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Cvejić, Igor

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orcid::0000-0001-9634-6652
  • Cvejić, Igor (33)
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Author's Bibliography

Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?

Milenković, Ivan; Krstić, Predrag; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

@misc{
author = "Milenković, Ivan and Krstić, Predrag and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
url = "http://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/article/view/15/90, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2113",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva",
title = "Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?",
number = "1",
volume = "1",
pages = "149-167"
}

Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/article/view/10/34
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2105
AB  - Namera nam je da u ovom tekstu ponudimo detaljnu analizu pojmova individualne i zajedničke perspektive, poziva i angažmana, kako bismo doprineli teorijskom osvetljavanju tih fenomena i raspravama o kolektivnoj intencionalnosti. U prvom delu rada ćemo uvesti i kroz kontrastiranje sa relevantnom literaturom preciznije razraditi fenomenološki pojam perspektive koji ćemo koristiti u ostatku rada. U drugom delu rada se fokusiramo na Helmovo shvatanje zajedničke evaluativne perspektive kao ključa za razumevanje kolektivne intencionalnosti. Pritom će se kao važan zadatak ispostaviti temeljnije razumevanje procesa konstituisanja zajedničke perspektive kroz interakcije između aktera i komunikaciju njihovih individualnih perspektiva, koje treba da dovedu do usaglašavanja zajedničke perspektive. Treći deo rada biće posvećen usko shvaćenim angažovanim aktima, aktima koji se vrše kao pozivi drugome na zajedničku perspektivu. Objasnićemo kako funkcioniše unutrašnja logika poziva, i preko toga pokazati da čak i kada ne postoje opštevažeće norme ili opšteprihvaćeni sadržaj zajedničke perspektive (kao kada je poziv upućen onima koji nisu deo zajedničke perspektive) zajednička perspektiva može da se konstituiše kroz distribuciju odgovornosti i poverenja. Na kraju ćemo na aktuelnom primeru angažmana za vreme korona-krize, pokazati kako se uz pomoć ovog teorijskog aparata mogu bolje razumeti drugačije forme globalnog zajedničkog delovanja, kao što su novi društveni pokreti.
AB  - The aim of this paper is to offer a detailed analysis of the concepts of individual and shared perspective, the call, and engagement, and thus contribute to the theoretical elumination of these phenomena and debates on collective intentionality. First, we introduce the phenomenological concept of perspective that we will use through the rest of the paper, refining it by making comparisons with the relevant literature. Sec-ond, we focus on Helm’s notion of joint evaluative perspective as the key to under-standing collective intentionality. A more thorough understanding of the process of constitution of the joint perspective through interactions between agents and the communication of their individual perspectives, leading to the harmonization of the joint perspective, will be pointed out as an important further task. The third part of the paper will be devoted to engaged acts (in the narrow sense of the term): acts per-formed as calls upon others to form a joint perspective. We will explain the inner logic of the call, and in this way show that even when there are no generally valid norms or a generally valid content of the joint perspective (e.g. when the call is directed at those who are not yet a part of the joint perspective), the joint perspective can be consti-tuted via a distribution of responsibility and trust. Finally, we will use the current ex-ample of the corona crisis in order to show how this theoretical apparatus can con-tribute to a better understanding of novel forms of global joint action, as exemplified by the new social movements.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva
T1  - Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva
T1  - Constituting joint perspective: engaged acts  and the logic of call
IS  - 1
VL  - 1
SP  - 7
EP  - 28
DO  - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
url = "http://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/article/view/10/34, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2105",
abstract = "Namera nam je da u ovom tekstu ponudimo detaljnu analizu pojmova individualne i zajedničke perspektive, poziva i angažmana, kako bismo doprineli teorijskom osvetljavanju tih fenomena i raspravama o kolektivnoj intencionalnosti. U prvom delu rada ćemo uvesti i kroz kontrastiranje sa relevantnom literaturom preciznije razraditi fenomenološki pojam perspektive koji ćemo koristiti u ostatku rada. U drugom delu rada se fokusiramo na Helmovo shvatanje zajedničke evaluativne perspektive kao ključa za razumevanje kolektivne intencionalnosti. Pritom će se kao važan zadatak ispostaviti temeljnije razumevanje procesa konstituisanja zajedničke perspektive kroz interakcije između aktera i komunikaciju njihovih individualnih perspektiva, koje treba da dovedu do usaglašavanja zajedničke perspektive. Treći deo rada biće posvećen usko shvaćenim angažovanim aktima, aktima koji se vrše kao pozivi drugome na zajedničku perspektivu. Objasnićemo kako funkcioniše unutrašnja logika poziva, i preko toga pokazati da čak i kada ne postoje opštevažeće norme ili opšteprihvaćeni sadržaj zajedničke perspektive (kao kada je poziv upućen onima koji nisu deo zajedničke perspektive) zajednička perspektiva može da se konstituiše kroz distribuciju odgovornosti i poverenja. Na kraju ćemo na aktuelnom primeru angažmana za vreme korona-krize, pokazati kako se uz pomoć ovog teorijskog aparata mogu bolje razumeti drugačije forme globalnog zajedničkog delovanja, kao što su novi društveni pokreti., The aim of this paper is to offer a detailed analysis of the concepts of individual and shared perspective, the call, and engagement, and thus contribute to the theoretical elumination of these phenomena and debates on collective intentionality. First, we introduce the phenomenological concept of perspective that we will use through the rest of the paper, refining it by making comparisons with the relevant literature. Sec-ond, we focus on Helm’s notion of joint evaluative perspective as the key to under-standing collective intentionality. A more thorough understanding of the process of constitution of the joint perspective through interactions between agents and the communication of their individual perspectives, leading to the harmonization of the joint perspective, will be pointed out as an important further task. The third part of the paper will be devoted to engaged acts (in the narrow sense of the term): acts per-formed as calls upon others to form a joint perspective. We will explain the inner logic of the call, and in this way show that even when there are no generally valid norms or a generally valid content of the joint perspective (e.g. when the call is directed at those who are not yet a part of the joint perspective), the joint perspective can be consti-tuted via a distribution of responsibility and trust. Finally, we will use the current ex-ample of the corona crisis in order to show how this theoretical apparatus can con-tribute to a better understanding of novel forms of global joint action, as exemplified by the new social movements.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva",
title = "Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva, Constituting joint perspective: engaged acts  and the logic of call",
number = "1",
volume = "1",
pages = "7-28",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509"
}

Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

@misc{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=811, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2072",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Pregled tribina i konferencija  u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.",
number = "1",
volume = "31",
pages = "129-137"
}

Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice

Bojanić, Petar; Cvejić, Igor; Čipranić, Miloš; Lošonc, Mark; Vesnić, Snežana

(Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet, 2019)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Bojanić, Petar
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
AU  - Čipranić, Miloš
AU  - Lošonc, Mark
AU  - Vesnić, Snežana
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2038
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet
T2  - Živeti zajedno
T1  - Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice
SP  - 375
EP  - 381
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Bojanić, Petar and Cvejić, Igor and Čipranić, Miloš and Lošonc, Mark and Vesnić, Snežana",
year = "2019",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2038",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet",
journal = "Živeti zajedno",
title = "Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice",
pages = "375-381"
}

Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo, 2019)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2003
AB  - Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma.
AB  - The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga
IS  - 2
VL  - 62
SP  - 53
EP  - 68
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2019",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2003",
abstract = "Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma., The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga",
number = "2",
volume = "62",
pages = "53-68",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C"
}

Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure

Cvejić, Igor

(2018)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1913
AB  - I will present the basics of Kant’s understanding of feelings. and specifically, try to show why we should not accept some conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert.  
In his interpretation of Third Critique, Paul Guyer that feelings are an inexplicable sensation, which can be explained in no other way than through its causes. Guyer insists on equalizing sensations and feelings. However, sensations are (according to Kant) the kind of presentations that appear as impressions of our outer senses. Additionally, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that only material for inner sense are outer sensations. (KrV, AA 03: 23,70; Allison 1983, 277) Feelings, on the contrary, do not provide new material of inner sense. (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 673) It is therefore impossible to hold that feelings are somehow new sensations that appear in our inner sense.
According to Zuckert, feelings can be understood as second-order consciousness, that has as its contents any other kind of representation (sensation, intuition or concept) and represents a formal relational characteristic of this content, with a tendency to persist. Unlike Guyer, Zuckert differentiates feelings from sensations, and like Guyer, correctly emphasizes that feelings are not discursive representations. (Zuckert 2007, 236) However, in her reading, feelings are a representation and their main function is cognitive, representational (Zuckert 2007, 233), which is exactly what the faculty of feeling does not do. I would argue that Zuckert’s interpretation fails to address definition of displeasure in §10. of Critique of the power of judgement, and both Guyer’s and Zuckert’s interpretation could not follow literally definition in §12. – Guyer modified a translation and Zuckert finds it is ‘a slip’.
The crucial challenge set by Kant is to characterize feeling as sui generis mental state, which means as a mental state that is not representation. Based on evidence in Kant’s lectures and major works I will argue that feeling in Kant’s works should be understood as an exercise of a causal power of representation for maintaining or hindering its state of representing (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 675). I will argue that Kant suggests that causality of representation does not demand higher-order-consciousness for us to be aware of it, but is rather one of the ways (“entirely special faculty of discriminating”) in which we come to be aware and itself manifests as awareness. Thus, we can keep to the formal structure that consists of representation and its relational property (to maintain its state), while avoiding some contradictions that emerge with the introduction of second-order consciousness. Feelings are a complex phenomenological structure that consists of two components: (1) cognitive component, representations themselves (sensation, intuition or concept) and (2) causal component, its tendency toward maintaining its state of representation (subjective causality). These two components in one feeling are of course, not separable. Subjective causality of representation is not a new, additional thing, on top of the representation itself, but a subjective characteristic (Beschaffenheit) of a cognitive state, one, albeit, which cannot be reduced to the cognitive state itself.
C3  - Leuven Kant Conference
T1  - Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1913",
abstract = "I will present the basics of Kant’s understanding of feelings. and specifically, try to show why we should not accept some conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert.  
In his interpretation of Third Critique, Paul Guyer that feelings are an inexplicable sensation, which can be explained in no other way than through its causes. Guyer insists on equalizing sensations and feelings. However, sensations are (according to Kant) the kind of presentations that appear as impressions of our outer senses. Additionally, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that only material for inner sense are outer sensations. (KrV, AA 03: 23,70; Allison 1983, 277) Feelings, on the contrary, do not provide new material of inner sense. (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 673) It is therefore impossible to hold that feelings are somehow new sensations that appear in our inner sense.
According to Zuckert, feelings can be understood as second-order consciousness, that has as its contents any other kind of representation (sensation, intuition or concept) and represents a formal relational characteristic of this content, with a tendency to persist. Unlike Guyer, Zuckert differentiates feelings from sensations, and like Guyer, correctly emphasizes that feelings are not discursive representations. (Zuckert 2007, 236) However, in her reading, feelings are a representation and their main function is cognitive, representational (Zuckert 2007, 233), which is exactly what the faculty of feeling does not do. I would argue that Zuckert’s interpretation fails to address definition of displeasure in §10. of Critique of the power of judgement, and both Guyer’s and Zuckert’s interpretation could not follow literally definition in §12. – Guyer modified a translation and Zuckert finds it is ‘a slip’.
The crucial challenge set by Kant is to characterize feeling as sui generis mental state, which means as a mental state that is not representation. Based on evidence in Kant’s lectures and major works I will argue that feeling in Kant’s works should be understood as an exercise of a causal power of representation for maintaining or hindering its state of representing (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 675). I will argue that Kant suggests that causality of representation does not demand higher-order-consciousness for us to be aware of it, but is rather one of the ways (“entirely special faculty of discriminating”) in which we come to be aware and itself manifests as awareness. Thus, we can keep to the formal structure that consists of representation and its relational property (to maintain its state), while avoiding some contradictions that emerge with the introduction of second-order consciousness. Feelings are a complex phenomenological structure that consists of two components: (1) cognitive component, representations themselves (sensation, intuition or concept) and (2) causal component, its tendency toward maintaining its state of representation (subjective causality). These two components in one feeling are of course, not separable. Subjective causality of representation is not a new, additional thing, on top of the representation itself, but a subjective characteristic (Beschaffenheit) of a cognitive state, one, albeit, which cannot be reduced to the cognitive state itself.",
journal = "Leuven Kant Conference",
title = "Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure"
}

Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence

Bojanić, Petar; Cvejić, Igor

(Torino : Labont, 2018)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bojanić, Petar
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1926
AB  - The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly
reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the
problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is
no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject.
The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum)
and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact of
reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act
or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus,
these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence.
PB  - Torino : Labont
T2  - Rivista di Estetica
T1  - Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence
VL  - 69
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Bojanić, Petar and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1926",
abstract = "The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly
reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the
problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is
no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject.
The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum)
and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact of
reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act
or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus,
these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence.",
publisher = "Torino : Labont",
journal = "Rivista di Estetica",
title = "Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence",
volume = "69"
}

Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

@misc{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1551",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.",
number = "1",
volume = "29",
pages = "139-147"
}

Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja

Cvejić, Igor

(IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1786
PB  - IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T1  - Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja
ER  - 
@book{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1786",
publisher = "IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
title = "Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja"
}

Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1478
PB  - Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Holokaust i filozofija
T1  - Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva
SP  - 56
EP  - 71
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1478",
publisher = "Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Holokaust i filozofija",
title = "Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva",
pages = "56-71"
}

Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017)

@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=513&path%5B%5D=481, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1538",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.",
number = "1",
volume = "28",
pages = "188-190"
}

Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?

Krstić, Predrag; Cvejić, Igor

(Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2017)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Krstić, Predrag
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1501
PB  - Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga
PB  - Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson
T1  - Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?
SP  - 7
EP  - 46
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Krstić, Predrag and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1501",
publisher = "Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson",
title = "Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?",
pages = "7-46"
}

Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1409
AB  - Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže, nasuprot desno-libertarijanskoj kritici socijalne 
pravde, da postoje dobri razlozi za odbranu politika socijalne pravde unutar slobodnog društva. U prvom delu rada, predstavićemo dve uticajne desno-libertarijanske kritike socijalne pravde, izložene u knjigama Pravo, zakonodavstvo i sloboda Fridriha Hajeka i Anarhija, država i utopija
 Roberta Nozika. Na osnovu njihovog pristupa, politike socijalne pravde vide se kao neopravdana povreda slobode pojedinačnih članova društva. U odgovoru na ovu kritiku, uvešćemo distinkciju između formalne i faktičke slobode i tvrdićemo da formalni princip slobode koji brane Hajek i Nozik nije dovoljan za zaštitu faktičke slobode članova društva, jer 
ne prepoznaje (1) moralnu obligaciju da se pomogne onima kojima, bez njihove krivice, u velikoj meri nedostaje faktička sloboda, i (2) pravnu obligaciju države da zaštiti građansko dostojanstvo svih članova društva. U drugom delu teksta, nudimo interpretaciju Kantovog argumenta o porezima, prema kom građansko dostojanstvo pretpostavlja faktičku slobodu, da bismo tvrdili da Kantovo opravdanje poreza daje dobre razloge da se tvrdi da država ima pravnu obligaciju da 
zaštiti faktičku slobodu politikama socijalne pravde.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom
T1  - Socijalna pravda i formalni princip slobode
IS  - 4
VL  - 28
SP  - 270
EP  - 284
DO  - 10.2298/FID1702270N
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1409",
abstract = "Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže, nasuprot desno-libertarijanskoj kritici socijalne 
pravde, da postoje dobri razlozi za odbranu politika socijalne pravde unutar slobodnog društva. U prvom delu rada, predstavićemo dve uticajne desno-libertarijanske kritike socijalne pravde, izložene u knjigama Pravo, zakonodavstvo i sloboda Fridriha Hajeka i Anarhija, država i utopija
 Roberta Nozika. Na osnovu njihovog pristupa, politike socijalne pravde vide se kao neopravdana povreda slobode pojedinačnih članova društva. U odgovoru na ovu kritiku, uvešćemo distinkciju između formalne i faktičke slobode i tvrdićemo da formalni princip slobode koji brane Hajek i Nozik nije dovoljan za zaštitu faktičke slobode članova društva, jer 
ne prepoznaje (1) moralnu obligaciju da se pomogne onima kojima, bez njihove krivice, u velikoj meri nedostaje faktička sloboda, i (2) pravnu obligaciju države da zaštiti građansko dostojanstvo svih članova društva. U drugom delu teksta, nudimo interpretaciju Kantovog argumenta o porezima, prema kom građansko dostojanstvo pretpostavlja faktičku slobodu, da bismo tvrdili da Kantovo opravdanje poreza daje dobre razloge da se tvrdi da država ima pravnu obligaciju da 
zaštiti faktičku slobodu politikama socijalne pravde.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom, Socijalna pravda i formalni princip slobode",
number = "4",
volume = "28",
pages = "270-284",
doi = "10.2298/FID1702270N"
}

