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Ferraris, Maurizio

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  • Ferraris, Maurizio (2)
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Author's Bibliography

A brief history of new realism

Ferraris, Maurizio

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ferraris, Maurizio
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=398
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1867
AB  - In this paper I try to sketch a brief history of new realism. Starting from
nineteenth century idealism, I then move on to discuss twentieth century postmodernism,
which, I argue, is the heir of idealism and the theoretical enemy of
new realism. Finally, I offer a reconstruction of how and why contemporary new
realism came into being and propose a few remarks on its future perspectives.
AB  - U ovom tek stu po ku šao sam da ski ci ram krat ku isto ri ju no vog re a li zma. Čla nak
sam za po čeo raz ma tra njem ide a li zma u de vet na e stom ve ku, da bi se pre ba cio
na ras pra vlja nje o post mo der ni zmu u dva de se tom ve ku ko ji je, ka ko tvr dim, nasled
nik ide a li zma i te o rij ski ne pri ja telj no vog re a li zma. Na kra ju sam po ku šao da
re kon stru i šem pro blem ka ko i za što je na stao sa vre me ni no vi re a li zam i dao neko
li ko na po me na o nje go voj bu du ćoj per spek ti vi.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - A brief history of new realism
T1  - Kratka istorija novog realizma
IS  - 3
VL  - 27
SP  - 591
EP  - 609
DO  - 10.2298/FID1603597F
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Ferraris, Maurizio",
year = "2016",
url = "http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=398, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1867",
abstract = "In this paper I try to sketch a brief history of new realism. Starting from
nineteenth century idealism, I then move on to discuss twentieth century postmodernism,
which, I argue, is the heir of idealism and the theoretical enemy of
new realism. Finally, I offer a reconstruction of how and why contemporary new
realism came into being and propose a few remarks on its future perspectives., U ovom tek stu po ku šao sam da ski ci ram krat ku isto ri ju no vog re a li zma. Čla nak
sam za po čeo raz ma tra njem ide a li zma u de vet na e stom ve ku, da bi se pre ba cio
na ras pra vlja nje o post mo der ni zmu u dva de se tom ve ku ko ji je, ka ko tvr dim, nasled
nik ide a li zma i te o rij ski ne pri ja telj no vog re a li zma. Na kra ju sam po ku šao da
re kon stru i šem pro blem ka ko i za što je na stao sa vre me ni no vi re a li zam i dao neko
li ko na po me na o nje go voj bu du ćoj per spek ti vi.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "A brief history of new realism, Kratka istorija novog realizma",
number = "3",
volume = "27",
pages = "591-609",
doi = "10.2298/FID1603597F"
}

Social Ontology : From Intentionality to Documentality

Bojanić, Petar D.; Ferraris, Maurizio; Mladenović, Ivan

(2011)

TY  - CONF
PY  - 2011
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1134
AB  - What keeps society together? According to John Searle is collective intentionality. Since Searle’s 1995 book, we find that idea at the centre of passionate discussions. More recently, in 2005, Maurizio Ferraris has suggested to substitute the notion of collective intentionality with the notion of “documentality”: the basis of social reality is the inscription of acts and the social objects that follow. Instead of the rule X counts as Y in C (which Searle himself acknowledged as flawed in his 2010’s book) we should have the rule Object = Inscribed Act. Social objects are the result of a social act (one that involves at least two persons or a person and a deputed machine), which is characterised by being registered on a piece of paper, in a computer file or even simply in the heads of persons.
Social objects — such as marriages, promises, bets, parties, revolutions and economic crises — fill up our world more than do stones, tress and coconuts, and they are more important for us, given that a good part of our happiness or unhappiness depends on them. Yet we do not always take account of them, and even more rarely do we ask what they are made of, taking them seriously only when we lose our wallet or train ticket, our passport or credit card and we set to searching, paying, phoning, writing e-mails and queuing in all sorts of offices. It is only then that we understand (too late, alas) that social objects are made of inscriptions, whether on paper or on some magnetic support, or even (in the case of the promises we make every day) in people’s heads.
T1  - Social Ontology : From Intentionality to Documentality
ER  - 
@conference{
editor = "Bojanić, Petar D., Ferraris, Maurizio, Mladenović, Ivan",
year = "2011",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1134",
abstract = "What keeps society together? According to John Searle is collective intentionality. Since Searle’s 1995 book, we find that idea at the centre of passionate discussions. More recently, in 2005, Maurizio Ferraris has suggested to substitute the notion of collective intentionality with the notion of “documentality”: the basis of social reality is the inscription of acts and the social objects that follow. Instead of the rule X counts as Y in C (which Searle himself acknowledged as flawed in his 2010’s book) we should have the rule Object = Inscribed Act. Social objects are the result of a social act (one that involves at least two persons or a person and a deputed machine), which is characterised by being registered on a piece of paper, in a computer file or even simply in the heads of persons.
Social objects — such as marriages, promises, bets, parties, revolutions and economic crises — fill up our world more than do stones, tress and coconuts, and they are more important for us, given that a good part of our happiness or unhappiness depends on them. Yet we do not always take account of them, and even more rarely do we ask what they are made of, taking them seriously only when we lose our wallet or train ticket, our passport or credit card and we set to searching, paying, phoning, writing e-mails and queuing in all sorts of offices. It is only then that we understand (too late, alas) that social objects are made of inscriptions, whether on paper or on some magnetic support, or even (in the case of the promises we make every day) in people’s heads.",
title = "Social Ontology : From Intentionality to Documentality"
}