Sort By
Publication Year
Deposit Date
Title
Type
Access
Publication Year
2018 (1)
2017 (1)
2016 (2)
Version
Access

Milidrag, Predrag

Link to this page

Authority KeyName Variants
881db180-fee6-4f90-92d6-13bfe537f206
  • Milidrag, Predrag (4)
Projects

Author's Bibliography

Suárezove večne istine i Descartesova Treća meditacija

Milidrag, Predrag

(Zagreb : Filozofsko teološki institut Družbe Isusove, 2018)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Milidrag, Predrag
PY  - 2018
UR  - https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=295187
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1559
AB  - U prvom delu rada izlaže se Suárezovo razumevanje večnih istina. Tri su momenta relevantna za tumačenje Descartesa: hipotetička nužnost večnih istina, uloga delotvornog uzrokovanja i večne istine o bićima razuma. U drugom delu teksta brani se teza da 16. pasus Treće meditacije (AT VII 42) sadrži dve suarezijanske večne istine i da obe tvrde da Bog postoji. Između ostalog, to vodi zaključku da ovaj pasus Treće meditacije zapravo sadrži Dekartovu nestvorenu večnu istinu o egzistenciji Boga (AT I 150).
AB  - The article analyzes Suárez’s understanding of the eternal truths in his 31st Disputation,
in regard to the status of creatures in the divine mind and the role of efficient
causality. Three points are relevant for an interpretation of Descartes: for Suárez,
the eternal truths regarding the essences of creatures express a hypothetical necessity
concerning real existence; it is impossible to adequately understand these essences
apart from their actual or possible efficient cause; there are eternal truths about entia
rationis that express nothing concerning real existence. Part two of the article defends
the thesis that Paragraph 16 of the Third Meditation (AT VII 42) contains two Suarezian
eternal truths and that from both of these it follows that God exists: from “it
could be demonstrated that there exists in the world something apart from myself,”
it follows that God exists, and from “it cannot be demonstrated that there exists in
the world something apart from myself” it also follows that God exists, i.e. myself.
Hence, paragraphs 17–22 of the Meditation do not contribute to the proof of God’s
existence, but they do prove that the subject itself of the Meditations is not God. All
of the above leads to the conclusion that paragraph 16 of the Third Meditation in fact
contains Descartes’ uncreated eternal truth about the existence of God (AT I 150).
PB  - Zagreb : Filozofsko teološki institut Družbe Isusove
C3  - Obnovljeni život
T1  - Suárezove večne istine i Descartesova Treća meditacija
IS  - 2
VL  - 73
SP  - 11
EP  - 23
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Milidrag, Predrag",
year = "2018",
url = "https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=295187, http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1559",
abstract = "U prvom delu rada izlaže se Suárezovo razumevanje večnih istina. Tri su momenta relevantna za tumačenje Descartesa: hipotetička nužnost večnih istina, uloga delotvornog uzrokovanja i večne istine o bićima razuma. U drugom delu teksta brani se teza da 16. pasus Treće meditacije (AT VII 42) sadrži dve suarezijanske večne istine i da obe tvrde da Bog postoji. Između ostalog, to vodi zaključku da ovaj pasus Treće meditacije zapravo sadrži Dekartovu nestvorenu večnu istinu o egzistenciji Boga (AT I 150)., The article analyzes Suárez’s understanding of the eternal truths in his 31st Disputation,
in regard to the status of creatures in the divine mind and the role of efficient
causality. Three points are relevant for an interpretation of Descartes: for Suárez,
the eternal truths regarding the essences of creatures express a hypothetical necessity
concerning real existence; it is impossible to adequately understand these essences
apart from their actual or possible efficient cause; there are eternal truths about entia
rationis that express nothing concerning real existence. Part two of the article defends
the thesis that Paragraph 16 of the Third Meditation (AT VII 42) contains two Suarezian
eternal truths and that from both of these it follows that God exists: from “it
could be demonstrated that there exists in the world something apart from myself,”
it follows that God exists, and from “it cannot be demonstrated that there exists in
the world something apart from myself” it also follows that God exists, i.e. myself.
Hence, paragraphs 17–22 of the Meditation do not contribute to the proof of God’s
existence, but they do prove that the subject itself of the Meditations is not God. All
of the above leads to the conclusion that paragraph 16 of the Third Meditation in fact
contains Descartes’ uncreated eternal truth about the existence of God (AT I 150).",
publisher = "Zagreb : Filozofsko teološki institut Družbe Isusove",
journal = "Obnovljeni život",
title = "Suárezove večne istine i Descartesova Treća meditacija",
number = "2",
volume = "73",
pages = "11-23"
}
Milidrag, P. (2018). Suárezove večne istine i Descartesova Treća meditacija.
Obnovljeni životZagreb : Filozofsko teološki institut Družbe Isusove., 73(2), 11-23.
Milidrag P. Suárezove večne istine i Descartesova Treća meditacija. Obnovljeni život. 2018;73(2):11-23
Milidrag Predrag, "Suárezove večne istine i Descartesova Treća meditacija" 73, no. 2 (2018):11-23

Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog

Milidrag, Predrag

(Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milidrag, Predrag
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1484
AB  - Tekst analizira problem dodavanja konceptu bića (ens) kod Tome Akvinskog. U prvom delu teksta razmotrena je nemogućnost dodavanja božanskom biću, a drugi se bavi odsustvom dodavanja u zajedničkom biću (ens commune). Dok božansko bivstvovanje nije u stanju da primi nikakva dodatna određenja, zajedničko bivstvovanje aktualno ne sadrži dodatna određenja, ali jeste u stanju da ih primi. U tom kontekstu, ističe se razlika između dodavanja rodnim pojmovima i dodavanja zajedničkom biću. U trećem delu teksta tumači se De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 i pokazuje da je zajedničko biće u stanju da primi dodatak ili na način kontrahovanja nečim realnim na determinatum modum essendi ili na način izražavanja savršenstava koja nisu eksplicitno iskazana rečju biće. Prvo su kategorije, drugo su transcendentalije.
AB  - The article analyzes the problem of addition to the concept of being (ens) in Thomas Aquinas. The first part analyzes the impossibility of addition to divine being, and the second one is dedicated to the lack of addition in common being (ens commune). Divine being cannot receive any further determinations, common being does not contain any further determinations, but it can receive it. In that context, the difference between adding to generic notions and adding to common being is highlighted. In the third part the De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 is interpreted and it is shown that common being is capable of receiving additions either as a contration of something real to the determinatum modum essendi, or as an expression of the prerfections that are not explicitly contained in being. The first additions are the categories, the second ones are transcendentals.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog
IS  - 1
VL  - 63
SP  - 110
EP  - 130
DO  - 10.2298/THEO1701110M
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Milidrag, Predrag",
year = "2017",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1484",
abstract = "Tekst analizira problem dodavanja konceptu bića (ens) kod Tome Akvinskog. U prvom delu teksta razmotrena je nemogućnost dodavanja božanskom biću, a drugi se bavi odsustvom dodavanja u zajedničkom biću (ens commune). Dok božansko bivstvovanje nije u stanju da primi nikakva dodatna određenja, zajedničko bivstvovanje aktualno ne sadrži dodatna određenja, ali jeste u stanju da ih primi. U tom kontekstu, ističe se razlika između dodavanja rodnim pojmovima i dodavanja zajedničkom biću. U trećem delu teksta tumači se De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 i pokazuje da je zajedničko biće u stanju da primi dodatak ili na način kontrahovanja nečim realnim na determinatum modum essendi ili na način izražavanja savršenstava koja nisu eksplicitno iskazana rečju biće. Prvo su kategorije, drugo su transcendentalije., The article analyzes the problem of addition to the concept of being (ens) in Thomas Aquinas. The first part analyzes the impossibility of addition to divine being, and the second one is dedicated to the lack of addition in common being (ens commune). Divine being cannot receive any further determinations, common being does not contain any further determinations, but it can receive it. In that context, the difference between adding to generic notions and adding to common being is highlighted. In the third part the De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 is interpreted and it is shown that common being is capable of receiving additions either as a contration of something real to the determinatum modum essendi, or as an expression of the prerfections that are not explicitly contained in being. The first additions are the categories, the second ones are transcendentals.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
pages = "110-130",
doi = "10.2298/THEO1701110M"
}
Milidrag, P. (2017). Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog.
TheoriaBeograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 63(1), 110-130.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1701110M
Milidrag P. Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog. Theoria. 2017;63(1):110-130
Milidrag Predrag, "Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog" 63, no. 1 (2017):110-130,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1701110M .

