic or existence postulates cannot be established by formal, deductive means alone; their adequacy and relevance always require additional considerations. Many such domains can be defined, constructed and evaluated rigorously, but the relevance of the use of any such formalised logistic system to any domain of inquiry requires assessment of the adequacy and

3 Just after drafting these lines news reached me of the unfortunate passing of both Abner Shimony and Jaakko Hintikka, both of them paragons of broadly and deeply informed, rigorously incisive philosophy. Allow me to pay tribute here to some, in these regard exemplary philosophers who are very much alive and active: Andreas Bartels, William Harper, Geert Keil, Wolfgang Künne and Holm Tetens.
suitability of that logistic system to the selected domain of use. Only within strictly formal domains is justification constituted by deduction, i.e., by provability. Within any non-formal, substantive domain, justification cannot be equated with strict deduction or provability. Due to the semantic or existence postulates involved in any non-formal, substantive domain, justification in such domains always requires more than logical deduction alone (Lewis 1929, 298; Carnap 1950b): justification in these domains also requires assessment of the relevance and appropriate use of the domain’s semantic and existence postulates. This is no fault; it is a fact. Fault lies only in failing to appreciate this fact and its significance for the justification of any claims within non-formal, substantive domains.

3.4 Explication, Justification & Specifically Cognitive Reference. Charles Travis (2006, 2008, 2013) has rightly emphasised that two distinct uses of descriptions have too often been conflated in recent philosophy. One use of a description is to explicate the meaning or the content (intension) of a concept, sentence or proposition. A different use of a description is to identify what some specific person said or thought on some particular occasion in those particular circumstances about whatever particular topics (persons, things, events, structures) S/he thought or spoke. The first use of a description can (à la Quine) prescind from any particular instances of the predicates or referring expressions which may occur within that description. The second use cannot so prescind from mentioning those particulars about which someone thought or spoke. In this important regard, Travis sides with Austin, Evans (1975) and ‘direct’ theorists of reference – and with Kant and Hegel.

The contrast between specifying the meaning of some sentence or proposition, and using a sentence to make a statement or claim, has an important epistemological corollary, which Kant first recognised – when prompted by Hume, Leibniz and Tetens. The conjoint implication of Kant’s ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and ‘Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’ is what I call his Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference. It pertains to the non-formal, substantive domain of empirical knowledge; it can be formulated, mutatis mutandis, in terms of judgments, statements, beliefs or claims; it allows one or several particulars as objects of one’s claims; it allows a range of precision or approximation; it is independent of the scale of the designated individuals; and it allows for approximations, provided they suffice (in context) to localize and individuate relevant individuals and some of their features.

Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference: To make even a candidate cognitive claim requires ascribing some characteristic(s) to some particular individual(s) one has localised within space and time.

4 On Kant’s cognitive semantics, see Melnick (1989); Westphal (2004), (2013b); Bird (2006).
Part of Kant’s justification of this Thesis is identical to Evans’ (1975): To use a predicate to ascribe a characteristic to some particular requires delimiting the aspect of that particular (of whatever kind or scale) which exhibits that characteristic, thus differentiating that aspect from other aspects of that (or those) particular(s), and thus (at least partially) differentiating that (or those) particular(s) from other surrounding regions and particulars. Accordingly, the spatio-temporal delimitation of particular(s) and the ascription of specified characteristic(s) to it (or to them) are conjoint, mutually interdependent proto-cognitive achievements. These achievements require appropriate, sufficiently accurate use of these concepts: ‘space’, ‘spatial region’, ‘time’, ‘temporal period’, ‘particular individual’ and the predicates (concepts of characteristics, classifications) in question. Using these concepts in such a referential, discriminatory way also requires competent use of the first-person pronoun ‘I’, to partially specify the relevant spatio-temporal points of reference, and to distinguish one’s own claim(s) in that circumstance on that occasion from claims made by others, or from one’s own claims on other occasions.

Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference, together with a justified true belief account of basic constituents of empirical knowledge (belief, truth and justification), justifies the following set of epistemic distinctions between description, ascription (attribution), sufficiently accurate ascription, cognitively justified ascription and sufficiently cognitively justified ascription:

1. Description (as in the first use of a description identified by Travis);
2. Ascription (attribution of some characteristic(s) to some individual(s));
3. Sufficiently accurate ascription (to avoid error or serious mischaracterisation);
4. Cognitively justified sufficiently accurate ascription (reasonable belief);
5. Sufficiently cognitively justified sufficiently accurate ascription (knowledge).

Only the last (5.) counts as empirical knowledge of the feature(s) of the individual(s) in question. The resources of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind extend no further than the first two proto-cognitive achievements (1., 2.). The first two are only proto-cognitive because they prescind from accuracy and from cognitive justification, though they are necessary for cognition of any particulars. Philosophy of language and philosophy of mind may contribute to, or augment, epistemology, but for these reasons

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5 ‘Cognitive justification’ may appear redundant, but recent discussions have injected other sorts of justification into doxastic matters, clouding the epistemic waters.
6 (3.) is relevant to philosophy of language in Donnellan’s (1966) criticism of descriptions theories of reference, which supports distinguishing (2.) from (1.).
they cannot supplant it – despite persistent claims to the contrary.\(^7\) Achieving (2.) – making some specific attribution to some particular(s) one has located (however approximately) within space and time – is necessary to make so much as a candidate cognitive claim: one which can have – and can be assessed for – truth, accuracy, sufficient approximation and also its kind or extent of cognitive justification.

An important feature of Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference is that it holds regardless of whatever theory of meaning (or of conceptual content, intension) one may espouse, and independently of the linguistic meaning or conceptual content of Someone’s claim. Kant’s Thesis concerns our securing reference to localised particulars, and that securing reference to localised particulars is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for empirical knowledge. Kant’s Thesis thus achieves one key aim of verificationist theories of meaning – eliminating experience-transcendent cognition of particulars (i.e., metaphysics) – without invoking verificationism, nor any other theory of meaning. Like Carnap, Kant regards predicate concepts as classificatory, and in this sense, as having ‘intension’, however specific, generic or complex these may be. His semantic, referential point accords with Austin, Evans, Donnellan and Travis: No matter how specific a description (intension) may be, and regardless of whether it contains putative singular referring terms or phrases (such as ‘the’ or ‘the one and only’), descriptive intension alone cannot secure singular reference, because that descriptive content may either lack any referent (and so be referentially empty) or it may happen to describe two or more individuals (and so be referentially indefinite). This is precisely Kant’s point, against Leibniz, illustrated by two qualitatively and quantitatively identical, though numerically distinct drops of rain.

4 Reconsidering Global Perceptual Scepticism.

Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference and the set of epistemic distinctions it justifies has direct implications for global perceptual scepticism.

4.1 Consider first that the challenge of global perceptual scepticism is, in effect, to demonstrate \textit{a priori}, on the basis of sheer logic and various ‘appearances to oneself’, that our actual cognitive capacities are adequate to any logically possible environment, prior to trusting our actual cognitive capacities within our actual environment (cf. Stroud 1989, 34, 36; 1994, 301–4). That challenge is surely insoluble; is perceptual scepticism an epistemological problem?

\(^7\) For a critical rejoinder, \textit{e.g.}, to Brandom in this regard, see Westphal (2017c), §5; cp. Westphal (2016b).
4.2 Note next that global perceptual sceptical ‘hypotheses’ – whether evil spirits, extra-terrestrial supercomputers stimulating brains in vats, experience machines, vivid life-long dreams or putative experience-inducing drugs – are no more than logical possibilities: they all extend no further than (1.) above (§3.4); they cannot be referred by anyone in any specific way to any specific particular(s). (This is not a point about belief or attitude ascription 2nd person, but about 1st person lack of cognitive reference to any particulars whatever.) Global perceptual sceptical hypotheses are ‘hypotheses’ in name only; they do not form even candidate cognitive claims. If they achieved that candidacy (by advancing at least to 2.), they would be subject to empirical investigation and assessment. This insight undergirds Bouwsma’s (1949) brilliant critique and parody of Cartesian scepticism.

