Mijić, Jelena

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The Advantages of Neomoorean Antiskeptical Strategy

Mijić, Jelena

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mijić, Jelena
PY  - 2020
UR  - https://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/fid/article/view/925/740
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2132
AB  - This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies – namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick’s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose’s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses’ contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called “abominable conjunction”. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose’s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick’s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black’s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.
AB  - Cilj ovog rada je da pruži podršku neomurovskom rešenju skeptičkog paradoksa. Branićemo tezu da ovakva epistemološka pozicija zadržava prednosti i izbegava nedostatke rivalskih antiskeptičkih pozicija, pre svega epistemičkog kontekstualizma. Radi ilustracije problema koji skeptik postavlja pred nas, pozivamo se na Nozikov poznati primer „mozga u posudi“ koji omogućava formulisanje valjanih argumenata koji se sastoje od međusobno nekonzistentnih, ali nezavisno plauzibilnih premisa. Prvi i drugi deo rada biće posvećeni Nozikovoj, i Dirouzo-voj teoriji znanja baziranim na principu osetljivosti. Pozivajući se na Dirouzov epistemički kontekstualizam, pokazaćemo da neuspeh Nozikove kondicionalne analize znanja u pružanju zadovoljavajućeg odgovora na skeptički paradoks nije posledica njene zasnovanosti na prin-cipu osetljivosti, već odbacivanja principa deduktivne zatvorenosti i usvajanja takozvane „nepodnošljive konjunkcije“. Treći deo biće posvećen ukazivanju na slabosti po pretpostavci najuspešnijeg, kontekstualističkog odgovora na paradoks. Pokazaćemo da iako Dirouz pre-vazilazi prepreke Nozikove teorije na kojoj je jednim delom sama njegova teorija izgrađena, kontekstualista pravi svojevrsne ustupke radikalnom skeptiku. Na kraju uvodimo Blekovo neomurovsko stanovište bazirano na principu osetljivosti, kao ono koje ne pravi ustupke, niti kontraintuitivne predloge.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - The Advantages of Neomoorean Antiskeptical Strategy
T1  - Prednosti neomurovske antiskeptičke strategije
IS  - 4
VL  - 31
SP  - 615
EP  - 628
DO  - 10.2298/FID2004615M
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Mijić, Jelena",
year = "2020",
url = "https://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/fid/article/view/925/740, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2132",
abstract = "This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies – namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick’s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose’s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses’ contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called “abominable conjunction”. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose’s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick’s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black’s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals., Cilj ovog rada je da pruži podršku neomurovskom rešenju skeptičkog paradoksa. Branićemo tezu da ovakva epistemološka pozicija zadržava prednosti i izbegava nedostatke rivalskih antiskeptičkih pozicija, pre svega epistemičkog kontekstualizma. Radi ilustracije problema koji skeptik postavlja pred nas, pozivamo se na Nozikov poznati primer „mozga u posudi“ koji omogućava formulisanje valjanih argumenata koji se sastoje od međusobno nekonzistentnih, ali nezavisno plauzibilnih premisa. Prvi i drugi deo rada biće posvećeni Nozikovoj, i Dirouzo-voj teoriji znanja baziranim na principu osetljivosti. Pozivajući se na Dirouzov epistemički kontekstualizam, pokazaćemo da neuspeh Nozikove kondicionalne analize znanja u pružanju zadovoljavajućeg odgovora na skeptički paradoks nije posledica njene zasnovanosti na prin-cipu osetljivosti, već odbacivanja principa deduktivne zatvorenosti i usvajanja takozvane „nepodnošljive konjunkcije“. Treći deo biće posvećen ukazivanju na slabosti po pretpostavci najuspešnijeg, kontekstualističkog odgovora na paradoks. Pokazaćemo da iako Dirouz pre-vazilazi prepreke Nozikove teorije na kojoj je jednim delom sama njegova teorija izgrađena, kontekstualista pravi svojevrsne ustupke radikalnom skeptiku. Na kraju uvodimo Blekovo neomurovsko stanovište bazirano na principu osetljivosti, kao ono koje ne pravi ustupke, niti kontraintuitivne predloge.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "The Advantages of Neomoorean Antiskeptical Strategy, Prednosti neomurovske antiskeptičke strategije",
number = "4",
volume = "31",
pages = "615-628",
doi = "10.2298/FID2004615M"
}
Mijić, J. (2020). Prednosti neomurovske antiskeptičke strategije.
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 31(4), 615-628.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2004615M
Mijić J. Prednosti neomurovske antiskeptičke strategije. Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2020;31(4):615-628
Mijić Jelena, "Prednosti neomurovske antiskeptičke strategije" Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 31, no. 4 (2020):615-628,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2004615M .

Feministička epistemologija: "Kćerke Kvajna"

Jovanov, Rastko; Mijić, Jelena

(2013)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mijić, Jelena
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/976
AB  - Feminist epistemology implies an approach to the theory of knowledge, which in its centre sets up feminist issues. The paper analyzes a recent course in the area dealing with feminist epistemology, namely feminist empiricism. Unlike other feminists engaged in epistemology, their goal is to keep the basic concepts of the analytic tradition, but considered in the light of feminist interests. Starting from Quine’s naturalized epistemology, feminist empiricists are introducing different concepts of knowledge and the nature of the knowers, creating a new perspective on the relationship of sociopolitical values and scientific research. The feminist empiricist’s advantage over feminist epistemology approaches outside the analytical framework is precisely in accepting the naturalistic and empiricist approach to gender biases. The aim is to evaluate how successful they are in achieving their ideas, and whether such an approach is acceptable.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Feministička epistemologija: "Kćerke Kvajna"
T1  - Feminist Epistemology: “Daughters of Quine”
SP  - 156
EP  - 176
DO  - 10.2298/FID1303156M
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Mijić, Jelena",
year = "2013",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/976",
abstract = "Feminist epistemology implies an approach to the theory of knowledge, which in its centre sets up feminist issues. The paper analyzes a recent course in the area dealing with feminist epistemology, namely feminist empiricism. Unlike other feminists engaged in epistemology, their goal is to keep the basic concepts of the analytic tradition, but considered in the light of feminist interests. Starting from Quine’s naturalized epistemology, feminist empiricists are introducing different concepts of knowledge and the nature of the knowers, creating a new perspective on the relationship of sociopolitical values and scientific research. The feminist empiricist’s advantage over feminist epistemology approaches outside the analytical framework is precisely in accepting the naturalistic and empiricist approach to gender biases. The aim is to evaluate how successful they are in achieving their ideas, and whether such an approach is acceptable.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Feministička epistemologija: "Kćerke Kvajna", Feminist Epistemology: “Daughters of Quine”",
pages = "156-176",
doi = "10.2298/FID1303156M"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Mijić, J. (2013). Feminist Epistemology: “Daughters of Quine”.
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 156-176.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1303156M
Jovanov R, Mijić J. Feminist Epistemology: “Daughters of Quine”. Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2013;:156-176
Jovanov Rastko, Mijić Jelena, "Feminist Epistemology: “Daughters of Quine”" Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2013):156-176,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1303156M .