TY  - JOUR
AU  - Radenović, Ljiljana
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/30
AB  - In the last several decades a number of studies on perceptual
learning in early infancy have suggested that even infants seem to be sensitive
to the way objects move and interact in the world. In order to explain the
early emergence of infants’ sensitivity to causal patterns in the world some
psychologists have proposed that core knowledge of objects and causal relations
is innate (Leslie & Keeble 1987, Carey & Spelke, 1994; Keil, 1995; Spelke
et al., 1994). The goal of this paper is to examine the nativist developmental
model by investigating the criteria that a mechanistic model needs to fulfill
if it is to be explanatory. Craver (2006) put forth a number of such criteria
and developed a few very useful distinctions between explanation sketches
and proper mechanistic explanations. By applying these criteria to the nativist
developmental model I aim to show, firstly, that nativists only partially
characterize the phenomenon at stake without giving us the details of when
and under which conditions perception and attention in early infancy take
place. Secondly, nativist start off with a description of the phenomena to be
explained (even if it is only a partial description) but import into it a particular
theory of perception that requires further empirical evidence and further
defense on its own. Furthermore, I argue that innate knowledge is a good
candidate for a filler term (a term that is used to name the still unknown
processes and parts of the mechanism) and is likely to become redundant.
Recent extensive research on early intermodal perception indicates that the
mechanism enabling the perception of regularities and causal patterns in
early infancy is grounded in our neurophysiology. However, this mechanism
is fairly basic and does not involve highly sophisticated cognitive structures
or innate core knowledge. I conclude with a remark that a closer examination
of the mechanisms involved in early perceptual learning indicates that
the nativism / empiricism debate (as usually construed in developmental literature)
is wrong headed and should be closed.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models. Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model
T1  - Objašnjenja, mehanizmi i razvojni modeli. Zašto nativistički model nije dobar mehanicistički model
SP  - 161
EP  - 180
DO  - 10.2298/FID1304161R
ER  - 

@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Radenović, Ljiljana",
year = "2013",
abstract = "In the last several decades a number of studies on perceptual
learning in early infancy have suggested that even infants seem to be sensitive
to the way objects move and interact in the world. In order to explain the
early emergence of infants’ sensitivity to causal patterns in the world some
psychologists have proposed that core knowledge of objects and causal relations
is innate (Leslie & Keeble 1987, Carey & Spelke, 1994; Keil, 1995; Spelke
et al., 1994). The goal of this paper is to examine the nativist developmental
model by investigating the criteria that a mechanistic model needs to fulfill
if it is to be explanatory. Craver (2006) put forth a number of such criteria
and developed a few very useful distinctions between explanation sketches
and proper mechanistic explanations. By applying these criteria to the nativist
developmental model I aim to show, firstly, that nativists only partially
characterize the phenomenon at stake without giving us the details of when
and under which conditions perception and attention in early infancy take
place. Secondly, nativist start off with a description of the phenomena to be
explained (even if it is only a partial description) but import into it a particular
theory of perception that requires further empirical evidence and further
defense on its own. Furthermore, I argue that innate knowledge is a good
candidate for a filler term (a term that is used to name the still unknown
processes and parts of the mechanism) and is likely to become redundant.
Recent extensive research on early intermodal perception indicates that the
mechanism enabling the perception of regularities and causal patterns in
early infancy is grounded in our neurophysiology. However, this mechanism
is fairly basic and does not involve highly sophisticated cognitive structures
or innate core knowledge. I conclude with a remark that a closer examination
of the mechanisms involved in early perceptual learning indicates that
the nativism / empiricism debate (as usually construed in developmental literature)
is wrong headed and should be closed.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models. Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model, Objašnjenja, mehanizmi i razvojni modeli. Zašto nativistički model nije dobar mehanicistički model",
pages = "161-180",
doi = "10.2298/FID1304161R"
}

Jovanov, R.,& Radenović, L.. (2013). Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models. Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 161-180.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304161R

Jovanov R, Radenović L. Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models. Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2013;:161-180.
doi:10.2298/FID1304161R .

Jovanov, Rastko, Radenović, Ljiljana, "Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models. Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society (2013):161-180,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304161R . .