4.3 Third, the observation that all of our beliefs and experiences might logically be just as they appear to be, and yet be non-veridical, amounts to no more than the observation that, because empirical knowledge concerns spatio-temporal individuals (of whatever kind or scale), empirical knowledge is a non-formal domain, in which cognitive justification in principle is not constituted by logical deduction alone (per above, §3.3). To regard the logical possibility of global perceptual scepticism as a fundamental problem for epistemology is to follow Descartes in following Bishop Tempier by insisting that nothing short of logical deduction suffices to justify any claim to know anything whatever (above, §2). What could justify the claim to know that only strict logical deduction suffices to justify any claim to empirical knowledge? Scepticism has long been used by fideists to assert the superiority of faith over reason, even after scientists (unlike philosophers) figured out how to gain knowledge of (e.g.) atoms (Chalmers 2009) or distance forces (Harper 2011). However, the programmatic hope, that achieving deductively infallible justification would certainly suffice to achieve empirical knowledge, should long ago have been jettisoned by epistemologists. Most epistemologists now espouse fallibilism. Nevertheless, infallibilist presumptions often pervade contemporary epistemology in the guises of presuming that mere logical possibilities suffice to block cognitive justification (e.g., van Fraassen; see Westphal 2017b), that we need concern ourselves with no more than our ‘conceptual practices’, that mounting a ‘serious’ objection to one’s own view must identify within it a flat contradiction, or that ‘But couldn’t s/he say ...?’ counts as a significant philosophical rejoinder – as if merely saying something sufficed to state a philosophical view or criticism.

4.4 The only two prospects for rebutting global perceptual scepticism by no more than conceptual analysis and appeal to one’s own apparent experiences are Descartes’ foundationalism and Carnap’s logical reconstruction
of the world. As responses to global perceptual scepticism, neither is sound. Descartes’ *Meditations* are vitiated, not by one, but by five distinct vicious circularities (Westphal 1987–88). If indeed the divine omnipotence can do anything which is not logically self-contradictory, then the divine omnipotence (or the evil deceiver) may have given to Descartes exactly the same innate ideas of simple natures – including his idea that only God could be the ultimate cause of his idea of God, or his idea that one of God’s perfections is that within the divine omnipotence all perfections are simply and solely one and the same – whilst so arranging the rest of creation that only Descartes’ idea of his own mere existence is true.

The empiricist alternative: to reconstruct the public, empirical world on the basis of nothing but experiences of simple sensory qualities and modern logic, is impossible. The problem is not merely that Carnap did not define ‘Quality Q is at x, y, z, t’; his constuctional programme cannot define those indexical parameters without obviating any and all basis of temporal ordering. This is because Carnap first chose ‘Recollection of Part Similarity’ (Rs) as his ‘basic relation,’ expressly in order later to specify the temporal order of anything experienced or investigated scientifically, though in between to ‘complete’ his reduction he substitutes for instances of Rs instances of ‘Part Similarity’ (Ps) – a symmetrical relation – thus obliterating any basis for specifying the temporal order in which any experiences, natural phenomena or scientific investigations occur: an irreparable problem in principle (Westphal 1989, 230–2).

4.5 These are unfortunate though instructive results – provided we carefully reconsider the problems of and prospects for epistemology. This requires more care than Richard Rorty (1989; rpt. 2009) and his tribe of loyalists expend on understanding and assessing historical philosophy. The comparatively recent rise of various anti-Cartesian forms of externalism in response to Gettier (1963) still has much to gain from reconsidering the original and still one of the most penetrating forms of anti-Cartesian epistemology, the kinds of transcendental examination and proof inaugurated by Kant (Westphal 2007). It is no accident that Gettier’s critique of justified true belief as a conceptual analysis of empirical knowledge would prompt varieties of justificatory externalism: all of Gettier’s counter-examples turn on contextual

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8 Note that ‘apparent experiences’ are specified; Moore did not so restrict his claims about his own hands, or about his knowledge of them.


