TY  - BOOK
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/248
UR  - https://labont.it/publications/social-objects-from-intentionality-to-documentality/
PB  - Torino : Rosenberg & Sellier
T1  - Social Objects. From Intentionality to Documentality
EP  - 
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_248
ER  - 

@book{
editor = "Bojanić, Petar D., Casetta, Elena, Torrengo , Giuliano",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Torino : Rosenberg & Sellier",
title = "Social Objects. From Intentionality to Documentality",
pages = "",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_248"
}

Bojanić, P. D., Casetta, E.,& Torrengo , G.. (2014). Social Objects. From Intentionality to Documentality. 
Torino : Rosenberg & Sellier..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_248

Bojanić PD, Casetta E, Torrengo  G. Social Objects. From Intentionality to Documentality. 2014;:null-.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_248 .

Bojanić, Petar D., Casetta, Elena, Torrengo , Giuliano, "Social Objects. From Intentionality to Documentality" (2014),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_248 .

TY  - CONF
PY  - 2012
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1099
AB  - Many philosophers think that philosophy should not merely 
rely on a priori reasoning, but that it should take into account 
evidence from experience, including experimental evidence 
from the sciences as well. That seems to be a reasonable 
methodological principle, at least if we accept the existence 
of something like a mind-independent reality. However, 
the ways philosophers consider empirical evidence to 
constrain philosophical tenets vary considerably different 
approaches. On one hand, “classical” empiricists tend to 
be constructionists (and more broadly anti-realists) while 
rationalists have an overall realist approach to theoretical 
tenets. On the other hand, the new trend of “experimental 
philosophy” aims to dismiss a priori reasoning of any sort 
as valuable in assessing philosophical theses. It argues that 
we should test philosophers’ intuitions as hypotheses about 
the behavior of the “ordinary” people. The philosophers 
who oppose that trend tend to grant a special status to the 
intuitions of “experts” even if they do not share an overall 
confidence into a priori theorizing. How should we appraise 
the relevance of empirical evidence in philosophical 
discussions? When is a priori reasoning legitimate? Can we 
regard that evidence based on intuitions has a different 
status from the experimental evidence from the sciences? 
The workshop aims at promoting a discussion about these 
and related topics.
T1  - Empirical Evidence and Philosophy
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1099
ER  - 

@conference{
editor = "Bojanić, Petar D., Torrengo , Giuliano",
year = "2012",
abstract = "Many philosophers think that philosophy should not merely 
rely on a priori reasoning, but that it should take into account 
evidence from experience, including experimental evidence 
from the sciences as well. That seems to be a reasonable 
methodological principle, at least if we accept the existence 
of something like a mind-independent reality. However, 
the ways philosophers consider empirical evidence to 
constrain philosophical tenets vary considerably different 
approaches. On one hand, “classical” empiricists tend to 
be constructionists (and more broadly anti-realists) while 
rationalists have an overall realist approach to theoretical 
tenets. On the other hand, the new trend of “experimental 
philosophy” aims to dismiss a priori reasoning of any sort 
as valuable in assessing philosophical theses. It argues that 
we should test philosophers’ intuitions as hypotheses about 
the behavior of the “ordinary” people. The philosophers 
who oppose that trend tend to grant a special status to the 
intuitions of “experts” even if they do not share an overall 
confidence into a priori theorizing. How should we appraise 
the relevance of empirical evidence in philosophical 
discussions? When is a priori reasoning legitimate? Can we 
regard that evidence based on intuitions has a different 
status from the experimental evidence from the sciences? 
The workshop aims at promoting a discussion about these 
and related topics.",
title = "Empirical Evidence and Philosophy",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1099"
}

Bojanić, P. D.,& Torrengo , G.. (2012). Empirical Evidence and Philosophy. .
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1099

Bojanić PD, Torrengo  G. Empirical Evidence and Philosophy. 2012;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1099 .

Bojanić, Petar D., Torrengo , Giuliano, "Empirical Evidence and Philosophy" (2012),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1099 .