Cvejić, Igor

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  • Cvejić, Igor (38)
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Author's Bibliography

Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection

Cvejić, Igor

(Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2021)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2307
AB  - In the following chapter, I will attempt to argue that feelings, and, above all, pleasure in mere reflection, ought to be understood as intentional states, and moreover, as feeling-intentionality sui generis. In the first portion of the text, I present the fundamentals of the Kantian understanding of feelings, and attempt to demonstrate why we should reject some of the conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert. In part two, I outline some of the particulars of pleasure in mere reflection. In part three, I detail problems relating to the question of the object of pleasure in the context of mere reflection. Finally, in part four, I propose an approach in which intentionality of pleasure in mere reflection can be understood as feeling-intentionality sui generis, explain why this understanding should be ascribed to Kant, and discuss how this might resolve some of the problems surveyed in part three.
PB  - Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter
T2  - ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid
T1  - Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection
SP  - 87
EP  - 106
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2021",
abstract = "In the following chapter, I will attempt to argue that feelings, and, above all, pleasure in mere reflection, ought to be understood as intentional states, and moreover, as feeling-intentionality sui generis. In the first portion of the text, I present the fundamentals of the Kantian understanding of feelings, and attempt to demonstrate why we should reject some of the conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert. In part two, I outline some of the particulars of pleasure in mere reflection. In part three, I detail problems relating to the question of the object of pleasure in the context of mere reflection. Finally, in part four, I propose an approach in which intentionality of pleasure in mere reflection can be understood as feeling-intentionality sui generis, explain why this understanding should be ascribed to Kant, and discuss how this might resolve some of the problems surveyed in part three.",
publisher = "Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter",
journal = "ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid",
booktitle = "Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection",
pages = "87-106",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2021). Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection. in ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid
Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter., 87-106.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008
Cvejić I. Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection. in ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid. 2021;:87-106.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008 .
Cvejić, Igor, "Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection" in ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (2021):87-106,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008 . .

Feeling Vulnerable: Interpersonal Relatedness and Situatedness

Cvejić, Igor

(Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2021
UR  - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030605186
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2308
AB  - My focus in this text is not the general notion of vulnerability (although it is important), but how one feels vulnerable. (1) In the first part, I will sketch the structure of such an emotional experience. (2) Then, I will try to explain why the recognition of another’s vulnerability is important in regard to emotional agency, emphasizing the difference between this kind of recognition and similar experience of empathy and social recognition. (3) In the third section, I will concentrate on the question of intersubjectivity of (mutual) recognition. However, I think that there is an inherent normative gap between the ideal of universal intersubjective mutual recognition with respect to emotional agency and the fact that in the social realm this recognition rests on culturally and socially dependent criteria of adequacy for such emotional experience. Moreover, the mentioned gap could put some persons in a situation (emotional exclusion) in which they don’t have a ‘right’ to feel vulnerable in their own way. (4) In the conclusion, I try to offer some practical possibilities to bridge this gap through emotion-oriented environmental structures.
PB  - Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
T2  - Rethinking  Vulnerability and  Exclusion: Historical and Critical Essays - Rodríguez Lopez B., Sánchez Madrid N., Zaharijević A. (eds)
T1  - Feeling Vulnerable: Interpersonal  Relatedness and Situatedness
SP  - 101
EP  - 116
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60519-3_6
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2021",
abstract = "My focus in this text is not the general notion of vulnerability (although it is important), but how one feels vulnerable. (1) In the first part, I will sketch the structure of such an emotional experience. (2) Then, I will try to explain why the recognition of another’s vulnerability is important in regard to emotional agency, emphasizing the difference between this kind of recognition and similar experience of empathy and social recognition. (3) In the third section, I will concentrate on the question of intersubjectivity of (mutual) recognition. However, I think that there is an inherent normative gap between the ideal of universal intersubjective mutual recognition with respect to emotional agency and the fact that in the social realm this recognition rests on culturally and socially dependent criteria of adequacy for such emotional experience. Moreover, the mentioned gap could put some persons in a situation (emotional exclusion) in which they don’t have a ‘right’ to feel vulnerable in their own way. (4) In the conclusion, I try to offer some practical possibilities to bridge this gap through emotion-oriented environmental structures.",
publisher = "Palgrave Macmillan, Cham",
journal = "Rethinking  Vulnerability and  Exclusion: Historical and Critical Essays - Rodríguez Lopez B., Sánchez Madrid N., Zaharijević A. (eds)",
booktitle = "Feeling Vulnerable: Interpersonal  Relatedness and Situatedness",
pages = "101-116",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60519-3_6"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2021). Feeling Vulnerable: Interpersonal  Relatedness and Situatedness. in Rethinking  Vulnerability and  Exclusion: Historical and Critical Essays - Rodríguez Lopez B., Sánchez Madrid N., Zaharijević A. (eds)
Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., 101-116.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60519-3_6
Cvejić I. Feeling Vulnerable: Interpersonal  Relatedness and Situatedness. in Rethinking  Vulnerability and  Exclusion: Historical and Critical Essays - Rodríguez Lopez B., Sánchez Madrid N., Zaharijević A. (eds). 2021;:101-116.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60519-3_6 .
Cvejić, Igor, "Feeling Vulnerable: Interpersonal  Relatedness and Situatedness" in Rethinking  Vulnerability and  Exclusion: Historical and Critical Essays - Rodríguez Lopez B., Sánchez Madrid N., Zaharijević A. (eds) (2021):101-116,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60519-3_6 . .

Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2274
AB  - Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto’s account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is treated by members of society as hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hatred (actually, they trace properties of someone being hateworthy). If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group’s own criteria.
AB  - Tomas Santo je nedavno uveo tezu da mržnja ne može biti podesna emocija zbog toga što 
je njen fokus zamagljen, te prema tome ona ne može pratiti svojstva svog intencionalnog 
objekta. Mada se slažem sa osnovom Santovog argumenta želeo bih nešto više pažnje da 
posvetim dva povezana problema koja mogu biti važna. Prvo ću se baviti pitanjem da li nepodesnost mržnje ima ikakve povezanosti sa mogućnošću da omražena osoba ne identifikuje 
sebe sa onim zbog čega je omražena. Zaključiću da, ukoliko je fokus mržnje zamagljen, mr žnja neće pratiti identifikaciju omražene osobe ili grupe. Zatim ću pokušati da ukažem na 
mogućnost da (izvesni) kriterijumi adekvatnosti mržnje (zbog čega se neko tretira kao vredan 
mržnje od strane članova društva) budu ukorenjeni u kulturalnom i socijalnom okviru na ta kav način da nisu neophodno opravdani svojom vezom za fokusom emocije i značajem koji 
on ima. Pod takvim okolnostima, mržnja bi i dalje bila nepodesna, ali bi ovi kriterijumi kreirali 
kvazi-korektnost mržnje (zapravo bi pratili svojstva koja određuju da li je nešto ili neko vredan mržnje). Ukoliko je to tačno, mogli bismo da zadržimo tezu o nepodesnosti mržnje, a da 
u isto vreme možemo da koristimo uobičajeni vokabular koji koristimo u slučajevima kada 
grupa ne odustaje od svoje mržnje i kada je potrebno da argumentujemo da neke pojedince 
ili grupe ljudi ne treba mrzeti čak ni prema kriterijumima same grupe koja je nosilac mržnje.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy
T1  - Razmatranja o nefokusiranoj mržnji: identitet omraženog  i kriterijumi adekvatnost
IS  - 3
VL  - 32
SP  - 377
EP  - 386
DO  - 10.2298/FID2103377C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto’s account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is treated by members of society as hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hatred (actually, they trace properties of someone being hateworthy). If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group’s own criteria., Tomas Santo je nedavno uveo tezu da mržnja ne može biti podesna emocija zbog toga što 
je njen fokus zamagljen, te prema tome ona ne može pratiti svojstva svog intencionalnog 
objekta. Mada se slažem sa osnovom Santovog argumenta želeo bih nešto više pažnje da 
posvetim dva povezana problema koja mogu biti važna. Prvo ću se baviti pitanjem da li nepodesnost mržnje ima ikakve povezanosti sa mogućnošću da omražena osoba ne identifikuje 
sebe sa onim zbog čega je omražena. Zaključiću da, ukoliko je fokus mržnje zamagljen, mr žnja neće pratiti identifikaciju omražene osobe ili grupe. Zatim ću pokušati da ukažem na 
mogućnost da (izvesni) kriterijumi adekvatnosti mržnje (zbog čega se neko tretira kao vredan 
mržnje od strane članova društva) budu ukorenjeni u kulturalnom i socijalnom okviru na ta kav način da nisu neophodno opravdani svojom vezom za fokusom emocije i značajem koji 
on ima. Pod takvim okolnostima, mržnja bi i dalje bila nepodesna, ali bi ovi kriterijumi kreirali 
kvazi-korektnost mržnje (zapravo bi pratili svojstva koja određuju da li je nešto ili neko vredan mržnje). Ukoliko je to tačno, mogli bismo da zadržimo tezu o nepodesnosti mržnje, a da 
u isto vreme možemo da koristimo uobičajeni vokabular koji koristimo u slučajevima kada 
grupa ne odustaje od svoje mržnje i kada je potrebno da argumentujemo da neke pojedince 
ili grupe ljudi ne treba mrzeti čak ni prema kriterijumima same grupe koja je nosilac mržnje.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy, Razmatranja o nefokusiranoj mržnji: identitet omraženog  i kriterijumi adekvatnost",
number = "3",
volume = "32",
pages = "377-386",
doi = "10.2298/FID2103377C"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2021). Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(3), 377-386.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2103377C
Cvejić I. Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(3):377-386.
doi:10.2298/FID2103377C .
Cvejić, Igor, "Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 3 (2021):377-386,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2103377C . .

Estetika i intersubjektivnost

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd: Estetičko Društvo Srbije, 2020)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2306
AB  - Интерсубјективност се у раној модерној естетици 
појављује као један од најосновнијих њених чинилаца, пре 
свега, као питање укуса. Упркос увреженом схватању да је 
естетски доживљај нешто приватно субјективно рани модерни 
естетичари (попут Шефтсберија, Хјума, Канта итд.) највећи 
напор су уложили да објасне интерсубјективност овог 
доживљаја, како наглашавајући његов друштвени карактер 
тако и објашњавајући захтев за његовом интерсубјективном 
валидношћу. Притом сам појам интерсубјективности више 
никако није могао остати исти. Наместо круто схваћене 
интерсубјективности засноване на општеприхваћеним 
нормама, препознатљивим колективним обрасцима и 
појмовима, као и општим правилима, ступио је феномен 
интерсубјективности који је омогућавао флексибилност, 
промене, незнање, игру и креацију нових правила. Самим тим 
ни теорија вредности није могла остати иста, она је морала да 
омогући не само инвенцију вредности већ и интерсубјективност 
ново-креираних вредности.
PB  - Beograd: Estetičko Društvo Srbije
T2  - Čemu estetika (prir. Una Popović, Miloš Miladinov, Vladimir Milenković)
T1  - Estetika i intersubjektivnost
SP  - 9
EP  - 27
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Интерсубјективност се у раној модерној естетици 
појављује као један од најосновнијих њених чинилаца, пре 
свега, као питање укуса. Упркос увреженом схватању да је 
естетски доживљај нешто приватно субјективно рани модерни 
естетичари (попут Шефтсберија, Хјума, Канта итд.) највећи 
напор су уложили да објасне интерсубјективност овог 
доживљаја, како наглашавајући његов друштвени карактер 
тако и објашњавајући захтев за његовом интерсубјективном 
валидношћу. Притом сам појам интерсубјективности више 
никако није могао остати исти. Наместо круто схваћене 
интерсубјективности засноване на општеприхваћеним 
нормама, препознатљивим колективним обрасцима и 
појмовима, као и општим правилима, ступио је феномен 
интерсубјективности који је омогућавао флексибилност, 
промене, незнање, игру и креацију нових правила. Самим тим 
ни теорија вредности није могла остати иста, она је морала да 
омогући не само инвенцију вредности већ и интерсубјективност 
ново-креираних вредности.",
publisher = "Beograd: Estetičko Društvo Srbije",
journal = "Čemu estetika (prir. Una Popović, Miloš Miladinov, Vladimir Milenković)",
booktitle = "Estetika i intersubjektivnost",
pages = "9-27"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2020). Estetika i intersubjektivnost. in Čemu estetika (prir. Una Popović, Miloš Miladinov, Vladimir Milenković)
Beograd: Estetičko Društvo Srbije., 9-27.
Cvejić I. Estetika i intersubjektivnost. in Čemu estetika (prir. Una Popović, Miloš Miladinov, Vladimir Milenković). 2020;:9-27..
Cvejić, Igor, "Estetika i intersubjektivnost" in Čemu estetika (prir. Una Popović, Miloš Miladinov, Vladimir Milenković) (2020):9-27.

Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd: Srpsko filozofsko društvo, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2292
AB  - Kada govorimo o estetskom sudu kod Kanta svakako je glavni primer 
sud ukusa, odnosno o lepom i ružnom. Međutim, pored suda ukusa, Kant govori o 
drugoj vrsti estetskih refleksivnih sudova, sudu o uzvišenom. Glavno pitanje kojim se 
ovaj rad bavi je da li možemo u slučaju uzvišenog da govorimo o negativnom estet-
skom sudu, o sudu o onome što bi bilo suprotno uzvišenom na način na koji je ružno 
suprotno lepom. Nakon razmatranja sličnosti i razlika ružnog i uzvišenost, te iznošenja 
formalnih problema da uopšte mislimo estetski sud o onome što je suprotno uzvišeno, 
pokušaćemo da pozitivan odgovor. Razmatraće se prvo sadržajni (objekt) argument, 
zatim argument na osnovu odnosa duševnih moći, koji će se pokazati kao nedostatni. 
Kao najpribližnije rešenje razmatraće se specifičan vid smešnog.
AB  - When we talk about the aesthetic judgement in Kant, certainly the main example is the judgement of taste, that is, beautiful and ugly. However, in addition to the judgement of taste, Kant speaks of another kind of aesthetic reflexive judgments - sublime. The main question addressed in this paper is whether in the case of the sublime we can speak of a negative aesthetic judgment, a judgment of what would be contrary to the sublime in the way that the ugly is opposite to the beautiful. After considering the similarities and differences of the ugly and sublime and outlining the formal problems of thinking at all about the aesthetic judgment of what is contrary to sublime, we will try to give a positive answer. The content (object) argument will be considered first, then the argument based on the relation of faculties, which will prove to be insufficient. The closest solution will be to consider in the specific kind of ridiculous.
PB  - Beograd: Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom
T1  - Can There Be a Negative Aesthetic Judgement on Sublime?
IS  - 4
VL  - 63
SP  - 175
EP  - 187
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004175C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Kada govorimo o estetskom sudu kod Kanta svakako je glavni primer 
sud ukusa, odnosno o lepom i ružnom. Međutim, pored suda ukusa, Kant govori o 
drugoj vrsti estetskih refleksivnih sudova, sudu o uzvišenom. Glavno pitanje kojim se 
ovaj rad bavi je da li možemo u slučaju uzvišenog da govorimo o negativnom estet-
skom sudu, o sudu o onome što bi bilo suprotno uzvišenom na način na koji je ružno 
suprotno lepom. Nakon razmatranja sličnosti i razlika ružnog i uzvišenost, te iznošenja 
formalnih problema da uopšte mislimo estetski sud o onome što je suprotno uzvišeno, 
pokušaćemo da pozitivan odgovor. Razmatraće se prvo sadržajni (objekt) argument, 
zatim argument na osnovu odnosa duševnih moći, koji će se pokazati kao nedostatni. 
Kao najpribližnije rešenje razmatraće se specifičan vid smešnog., When we talk about the aesthetic judgement in Kant, certainly the main example is the judgement of taste, that is, beautiful and ugly. However, in addition to the judgement of taste, Kant speaks of another kind of aesthetic reflexive judgments - sublime. The main question addressed in this paper is whether in the case of the sublime we can speak of a negative aesthetic judgment, a judgment of what would be contrary to the sublime in the way that the ugly is opposite to the beautiful. After considering the similarities and differences of the ugly and sublime and outlining the formal problems of thinking at all about the aesthetic judgment of what is contrary to sublime, we will try to give a positive answer. The content (object) argument will be considered first, then the argument based on the relation of faculties, which will prove to be insufficient. The closest solution will be to consider in the specific kind of ridiculous.",
publisher = "Beograd: Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom, Can There Be a Negative Aesthetic Judgement on Sublime?",
number = "4",
volume = "63",
pages = "175-187",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004175C"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2020). Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom. in Theoria
Beograd: Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 63(4), 175-187.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004175C
Cvejić I. Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom. in Theoria. 2020;63(4):175-187.
doi:https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004175C .
Cvejić, Igor, "Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom" in Theoria, 63, no. 4 (2020):175-187,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004175C . .

Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?

Milenković, Ivan; Krstić, Predrag; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milenković, Ivan
AU  - Krstić, Predrag
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/article/view/15/90
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2113
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva
T1  - Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?
IS  - 1
VL  - 1
SP  - 149
EP  - 167
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Milenković, Ivan and Krstić, Predrag and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva",
title = "Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?",
number = "1",
volume = "1",
pages = "149-167"
}
Milenković, I., Krstić, P.,& Cvejić, I.. (2020). Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?. in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 1(1), 149-167.
Milenković I, Krstić P, Cvejić I. Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?. in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva. 2020;1(1):149-167..
Milenković, Ivan, Krstić, Predrag, Cvejić, Igor, "Da li se Holokaust može ponoviti?" in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva, 1, no. 1 (2020):149-167.

Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=811
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2072
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Pregled tribina i konferencija  u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.
IS  - 1
VL  - 31
SP  - 129
EP  - 137
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Pregled tribina i konferencija  u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.",
number = "1",
volume = "31",
pages = "129-137"
}
Nikolić, O.,& Cvejić, I.. (2020). Pregled tribina i konferencija  u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 31(1), 129-137.
Nikolić O, Cvejić I. Pregled tribina i konferencija  u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2020;31(1):129-137..
Nikolić, Olga, Cvejić, Igor, "Pregled tribina i konferencija  u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2019." in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 31, no. 1 (2020):129-137.

Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://kritika.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/kc/article/view/10/34
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2105
AB  - Namera nam je da u ovom tekstu ponudimo detaljnu analizu pojmova individualne i zajedničke perspektive, poziva i angažmana, kako bismo doprineli teorijskom osvetljavanju tih fenomena i raspravama o kolektivnoj intencionalnosti. U prvom delu rada ćemo uvesti i kroz kontrastiranje sa relevantnom literaturom preciznije razraditi fenomenološki pojam perspektive koji ćemo koristiti u ostatku rada. U drugom delu rada se fokusiramo na Helmovo shvatanje zajedničke evaluativne perspektive kao ključa za razumevanje kolektivne intencionalnosti. Pritom će se kao važan zadatak ispostaviti temeljnije razumevanje procesa konstituisanja zajedničke perspektive kroz interakcije između aktera i komunikaciju njihovih individualnih perspektiva, koje treba da dovedu do usaglašavanja zajedničke perspektive. Treći deo rada biće posvećen usko shvaćenim angažovanim aktima, aktima koji se vrše kao pozivi drugome na zajedničku perspektivu. Objasnićemo kako funkcioniše unutrašnja logika poziva, i preko toga pokazati da čak i kada ne postoje opštevažeće norme ili opšteprihvaćeni sadržaj zajedničke perspektive (kao kada je poziv upućen onima koji nisu deo zajedničke perspektive) zajednička perspektiva može da se konstituiše kroz distribuciju odgovornosti i poverenja. Na kraju ćemo na aktuelnom primeru angažmana za vreme korona-krize, pokazati kako se uz pomoć ovog teorijskog aparata mogu bolje razumeti drugačije forme globalnog zajedničkog delovanja, kao što su novi društveni pokreti.
AB  - The aim of this paper is to offer a detailed analysis of the concepts of individual and shared perspective, the call, and engagement, and thus contribute to the theoretical elumination of these phenomena and debates on collective intentionality. First, we introduce the phenomenological concept of perspective that we will use through the rest of the paper, refining it by making comparisons with the relevant literature. Sec-ond, we focus on Helm’s notion of joint evaluative perspective as the key to under-standing collective intentionality. A more thorough understanding of the process of constitution of the joint perspective through interactions between agents and the communication of their individual perspectives, leading to the harmonization of the joint perspective, will be pointed out as an important further task. The third part of the paper will be devoted to engaged acts (in the narrow sense of the term): acts per-formed as calls upon others to form a joint perspective. We will explain the inner logic of the call, and in this way show that even when there are no generally valid norms or a generally valid content of the joint perspective (e.g. when the call is directed at those who are not yet a part of the joint perspective), the joint perspective can be consti-tuted via a distribution of responsibility and trust. Finally, we will use the current ex-ample of the corona crisis in order to show how this theoretical apparatus can con-tribute to a better understanding of novel forms of global joint action, as exemplified by the new social movements.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva
T1  - Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva
T1  - Constituting joint perspective: engaged acts  and the logic of call
IS  - 1
VL  - 1
SP  - 7
EP  - 28
DO  - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Namera nam je da u ovom tekstu ponudimo detaljnu analizu pojmova individualne i zajedničke perspektive, poziva i angažmana, kako bismo doprineli teorijskom osvetljavanju tih fenomena i raspravama o kolektivnoj intencionalnosti. U prvom delu rada ćemo uvesti i kroz kontrastiranje sa relevantnom literaturom preciznije razraditi fenomenološki pojam perspektive koji ćemo koristiti u ostatku rada. U drugom delu rada se fokusiramo na Helmovo shvatanje zajedničke evaluativne perspektive kao ključa za razumevanje kolektivne intencionalnosti. Pritom će se kao važan zadatak ispostaviti temeljnije razumevanje procesa konstituisanja zajedničke perspektive kroz interakcije između aktera i komunikaciju njihovih individualnih perspektiva, koje treba da dovedu do usaglašavanja zajedničke perspektive. Treći deo rada biće posvećen usko shvaćenim angažovanim aktima, aktima koji se vrše kao pozivi drugome na zajedničku perspektivu. Objasnićemo kako funkcioniše unutrašnja logika poziva, i preko toga pokazati da čak i kada ne postoje opštevažeće norme ili opšteprihvaćeni sadržaj zajedničke perspektive (kao kada je poziv upućen onima koji nisu deo zajedničke perspektive) zajednička perspektiva može da se konstituiše kroz distribuciju odgovornosti i poverenja. Na kraju ćemo na aktuelnom primeru angažmana za vreme korona-krize, pokazati kako se uz pomoć ovog teorijskog aparata mogu bolje razumeti drugačije forme globalnog zajedničkog delovanja, kao što su novi društveni pokreti., The aim of this paper is to offer a detailed analysis of the concepts of individual and shared perspective, the call, and engagement, and thus contribute to the theoretical elumination of these phenomena and debates on collective intentionality. First, we introduce the phenomenological concept of perspective that we will use through the rest of the paper, refining it by making comparisons with the relevant literature. Sec-ond, we focus on Helm’s notion of joint evaluative perspective as the key to under-standing collective intentionality. A more thorough understanding of the process of constitution of the joint perspective through interactions between agents and the communication of their individual perspectives, leading to the harmonization of the joint perspective, will be pointed out as an important further task. The third part of the paper will be devoted to engaged acts (in the narrow sense of the term): acts per-formed as calls upon others to form a joint perspective. We will explain the inner logic of the call, and in this way show that even when there are no generally valid norms or a generally valid content of the joint perspective (e.g. when the call is directed at those who are not yet a part of the joint perspective), the joint perspective can be consti-tuted via a distribution of responsibility and trust. Finally, we will use the current ex-ample of the corona crisis in order to show how this theoretical apparatus can con-tribute to a better understanding of novel forms of global joint action, as exemplified by the new social movements.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva",
title = "Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva, Constituting joint perspective: engaged acts  and the logic of call",
number = "1",
volume = "1",
pages = "7-28",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509"
}
Nikolić, O.,& Cvejić, I.. (2020). Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva. in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 1(1), 7-28.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509
Nikolić O, Cvejić I. Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva. in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva. 2020;1(1):7-28.
doi:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509 .
Nikolić, Olga, Cvejić, Igor, "Konstituisanje zajedničke perspektive: angažovani akti i logika poziva" in Kritika: časopis za filozofiju i teoriju društva, 1, no. 1 (2020):7-28,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3826509 . .

Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice

Bojanić, Petar; Cvejić, Igor; Čipranić, Miloš; Lošonc, Mark; Vesnić, Snežana

(Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet, 2019)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Bojanić, Petar
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
AU  - Čipranić, Miloš
AU  - Lošonc, Mark
AU  - Vesnić, Snežana
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2038
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet
T2  - Živeti zajedno
T1  - Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice
SP  - 375
EP  - 381
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Bojanić, Petar and Cvejić, Igor and Čipranić, Miloš and Lošonc, Mark and Vesnić, Snežana",
year = "2019",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet",
journal = "Živeti zajedno",
booktitle = "Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice",
pages = "375-381"
}
Bojanić, P., Cvejić, I., Čipranić, M., Lošonc, M.,& Vesnić, S.. (2019). Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice. in Živeti zajedno
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Arhitektonski fakultet., 375-381.
Bojanić P, Cvejić I, Čipranić M, Lošonc M, Vesnić S. Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice. in Živeti zajedno. 2019;:375-381..
Bojanić, Petar, Cvejić, Igor, Čipranić, Miloš, Lošonc, Mark, Vesnić, Snežana, "Arhitektonska realnost ili lice zajednice" in Živeti zajedno (2019):375-381.

Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo, 2019)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2003
AB  - Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma.
AB  - The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga
IS  - 2
VL  - 62
SP  - 53
EP  - 68
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma., The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga",
number = "2",
volume = "62",
pages = "53-68",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2019). Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga. in Theoria
Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 62(2), 53-68.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C
Cvejić I. Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga. in Theoria. 2019;62(2):53-68.
doi:https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C .
Cvejić, Igor, "Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga" in Theoria, 62, no. 2 (2019):53-68,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C . .

Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1551
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.
IS  - 1
VL  - 29
SP  - 139
EP  - 147
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.",
number = "1",
volume = "29",
pages = "139-147"
}
Nikolić, O.,& Cvejić, I.. (2018). Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 29(1), 139-147.
Nikolić O, Cvejić I. Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2018;29(1):139-147..
Nikolić, Olga, Cvejić, Igor, "Pregled tribina i konferencija u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju u 2017." in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 29, no. 1 (2018):139-147.

Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure

Cvejić, Igor

(2018)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1913
AB  - I will present the basics of Kant’s understanding of feelings. and specifically, try to show why we should not accept some conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert.  
In his interpretation of Third Critique, Paul Guyer that feelings are an inexplicable sensation, which can be explained in no other way than through its causes. Guyer insists on equalizing sensations and feelings. However, sensations are (according to Kant) the kind of presentations that appear as impressions of our outer senses. Additionally, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that only material for inner sense are outer sensations. (KrV, AA 03: 23,70; Allison 1983, 277) Feelings, on the contrary, do not provide new material of inner sense. (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 673) It is therefore impossible to hold that feelings are somehow new sensations that appear in our inner sense.
According to Zuckert, feelings can be understood as second-order consciousness, that has as its contents any other kind of representation (sensation, intuition or concept) and represents a formal relational characteristic of this content, with a tendency to persist. Unlike Guyer, Zuckert differentiates feelings from sensations, and like Guyer, correctly emphasizes that feelings are not discursive representations. (Zuckert 2007, 236) However, in her reading, feelings are a representation and their main function is cognitive, representational (Zuckert 2007, 233), which is exactly what the faculty of feeling does not do. I would argue that Zuckert’s interpretation fails to address definition of displeasure in §10. of Critique of the power of judgement, and both Guyer’s and Zuckert’s interpretation could not follow literally definition in §12. – Guyer modified a translation and Zuckert finds it is ‘a slip’.
The crucial challenge set by Kant is to characterize feeling as sui generis mental state, which means as a mental state that is not representation. Based on evidence in Kant’s lectures and major works I will argue that feeling in Kant’s works should be understood as an exercise of a causal power of representation for maintaining or hindering its state of representing (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 675). I will argue that Kant suggests that causality of representation does not demand higher-order-consciousness for us to be aware of it, but is rather one of the ways (“entirely special faculty of discriminating”) in which we come to be aware and itself manifests as awareness. Thus, we can keep to the formal structure that consists of representation and its relational property (to maintain its state), while avoiding some contradictions that emerge with the introduction of second-order consciousness. Feelings are a complex phenomenological structure that consists of two components: (1) cognitive component, representations themselves (sensation, intuition or concept) and (2) causal component, its tendency toward maintaining its state of representation (subjective causality). These two components in one feeling are of course, not separable. Subjective causality of representation is not a new, additional thing, on top of the representation itself, but a subjective characteristic (Beschaffenheit) of a cognitive state, one, albeit, which cannot be reduced to the cognitive state itself.
C3  - Leuven Kant Conference
T1  - Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
abstract = "I will present the basics of Kant’s understanding of feelings. and specifically, try to show why we should not accept some conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert.  
In his interpretation of Third Critique, Paul Guyer that feelings are an inexplicable sensation, which can be explained in no other way than through its causes. Guyer insists on equalizing sensations and feelings. However, sensations are (according to Kant) the kind of presentations that appear as impressions of our outer senses. Additionally, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that only material for inner sense are outer sensations. (KrV, AA 03: 23,70; Allison 1983, 277) Feelings, on the contrary, do not provide new material of inner sense. (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 673) It is therefore impossible to hold that feelings are somehow new sensations that appear in our inner sense.
According to Zuckert, feelings can be understood as second-order consciousness, that has as its contents any other kind of representation (sensation, intuition or concept) and represents a formal relational characteristic of this content, with a tendency to persist. Unlike Guyer, Zuckert differentiates feelings from sensations, and like Guyer, correctly emphasizes that feelings are not discursive representations. (Zuckert 2007, 236) However, in her reading, feelings are a representation and their main function is cognitive, representational (Zuckert 2007, 233), which is exactly what the faculty of feeling does not do. I would argue that Zuckert’s interpretation fails to address definition of displeasure in §10. of Critique of the power of judgement, and both Guyer’s and Zuckert’s interpretation could not follow literally definition in §12. – Guyer modified a translation and Zuckert finds it is ‘a slip’.
The crucial challenge set by Kant is to characterize feeling as sui generis mental state, which means as a mental state that is not representation. Based on evidence in Kant’s lectures and major works I will argue that feeling in Kant’s works should be understood as an exercise of a causal power of representation for maintaining or hindering its state of representing (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 675). I will argue that Kant suggests that causality of representation does not demand higher-order-consciousness for us to be aware of it, but is rather one of the ways (“entirely special faculty of discriminating”) in which we come to be aware and itself manifests as awareness. Thus, we can keep to the formal structure that consists of representation and its relational property (to maintain its state), while avoiding some contradictions that emerge with the introduction of second-order consciousness. Feelings are a complex phenomenological structure that consists of two components: (1) cognitive component, representations themselves (sensation, intuition or concept) and (2) causal component, its tendency toward maintaining its state of representation (subjective causality). These two components in one feeling are of course, not separable. Subjective causality of representation is not a new, additional thing, on top of the representation itself, but a subjective characteristic (Beschaffenheit) of a cognitive state, one, albeit, which cannot be reduced to the cognitive state itself.",
journal = "Leuven Kant Conference",
title = "Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2018). Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure. in Leuven Kant Conference.
Cvejić I. Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure. in Leuven Kant Conference. 2018;..
Cvejić, Igor, "Phenomenological Structure of Feeling Of Pleasure And Displeasure" in Leuven Kant Conference (2018).

Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence

Bojanić, Petar; Cvejić, Igor

(Torino : Labont, 2018)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bojanić, Petar
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1926
AB  - The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly
reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the
problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is
no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject.
The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum)
and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact of
reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act
or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus,
these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence.
PB  - Torino : Labont
T2  - Rivista di Estetica
T1  - Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence
VL  - 69
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Bojanić, Petar and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
abstract = "The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly
reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the
problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is
no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject.
The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum)
and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact of
reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act
or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus,
these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence.",
publisher = "Torino : Labont",
journal = "Rivista di Estetica",
title = "Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence",
volume = "69"
}
Bojanić, P.,& Cvejić, I.. (2018). Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence. in Rivista di Estetica
Torino : Labont., 69.
Bojanić P, Cvejić I. Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence. in Rivista di Estetica. 2018;69..
Bojanić, Petar, Cvejić, Igor, "Fact of Reason, Social Facts and Evidence" in Rivista di Estetica, 69 (2018).

Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja

Cvejić, Igor

(IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1786
PB  - IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T1  - Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja
ER  - 
@book{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
publisher = "IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
title = "Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2018). Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja. 
IBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju..
Cvejić I. Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja. 2018;..
Cvejić, Igor, "Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja" (2018).

Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1478
PB  - Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Holokaust i filozofija
T1  - Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva
SP  - 56
EP  - 71
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2018",
publisher = "Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Holokaust i filozofija",
booktitle = "Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva",
pages = "56-71"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2018). Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva. in Holokaust i filozofija
Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 56-71.
Cvejić I. Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva. in Holokaust i filozofija. 2018;:56-71..
Cvejić, Igor, "Ravnodušnost i akcija: Holokaust i granice emotivnog iskustva" in Holokaust i filozofija (2018):56-71.

Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom

Nikolić, Olga; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1409
AB  - Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže, nasuprot desno-libertarijanskoj kritici socijalne 
pravde, da postoje dobri razlozi za odbranu politika socijalne pravde unutar slobodnog društva. U prvom delu rada, predstavićemo dve uticajne desno-libertarijanske kritike socijalne pravde, izložene u knjigama Pravo, zakonodavstvo i sloboda Fridriha Hajeka i Anarhija, država i utopija
 Roberta Nozika. Na osnovu njihovog pristupa, politike socijalne pravde vide se kao neopravdana povreda slobode pojedinačnih članova društva. U odgovoru na ovu kritiku, uvešćemo distinkciju između formalne i faktičke slobode i tvrdićemo da formalni princip slobode koji brane Hajek i Nozik nije dovoljan za zaštitu faktičke slobode članova društva, jer 
ne prepoznaje (1) moralnu obligaciju da se pomogne onima kojima, bez njihove krivice, u velikoj meri nedostaje faktička sloboda, i (2) pravnu obligaciju države da zaštiti građansko dostojanstvo svih članova društva. U drugom delu teksta, nudimo interpretaciju Kantovog argumenta o porezima, prema kom građansko dostojanstvo pretpostavlja faktičku slobodu, da bismo tvrdili da Kantovo opravdanje poreza daje dobre razloge da se tvrdi da država ima pravnu obligaciju da 
zaštiti faktičku slobodu politikama socijalne pravde.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom
T1  - Socijalna pravda i formalni princip slobode
IS  - 4
VL  - 28
SP  - 270
EP  - 284
DO  - 10.2298/FID1702270N
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nikolić, Olga and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
abstract = "Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže, nasuprot desno-libertarijanskoj kritici socijalne 
pravde, da postoje dobri razlozi za odbranu politika socijalne pravde unutar slobodnog društva. U prvom delu rada, predstavićemo dve uticajne desno-libertarijanske kritike socijalne pravde, izložene u knjigama Pravo, zakonodavstvo i sloboda Fridriha Hajeka i Anarhija, država i utopija
 Roberta Nozika. Na osnovu njihovog pristupa, politike socijalne pravde vide se kao neopravdana povreda slobode pojedinačnih članova društva. U odgovoru na ovu kritiku, uvešćemo distinkciju između formalne i faktičke slobode i tvrdićemo da formalni princip slobode koji brane Hajek i Nozik nije dovoljan za zaštitu faktičke slobode članova društva, jer 
ne prepoznaje (1) moralnu obligaciju da se pomogne onima kojima, bez njihove krivice, u velikoj meri nedostaje faktička sloboda, i (2) pravnu obligaciju države da zaštiti građansko dostojanstvo svih članova društva. U drugom delu teksta, nudimo interpretaciju Kantovog argumenta o porezima, prema kom građansko dostojanstvo pretpostavlja faktičku slobodu, da bismo tvrdili da Kantovo opravdanje poreza daje dobre razloge da se tvrdi da država ima pravnu obligaciju da 
zaštiti faktičku slobodu politikama socijalne pravde.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom, Socijalna pravda i formalni princip slobode",
number = "4",
volume = "28",
pages = "270-284",
doi = "10.2298/FID1702270N"
}
Nikolić, O.,& Cvejić, I.. (2017). Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 28(4), 270-284.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1702270N
Nikolić O, Cvejić I. Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;28(4):270-284.
doi:10.2298/FID1702270N .
Nikolić, Olga, Cvejić, Igor, "Social Justice and the Formal Principle of Freedom" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 28, no. 4 (2017):270-284,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1702270N . .
1

Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?