10 The relevant ‘parts’ are qualitatively similar aspects or portions of perceptual *Gestalten*; Carnap’s example of construction in the *Aufbau* is not a sense data theory, though because it focusses upon qualitatively similar (manifestly uniform) ‘parts’ of perceptual *Gestalten*, it is an exact counterpart to a sense data analysis.
factors unknown to their hapless Subject, Smith; i.e., they turn upon cognitively relevant circumstances of which Smith cannot be aware by simple reflection – they are thus ‘external’ to Smith’s so-called ‘epistemic perspective’ on the world and on his own beliefs about it. One central theme in ‘externalist’ approaches to cognitive justification is that human cognition is a finite, dependent capacity. To this Descartes testified that he and his clear and distinct ideas were all entirely dependent upon the divine omnipotence. The problem is to ascertain how, specifically, human cognition depends upon the world, and to do so in ways which illuminate philosophical issues about empirical knowledge. Solving this problem likewise requires a cogent account of whether or how we are able to solve it philosophically – why epistemology is not simply replaced by cognitive psychology. One important result is already at hand.

Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference shows that achieving (2.) is required for any statement or thought to be a candidate cognitive claim. Because global perceptual sceptical ‘hypotheses’ fail to achieve (2.) – they stop with (1.) – they are not even candidate cognitive claims; in principle they altogether lack any justificatory status. Consequently, they do not and cannot serve to defeat or to undermine the cognitive justification of any candidate claim to empirical knowledge (2.). Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference thus shows that in principle global sceptical hypotheses are irrelevant to the assessment of any and all knowledge of particulars.

5 Thinking Transcendentally about Scepticism, Perception & Empirical Knowledge.

5.1 A further significant point about Carnap’s failure to reduce or to reconstruct the temporal order of the world (or of anyone’s experience of it, scientific or otherwise), is this: the concepts ‘time’ and ‘period of time’ cannot be defined or learned on the basis of, nor in accord with, the strictures of concept empiricism. Indeed, aside from descriptive predicates, none the concepts required for and involved in any instance of Singular Cognitive Reference (above, §3.4) can be defined, learned or otherwise acquired on the basis of, nor in accord with, concept empiricism because competent use of those concepts is required to locate and identify any spatio-temporal particulars (and their aspects), on the basis of which alone any concepts can be defined, learned or acquired empirically.

This result can be demonstrated by critical re-examination of Hume’s Treatise. The relevant concepts are all (merely) determinable concepts, concepts the significance and scope of which can only be specified within the context of their determinate use on any occasion; these include: ‘space’, ‘region of space’, ‘time’, ‘period of time’, ‘spatio-temporal individual’ (or: ‘particular’ – of whatever kind or scale; Hume wrote of ‘body’), ‘characteristic’, demonstrative
or indexical terms, including ‘I’ and ‘that’, and ‘word’. At most, Hume’s official ‘copy theory’ of sensory impressions and ideas, together with his three official ‘laws’ of psychological association (apparent qualitative similarity, contiguity, 1:1 correlation) can only define specific sensory qualities and their kinds – classifications as fine-grained as one can perceptually discriminate, and as generic as one may notice as a sensory, qualitative similarity. Hume recognised, indeed insisted, that we also use – without problem or confusion – a host of merely determinable concepts, highly abstract concepts (such as ‘government’) and also meaningful words (in contrast to senseless vocalisations or mere marks). Yet for these cognitively crucial capacities and their exercise only Hume’s ever-ready ‘imagination’ could account, yet for these capacities and functions of human imagination Hume can provide no empiricist account: that account is exhausted by the copy theory and three forms of psychological association (Westphal 2013a; cf. Turnbull 1959). Hume unwittingly provides all the resources required to demonstrate that those determinable concepts are a priori, insofar as they cannot be exhaustively defined, specified or learned solely on the basis of elementary sensory experiences, logic, or their combination(s).

