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Logical-epistemological basis of metaphysics

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info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179067/RS//

Logical-epistemological basis of metaphysics (en)
Логичко-епистемолошки основи метафизике (sr)
Logičko-epistemološki osnovi metafizike (sr_RS)
Authors

Publications

Epistemic Feature of Democracy: the Role of Expert in Democratic Decision Making

Janković, Ivana

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Janković, Ivana
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID2001037J
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2065
AB  - In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates that a purely procedural justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the author is advocating a hybrid theory that secures harmony between political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making.
AB  - U svojoj knjizi Demokratija i istina: sukob između političkih i epistemičkih vrlina, Snježana Prijić Samaržija se zalaže za stanovište po kom čisto proceduralno opravdanje, koje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, nije dovoljno za potpuno opravdanje demokratije i da, stoga, treba uključiti i neke epistemičke vrednosti. Ova epistemička vrednost demokratije zavisi od kvaliteta odluka koje demokratske procedure proizvode. U tom smislu autorka se zalaže za hibirnu teoriju koja obezbeđuje sklad između političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti, favorizujući deliberativnu proceduru za tu svrhu, i na taj način promoviše jednako poštovanje obe demokratske vrednosti. Pri tome, autorka zagovara specifičnu vrstu epsitemičke podele rada koju ću ovde pokušati da kritički preispitam, a samim tim i izolovanu ulogu eskperata u demokratskom odlučivanju.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Epistemic Feature of Democracy: the Role of Expert in Democratic Decision Making
T1  - Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom donošenju odluka
IS  - 1
VL  - 31
SP  - 37
EP  - 42
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001037J
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Janković, Ivana",
year = "2020",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID2001037J, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2065",
abstract = "In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates that a purely procedural justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the author is advocating a hybrid theory that secures harmony between political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making., U svojoj knjizi Demokratija i istina: sukob između političkih i epistemičkih vrlina, Snježana Prijić Samaržija se zalaže za stanovište po kom čisto proceduralno opravdanje, koje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, nije dovoljno za potpuno opravdanje demokratije i da, stoga, treba uključiti i neke epistemičke vrednosti. Ova epistemička vrednost demokratije zavisi od kvaliteta odluka koje demokratske procedure proizvode. U tom smislu autorka se zalaže za hibirnu teoriju koja obezbeđuje sklad između političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti, favorizujući deliberativnu proceduru za tu svrhu, i na taj način promoviše jednako poštovanje obe demokratske vrednosti. Pri tome, autorka zagovara specifičnu vrstu epsitemičke podele rada koju ću ovde pokušati da kritički preispitam, a samim tim i izolovanu ulogu eskperata u demokratskom odlučivanju.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Epistemic Feature of Democracy: the Role of Expert in Democratic Decision Making, Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom donošenju odluka",
number = "1",
volume = "31",
pages = "37-42",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001037J"
}
Janković, I. (2020). Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom donošenju odluka.
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and SocietyBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 31(1), 37-42.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001037J
Janković I. Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom donošenju odluka. Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2020;31(1):37-42
Janković Ivana, "Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom donošenju odluka" 31, no. 1 (2020):37-42,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001037J .

Deliberativna demokratija između moralizma i realizma

Andrija, Šoć

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Andrija, Šoć
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=470
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1885
AB  - U ovom radu ću izložiti debatu između političkih moralista i političkih realista i pokušati da pokažem da je moguće naći srednje rešenje koje istovremeno zadovoljava osnovne zahteve oba pristupa a ne podleže prigovorima koji se upućuju i jednom i drugom stanovištu. U prvom delu izlažem stav koji dele i moralisti i realisti: da je osnovni izazov koji se pred jednu političku teoriju postavlja rešenje problema legitimnosti. Prvo skiciram Rolsov moralistički pristup, da bih potom prešao na realisičke kritike takvog moralizma. Uglavnom ću se držati jedne od najdetaljnije razrađenih novijih teorija – Slitove (Sleat) realističke teorije, mada će biti reči i o drugim sličnim razmatranjima. U drugom delu ukazujem na kritike koje bi se mogle uputiti realistima. One su u mnogome slične onim kritikama koje oni sami upućuju moralistima, a svode se na problem subdeterminacije odnosno nedovoljne određenosti političkog delovanja činjenicama. Kako realisti smatraju da je test održivosti jedne političke teorije njena primenljivost, njihova pozicija je utoliko posebno oslabljena jednom takvom kritikom. U trećem delu rada ukazujem na deliberativnu teoriju, koja može da odgovori i na realističke kritike – jer je svojim velikim delom okrenuta načinu na koji se stvari odvijaju u konkretnom političkom životu konkretnih društava – ali i na kritike upućene samim realistima, jer empirička istraživanja sugerišu konkretan put ka rešenju problema legitimnosti – podizanje kvaliteta deliberacije. Takođe, deliberativna teorija zadržava autonomne etičke vrednosti, iako to, za razliku od moralizma, ne čini narušavajući zahtev za autonomijom politike od etike, ekonomije i drugih disciplina. Stoga, na kraju rada, iznosim tvrdnju da takvu deliberativnu teoriju mogu prihvatiti i realisti i moralisti.
AB  - The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls’ moralist approach. I then move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories – Sleat’s realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination – that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a political theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism – because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies – but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy – by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn’t do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Deliberativna demokratija između moralizma i realizma
T1  - Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism
IS  - 4
VL  - 27
SP  - 920
EP  - 937
DO  - 10.2298/FID1604920S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Andrija, Šoć",
year = "2016",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=470, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1885",
abstract = "U ovom radu ću izložiti debatu između političkih moralista i političkih realista i pokušati da pokažem da je moguće naći srednje rešenje koje istovremeno zadovoljava osnovne zahteve oba pristupa a ne podleže prigovorima koji se upućuju i jednom i drugom stanovištu. U prvom delu izlažem stav koji dele i moralisti i realisti: da je osnovni izazov koji se pred jednu političku teoriju postavlja rešenje problema legitimnosti. Prvo skiciram Rolsov moralistički pristup, da bih potom prešao na realisičke kritike takvog moralizma. Uglavnom ću se držati jedne od najdetaljnije razrađenih novijih teorija – Slitove (Sleat) realističke teorije, mada će biti reči i o drugim sličnim razmatranjima. U drugom delu ukazujem na kritike koje bi se mogle uputiti realistima. One su u mnogome slične onim kritikama koje oni sami upućuju moralistima, a svode se na problem subdeterminacije odnosno nedovoljne određenosti političkog delovanja činjenicama. Kako realisti smatraju da je test održivosti jedne političke teorije njena primenljivost, njihova pozicija je utoliko posebno oslabljena jednom takvom kritikom. U trećem delu rada ukazujem na deliberativnu teoriju, koja može da odgovori i na realističke kritike – jer je svojim velikim delom okrenuta načinu na koji se stvari odvijaju u konkretnom političkom životu konkretnih društava – ali i na kritike upućene samim realistima, jer empirička istraživanja sugerišu konkretan put ka rešenju problema legitimnosti – podizanje kvaliteta deliberacije. Takođe, deliberativna teorija zadržava autonomne etičke vrednosti, iako to, za razliku od moralizma, ne čini narušavajući zahtev za autonomijom politike od etike, ekonomije i drugih disciplina. Stoga, na kraju rada, iznosim tvrdnju da takvu deliberativnu teoriju mogu prihvatiti i realisti i moralisti., The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls’ moralist approach. I then move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories – Sleat’s realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination – that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a political theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism – because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies – but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy – by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn’t do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Deliberativna demokratija između moralizma i realizma, Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism",
number = "4",
volume = "27",
pages = "920-937",
doi = "10.2298/FID1604920S"
}
Andrija, Š. (2016). Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism.
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and SocietyBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 27(4), 920-937.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604920S
Andrija Š. Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism. Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2016;27(4):920-937
Andrija Šoć, "Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism" 27, no. 4 (2016):920-937,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604920S .