Kantova teorija osećaja

Cvejić, Igor

(2017)

@phdthesis{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
url = "http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=48753679, http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=4655, https://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:14826/bdef:Content/download, http://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/123456789/7727, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1464",
abstract = "Uobičajene su interpretacije po kojima Kant osećaje objašnjava ili kauzalno ili kao intencionalna stanja. Pod kauzalnim objašnjenjem, podrazumeva se da je osećaj prost oset (materijalna predstava čula) koja se ne može nikako drugačije objasniti osim preko svojih uzroka. Prema intencionalnom objašnjenju, kakvo je ono Rejčel Zakert, Kant osećaj shvata kao mentalno stanje drugog reda, kao svest o, ili predstavu o, nekom drugom stanju i njegovoj relacionoj karakteristici. Oslanjajući se na podelu osnovnih moći duše, u radu će se braniti teza da obe prethodne interpretacije ne mogu adekvatno da objasne Kantovo shvatanje osećaja. Prema razlici osnovnih odredbi duše osećaji, kao mentalna stanja sui generis, sami nisu predstave, prema tome ni oset, ni predstava višeg reda. Naprotiv, osećaj jeste subjektivni kauzalitet predstave, težnja da se u datom stanju predstavljanja održi ili da se ono odbaci – koja se i bez predstave višeg reda manifestuje kao svest..., Two main contemporary interpretations of Kant’s account concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure argue that he explains feeling either causally or as an intentional mental state. According to the causal interpretation a feeling is an opaque sensation, which could not be explained by itself, but rather by its causes. As claimed by Rachel Zuckert, chosen due to her detailed explanation of intentional interpretation, feeling for Kant could be understood as a second order mental state, as a ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representations of’ another mental state and its relational characteristic. Relaying on Kant’s division of the faculties of the soul, the thesis will be defended, that both interpretations could not adequately explain Kant’s account of feeling. According to the difference between basic determinations of the soul, feelings, as mental states sui generis, are themselves not representations, therefore, they are nor sensations, nor second-order representations. Instead, a feeling should be understood as a subjective causality of representation, a tendency to maintain or restrain the state of representation – which is by itself manifested as a consciousness...",
title = "Kantova teorija osećaja, Kant's Theory of Feeling"
}