Kant (KdRV, A195–6/B240–1) further noted that Hume’s concept empiricism shows that the concept ‘cause’ is a priori, because we so very often observe only a (putative) cause or only a (putative) effect, without observing both members of the alleged pair. By Hume’s account of customary association, this phenomenon should either prevent or strongly hinder the development of any particular beliefs about any particular (putative) causal relations, thus preventing our ever devising the general concept ‘cause’ (Beck 1978, 121–9). 5.2 Kant realised, however, that mere possession of a priori concepts settles no epistemological issues. To address epistemological issues requires showing that we are entitled to use those concepts in cognitively justifiable – and indeed also in cognitively justified – judgments. This requires – per Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference – that we can localise within space and time relevant instances of those a priori concepts. Localising and identifying relevant instances of concepts Tetens (1775) called ‘realising’ (realisieren) a concept; Kant adopted both this term and the key issue it identifies from Tetens. Kant developed this issue in connection with this further insight: ‘whatever I must presuppose in order to know an object at all, I cannot

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11 That Hume happens to call 1:1 correlations ‘causal’ (En 3.2) does not show that they are causal; rather, he contends that all we can know or conceive of causal relations amounts to no more than 1:1 correlations, coupled only by our expectations become habitual.

12 There has been renewed interest in a priori knowledge, but in focussing on such (putative) knowledge, recent discussions have neglected these basic, antecedent issues regarding the content, status and use of basic categorial concepts. On Kant’s identification of our basic logical forms of judgment, see Wolff (2016), (forthcoming).
itself know as an object (Object) (KdrV A402). Modern empiricism denied there are any such presuppositions, but the fundamental problems (noted above) with Hume’s concept empiricism and with logically (re)constructing the world on the basis of purported sense-data undermine that denial: Empiricism is not a tenable theory of human knowledge or experience. The problems, then, both methodological and substantive, concern how to identify – accurately, informatively and justifiably – relevant preconditions for human knowledge of any object. With care, such conditions can be identified by philosophical reflection; in part they concern our capacities so much as to understand and use any argument, evidence or analysis whatever. The aim of transcendental analysis and proof (or demonstration) is identify basic, pervasive externalist conditions regarding mental or semantic content (intension) or justification, such that these conditions must be satisfied by anyone who is able to consider her or his present thoughts or experiences. The aim is to demonstrate that and how the possibility of episodes of human self-conscious experience (apperception) is rooted in actual episodes of conscious human experience of our worldly surrounding (perception), without lapsing into psychologism – it is possible (cf. Guyer 1989). Such transcendental proof or demonstration is non-formal; accordingly the justification involved is fallible, as in all non-formal domains. Yet by that very token, mere logical possibilities do not undermine the justification of such transcendental proofs. ‘Fallibilism’ regarding justification is the view that justification sufficient for knowledge does not entail the truth of what is known. Fallibilism about justification is entirely compatible with our knowing necessary truths, say, in mathematics – or also in transcendental philosophy, e.g., about necessary features of rational human judgment and our capacities to integrate sensory information through time and space. The ‘fallibility’ of the justification of any claim does not require that the claim might be false; it allows that any claim or its justification may be revisited and perhaps revised – though revisions may make it more precise, or its justification may be further corroborated or strengthened! That there is no finality to rational justification in non-formal domains, does not entail that we err, nor that we lack sufficient accuracy or justification.

5.3 Kant identified at least three key points which ultimately justify mental content externalism and block the sceptical generalisation from the universal possibility of perceptual error to the alleged possibility of universal perceptual error. (Exactly how and how well Kant’s points succeed in these regards cannot be detailed here; see Westphal 2004.) One point is that the putative ‘whole’ of anyone’s perceptual experience is itself neither an object of perception nor a perceptual episode; it is a theoretical construct (KdrV A483–4/ B511–2). Hence it is neither cause nor occasion for scepticism about the objects of human perception, nor about our perceptual episodes.
A second point is that Hume’s ironic reply to Leibniz, that on Hume’s view of customary habituation there occurs (as it were) a preestablished harmony between the natural order and the order of human experiences (*En* 5.21, 8.5), is not nearly radical enough. Rather, if there were not (at least) some minimal, humanly detectable regularity and variety amongst the qualities of sensations, amongst the contents of percepts or perceptual episodes, or likewise amongst the objects and events we perceive (Kant argues in parallel for each case), we would be altogether incapable of using any concepts to identify and localise any particular (putative) objects or events whatsoever. At most we might be inundated by a senseless mass of sensory stimulations, though no even putative awareness of ourselves as putatively aware of any individuals whatever. (This is the upshot of Kant’s examination of the ‘transcendental affinity’ of the sensory manifold.)