Krstić, Predrag; Cvejić, Igor

(Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2017)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Krstić, Predrag
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1501
PB  - Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga
PB  - Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson
T1  - Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?
SP  - 7
EP  - 46
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Krstić, Predrag and Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
publisher = "Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson",
booktitle = "Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?",
pages = "7-46"
}
Krstić, P.,& Cvejić, I.. (2017). Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?. in O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson
Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga., 7-46.
Krstić P, Cvejić I. Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?. in O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson. 2017;:7-46..
Krstić, Predrag, Cvejić, Igor, "Kako pristupiti prosvećivanju?" in O prosvećivanju naroda / Johan Karl Vilhelm Mezen, Mozes Mendelson (2017):7-46.

Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=513&path%5B%5D=481
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1538
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.
IS  - 1
VL  - 28
SP  - 188
EP  - 190
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.",
number = "1",
volume = "28",
pages = "188-190"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2017). Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 28(1), 188-190.
Cvejić I. Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;28(1):188-190..
Cvejić, Igor, "Andrea Faggion, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Alessandro Pinzani (Eds.) Kant and Social Policies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York, 2016." in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 28, no. 1 (2017):188-190.

Kantova teorija osećaja

Cvejić, Igor

(2017)

TY  - THES
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=48753679
UR  - http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=4655
UR  - https://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:14826/bdef:Content/download
UR  - http://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/123456789/7727
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1464
AB  - Uobičajene su interpretacije po kojima Kant osećaje objašnjava ili kauzalno ili kao intencionalna stanja. Pod kauzalnim objašnjenjem, podrazumeva se da je osećaj prost oset (materijalna predstava čula) koja se ne može nikako drugačije objasniti osim preko svojih uzroka. Prema intencionalnom objašnjenju, kakvo je ono Rejčel Zakert, Kant osećaj shvata kao mentalno stanje drugog reda, kao svest o, ili predstavu o, nekom drugom stanju i njegovoj relacionoj karakteristici. Oslanjajući se na podelu osnovnih moći duše, u radu će se braniti teza da obe prethodne interpretacije ne mogu adekvatno da objasne Kantovo shvatanje osećaja. Prema razlici osnovnih odredbi duše osećaji, kao mentalna stanja sui generis, sami nisu predstave, prema tome ni oset, ni predstava višeg reda. Naprotiv, osećaj jeste subjektivni kauzalitet predstave, težnja da se u datom stanju predstavljanja održi ili da se ono odbaci – koja se i bez predstave višeg reda manifestuje kao svest...
AB  - Two main contemporary interpretations of Kant’s account concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure argue that he explains feeling either causally or as an intentional mental state. According to the causal interpretation a feeling is an opaque sensation, which could not be explained by itself, but rather by its causes. As claimed by Rachel Zuckert, chosen due to her detailed explanation of intentional interpretation, feeling for Kant could be understood as a second order mental state, as a ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representations of’ another mental state and its relational characteristic. Relaying on Kant’s division of the faculties of the soul, the thesis will be defended, that both interpretations could not adequately explain Kant’s account of feeling. According to the difference between basic determinations of the soul, feelings, as mental states sui generis, are themselves not representations, therefore, they are nor sensations, nor second-order representations. Instead, a feeling should be understood as a subjective causality of representation, a tendency to maintain or restrain the state of representation – which is by itself manifested as a consciousness...
T1  - Kantova teorija osećaja
T1  - Kant's Theory of Feeling
ER  - 
@phdthesis{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
abstract = "Uobičajene su interpretacije po kojima Kant osećaje objašnjava ili kauzalno ili kao intencionalna stanja. Pod kauzalnim objašnjenjem, podrazumeva se da je osećaj prost oset (materijalna predstava čula) koja se ne može nikako drugačije objasniti osim preko svojih uzroka. Prema intencionalnom objašnjenju, kakvo je ono Rejčel Zakert, Kant osećaj shvata kao mentalno stanje drugog reda, kao svest o, ili predstavu o, nekom drugom stanju i njegovoj relacionoj karakteristici. Oslanjajući se na podelu osnovnih moći duše, u radu će se braniti teza da obe prethodne interpretacije ne mogu adekvatno da objasne Kantovo shvatanje osećaja. Prema razlici osnovnih odredbi duše osećaji, kao mentalna stanja sui generis, sami nisu predstave, prema tome ni oset, ni predstava višeg reda. Naprotiv, osećaj jeste subjektivni kauzalitet predstave, težnja da se u datom stanju predstavljanja održi ili da se ono odbaci – koja se i bez predstave višeg reda manifestuje kao svest..., Two main contemporary interpretations of Kant’s account concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure argue that he explains feeling either causally or as an intentional mental state. According to the causal interpretation a feeling is an opaque sensation, which could not be explained by itself, but rather by its causes. As claimed by Rachel Zuckert, chosen due to her detailed explanation of intentional interpretation, feeling for Kant could be understood as a second order mental state, as a ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representations of’ another mental state and its relational characteristic. Relaying on Kant’s division of the faculties of the soul, the thesis will be defended, that both interpretations could not adequately explain Kant’s account of feeling. According to the difference between basic determinations of the soul, feelings, as mental states sui generis, are themselves not representations, therefore, they are nor sensations, nor second-order representations. Instead, a feeling should be understood as a subjective causality of representation, a tendency to maintain or restrain the state of representation – which is by itself manifested as a consciousness...",
title = "Kantova teorija osećaja, Kant's Theory of Feeling"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2017). Kantova teorija osećaja. .
Cvejić I. Kantova teorija osećaja. 2017;..
Cvejić, Igor, "Kantova teorija osećaja" (2017).

