@conference{
editor = "Bojanić, Petar D., Torrengo , Giuliano",
year = "2012",
abstract = "Many philosophers think that philosophy should not merely
rely on a priori reasoning, but that it should take into account
evidence from experience, including experimental evidence
from the sciences as well. That seems to be a reasonable
methodological principle, at least if we accept the existence
of something like a mind-independent reality. However,
the ways philosophers consider empirical evidence to
constrain philosophical tenets vary considerably different
approaches. On one hand, “classical” empiricists tend to
be constructionists (and more broadly anti-realists) while
rationalists have an overall realist approach to theoretical
tenets. On the other hand, the new trend of “experimental
philosophy” aims to dismiss a priori reasoning of any sort
as valuable in assessing philosophical theses. It argues that
we should test philosophers’ intuitions as hypotheses about
the behavior of the “ordinary” people. The philosophers
who oppose that trend tend to grant a special status to the
intuitions of “experts” even if they do not share an overall
confidence into a priori theorizing. How should we appraise
the relevance of empirical evidence in philosophical
discussions? When is a priori reasoning legitimate? Can we
regard that evidence based on intuitions has a different
status from the experimental evidence from the sciences?
The workshop aims at promoting a discussion about these
and related topics.",
title = "Empirical Evidence and Philosophy",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1099"
}