The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1424
AB  - My aim is to draw attention to the different forms of social engagement
regarding the subject of import. The concept of import was introduced in the
theory of action by Bennet Helm. It denotes an intentional characteristic of an
object, to be viewed as worthy of pursuit or avoidance. However, according to
Helm, the subject of import could be: either an individual person, the other or
plural agent. Using this division in the context of social engagement, I propose
to distinguish three forms of social engagement: (1) personal social engagement,
(2) social engagement for the sake of others and (3) social engagement as togetherness. Social engagement as togetherness (plural agent) should not be
confused with plural action with the same goal-directedness (which is part of
personal social engagement). This argumentative step was enabled by Helm’s
complex theory about “us” as a subject of import, contrary to some contemporary
theorists who dispute the possibility of plural agents.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import
IS  - 2
VL  - 27
SP  - 332
EP  - 342
DO  - 10.2298/FID1602332C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2016",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1424",
abstract = "My aim is to draw attention to the different forms of social engagement
regarding the subject of import. The concept of import was introduced in the
theory of action by Bennet Helm. It denotes an intentional characteristic of an
object, to be viewed as worthy of pursuit or avoidance. However, according to
Helm, the subject of import could be: either an individual person, the other or
plural agent. Using this division in the context of social engagement, I propose
to distinguish three forms of social engagement: (1) personal social engagement,
(2) social engagement for the sake of others and (3) social engagement as togetherness. Social engagement as togetherness (plural agent) should not be
confused with plural action with the same goal-directedness (which is part of
personal social engagement). This argumentative step was enabled by Helm’s
complex theory about “us” as a subject of import, contrary to some contemporary
theorists who dispute the possibility of plural agents.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import",
number = "2",
volume = "27",
pages = "332-342",
doi = "10.2298/FID1602332C"
}

Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka

Jovanov, Rastko; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2015)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/245
AB  - U prvoj polovini osamnaestog veka nemačku filozofiju je obeležavao racionalizam. U njegovoj drugoj polovini pojavila se jedna nova tendencija koja je, u većoj meri orijentisana na oblast estetike i s osloncem u neposrednom osećaju, vodila ka ranom romantizmu. Namera ovog rada je da pokaže osnovna obeležja Kantovog odgovora na ovu tendenciju. On se, međutim, mora shvatiti unutar Kantove transcendentalne filozofije i tripartitne podele osnovnih moći duše. Učenjem o osećaju, kao posebnoj moći duše i principu svrhovitosti, kao jednom apriornom principu za ovu moć, Kantje razvio sopstvenu poziciju.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka
SP  - 27
EP  - 46
DO  - 10.2298/FID1501027C
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2015",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/245",
abstract = "U prvoj polovini osamnaestog veka nemačku filozofiju je obeležavao racionalizam. U njegovoj drugoj polovini pojavila se jedna nova tendencija koja je, u većoj meri orijentisana na oblast estetike i s osloncem u neposrednom osećaju, vodila ka ranom romantizmu. Namera ovog rada je da pokaže osnovna obeležja Kantovog odgovora na ovu tendenciju. On se, međutim, mora shvatiti unutar Kantove transcendentalne filozofije i tripartitne podele osnovnih moći duše. Učenjem o osećaju, kao posebnoj moći duše i principu svrhovitosti, kao jednom apriornom principu za ovu moć, Kantje razvio sopstvenu poziciju.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka",
pages = "27-46",
doi = "10.2298/FID1501027C"
}
1

Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2014",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1328",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.",
pages = "239-242"
}

The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement

Cvejić, Igor; Losoncz, Márk; Matković, Aleksandar; Ivković, Marjan

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ivković, Marjan
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/376
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar
T1  - The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement
SP  - 128
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Cvejić, Igor, Losoncz, Márk, Matković, Aleksandar",
author = "Ivković, Marjan",
year = "2014",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/376",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar",
title = "The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement",
pages = "128"
}

Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/282
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar
T1  - Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'
SP  - 54
EP  - 55
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2014",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/282",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar",
title = "Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'",
pages = "54-55"
}

Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014

Cvejić, Igor; Losoncz, Márk; Matković, Aleksandar

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - BOOK
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/265
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T1  - Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014
ER  - 
@book{
editor = "Cvejić, Igor, Losoncz, Márk, Matković, Aleksandar",
year = "2014",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/265",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
title = "Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014"
}