Toma Akvinski o predmetu metafizike

Milidrag, Predrag

(Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo, 2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milidrag, Predrag
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1487
AB  - U tekstu se analizira pojam predmeta metafizike kod Tome Akvinskog kako ga je ovaj izložio u Predgovoru za Komentar Aristotelove Metafizike i u petom pitanju Komentara Boetijevog spisa O Trojstvu. U tom kontekstu razmatra se Tomino tumačenje aristotelovske formule ens inquantum ens, odnos Boga i ens commune, nematerijalnost zajedničkog bića i razlika između metafizike i druge dve teorijske nauke, fizike i matematike, kao i razlika između filozofske teologije i hrišćanske teologije.
AB  - The article analyzes the concept of the subject of the metaphysics in Aquinas's Proem. of the Commentary on the Metaphysics and in question five of the Exposition of the De Trinitate by Boethius. Aquinas's interpretation of the Aristotelian formula ens inquantum ens is analysed, as well as the relation between God and ens commune, immateriality of common being and the difference among metaphysics and the other two speculative sciences, physics and mathematics.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Toma Akvinski o predmetu metafizike
IS  - 1
VL  - 58
SP  - 42
EP  - 58
DO  - 10.2298/THEO1601037M
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Milidrag, Predrag",
year = "2016",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1487",
abstract = "U tekstu se analizira pojam predmeta metafizike kod Tome Akvinskog kako ga je ovaj izložio u Predgovoru za Komentar Aristotelove Metafizike i u petom pitanju Komentara Boetijevog spisa O Trojstvu. U tom kontekstu razmatra se Tomino tumačenje aristotelovske formule ens inquantum ens, odnos Boga i ens commune, nematerijalnost zajedničkog bića i razlika između metafizike i druge dve teorijske nauke, fizike i matematike, kao i razlika između filozofske teologije i hrišćanske teologije., The article analyzes the concept of the subject of the metaphysics in Aquinas's Proem. of the Commentary on the Metaphysics and in question five of the Exposition of the De Trinitate by Boethius. Aquinas's interpretation of the Aristotelian formula ens inquantum ens is analysed, as well as the relation between God and ens commune, immateriality of common being and the difference among metaphysics and the other two speculative sciences, physics and mathematics.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Toma Akvinski o predmetu metafizike",
number = "1",
volume = "58",
pages = "42-58",
doi = "10.2298/THEO1601037M"
}
Milidrag, P. (2016). Toma Akvinski o predmetu metafizike.
TheoriaBeograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 58(1), 42-58.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1601037M
Milidrag P. Toma Akvinski o predmetu metafizike. Theoria. 2016;58(1):42-58
Milidrag Predrag, "Toma Akvinski o predmetu metafizike" 58, no. 1 (2016):42-58,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1601037M .