Why Does a Woman's Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? Aristotle on the Political Role of Women

Jovanov, Rastko; Deretić, Irina

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2015)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Deretić, Irina
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/346
AB  - In this paper I will discuss Aristotle’s controversial philosophical views on women. I will critically examine three main interpretations of his claim that women have deliberative faculty “without authority”. According to the first line of interpretation, Aristotle has in mind that women’s incapacity of advice-giving and decision-making in public afairs are determined by conventions in the political context of his time. I will attempt to point out the disadvantages of this kind of interpretation. Furthermore, I will put forward the reasons why is implausible the more recent interpretation, given by Marguerite Deslauriers. According to her reading, the lack of authority of deliberative faculty in women means nothing else than the tasks over which women have authority are for the purpose of the tasks put forth by men. The prevailing interpretation among scholars is that, in Aristotle’s view, women are naturally inferior to men, due to the fact that they are all too frequently over-ruled by the irrational “forces” of their nature. I will argue that this line of interpretation elucidates what Aristotle presumably has in mind, although it makes his account of women and their rationality, if not inconclusive, then indisputably problematic. In other words, I attempt to prove that, if the prevailing line of interpretation is correct, such view of women produces some philosophically “insurmountable” problems for Aristotle. The aim of the last section of the paper is to point out how some of these problems could eventually be resolved.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Why Does a Woman's Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? Aristotle on the Political Role of Women
SP  - 902
EP  - 916
DO  - 10.2298/FID1504902D
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Deretić, Irina",
year = "2015",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/346",
abstract = "In this paper I will discuss Aristotle’s controversial philosophical views on women. I will critically examine three main interpretations of his claim that women have deliberative faculty “without authority”. According to the first line of interpretation, Aristotle has in mind that women’s incapacity of advice-giving and decision-making in public afairs are determined by conventions in the political context of his time. I will attempt to point out the disadvantages of this kind of interpretation. Furthermore, I will put forward the reasons why is implausible the more recent interpretation, given by Marguerite Deslauriers. According to her reading, the lack of authority of deliberative faculty in women means nothing else than the tasks over which women have authority are for the purpose of the tasks put forth by men. The prevailing interpretation among scholars is that, in Aristotle’s view, women are naturally inferior to men, due to the fact that they are all too frequently over-ruled by the irrational “forces” of their nature. I will argue that this line of interpretation elucidates what Aristotle presumably has in mind, although it makes his account of women and their rationality, if not inconclusive, then indisputably problematic. In other words, I attempt to prove that, if the prevailing line of interpretation is correct, such view of women produces some philosophically “insurmountable” problems for Aristotle. The aim of the last section of the paper is to point out how some of these problems could eventually be resolved.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Why Does a Woman's Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? Aristotle on the Political Role of Women",
pages = "902-916",
doi = "10.2298/FID1504902D"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Deretić, I. (2015). Why Does a Woman's Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? Aristotle on the Political Role of Women.
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and SocietyBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 902-916.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1504902D
Jovanov R, Deretić I. Why Does a Woman's Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? Aristotle on the Political Role of Women. Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2015;:902-916
Jovanov Rastko, Deretić Irina, "Why Does a Woman's Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? Aristotle on the Political Role of Women" (2015):902-916,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1504902D .
1