Kant’s third point is that causal judgments are discriminatory: We are only able to identify any one kind of causal change by determining that the other two causal possibilities do not obtain (in some one specific regard; several relevant causal relations may be involved in any observed process or event). These causal possibilities are: 1) One substance persists through a change of one characteristic to another; 2) One substance and its features persist through a merely apparent change due to local motion relative to the perceiver; 3) Two or more substances interact causally, producing either changes of state, orientation or location in each other. Only if we can and do make at least some of these kinds of causal discrimination and identification through perceiving our surroundings can we reconstruct and identify any objective order in which events occur, as distinct to the order in which we happen to observe those events (even when these two orders coincide). Hume’s empiricist epistemology is insufficient for his own effortless reconstruction of the order of events when a porter knocked upon the door to Hume’s upper-storey apartment, to enter when beckoned, to open the squeaky door and to come into view only as he reaches the letter out to Hume sitting before his fire. This commonsense sequence can only occur if the door to Hume’s apartment, the stairs up to his storey and the walkway from the post office to Hume’s apartment building continue to exist, largely unchanged, whilst unperceived by Hume – all of which Hume knows and reports perfectly well (*T* 1.4.2), though his empiricism cannot account properly for his own reliable empirical beliefs and perceptual reports. In sum, Kant shows that Hume was not nearly sceptical enough, not even about his own empiricist account of his own mental capacities and activities.\(^\text{13}\)

Now Kant’s three key points favouring mental content externalism are not obvious, much less self-evident; they require detailed examination and

\(^{13}\) For concise discussion of Kant’s discriminatory account of causal judgment, see Westphal (2016c).
assessment – as do our own epistemological preconceptions about the relevant or proper parameters of epistemological inquiry and assessment. No die-hard sceptic can be refuted to his or her own satisfaction. That, however, is no reason for epistemologists to despair about human cognition, nor our philosophical examination of it, nor of our fundamental capacities for it.

5.4 Transcendental reflection upon and examination of empirical knowledge and our human cognitive capacities can take forms other than Kant’s. Independently, Hegel defended Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference, and in his subtle internal critique of ‘Lord and Bondsman’ explicated how our biological dependencies upon our surroundings likewise reveal some of our basic cognitive capacities for learning about, coping with and knowing some about our surroundings – including that we are amongst other human beings, whose points of view on the world and upon ourselves we in principle cannot and do not constitute (Westphal 2009b, 2011).

In Mind and the World Order (1929), C. I. Lewis developed an analysis very much like Kant’s analysis of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold, which Lewis deployed against Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and in support of his pragmatic realism (Westphal 2010a, §2).

In Being and Time (1927, §43.a), Heidegger countered Kant (KdrV, Bxxxiv), contending that the scandal of philosophy lies, not in the lack of a refutation of scepticism, but in the continued demand for any such refutation. Instead, Heidegger sought to make evident to us that posing the epistemological issue of whether global perceptual scepticism holds, presupposes that we are alive and engaged in and with the world (both natural and social), in ways which belie the merely theoretical possibility of global perceptual scepticism (Scharff 1992; Dahlstrom 1994, esp. 385–433).