Privatno, javno i zajedničko

Cvejić, Igor

(Novi Sad : Kolektiv Gerusija, 2013)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1167
PB  - Novi Sad : Kolektiv Gerusija
T2  - Stvar
T1  - Privatno, javno i zajedničko
SP  - 165
EP  - 173
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2013",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1167",
publisher = "Novi Sad : Kolektiv Gerusija",
journal = "Stvar",
title = "Privatno, javno i zajedničko",
pages = "165-173"
}

Svrhovitost, harmonija, sensus communis i orijentacija

Jovanov, Rastko; Cvejić, Igor

(2013)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/910
AB  - In dem ersten Teil dieses Texts wird zuerst eine Analyse von Kants Begriffen des Zweckmäßigkeit und Harmonie und ihren Verhältnisse miteinander, so wie mit dem Gefühl der Lust, unternommen werden. Diese Analyse wird mit Bezug auf Shaftesbury Ansicht auf die, heutige sogenannte, „Affektionen zweiter Ordnung“ und ihre Bedeutung in der sozialen und politischen Philosophie betrachten werden. Abschließend dieser erste Teil beschäftigt sich mit Kants Konzeption der sensus communis, und versucht einige seiner Besonderheiten hinzuweisen, die ermöglichen, sensus communis nicht als eine empirische Tatsache anzunehmen. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird versucht werden, die Position der sensus communis in Kants politische – Philosophie und – Situation hinzuweisen, und einige Auswirkungen, die daraus abgeleitet werden könnten.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - Svrhovitost, harmonija, sensus communis i orijentacija
T1  - Zweckmäßigkeit, Harmonie, sensus communis und Orientierung
SP  - 34
EP  - 51
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2013",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/910",
abstract = "In dem ersten Teil dieses Texts wird zuerst eine Analyse von Kants Begriffen des Zweckmäßigkeit und Harmonie und ihren Verhältnisse miteinander, so wie mit dem Gefühl der Lust, unternommen werden. Diese Analyse wird mit Bezug auf Shaftesbury Ansicht auf die, heutige sogenannte, „Affektionen zweiter Ordnung“ und ihre Bedeutung in der sozialen und politischen Philosophie betrachten werden. Abschließend dieser erste Teil beschäftigt sich mit Kants Konzeption der sensus communis, und versucht einige seiner Besonderheiten hinzuweisen, die ermöglichen, sensus communis nicht als eine empirische Tatsache anzunehmen. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird versucht werden, die Position der sensus communis in Kants politische – Philosophie und – Situation hinzuweisen, und einige Auswirkungen, die daraus abgeleitet werden könnten.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Svrhovitost, harmonija, sensus communis i orijentacija, Zweckmäßigkeit, Harmonie, sensus communis und Orientierung",
pages = "34-51"
}

Emotionen und Normen in der Diskussion über moralische Verbesserung

Cvejić, Igor

(2013)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1178
C3  - Bioethik – Recht – Technik
T1  - Emotionen und Normen in der Diskussion über moralische Verbesserung
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2013",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1178",
journal = "Bioethik – Recht – Technik",
title = "Emotionen und Normen in der Diskussion über moralische Verbesserung"
}

Marx and Nietzsche: The Critical Revaluation of History

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(2013)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1751
C3  - Philosophical Approaches to History (ELTE Budapest)
T1  - Marx and Nietzsche: The Critical Revaluation of History
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2013",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1751",
journal = "Philosophical Approaches to History (ELTE Budapest)",
title = "Marx and Nietzsche: The Critical Revaluation of History"
}

Ästhetik der Schuld

Filozofski fakultet Banja Luka; Institut für Philosophie Darmstadt; Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju Beograd; Cvejić, Igor

(2013)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1122
C3  - Erörterung grundlegender Fragen zum Verhältnis von Biopolitik und Institutionen
T1  - Ästhetik der Schuld
ER  - 
@conference{
editor = "Filozofski fakultet Banja Luka; Institut für Philosophie Darmstadt; Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju Beograd",
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2013",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1122",
journal = "Erörterung grundlegender Fragen zum Verhältnis von Biopolitik und Institutionen",
title = "Ästhetik der Schuld"
}