Neo i agent Smit kao svetskoistorijske ličnosti trilogije Matriks

Milidrag, Predrag

(2016)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Milidrag, Predrag
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1490
AB  - U članku se filmska trilogija Matriks tumači na zaleđu Hegelove filozofije istorije. U prvom delu analizira se lik Nea i pokazuje da se na izbor koji pred njega postavlja Arhitekta ne mogu primeniti Kantova moralna načela, ali može Hegelovo objašnjenje uloge strasti u svestskoistorijskim pojedincima. U drugom delu pokazuje se da je lik Agenta Smita objašnjiv prisustvom hegelovskog svetskog duha koji upravlja istorijom, u filmu to je splet Arhitekta-Proročica. Treći deo otkriva hegelovski proces napretka svesti o slobodi kroz preobražaj pojma slobode kod Nea i spleta Arhitekta-Proročica što vodi hegelovskom priznanju prava ljudi na slobodu. Na drugoj strani je Agent Smit kod koga nema takvog procesa i koji zato na kraju biva uništen.
AB  - The article interprets The Matrix film trilogy against the background of Hegel’s philosophy of history. The first part analyzes the character of Neo and shows that it is impossible to apply the Kantian moral principles on the choice that before Neo is posed by Architect; nevetheless, it is possible to apply Hegel's explanation of the role of passion in the world historical individuals. In the second part it is shown that the character of Agent Smith could be explained by the presence of the Hegelian world spirit that manages history; in the film it is the plexus Architect-Oracle. The third part reveals the Hegelian process of progress of the awareness of freedom through the transformation of the concept of freedom in Neo and in plexus Architect-Oracle. That leads to the Hegelian recognition (from the Phenomenology of Spirit) of the rights of people to freedom.
C3  - Zbornik radova sa X međunarodnog naučnog skupa Srpski jezik, književnost, umetnost
T1  - Neo i agent Smit kao svetskoistorijske ličnosti trilogije Matriks
VL  - 2
SP  - 581
EP  - 590
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Milidrag, Predrag",
year = "2016",
url = "http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1490",
abstract = "U članku se filmska trilogija Matriks tumači na zaleđu Hegelove filozofije istorije. U prvom delu analizira se lik Nea i pokazuje da se na izbor koji pred njega postavlja Arhitekta ne mogu primeniti Kantova moralna načela, ali može Hegelovo objašnjenje uloge strasti u svestskoistorijskim pojedincima. U drugom delu pokazuje se da je lik Agenta Smita objašnjiv prisustvom hegelovskog svetskog duha koji upravlja istorijom, u filmu to je splet Arhitekta-Proročica. Treći deo otkriva hegelovski proces napretka svesti o slobodi kroz preobražaj pojma slobode kod Nea i spleta Arhitekta-Proročica što vodi hegelovskom priznanju prava ljudi na slobodu. Na drugoj strani je Agent Smit kod koga nema takvog procesa i koji zato na kraju biva uništen., The article interprets The Matrix film trilogy against the background of Hegel’s philosophy of history. The first part analyzes the character of Neo and shows that it is impossible to apply the Kantian moral principles on the choice that before Neo is posed by Architect; nevetheless, it is possible to apply Hegel's explanation of the role of passion in the world historical individuals. In the second part it is shown that the character of Agent Smith could be explained by the presence of the Hegelian world spirit that manages history; in the film it is the plexus Architect-Oracle. The third part reveals the Hegelian process of progress of the awareness of freedom through the transformation of the concept of freedom in Neo and in plexus Architect-Oracle. That leads to the Hegelian recognition (from the Phenomenology of Spirit) of the rights of people to freedom.",
journal = "Zbornik radova sa X međunarodnog naučnog skupa Srpski jezik, književnost, umetnost",
title = "Neo i agent Smit kao svetskoistorijske ličnosti trilogije Matriks",
volume = "2",
pages = "581-590"
}
Milidrag, P. (2016). Neo i agent Smit kao svetskoistorijske ličnosti trilogije Matriks.
Zbornik radova sa X međunarodnog naučnog skupa Srpski jezik, književnost, umetnost, 2, 581-590.
Milidrag P. Neo i agent Smit kao svetskoistorijske ličnosti trilogije Matriks. Zbornik radova sa X međunarodnog naučnog skupa Srpski jezik, književnost, umetnost. 2016;2:581-590
Milidrag Predrag, "Neo i agent Smit kao svetskoistorijske ličnosti trilogije Matriks" 2 (2016):581-590