TY  - JOUR
AU  - Zubčić, Marko-Luka
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID2001043Z
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2066
AB  - In this paper I argue that social epistemic inequalities, exemplified by expert structures and their introduction into various social and political processes, may be a collective epistemic virtue only if they are discovered under the conditions of free possibility of redundant disagreement. In the first part of the paper, following Snježana Prijić Samaržija’s work in Democracy and Truth, I explicate the epistemic value of social epistemic inequalities, and address the epistemic defectiveness of both the complete social disregard for any expertize (flat epistemology) and the rule of experts. In the second part of the paper, I argue that social epistemic inequalities governing a large and complex population of epistemically suboptimal agents may be a collective epistemic virtue, reflective of discovery of epistemically reliable processes, if they can be contested and, in principle, withstand redundant disagreement.
AB  - Centralna teza ovog članka je da društvene epistemičke nejednakosti, oprimerene stručnjačkim strukturama i njihovim uključivanjem u razne društvene i političke procese, mogu biti kolektivne epistemičke vrline samo ako su otkrivene pod uslovima slobodne mogućnosti suvišnog neslaganja. U prvom dijelu članka, slijedeći rad Snježane Prijić Samaržije u Democracy and Truth, ekspliciram epistemičku vrednost društvenih epistemičkih nejednakosti te pritom poseban fokus posvećujem razradi teze jednake epistemičke defektivnosti vladavine stručnjaka i potpunog društvenog neuvažavanja bilo kakve ekspertize (tzv. flat epistemologija). U drugom delu članka argumentiram da društvene epistemičke nejednakosti u kontekstu upravljanja velikom i kompleksnom populacijom epistemički suboptimalnih agenata mogu biti kolektivna epistemička vrlina, koja reflektuje otkrivanje epistemički pouzdanih procesa, tek ako te nejednakosti mogu biti izazvane i, u principu, „preživljavaju“ suvišno neslaganje.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Social Epistemic Inequalities, Redundancy and Epistemic Reliability in Governance
T1  - Društvene epistemičke nejednakosti, redundantnost i epistemička pouzdanost u upravljanju
IS  - 1
VL  - 31
SP  - 43
EP  - 55
DO  - 10.2298/FID2001043Z
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Zubčić, Marko-Luka",
year = "2020",
abstract = "In this paper I argue that social epistemic inequalities, exemplified by expert structures and their introduction into various social and political processes, may be a collective epistemic virtue only if they are discovered under the conditions of free possibility of redundant disagreement. In the first part of the paper, following Snježana Prijić Samaržija’s work in Democracy and Truth, I explicate the epistemic value of social epistemic inequalities, and address the epistemic defectiveness of both the complete social disregard for any expertize (flat epistemology) and the rule of experts. In the second part of the paper, I argue that social epistemic inequalities governing a large and complex population of epistemically suboptimal agents may be a collective epistemic virtue, reflective of discovery of epistemically reliable processes, if they can be contested and, in principle, withstand redundant disagreement., Centralna teza ovog članka je da društvene epistemičke nejednakosti, oprimerene stručnjačkim strukturama i njihovim uključivanjem u razne društvene i političke procese, mogu biti kolektivne epistemičke vrline samo ako su otkrivene pod uslovima slobodne mogućnosti suvišnog neslaganja. U prvom dijelu članka, slijedeći rad Snježane Prijić Samaržije u Democracy and Truth, ekspliciram epistemičku vrednost društvenih epistemičkih nejednakosti te pritom poseban fokus posvećujem razradi teze jednake epistemičke defektivnosti vladavine stručnjaka i potpunog društvenog neuvažavanja bilo kakve ekspertize (tzv. flat epistemologija). U drugom delu članka argumentiram da društvene epistemičke nejednakosti u kontekstu upravljanja velikom i kompleksnom populacijom epistemički suboptimalnih agenata mogu biti kolektivna epistemička vrlina, koja reflektuje otkrivanje epistemički pouzdanih procesa, tek ako te nejednakosti mogu biti izazvane i, u principu, „preživljavaju“ suvišno neslaganje.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Social Epistemic Inequalities, Redundancy and Epistemic Reliability in Governance, Društvene epistemičke nejednakosti, redundantnost i epistemička pouzdanost u upravljanju",
number = "1",
volume = "31",
pages = "43-55",
doi = "10.2298/FID2001043Z"
}

Zubčić, M.. (2020). Social Epistemic Inequalities, Redundancy and Epistemic Reliability in Governance. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 31(1), 43-55.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001043Z

Zubčić M. Social Epistemic Inequalities, Redundancy and Epistemic Reliability in Governance. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2020;31(1):43-55.
doi:10.2298/FID2001043Z .

Zubčić, Marko-Luka, "Social Epistemic Inequalities, Redundancy and Epistemic Reliability in Governance" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 31, no. 1 (2020):43-55,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001043Z . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Zubčić, Marko Luka
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2029
AB  - Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.
AB  - Koja epistemološka vrednost je standard prema kome se trebaju upoređivati, procenjivati i
dizajnirati institucionalna uređenja s obzirom na njihova epistemološka svojstava? Dve klasične
opcije su razvoj agenata (u smislu individualnih epistemoloških vrlina ili sposobnosti) i
dostizanje istine. Opcije su predstavljene kroz dva autoritativna savremena iskaza – razvoj
agenata kroz rad Roberta Telisija u Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009), te dostizanje istine
kroz rad Dejvida Istlunda, najistaknutije u Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
(2008). Ovaj članak pokazuje da su obe opcije nezadovoljavajuće jer su podložne problematičnom
riziku “zaglavljivanja” u suboptimalnom epistemološkom stanju. Članak argumentuje
da je sposobnost sistema da revidira suboptimalna epistemološka stanja najbolja opcija za
komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology
T1  - Komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji
IS  - 3
VL  - 30
SP  - 418
EP  - 430
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Zubčić, Marko Luka",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology., Koja epistemološka vrednost je standard prema kome se trebaju upoređivati, procenjivati i
dizajnirati institucionalna uređenja s obzirom na njihova epistemološka svojstava? Dve klasične
opcije su razvoj agenata (u smislu individualnih epistemoloških vrlina ili sposobnosti) i
dostizanje istine. Opcije su predstavljene kroz dva autoritativna savremena iskaza – razvoj
agenata kroz rad Roberta Telisija u Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009), te dostizanje istine
kroz rad Dejvida Istlunda, najistaknutije u Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
(2008). Ovaj članak pokazuje da su obe opcije nezadovoljavajuće jer su podložne problematičnom
riziku “zaglavljivanja” u suboptimalnom epistemološkom stanju. Članak argumentuje
da je sposobnost sistema da revidira suboptimalna epistemološka stanja najbolja opcija za
komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology, Komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji",
number = "3",
volume = "30",
pages = "418-430",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029"
}

Zubčić, M. L.. (2019). Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 30(3), 418-430.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029

Zubčić ML. Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2019;30(3):418-430.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029 .

Zubčić, Marko Luka, "Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 30, no. 3 (2019):418-430,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029 .