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Jovanov, Rastko

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  • Jovanov, Rastko (2)
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Constitutive Justice and Human Rights

Jovanov, Rastko; Velinov, Marija

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2019)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jovanov, Rastko
AU  - Velinov, Marija
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1904478J
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2046
AB  - In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2) introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s legal positivism.
AB  - Da bismo pokazali valjanost ovde predložene koncepcije socijalne ontologije i njene pred-nosti u odnosu na deskriptivne teorije društvene stvarnosti, koje u analizi socijalno-ontološ-kog statusa ljudskih prava nalaze samo pravno shvaćenu normativnost kao prisutnu u druš-tvenoj stvarnosti, na prvom mestu (1) iznosimo Serleovo tumačenje ljudskih prava. Zatim (2), uvodimo metodski pristup i osnovne pojmove našeg socijalno-ontološkog shvatanja i objaš-njavamo strukturu odnosa pravde, zakona, morala, društvenih institucija i kolektivne inten-cionalnosti. Te na kraju (3) pokazujemo na koji način ovde iznesena teorija socijalne ontolo-gije intuitivnije i sa opširnijim argumentima objašnjava ontološki status institucije ljudskih prava od Serlovog pravnog pozitivizma.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - Constitutive Justice and Human Rights
T1  - Konstitutivna pravda i ljudska prava
IS  - 4
VL  - 30
SP  - 478
EP  - 492
DO  - 10.2298//FID1904478J
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Jovanov, Rastko and Velinov, Marija",
year = "2019",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1904478J, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2046",
abstract = "In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2) introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s legal positivism., Da bismo pokazali valjanost ovde predložene koncepcije socijalne ontologije i njene pred-nosti u odnosu na deskriptivne teorije društvene stvarnosti, koje u analizi socijalno-ontološ-kog statusa ljudskih prava nalaze samo pravno shvaćenu normativnost kao prisutnu u druš-tvenoj stvarnosti, na prvom mestu (1) iznosimo Serleovo tumačenje ljudskih prava. Zatim (2), uvodimo metodski pristup i osnovne pojmove našeg socijalno-ontološkog shvatanja i objaš-njavamo strukturu odnosa pravde, zakona, morala, društvenih institucija i kolektivne inten-cionalnosti. Te na kraju (3) pokazujemo na koji način ovde iznesena teorija socijalne ontolo-gije intuitivnije i sa opširnijim argumentima objašnjava ontološki status institucije ljudskih prava od Serlovog pravnog pozitivizma.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Constitutive Justice and Human Rights, Konstitutivna pravda i ljudska prava",
number = "4",
volume = "30",
pages = "478-492",
doi = "10.2298//FID1904478J"
}

Zwischen Philosophie und Staat: Hegels Dialektik der Freiheitsinstitutionalisierung

Jovanov, Rastko

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jovanov, Rastko
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=704
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1971
AB  - Hegel betrachtet in seinem philosophischen System die verschiedenen Bestimmungen der Freiheit; er unterscheidet die subjektive, objektive und absolute Freiheit. In dieser Arbeit wird mich primär die Dialektik der objektiven Freiheit interessieren, die Hegel am Niveau der Staats- und Geschichtsphilosophie einführt, um danach die Problematik der Geschichtlichkeit der objektiven Freiheit auszulegen, und schließlich zu behaupten, dass der Freiheitsbegriff erst am Niveau des absoluten Geistes die Qualität der wahren Geschichtlichkeit bekommt. Damit wird im Denken ein Raum geöffnet um eine These von der dialektischen Spannung, die in der Hegelschen Auffassung der erfüllenden Freiheit in beiden Niveaus seines Systems anwesend ist, aufzustellen: Nämlich, im Staat als Erreichung der konkreten Freiheit innerhalb der Objektivität des Geistes, als auch im scheinbaren a-politischen Freiheitsbegriff in der Sphäre des absoluten Geistes, bzw. der Sphäre des konkreten Denkens, der Sphäre der Philosophie selbst.
AB  - Hegel considers, in his system of philosophy, different specifications of freedom; he distinguishes between subjective, objective and absolute freedom. I am interested, in this paper, primarily in the dialectics of objective freedom, which Hegel introduces in his Philosophy of Law, in order to point out the problematics of the historicity of objective freedom, and to argue that the concept of freedom gains the quality of true historicity only at the level of the absolute spirit. This will allow me to open the space, within my argument, for presenting the thesis about the dialectical gap which is present in Hegel’s understanding of the perfection of freedom at two different levels of his system: in the state as attaining the concreteness of freedom in the domain of the objectivity of the spirit, as well as in the apparently apolitical notion of freedom in the sphere of the absolute spirit, that is, in the sphere of concrete thinking, the sphere of philosophy itself.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - Zwischen Philosophie und Staat: Hegels Dialektik der Freiheitsinstitutionalisierung
IS  - 4
VL  - 29
SP  - 553
EP  - 564
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1804553J
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Jovanov, Rastko",
year = "2018",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=704, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1971",
abstract = "Hegel betrachtet in seinem philosophischen System die verschiedenen Bestimmungen der Freiheit; er unterscheidet die subjektive, objektive und absolute Freiheit. In dieser Arbeit wird mich primär die Dialektik der objektiven Freiheit interessieren, die Hegel am Niveau der Staats- und Geschichtsphilosophie einführt, um danach die Problematik der Geschichtlichkeit der objektiven Freiheit auszulegen, und schließlich zu behaupten, dass der Freiheitsbegriff erst am Niveau des absoluten Geistes die Qualität der wahren Geschichtlichkeit bekommt. Damit wird im Denken ein Raum geöffnet um eine These von der dialektischen Spannung, die in der Hegelschen Auffassung der erfüllenden Freiheit in beiden Niveaus seines Systems anwesend ist, aufzustellen: Nämlich, im Staat als Erreichung der konkreten Freiheit innerhalb der Objektivität des Geistes, als auch im scheinbaren a-politischen Freiheitsbegriff in der Sphäre des absoluten Geistes, bzw. der Sphäre des konkreten Denkens, der Sphäre der Philosophie selbst., Hegel considers, in his system of philosophy, different specifications of freedom; he distinguishes between subjective, objective and absolute freedom. I am interested, in this paper, primarily in the dialectics of objective freedom, which Hegel introduces in his Philosophy of Law, in order to point out the problematics of the historicity of objective freedom, and to argue that the concept of freedom gains the quality of true historicity only at the level of the absolute spirit. This will allow me to open the space, within my argument, for presenting the thesis about the dialectical gap which is present in Hegel’s understanding of the perfection of freedom at two different levels of his system: in the state as attaining the concreteness of freedom in the domain of the objectivity of the spirit, as well as in the apparently apolitical notion of freedom in the sphere of the absolute spirit, that is, in the sphere of concrete thinking, the sphere of philosophy itself.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "Zwischen Philosophie und Staat: Hegels Dialektik der Freiheitsinstitutionalisierung",
number = "4",
volume = "29",
pages = "553-564",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1804553J"
}