The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1424
AB  - My aim is to draw attention to the different forms of social engagement
regarding the subject of import. The concept of import was introduced in the
theory of action by Bennet Helm. It denotes an intentional characteristic of an
object, to be viewed as worthy of pursuit or avoidance. However, according to
Helm, the subject of import could be: either an individual person, the other or
plural agent. Using this division in the context of social engagement, I propose
to distinguish three forms of social engagement: (1) personal social engagement,
(2) social engagement for the sake of others and (3) social engagement as togetherness. Social engagement as togetherness (plural agent) should not be
confused with plural action with the same goal-directedness (which is part of
personal social engagement). This argumentative step was enabled by Helm’s
complex theory about “us” as a subject of import, contrary to some contemporary
theorists who dispute the possibility of plural agents.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo
T1  - The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import
IS  - 2
VL  - 27
SP  - 332
EP  - 342
DO  - 10.2298/FID1602332C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2016",
abstract = "My aim is to draw attention to the different forms of social engagement
regarding the subject of import. The concept of import was introduced in the
theory of action by Bennet Helm. It denotes an intentional characteristic of an
object, to be viewed as worthy of pursuit or avoidance. However, according to
Helm, the subject of import could be: either an individual person, the other or
plural agent. Using this division in the context of social engagement, I propose
to distinguish three forms of social engagement: (1) personal social engagement,
(2) social engagement for the sake of others and (3) social engagement as togetherness. Social engagement as togetherness (plural agent) should not be
confused with plural action with the same goal-directedness (which is part of
personal social engagement). This argumentative step was enabled by Helm’s
complex theory about “us” as a subject of import, contrary to some contemporary
theorists who dispute the possibility of plural agents.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo",
title = "The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import",
number = "2",
volume = "27",
pages = "332-342",
doi = "10.2298/FID1602332C"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2016). The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import. in Filozofija i društvo
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 27(2), 332-342.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1602332C
Cvejić I. The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import. in Filozofija i društvo. 2016;27(2):332-342.
doi:10.2298/FID1602332C .
Cvejić, Igor, "The Forms of Social Engagement Regarding the Subject of Import" in Filozofija i društvo, 27, no. 2 (2016):332-342,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1602332C . .
1

Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka

Jovanov, Rastko; Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2015)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/245
AB  - U prvoj polovini osamnaestog veka nemačku filozofiju je obeležavao racionalizam. U njegovoj drugoj polovini pojavila se jedna nova tendencija koja je, u većoj meri orijentisana na oblast estetike i s osloncem u neposrednom osećaju, vodila ka ranom romantizmu. Namera ovog rada je da pokaže osnovna obeležja Kantovog odgovora na ovu tendenciju. On se, međutim, mora shvatiti unutar Kantove transcendentalne filozofije i tripartitne podele osnovnih moći duše. Učenjem o osećaju, kao posebnoj moći duše i principu svrhovitosti, kao jednom apriornom principu za ovu moć, Kantje razvio sopstvenu poziciju.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka
SP  - 27
EP  - 46
DO  - 10.2298/FID1501027C
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2015",
abstract = "U prvoj polovini osamnaestog veka nemačku filozofiju je obeležavao racionalizam. U njegovoj drugoj polovini pojavila se jedna nova tendencija koja je, u većoj meri orijentisana na oblast estetike i s osloncem u neposrednom osećaju, vodila ka ranom romantizmu. Namera ovog rada je da pokaže osnovna obeležja Kantovog odgovora na ovu tendenciju. On se, međutim, mora shvatiti unutar Kantove transcendentalne filozofije i tripartitne podele osnovnih moći duše. Učenjem o osećaju, kao posebnoj moći duše i principu svrhovitosti, kao jednom apriornom principu za ovu moć, Kantje razvio sopstvenu poziciju.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka",
pages = "27-46",
doi = "10.2298/FID1501027C"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Cvejić, I.. (2015). Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 27-46.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1501027C
Jovanov R, Cvejić I. Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2015;:27-46.
doi:10.2298/FID1501027C .
Jovanov, Rastko, Cvejić, Igor, "Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja : kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2015):27-46,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1501027C . .

Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1328
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.
SP  - 239
EP  - 242
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.",
pages = "239-242"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2014). Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 239-242.
Cvejić I. Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2014;:239-242..
Cvejić, Igor, "Nebojša Grubor: lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja, Plato, Beograd 2012." in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2014):239-242.

The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement

Cvejić, Igor; Losoncz, Márk; Matković, Aleksandar; Ivković, Marjan

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ivković, Marjan
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/376
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar
T1  - The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement
SP  - 128
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Cvejić, Igor, Losoncz, Márk, Matković, Aleksandar",
author = "Ivković, Marjan",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar",
title = "The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement",
pages = "128"
}
Cvejić, I., Losoncz, M., Matković, A.,& Ivković, M.. (2014). The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement. in Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 128.
Cvejić I, Losoncz M, Matković A, Ivković M. The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement. in Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar. 2014;:128..
Cvejić, Igor, Losoncz, Márk, Matković, Aleksandar, Ivković, Marjan, "The Two Dimensions of Foucauldian Critique and Engagement" in Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. Decembar (2014):128.

Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'

Cvejić, Igor

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/282
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar
T1  - Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'
SP  - 54
EP  - 55
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar",
booktitle = "Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'",
pages = "54-55"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2014). Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'. in Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 54-55.
Cvejić I. Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'. in Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar. 2014;:54-55..
Cvejić, Igor, "Foucault and Kant's 'lost chapter'" in Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar (2014):54-55.

Knjiga apstrakata sa konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014

Cvejić, Igor; Losoncz, Márk; Matković, Aleksandar

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - BOOK
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/265
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T1  - Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014
ER  - 
@book{
editor = "Cvejić, Igor, Losoncz, Márk, Matković, Aleksandar",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
title = "Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014"
}
Cvejić, I., Losoncz, M.,& Matković, A.. (2014). Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014. 
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju..
Cvejić I, Losoncz M, Matković A. Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014. 2014;..
Cvejić, Igor, Losoncz, Márk, Matković, Aleksandar, "Knjiga apstrakata sa  konferencije Engaging Foucault – International Conference, Beograd, 5-7. decembar 2014" (2014).