In sections often neglected in his Philosophical Investigations (§142; Part II §xii), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (I, §§5, 140) and On Certainty, Wittgenstein proposes we consider (e.g.) unusual rulers which radically expand and contract upon slight changes in ambient temperature. For our actual world,

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14 The alternative transcendental reflections on human cognition mentioned here are examined in Westphal (2017a).
15 Hegel argued – soundly, I submit – for Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference in his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, chapter 1, altogether independently of Transcendental Idealism (or any similar view), by reductio ad absurdum of both aconceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and of knowledge merely by description (per §3.4, Nr. I); see Westphal (2010b). Hegel further argued by strictly internal critique of Hume’s empiricist analysis of our concept of and belief in the existence of physical objects (T 1.4.2), that the relation ‘thing/property’ can neither be reduced to, nor replaced by, the relations ‘one/many’, ‘whole/part’, ‘product/ingredient’ or ‘set/member’; hence the concept ‘physical particular’ is a priori and yet non-formal, as Hume himself all but admits (Westphal 1998).
such rulers would be useless, though they might be exactly what we would need in a world containing many objects with similar dimensional characteristics. Wittgenstein’s wildly counter-factual examples take on a transcendental cast when he proposes we consider that such exceptional cases were instead typical, and our typical cases of manageable regularity instead were rare exceptions. In just this connection, Wittgenstein notes that were such irregularities typical, we could neither speak or think at all (Westphal 2005).

In ‘Other Minds’ (1946), J. L. Austin considered a goldfinch perched in plain view in his garden, which is observed to behave just like a goldfinch for some period of time. He remarks:

If we have made sure it’s a goldfinch, and a real goldfinch, and then in the future it does something outrageous (explodes, quotes Mrs. Woolf, or what not), we don’t say we were wrong to say it was a goldfinch, we don’t know what to say. Words literally fail us .... (Austin 1979, 86)

Reflecting on Austin’s example, and on Waismann’s (1945) case for the ‘porosity’ or open-texture of all empirical concepts, by which they (or our use of them) are in principle always subject to correction by unexpected occurrences, Frederick Will (1969) argued that the porosity of our empirical concepts is considerable evidence for semantic externalism, and that Austin is correct that, in the imagined case of the outrageous goldfinch, ‘words literally fail us’, because thought itself, thinking itself, fails us. The relations between features or aspects of the world and human thought – indeed: our very capacity to think – may be manifold, various and highly indirect, though nevertheless we human beings cannot think at all without relying upon guidance afforded by the world we inhabit. Will’s point is transcendental, not incidental (Westphal 1997, xvii–xxiii).

6 Conclusions.

Insofar as ‘transcendental arguments’ are conceived within the Cartesian-empiricist framework which persists into the present day – witness the enormous difficulties lodged against Burge’s (1979, 2010) efforts to counter it – they and philosophical responses to them are fit subjects for philosophical diagnosis, in service of more sensitive and sensible philosophical reflections upon empirical knowledge and our capacities for it. Descartes was correct in this regard: The proper philosophical response to global perceptual scepticism lies in identifying, examining and appreciating the implications of our fundamental, manifold cognitive dependencies upon our

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16 Wittgenstein’s critique of the possibility of ‘private language’ also has anti-sceptical implications, and perhaps a transcendental character. In these regards, the best reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s account is Wright (2001), 223–90.
worldly (natural and social) environs. That he failed to identify and to exploit our human forms of cognitive dependency and interdependency to epistemologically sound effect is unfortunate, though no reason for philosophers to persist in neglecting our cognitive dependencies and their epistemological examination and assessment. Descartes himself was not the Cartesian his successors forged out of the problem putatively posed by the evil deceiver (cf. Ferrini 2016). Infallibilists, strong internalists and other advocates of the justificatory relevance of mere logical possibilities should consider whether they slumber dogmatically; too much epistemology has been, as Kant said of metaphysics (KdrV, Bxv), ‘a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts’.  

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17 This holds, too, of popular ‘causal reliability’ views, which appeal to alleged causal relations they do not (remotely) identify or justify; see Westphal (2016b).


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Kenet R. Vestfal

Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje

Apstrakt
Kant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. 'Transcendentalni karakter' ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, Hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološke refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim.

Ključne reči: skepticizam, transcendentalni dokaz, eksternalizam mentalne sadržine, Kant, Hegel, K.I. Luis, Hajdeger, Vitgenštajn